Most Overrated General?

[Elennsar]

"Bull of the Woods" at Chickamauga.

Exactly.

Longstreet most certainly had his failings, but even allowing for having a gap to hit, Longstreet's attack there was more than worthy of the reputation of being "my old warhorse".

And warhorses are not known for being passive beasts. Strong willed, but not passive.

Dear Elennsar,
I am aware of what Rhea said. Yet, most sources cite it at 7000, including Shelby Foote, Douglas Southall Freeman, E.B. Long and James McPherson. Some say it was even more, since total casualties for the Union throughout the first three days of June, 1864 are just under 13000, while Lee suffered well under one third of that. Rhea, like any other writer, is not perfect while Boonekemper really rewrote history from his mind.

"Most sources" being in error does not change the fact that it is an error.

As for Longstreet, while the march his soldiers had to make was not their easiest, they had seen worst. Hood's men especially were the shock troops of the Army of Northern Virginia and had performed their duty under worst circumstances. Having the attack been launched when Lee ordered it, it would have succeeded. Yes, Sickles was wrong in repositioning his men, but admittedly he gained time for Meade at a cruel cost. Having Sickles not redeployed, the element of surprise would have played a major role. This means, the US troops would have been dislodged and Gettysburg a Confederate victory.
Think about it and send me a reply if you want.
Civil War Scholar.

Sure they had seen worse. My point is that it would take time to set things up - you can't take a corps from a few miles (not counting Law's brigade) to the rear into "ready to attack" in an hour without throwing units in piecemeal at best even if moving with "all possible speed".

And Sickles not redeploying would give him a good position to hold which would take a great deal of effort to dislodge, and which would be easier to reinforce - "the element of surprise" is not going to be on the Confederate side either, the ground simply isn't that concealing.

Have you been to Gettysburg? Have you seen what can be seen below from Little Round Top (to name the highest point on Sickles's line)?

Sickles did not gain time. Sickles destroyed his corps and ruined at least two other divisions for nothing (1st division/2nd Corps, 2nd division/5th Corps).

 

[NedBaldwin]

And Sickles not redeploying would give him a good position to hold which would take a great deal of effort to dislodge, and which would be easier to reinforce

Assuming there would have been an effort to dislodge him from his first position.

Not redeploying would also mean that it would have taken little effort to take the Peach Orchard/Wheatfield area.

Have you been to Gettysburg? Have you seen what can be seen below from Little Round Top (to name the highest point on Sickles's line)?

Does what can be seen from LRT matter?

Sickles did not gain time.

Lee wanted an attack on Cemetery Hill; that was delayed by a day.

 

[Elennsar]

Assuming there would have been an effort to dislodge him from his first position.

Not redeploying would also mean that it would have taken little effort to take the Peach Orchard/Wheatfield area.

Which, as Alexander found out the next day, was not that useful a position to the Confederates. Not worth the price in blood trying to deny it cost the AotP.

Does what can be seen from LRT matter?

If talking "would the attack come as a surprise" had Sickles remained in his intended position, yes - unless you're suggesting a better position to view an assault coming at Sickles's lines within the ground intended to be held by his corps.

Lee wanted an attack on Cemetery Hill; that was delayed by a day.

Anderson's ineffectiveness (Posey's brigade busy skirmishing and Mahone busy disobeying orders) and the divisions of Pender (due in part to Pender's wounding) and Rodes (sick at the time?) not going in at all did not come from Sickles..

And with Sickles forcing Meade to spend an inordinate amount of the AotP's resources patching up a problem that wouldn't have happened if Sickles hadn't tried to hold more ground than his corps could cover, those attacks would be facing even longer odds if they had come off.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Which, as Alexander found out the next day, was not that useful a position to the Confederates. Not worth the price in blood trying to deny it cost the AotP.

If the Longstreet was going to attack Cemetery hill from Emmitsburg road, then it seems to me that he had to occupy Peach orchard. Was it worth trying to deny it to him? Good question that I am not sure of.

If talking "would the attack come as a surprise" had Sickles remained in his intended position, yes -

Im not following the "come as a surprise" part; I might have missed something earlier in the thread.

unless you're suggesting a better position to view an assault coming at Sickles's lines within the ground intended to be held by his corps.

If he hadnt moved forward, would there have been an assault coming at his lines?

 

[Elennsar]

If the Longstreet was going to attack Cemetery hill from Emmitsburg road, then it seems to me that he had to occupy Peach orchard. Was it worth trying to deny it to him? Good question that I am not sure of.

Allow me answer that with a question if I may: Would trying to deny him that position be worth the cost?

Im not following the "come as a surprise" part; I might have missed something earlier in the thread.

