Sickles Venture Forward

[OpnCoronet]

But, the effect of Sickles' movement is more important in relation to Lee's plans on the offensive, than on Meade's passive-defensive mode. Whatever Lee's offensive plan, we know that Sickles movement represented a surprise, amounting to shock, to Longstreet's commanders, if not Lee. As III Corps moved into their assigned attack position, McLaws made a quick recon to his front and was shocked to discover Union trioops, stretching to his right and left as far as he could see. He immediately informs Longstreet and suggest recasting the plan of attack. Hood is equally surprised at Union troops to his immediate front, and suggests a change in his line of attack. Evander Laws formally protests his orders to attack LRT. All of which are rejected by higher commands.
Whatever the Confederate attack plan, it clearly did not envisage a Union corps to the immediate front of their jumping off positions. Clearly, from the reactions of III Corps commanders the plan had been rendered moot even before it began; McLaws and Hood both, would have to fight every inch the way to the Union MLR in order to attack it.

 

[TDMD]

The other question of importance is whether the position that Meade wanted the III Corps to occupy was wooded or cleared. I suppose it is likely that it was wooded but I don't have a map that depicts that area during the period.

A couple years ago, after they cleared a bunch of trees in the area, rangers were saying that it now more closely resembled 1863.

 

[TDMD]

But, the effect of Sickles' movement is more important in relation to Lee's plans on the offensive, than on Meade's passive-defensive mode. Whatever Lee's offensive plan, we know that Sickles movement represented a surprise, amounting to shock, to Longstreet's commanders, if not Lee. As III Corps moved into their assigned attack position, McLaws made a quick recon to his front and was shocked to discover Union trioops, stretching to his right and left as far as he could see. He immediately informs Longstreet and suggest recasting the plan of attack. Hood is equally surprised at Union troops to his immediate front, and suggests a change in his line of attack. Evander Laws formally protests his orders to attack LRT. All of which are rejected by higher commands.
Whatever the Confederate attack plan, it clearly did not envisage a Union corps to the immediate front of their jumping off positions. Clearly, from the reactions of III Corps commanders the plan had been rendered moot even before it began; McLaws and Hood both, would have to fight every inch the way to the Union MLR in order to attack it.

We truly do not how much of a shock or surprise it was. You are correct that Lee's plans did not envisage a Union corps sitting there, but that does not make the position a good one to assume. And the fight came from Federal reinforcements more than from Third Corps.

 

[101combatvet]

A couple years ago, after they cleared a bunch of trees in the area, rangers were saying that it now more closely resembled 1863.

What is interesting to note is that the line Meade wanted the III Corps to occupy was never occupied in whole during the rest of the battle. What remains of the III Corps by the third day sits east of that position, again they are obstructed by woods and the elevation of Cemetery Ridge. Then again when the Union line finally pursues the Confederate retreat (south) towards the Emmitsburg Pike the entire formation avoids a portion of the Meade line by doing a right oblique (north), strange or what?

 

[OpnCoronet]

Well, Gen Humphrey's might have something to say about the fight his men put up. In any case, it seems pretty clear that Sickles movement forward, had far reaching repercussions on the battle on Day 2 And Day 3.
It is not a given that III Corps would have escaped its fate, even if it had remained in position and if it failed, there would certainly have been no victorious (for the Union Cause at least) Day 3.

 

[TDMD]

What is interesting to note is that the line Meade wanted the III Corps to occupy was never occupied in whole during the rest of the battle. What remains of the III Corps by the third day sits east of that position, again they are obstructed by woods and the elevation of Cemetery Ridge. Then again when the Union line finally pursues the Confederate retreat (south) towards the Emmitsburg Pike the entire formation avoids a portion of the Meade line by doing a right oblique (north), strange or what?

I posted a quote from E.P. Alexander earlier in this thread. He mentions that the original position had good fields of fire.

 

[101combatvet]

I posted a quote from E.P. Alexander earlier in this thread. He mentions that the original position had good fields of fire.

Based on what?

 

[TDMD]

Based on what?

