Some Truths about Prentiss and the Hornets' Nest

[HeroPrentiss]

For those interested in the truth about Shiloh this post discusses whether Prentiss took credit and whether WHL Wallace commanded the most men in the Hornets' Nest. Also included is information about the charge of "stolen valor" against Prentiss for stealing credit due to Peabody and WHL Wallace.

The following paragraph was posted on the Facebook page of the Shiloh Discussion Group. The claim that Prentiss "takes credit" because he had months to think about his report and that WHL Wallace had more men in the Hornets' Nest than did Prentiss necessitated a response as both items are not true. But responses to the false claims of the Shiloh revisionists require a comprehensive and lengthy effort that are not conducive to Facebook.

Here is the post from the Shiloh Discussion Group's Facebook page that trumpets the Shiloh revisionists' narrative:

"So, Prentiss takes credit since he was taken prisoner and had months to think about his report, but they were both division commanders. Wallace was there with his men commanding. He had more men in the Hornet's Nest are (sic) than Prentiss due to earlier fighting. Not sure if you have access to the ORs but check out the reports of the Iowa regiments (2nd, 7th, 12th, and 14th) along with Stones, Welker, and Richardson's batteries."

This is the first time I have seen the claim that Prentiss spent his seven months in Southern prisons thinking about his report which had to wait until he was released. The implication is that Prentiss was worried about his conduct during the battle and needed to get his story straight and claim that his actions in defending the Hornets' Nest had saved the army and he was the big hero of Shiloh. In other words, Prentiss had months to conjure up the lies that the Shiloh revisionists claim are in his report.

But the Shiloh revisionists are not content to label such scurrilous charges just against Prentiss. The same charges of bonding together in prison to come up with a convincing story so all the Shiloh prisoners could hide their cowardice and claim that they saved the army on April 6, 1862, are made against the Shiloh prisoners. According to the Shiloh revisionists the Hornets' Nest defenders spent their time in prison getting their story straight.

There is no report in the ORs for either the 2nd Iowa infantry regiment or Stone's battery. The suggested reports are from regiments in WHL Wallace's division. If Prentiss is to be judged the reports of the regiments Prentiss commanded in the Hornets' Nest should also be read. There are reports from the 8th Iowa, 23rd Missouri, 16th Wisconsin, 12th Michigan, 25th Missouri and two reports from the 21st Missouri. Prentiss's First Brigade under command of Everett Peabody has reports. The Second Brigade under Madison Miller has no reports in the ORs.

It took over 100 years for Shiloh revisionist historians to claim they know Prentiss's state of mind when he wrote his report. Wiley Sword started the Prentiss persecution in his book. On page 151 of the first edition of Sword's Shiloh: Bloody April from 1974 is found the following after a description on the encounter Prentiss had with Peabody in the camp of the 25th Missouri when Prentiss told Peabody he would hold him responsible for bringing on an engagement as opposed to holding General Albert Sidney Johnston responsible. Sword wrote "Prentiss never forgave him. In his official report he mentioned Everett Peabody only once, and then merely to list him as a brigade commander." (Page 152 in the 2001 revised edition)

Never forgave Peabody for what? Sword doesn't say.

Worse, text with Prentiss's photograph on page 135 (page 136 in 2001 revised edition) states: "Although taken totally by surprise on the morning of April 6, Prentiss later claimed credit for discovery of the Confederates, a discovery that he inadvertently impeded. Really? And just where and when did Prentiss take credit for discovering the Confederates? Sword doesn't say. No sources. No evidence. Just Sword's unsubstantiated opinion which over the years has morphed into Prentiss being labeled a liar and "The Villain of Shiloh" by The American Battlefield Trust, Emerging Civil War and no correction from the Shiloh National Military Park.

The Shiloh revisionists claim that Prentiss took credit that should have gone to WHL Wallace. If you believe that, then prove it. Provide a report, letter, newspaper article, journal, book, napkin, envelope, anything that shows Prentiss took credit for what WHL Wallace, his friend, did.
Such a claim is not even made in Tim Smith's books, yet we see it here.

