Rosecrans and Thomas

[richard]

Has anyone noticed any command elements of these two generals that seem to be close to the same?

Richard

 

[ole]

Not sure what you mean. Care to expand just enough to take in my pea-brain?

ole

 

[cw1865]

Rosecrans v. Thomas

Rosecrans = McClellan light
Thomas is much more aggresive.

 

[trice]

Rosecrans = McClellan light
Thomas is much more aggresive.

I like Rosecrans, and have for a long time, ever since I read Tucker's book on Chickamauga about 40 years back.

Rosecrans was an aggressive commander -- so much so that I think he benefitted from having Thomas with him to control his impulses. They made a very good team.

Rosecrans was loved by his soldiers, had a contentious relationship with many of his division and corps commanders, seemed to feud with everyone above him (Stanton, Halleck, Grant, McClellan, etc.) Partially this was due to the way in which he would criticize underlings for mistakes (he had a tongue with a rasp like a coarse file). He also seemed to have a talent for picking feuds over small issues with superiors. Even worse, he doesn't seem to have realized the animosity he built up with the feuds and dressing-downs, acting as if they'd be forgotten right after they occurred. In the end, this clobbered him at Chickamauga and afterwards.

On campaign, he was the opposite of McClellan. Where McClellan was cautious the more he was in the field, Rosecrans was bold. Rosey's problem was that he didn't sleep, wore himself out with restless energy, became more and more impulsive. But if you compare Rosey's battlefield actions to Mac's, there is a big, big difference. Rosey would not have had a single problem launching another attack at Antietam; Mac would not have been holding on after the first day at Stones River or Chickamauga, IMHO. Mac could never move with the speed Rosey consistently showed in his campaigns.

But both men were their own worst enemy. The grief they stored up came back to get them in the end.

Regards,
Tim

 

[richard]

Ole, I guess that what brought this question to mind is Rosecrans prep for the June '63 effort to remove Bragg from Middle Tennessee, and the efforts of Thomas at Nashville in '64.

 

[OpnDownfall]

They were both meticulous planners, reluctant to act until everything and every man was available and ready for action.
Just before his Chattanooga Campaign, Rosecrans, refused to advance, because he was convinced that he should not advance until After Grant had taken Vicksburg and nothing Lincoln, Halleck or Stanton said or ordered could convince him otherwise I have heard it argued that it was just one of his many excuses not to move until he was ready. But was this true? From all I can learn this conviction seemed sincere.

 

[trice]

They were both meticulous planners, reluctant to act until everything and every man was available and ready for action.
Just before his Chattanooga Campaign, Rosecrans, refused to advance, because he was convinced that he should not advance until After Grant had taken Vicksburg and nothing Lincoln, Halleck or Stanton said or ordered could convince him otherwise I have heard it argued that it was just one of his many excuses not to move until he was ready. But was this true? From all I can learn this conviction seemed sincere.

I think Rosecrans was sincere. Like McClellan, he saw the war through the lens of his own position, and found great difficulty in placing the national interests above the interests of his own command.

Strategic considerations had Washington doing everything they could to make sure Grant took Vicksburg. They wanted Rosecrans to pressure Bragg to keep him from detaching against Grant. Rosecrans refused.

Rosecrans waited until Bragg had dispatched 10,000 reinforcements to Joe Johnston, trying to build a relief force for Vicksburg. Tactically, this was very good for Rosecrans and his effort. As things worked out, those 10,000 were in transit during the Tullahoma Campaign, and did not arrive in Mississippi in time to take part in an effort to relieve Vicksburg.

In hindsight, it doesn't matter. But in real life, hindsight is what doesn't matter.

If Pemberton held on longer (a definite possibility to consider in June 1863) and Stevenson's 10,000 reinforced Johnston (they were en route) and Joe Johnston does attack successfully, disaster threatens Grant. That's what Lincoln, Stanton, Halleck, and Grant wanted to prevent. That's what Rosecrans refused to do anything about. Rosecrans was in the wrong, no matter what his local situation was, because he was unwilling to subordinate himself to higher command.

Regards,
Tim

 

[cw1865]

Chickamauga

Rosecran's ruse. He lights fires to lead the Confederates to believe that the Federal right extends beyond the Confederate left. Nifty ploy, Bragg takes the bait loads up his left and crushes Rosecran's right. Talk about 'be careful for what you wish for!'

My theory is that if you lose a battle to Bragg you have to be pretty bad!