Here: http://civilwartalk.com/threads/most-overrated-general.102318/page-9#post-918700

If he hadnt moved forward, would there have been an assault coming at his lines?

Allowing for the difference between what Lee thought the Union line was and what it actually was:

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...o=waro0044;didno=waro0044;view=image;seq=0320

"It was determined to make the principal attack upon the enemy's left, and endeavour to gain a position from which it was thought our artillery could be brought to bear with effect. Longstreet was directed to place the divisions of McLaws and Hood on the right of Hill, partially enveloping the enemy's left, which he was to drive in."

If Longstreet was to engage the enemy's left, that would mean Sickles' corps.

 

[rpkennedy]

Dear Elennsar,
I am aware of what Rhea said. Yet, most sources cite it at 7000, including Shelby Foote, Douglas Southall Freeman, E.B. Long and James McPherson. Some say it was even more, since total casualties for the Union throughout the first three days of June, 1864 are just under 13000, while Lee suffered well under one third of that. Rhea, like any other writer, is not perfect while Boonekemper really rewrote history from his mind.
As for Longstreet, while the march his soldiers had to make was not their easiest, they had seen worst. Hood's men especially were the shock troops of the Army of Northern Virginia and had performed their duty under worst circumstances. Having the attack been launched when Lee ordered it, it would have succeeded. Yes, Sickles was wrong in repositioning his men, but admittedly he gained time for Meade at a cruel cost. Having Sickles not redeployed, the element of surprise would have played a major role. This means, the US troops would have been dislodged and Gettysburg a Confederate victory.
Think about it and send me a reply if you want.
Civil War Scholar.

Do you have any evidence to refute Rhea's conclusion?

Longstreet was initially ordered by Lee to move into position to attack earlier but was allowed to wait until Law's Brigade arrived on the field which delayed the attack. Lee was aware of this delay and allowed it. Even if the attack had gone earlier in the day, there is no telling what would have happened. It's all speculation. While I agree that Longstreet is a bit overrated, Lee was fully responsible for Gettysburg.

R

 

[Elennsar]

Longstreet was initially ordered by Lee to move into position to attack earlier but was allowed to wait until Law's Brigade arrived on the field which delayed the attack. Lee was aware of this delay and allowed it. Even if the attack had gone earlier in the day, there is no telling what would have happened. It's all speculation. While I agree that Longstreet is a bit overrated, Lee was fully responsible for Gettysburg.

R

How do you feel Longstreet is overrated?

I think his performance at Gettysburg was an indifferent sort of "average" level competent - but as a corps commander (as distinct from independent command) his record is generally good to my eyes.

Though his independent command record is alarmingly ineffective. Even allowing for all the reasons in the way of success, Knoxville is just humiliating (as well as marked by a much more quarrelsome and partisan attitude than in Virginia - treating the issue between Jenkins and Law as "I'm on Jenkins's side" instead of telling them both to act like soldiers is just wrong), and not even for "against Burnside, of all generals".

 

[KeyserSoze]

Dear Elennsar,
I am aware of what Rhea said. Yet, most sources cite it at 7000, including Shelby Foote, Douglas Southall Freeman, E.B. Long and James McPherson. Some say it was even more, since total casualties for the Union throughout the first three days of June, 1864 are just under 13000, while Lee suffered well under one third of that. Rhea, like any other writer, is not perfect while Boonekemper really rewrote history from his mind.

If you had read Rhea then you would know that the man has spent a large part of his career researching and writing about Grant's Overland Campaign and that he went into great detail explaining just how he arrived at his casualty figures. By my way of thinking someone who had gone to that much time and trouble researching a single area of the war is likely more accurate in his conclusion than someone who had written on the campaign almost in passing.

 

[Civil War Scholar]

Dear Keyer Soze,
I have read Rhea's book, but why all other sources, Internet and books say it afterwards? This troubles me. The National Park Service gives Grant's total casualties as 13,000 and Lee's as 2500. Since the main attack was on June 3, at least half of the casualties must have occurred there. This gives us 6500, which is close to the 7000 figure. Grant himself stated that Cold Harbor was the only attack he regretted making. Meade told his wife that after Cold Harbor Grant had started to understand that Virginia and Lee's army was not Tennessee and Bragg's army. Evidence points to the 7000 figure and not 3000 unless the latter figure concerns only killed and gravely wounded.
Civil War Scholar.

 

[KeyserSoze]

Dear Keyer Soze,
I have read Rhea's book, but why all other sources, Internet and books say it afterwards? This troubles me. The National Park Service gives Grant's total casualties as 13,000 and Lee's as 2500. Since the main attack was on June 3, at least half of the casualties must have occurred there. This gives us 6500, which is close to the 7000 figure. Grant himself stated that Cold Harbor was the only attack he regretted making. Meade told his wife that after Cold Harbor Grant had started to understand that Virginia and Lee's army was not Tennessee and Bragg's army. Evidence points to the 7000 figure and not 3000 unless the latter figure concerns only killed and gravely wounded.
Civil War Scholar.