The devoid of truth Hornets' Nest Myth pamphlet that the park has passed out for over twenty-years started the false claims against Prentiss's report circa 2000 by stating: "Division commander Brigadier General Benjamin M. Prentiss wrote a widely-circulated report after the battle, which emphasized his role in the battle as well as that of his troops." One wonders just whose troops Prentiss should have written about in his report if not his own.
In This Great Battlefield of Shiloh published in 2004, p. 69 is the following, "Supporting Reed's thesis, Benjamin Prentiss, who surrendered in the Hornet's Nest, had made dramatic claims in his battle report that he had saved the day for the Union."
For those interested in the truth about Shiloh and Prentiss's report here is a link to Prentiss's report. https://mo21infantry.tripod.com/21rep_prentiss.html You will read in vain to find anywhere in the report where Prentiss claimed that he had saved the day for the Union. I remember that after believing the Shiloh revisionists' claims about what is in Prentiss's report, I read it. I thought it must be the wrong report and that there was another one somewhere because I did not read anything the Shiloh revisionists told me I would read. Here is a link that will take you to the start of Prentiss's report in the ORs.
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo.31924077730160&view=1up&seq=295

In The Untold Story of Shiloh – The Battle and the Battlefield 2006. p. 24 is the following, "Prentiss's own after-action report was glowing in terms of his own accomplishments." On p. 150 is – "Supporting Reed's thesis, Benjamin Prentiss, who surrendered in the Hornet's Nest, had made dramatic claims in his battle report that he had saved the day for the Union." This is the same statement from This Great Battlefield of Shiloh.
If you read Prentiss's report to see the dramatic claims Prentiss made that he had saved the day for the Union, you will not find any. There is just one sentence relating to the salvation of the army. Prentiss wrote, " I was in constant communication with Generals Hurlbut and Wallace during the day, and both of them were aware of the importance of holding our position until night. When the gallant Hurlbut was forced to retire General Wallace and myself consulted, and agreed to hold our positions at all hazards, believing that we could thus save the army from destruction; we having been now informed for the first time that all others had fallen back to the vicinity of the river." Prentiss wrote that he and Wallace believed that if they held their positions the army would be saved. Prentiss did not claim that he had saved the day for the Union. Prentiss and Wallace fought on to hold their positions until nightfall would end the fighting. That did not happen. Wallace was killed and Prentiss and the remaining defenders of the Hornets' Nest were captured before night fell.

After the publication of The Untold Story of Shiloh – The Battle and the Battlefield in 2006 it appears that Tim Smith realized that his dramatic claims that Prentiss made dramatic claims about saving the day at Shiloh were not true.

This is evident in the publication of "Shiloh's False Hero" in Civil War Times, Dec. 2008. Referenced to Prentiss's report is, "Not long after being released from Confederate custody in October 1862, he wrote an after action report that provided a fairly accurate representation of the events in the Hornets' Nest; he even gave Wallace full credit for his actions."
Whoa. If Tim Smith acknowledged in 2008 that Prentiss gave Wallace full credit for his actions, why is it that in 2024 the claim is made that Prentiss took credit from Wallace? The American Battlefield Trust claimed in December 2021 that Prentiss, with the help of David Wilson Reed, threw Wallace under the bus.

I remember hoping that Tim Smith would reassess his Shiloh revisionist narrative after conceding that Prentiss had not made dramatic claims about his saving the army and did not walk over Wallace's grave, but it only got worse.

The next sentence after conceding Prentiss had given Wallace full credit is, "During a subsequent round of speaking engagements, however, the general began making more grandiose claims about his own role." Here is the astounding claim that Prentiss went on a speaking tour after submitting his Shiloh official report on November 17, 1862. That makes no sense. The only speeches Prentiss gave upon release from prison were made prior to the filing of his official report. Prentiss filed his report at the end of his 30-day leave and he was assigned to the Fitz John Porter trial and served on that panel until January 1863. Prentiss never went on a speaking tour as the revisionists allege.