Alexander was able to see the area that Sickles was supposed to initially occupy when the fighting on the southern end of the field subsided. Look up a couple pages and you should see the quote.

I apologize, it was in a similar thread below. Here is the quote:

Finally, no soldier of note in the Army of the Potomac approved of Sickles' advanced position. This included, Hancock, Gibbon, Hunt, Warren, and one of Sickles' division commanders, Andrew A. Humphreys. But the last word on the merit of the line Meade selected comes from a Confederate, Colonel Edward P. Alexander. When Longstreet's assault broke the III Corps line at the Peach Orchard, Alexander thought they had shattered the main enemy line and that "all the rest would be only fun," consisting of shooting at the retreating Federals. But when he arrived at the orchard and had a chance "to take in all the topography, " he was severely disappointed. "It was not the enemy's main line we had broken. That loomed up near 1,000 yards beyond us, a ridge giving good cover behind it & endless fine positions for batteries." Good cover, and endless fine positions for batteries - it was the very ground Meade had ordered Sickles to form on that morning.

The above comes from pages 59 and 60 of North And South Magazine (Volume 8, #4). Scott Hartwig quotes Alexander from Fighting For The Confederacy: The Personal Recollections Of General Edward Porter Alexander, page 240.

 

[TDMD]

Well, Gen Humphrey's might have something to say about the fight his men put up. In any case, it seems pretty clear that Sickles movement forward, had far reaching repercussions on the battle on Day 2 And Day 3.
It is not a given that III Corps would have escaped its fate, even if it had remained in position and if it failed, there would certainly have been no victorious (for the Union Cause at least) Day 3.

I can tell you that Humphreys was not fond of the position that Sickles chose.

Here is what Coddington (pages 445-446) had to say about your apparent contention that somehow Sickles move stemmed the tide of the Confederate advance:

It so happens that Longstreet could not have hit the Union left flank at a
more inopportune moment for Meade. The timing of Sickles' move to a new
position compounded the inherent defects in the line Sickles had chosen for his
Third Corps. Before his men could dig in and Meade could shift the Fifth Corps
from right to left, Longstreet opened his attack. From then on the
Confederates held the initiative and maintained it until the last phase of the
engagement. By setting the pace of the fighting, they kepy Meade busy coping
with one emergency after another, and only his ability to improvise and
develop countermeasures quickly enough prevented the collapse of Sickles' line
from turning into a catastrophe.

On page 447, Coddington continues:

The metaphor of a breakwater is striking but not very apt, for it implies that Sickles and the Third Corps' line, like a good breakwater, had something behind them to protect. But behind them was nothing-an empty harbor-and they found themselves being pounded by wave after wave of Confederates until they could hold out no longer and were overwhelmed. Many thought it an unnecessary sacrifice. If Sickles had stayed where Meade meant him to be Hood would not have been tempted to try a flanking movement at Devil's Den and Little Round Top. Instead his division, guided by the Emmittsburg road, would have moved in a northerly direction to hit the Union left where Lee thought it was on Cemetery Ridge. In that case Sickles' men lined up on Little Round Top and north of it, would have been in position to hit Hood's right flank with raking fire and perhaps roll it up in a counterattack.

 

[101combatvet]

Alexander was able to see the area that Sickles was supposed to initially occupy when the fighting on the southern end of the field subsided. Look up a couple pages and you should see the quote.

I apologize, it was in a similar thread below. Here is the quote:

The above comes from pages 59 and 60 of North And South Magazine (Volume 8, #4). Scott Hartwig quotes Alexander from Fighting For The Confederacy: The Personal Recollections Of General Edward Porter Alexander, page 240.

If the position Sickles was supposed to occupy was so good we should be able to find accounts of his staff that disagreed with him. I would discount Alexander's assessment from a spyglass. Two other factors come into play why Sickles decided to move forward. His view to the west was blocked by wooded terrain. The Peach Orchard is commanding ground over 580 feet in elevation and higher then the position on Cemetery Ridge, Sickles believed that if the Confederates captured the Peach Orchard and positioned artillery there it could cause havoc with the Union line. I don't agree with Sickles move but I understand why he did what he did.