But all kidding aside, I do liken Rosecrans to McClellan because Rosecrans was going to move when Rosecrans felt absolutely, positively, 100% ready to move.

 

[trice]

But all kidding aside, I do liken Rosecrans to McClellan because Rosecrans was going to move when Rosecrans felt absolutely, positively, 100% ready to move.

That part I agree with. Other people's needs and requests were not going to hurry him.

Regards,
Tim

 

[OpnDownfall]

Another similarity between the two, was that once they finally completed their preparations, they moved with speed and power.
I believe Thomas would probably had stopped his advance after taking Chattanooga. To build up and resupply his Army. If he had continued his advance, it would, probably, have been a little slower, with units in closer contact with each other.
Before WWI the French Army developed the idea of the all-out offensive as the best way for France to win a war with Germany. General Foch, was an ardent believer and exponent of this doctrine, but he also included the proviso of 'security' it was said his lectures included the metaphysics of the offensive to the point it becoming almost incomprehensible and then suddently switching to the hard practicalities of 'security'
I think Thomas accepted the offensive as the way to win battles but always paid strict attention to planning for unforseen eventuality without getting bogged down by overplanning or worrying too much about those things that were beyond ones control.
The offensive 'with' security, a difficult balance to maintain and not for the faint of heart. I think Thomas did it best, except for Grant.

 

[larry_cockerham]

Thomas certainly prepared well at Nashville. When it came time to ring the bell, his guys executed flawlessly.

 

[KLSDAD]

Three year old thread but.... just finished The Edge of Glory by William Lamers (1961) and came away with a much greater appreciation of Rosecrans than I had before.

Can anyone recommend anything more recent?

He definitely had his flaws but don't we all. Just made too many enemies so it was only a matter of time.

I've read Cozzens' books on Chic. and Chat. ................ I'll probably look for his books on Iuka and Stone's River next unless there are other suggestions.

 

[wilber6150]

Three year old thread but.... just finished The Edge of Glory by William Lamers (1961) and came away with a much greater appreciation of Rosecrans than I had before.

Can anyone recommend anything more recent?

He definitely had his flaws but don't we all. Just made too many enemies so it was only a matter of time.

I've read Cozzens' books on Chic. and Chat. ................ I'll probably look for his books on Iuka and Stone's River next unless there are other suggestions.

Definitly read Cozzen's book on Chick, its a great history of the battle and very easy to read...

 

[johan_steele]

Both men were methodical planners who took logistics very seriously. I think Old Rosy never recovered from his screw up at Chickamauga; it was catastrophic but in his defense I don't think a Lee or Longstreet would have fared any better after such a disaster. Thomas made his reputation well prior to becoming the "Rock" but he was another general that you couldn't shake or panic... the best kind of personality to have IMO.

 

[OpnCoronet]

I tend to agree withj another poster who has already noted, that Rosey had many(some could say, too many) characteristics of a McClellan and IMO, Thomas had many of the characteristics a Grant.

 

[ole]

Will take issue with that, Opn. I think Grant's success came from his ability to make hay while the sun shone, ready or not. And that taking time to make sure all the "Ts" were crossed gave the foeman the same amount of time to improve his position. Thomas took the time to cross them ... and dot the other one.

Of course, there were times when immediate action didn't work out well, but Grant seemed to learn when it would work and when it wouldn't. And that learning process and aggresiveness is what makes him a winning General.

 

[BillO]

Ole, I agree with your first paragraph completely but not the second, He was certainly aggresive but he has never struck me as a quick learner. His greatness lies primarily in the fact that he had the complete support of Lincoln and an apparently endless supply of manpower. No other union general would have politically survived after Spotsylvania without it.

 

[captainrlm]

Glad to see this old t hread revised - that was a great read. I can add nothing to it, but my thanks for all the insight expressed on it. Good stuff to ponder.

 

[OpnCoronet]

But how did, Grant gain Lincoln's confidence? One of, if not the hardest and most horrific battle was probably the Wilderness. Historical precedent, said the AoP would pull back rest, refit, and start afresh sometime in the future. Instead, it kept moving south and instead of regaining the initiative to relieve pressure on Richmond, Lee could only follow Grant's lead, all the way South to Appomattox; in a little less than a year.

 

[Elennsar]

Though interestingly, percentage-wise, its not that serious.

~22,000 out of ~180,000?

Antietam, Shiloh, Gettysburg...

all much uglier.