Again, Gordon Rhea has spent a career studying the campaign. He has written a four volume series on the campaign. In the preface to his book "Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26-June 3, 1864" he explains how he arrived at his casualty list and the sources he used. I know of no other historian who has devoted as much time, effort and study to this part of the rebellion. As a result I'm going to conclude that he knows what he is talking about and that his casualty figure is the most accurate available.

 

[BillO]

My choice, I think is A.S. Johnston. But I have a couple of others that may be contending, in no order:

1. Buckner
2. Beauregard
3. DH Hill
4. McPherson
5. Schofield
6. Sedgewick

Actually, I guess I had them in my head in alphabetical order.

Interesting list but DH Hill certainly doesn't seem over rated. If anything he seems to me to be under rated and Sedgewick was a very well liked man but I haven't noticed many people giving him much credit as a great general.

 

[CSA Today]

Again, Gordon Rhea has spent a career studying the campaign. He has written a four volume series on the campaign. In the preface to his book "Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26-June 3, 1864" he explains how he arrived at his casualty list and the sources he used. I know of no other historian who has devoted as much time, effort and study to this part of the rebellion. As a result I'm going to conclude that he knows what he is talking about and that his casualty figure is the most accurate available.

If Rhea claims Grant lost only 3,000 men during the disastrous attacks of 3rd June, does he indicate where Grant lost the other 10,000 casualties during the nearly two week battle.

"At dawn June 3, the II and XVIII Corps, followed later by the IX Corps, assaulted along the Bethesda Church-Cold Harbor line and were slaughtered at all points. Grant commented in his memoirs that this was the only attack he wished he had never ordered."
http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va062.htm

 

[KeyserSoze]

If Rhea claims Grant lost only 3,000 men during the disastrous attacks of 3rd June, does he indicate where Grant lost the other 10,000 casualties during the nearly two week battle.

I don't know what two week period you're talking about or where the 10,000 figure comes from, but if you're talking about the two weeks leading up to the battle on June 3rd then there had been fighting along the North Anna River and at Bethesda Church and Matadequin Creek.

 

[CSA Today]

I don't know what two week period you're talking about or where the 10,000 figure comes from, but if you're talking about the two weeks leading up to the battle on June 3rd then there had been fighting along the North Anna River and at Bethesda Church and Matadequin Creek.

May 31-June 12, 1864

http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va062.htm

 

[KeyserSoze]

May 31-June 12, 1864

[URL='http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va062.htm[/QUOTE']http://www.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/va062.htm[/URL]

You are going on the assumption that the National Park Service figures are accurate. As Rhea points out in his book those figure are not.

 

[SouthernRebel772]

Interesting list but DH Hill certainly doesn't seem over rated. If anything he seems to me to be under rated and Sedgewick was a very well liked man but I haven't noticed many people giving him much credit as a great general.

I'll second the statement of D.H. Hill, everything I've ever read has him as being tenacious as they come. Longstreet used Hill's boys at Sharpsburg as the example of the toughest holding of ground he's ever seen. I reckon he would have done quite well if kept in command at the corps level in the Army of Tennessee.

 

[rbasin]

Losses at Cold Harbor and Bethesda Church from Battles and Leaders Vol. 4 page 182 and page 187 (reporting these numbers from June 1st to June 12th). These numbers also include WF Smith's Army of the James troops

Union:
Killed: 1844
Wounded: 9077
Captured or Missing: 1816

Found at Wiki for Bethesda Church 679 killed and wounded, 52 missing (added into the numbers above)

Lee's army had only partial returns, according to B&L

 

[CSA Today]

You are going on the assumption that the National Park Service figures are accurate. As Rhea points out in his book those figure are not.

Is Rhea saying Grant didn't have 13,000 casualties at Cold Harbor? If he is, how many is he saying Grant suffered ?

 

[KeyserSoze]

Is Rhea saying Grant didn't have 13,000 casualties at Cold Harbor? If he is, how many is he saying Grant suffered ?

Between 3500 and 4000 for the assault on June 3rd.

 

[rbasin]

I was very critical of Halleck - still am in some regards - then somebody stuck up for him and I seen the light! I'd just been accepting the standard opinions - so I know all about being a baby bird!

I love Halleck. Easily the most interesting guy in the war. If I was smart, or not plain lazy, maybe I'd write something on him. The O.R. and what's been written about him differ greatly.