 

[TDMD]

If the position Sickles was supposed to occupy was so good we should be able to find accounts of his staff that disagreed with him. I would discount Alexander's assessment from a spyglass. Two other factors come into play why Sickles decided to move forward. His view to the west was blocked by wooded terrain. The Peach Orchard is commanding ground over 580 feet in elevation and higher then the position on Cemetery Ridge, Sickles believed that if the Confederates captured the Peach Orchard and positioned artillery there it could cause havoc with the Union line. I don't agree with Sickles move but I understand why he did what he did.

I do not believe that the PO is anywhere near 580' in elevation, LRT is only 500-600 feet itself. I do believe Alexander, spyglass and all. Sickles staff may or may not have agreed with Sickles' move, but when one of his own experienced division commanders openly disagrees with it, it is time to stop and consider the wisdom of the move. Again, Sickles may have assumed that the position he was to hold was in the swale where his HQ was the night before - he did not bother to stop and confirm his position with John Geary, who's division held the LRT area the night before and who waited awhile to try to talk to Sickles. And again the PO is a mirage, it is a prime artillery target from across both ridges (Seminary and Cemtery).

 

[OpnCoronet]

But, is what Alexander saw through his spyglass, Sickles' assigned position on Cemetary Ridge? Was the position occupied by Geary, different from the one assumed by Sickles?
But, the question would still remain, from where comes the confidence that a better result was to be expectred from Meade's original line, than that which actually occured?

 

[TDMD]

But, is what Alexander saw through his spyglass, Sickles' assigned position on Cemetary Ridge? Was the position occupied by Geary, different from the one assumed by Sickles?
But, the question would still remain, from where comes the confidence that a better result was to be expectred from Meade's original line, than that which actually occured?

According to what GNMP ranger/historian Scott Hartwig it is where Meade assigned Sickles. It was suggested to Sickles early in the morning of 7/2 that he check with Geary about what ground he was to occupy. Sickles dismissed Geary out of hand and told him he would handle things in due time. That is a paraphrase from Rick Sauers' book about the controversy between Sickles and Meade.

And again, the line Meade ordered him to be was shorter, had both flanks of Third Corps protected, and had immediate rear support and accordingly did not isolate Third Corps from the rest of the AotP.

 

[101combatvet]

I do not believe that the PO is anywhere near 580' in elevation, LRT is only 500-600 feet itself.

Check a topographic map of the area.

I do believe Alexander, spyglass and all. Sickles staff may or may not have agreed with Sickles' move, but when one of his own experienced division commanders openly disagrees with it, it is time to stop and consider the wisdom of the move.

I would only trust Alexander's opinion if he had walked the grounds. Where is the post war evidence for Sickles staff that disagreed with him?

Again, Sickles may have assumed that the position he was to hold was in the swale where his HQ was the night before - he did not bother to stop and confirm his position with John Geary, who's division held the LRT area the night before and who waited awhile to try to talk to Sickles. And again the PO is a mirage, it is a prime artillery target from across both ridges (Smeinary and Cemtery).

I have to say that if Sickles position Meade wanted him to occupy was so confusing then Meade shares part of the blame for not making it crystal clear. If the Peach Orchard "is a mirage" then why did the Confederates want it so bad?

 

[TDMD]

Check a topographic map of the area.



I would only trust Alexander's opinion if he had walked the grounds. Where is the post war evidence?



I have to say that if Sickles position Meade wanted him to occupy was so confussing then Meade shares part of the blame for not making it crystal clear. If the Peach Orchard "is a mirage" then why did the Confederates want it so bad?

You know where Meade shares blame? He should have made sure that Pleasonton replaced Buford's division with another cav division at the PO. Instead, the cav division ordered to take up Buford's spot got hung up in a scrape elsewhere. That was one argument that Sickles had, but then, instead of unilaterally moving an entire infantry corps there, he should either have posted only the USSS there, or complained that there was nothing to act as an early warning sign. Also, it was more Pleasonton's falt than anyone else's because he let the situation slip.

I do not own Alexander's book, so I cannot comment further about it. My quote comes from Scott Hartwig's article, quoting Alexander. And I would bet he walked the area at one time or another.

Finally, the Confederates did not want the PO - they wanted to roll up the Federal left flank. It was meant only as a possible arty platform and realizing what they assumed (that the Union left flank was farther north from where it was) it made sense at the time. Unfortunately with artillery from Cemetery Hill to LRT the PO was a prime target. A sketch went to every corps commander including Sickles - he was the only corps commander confused as to his position. Frankly, from his actions, I think he was feigning confusion, he wanted his men at the PO from jump street and he was going to place them there come what may.

 

[101combatvet]

You know where Meade shares blame? He should have made sure that Pleasonton replaced Buford's division with another cav division at the PO. Instead, the cav division ordered to take up Buford's spot got hung up in a scrape elsewhere. That was one argument that Sickles had, but then, instead of unilaterally moving an entire infantry corps there, he should either have posted only the USSS there, or complained that there was nothing to act as an early warning sign. Also, it was more Pleasonton's falt than anyone else's because he let the situation slip.

No matter who would have taken the initiative a succes spells hero and a failure spells "idiot".

I do not own Alexander's book, so I cannot comment further about it. My quote comes from Scott Hartwig's article, quoting Alexander. And I would bet he walked the area at one time or another.

Hartwig.... certainly.... Alexander perhaps.... but I'd rather hear from someone that was in the III Corps.

Finally, the Confederates did not want the PO - they wanted to roll up the Federal left flank. It was meant only as a possible arty platform and realizing what they assumed (that the Union left flank was farther north from where it was) it made sense at the time. Unfortunately with artillery from Cemetery Hill to LRT the PO was a prime target. A sketch went to every corps commander including Sickles - he was the only corps commander confused as to his position. Frankly, from his actions, I think he was feigning confusion, he wanted his men at the PO from jump street and he was going to place them there come what may.

The Confederates wanted it just for that reason. If Meade had been more like Napoleon this thread would never have been started. I'd still like to hear what the III Corps staff had to say.

 

[TDMD]

No matter who would have taken the initiative a succes spells hero and a failure spells "idiot".



Hartwig.... certainly.... Alexander perhaps.... but I'd rather hear from someone that was in the III Corps.



The Confederates wanted it just for that reason. If Meade had been more like Napoleon this thread would never have been started. I'd still like to hear what the III Corps staff had to say.

Well, Sickles took the initiative, and despite his MoH, he was not a hero.

Regarding point two, the only one of any rank in Third Corps who expressed their feelings about the move was Humphrey, but I don't have any of his commentary handy. Perhaps there is something in Coddington or Pfanz.

Regarding the Confederates wanting the PO, that desire was probably only temporary. And if it wasn't, they would have been quickly disabused of that notion by Federal artillery. Not even Lee was Napoleon. Only Napoleon was Napoleon, but then I'm sure there are people in other websites arguing his moves at Waterloo, Eylau, Borodino and Aspern-Essling.

 

[101combatvet]

Well, Sickles took the initiative, and despite his MoH, he was not a hero.

Citation: Displayed most conspicuous gallantry on the field vigorously contesting the advance of the enemy and continuing to encourage his troops after being himself severely wounded. I'm sure it can be rescinded.

Regarding point two, the only one of any rank in Third Corps who expressed their feelings about the move was Humphrey, but I don't have any of his commentary handy. Perhaps there is something in Coddington or Pfanz.

Sounds like a weak argument.

Regarding the Confederates wanting the PO, that desire was probably only temporary. And if it wasn't, they would have been quickly disabused of that notion by Federal artillery. Not even Lee was Napoleon. Only Napoleon was Napoleon, but then I'm sure there are people in other websites arguing his moves at Waterloo, Eylau, Borodino and Aspern-Essling.

Of course.... the entire invasion was "temporary." In regards to clarity of orders.

 

[ole]

Sickles practically wrote that citation himself.

 

[101combatvet]

Sickles practically wrote that citation himself.

Good for him.... maybe Meade should have done the same.

The interesting thing is that the officers and men of the III Corps endorsed him to the end.... and that's all that really matters.