Before the admittance in "Shiloh's False Hero" that Prentiss gave full credit to Wallace for his actions Prentiss is compared to false Vietnam veterans in the following paragraph, "Every war produces its false heroes, men who claim they did much more than the actual records validate. Stories have recently popped up in the news about Vietnam veterans wearing medals they bought at surplus stores, for example, unscrupulous behavior that insults the soldiers, sailors and Marines who have put forth the true measure of heroism. Sometimes these frauds are found out, but it seems just as often they manage to get away with their deceit."

And there you have the lens through which Shiloh revisionism has been fabricated. General Benjamin Mayberry Prentiss is guilty of stolen valor for his actions at Shiloh and after.

In "Shiloh's False Hero" the charge of stolen valor against Prentiss is made before the presentation of any so-called evidence to back it up. It appears that the evidence is found in the following paragraphs because Prentiss is specifically identified as being the culprit who made unwarranted grandiose claims as to what he had done at Shiloh. Prentiss is blamed for swaying historians. For that he is accused of stealing valor on the battlefield.

"Prentiss himself had a lot to do with the shift in public opinion about Shiloh, and he played a major role in swaying later historians into inaccurately chronicling what had occurred during the battle. Not long after being released from Confederate custody in October 1862 he wrote an after-action report that provided a fairly accurate representation of the events in the Hornets' Nest; he even gave Wallace full credit for his actions. During a subsequent round of speaking engagements, however, the general began making more grandiose claims about his own role.

On his way back home to Quincy, Ill., following his release, Prentiss spoke in Washington, D.C., Chicago and many other cities, always to huge crowds that hung on his every word. In a number of essentially similar speeches, Prentiss recounted his capture and captivity and was extremely critical of the treatment he and his men received in Confederate custody.

Playing on the emotions of the crowd, Prentiss began a speech in Chicago with, "My friends, I feel free to-night; I am at home in Illinois." Near the end of his oration, Prentiss spoke of meeting with Wallace. "We had determined to hold our position," he thundered, "We determined to sustain our government; we determined there to save the army of Gen. Grant. I think we did it." Loud applause filled the building."

These three paragraphs are inconsistent about the fabricated speaking tour. The first paragraph has the speaking tour occurring after Prentiss submitted his report in November 1862. But the second paragraph claimed Prentiss spoke in many other cities other than Washington, D.C. and Chicago on his way back home to Quincy, Illinois.

So, which is it? The answer is neither. There was no time for Prentiss to have spoken in many other cities on his way from Washington, D.C. to Chicago. The scheduled train trip was only three days. After his Chicago speech on October 21, 1862, Prentiss did not speak publicly about Shiloh again until January 12, 1882. That is twenty years later. Prentiss never went on a speaking tour making grandiose claims about how he saved the army at Shiloh.

After conceding that Prentiss gave a "fairly accurate" account about the Hornets' Nest in his after-action report the claim is made that Prentiss stole valor from other soldiers by making grandiose claims about himself in a "subsequent round of speaking engagements." As noted earlier, the accusation that Prentiss went on a speaking tour after filing his official report is a total fabrication. It makes no sense. After the Fitz John Porter trial ended in January, Prentiss returned to active assignments that resulted with Prentiss defending Helena, Arkansas, on July 4, 1863. The false claim of Prentiss's speaking tour is not a minor miscue or mistake as it is used to charge Prentiss with stolen valor.

The Shiloh revisionists are pushing a false narrative. They want you to think Prentiss went on a speaking tour to promote himself. Thus, you read, "On his way back home to Quincy, Ill., following his release, Prentiss spoke in Washington, D.C., Chicago and many other cities." No, he didn't speak in many other cities. He spoke just in Washington, D.C. and Chicago. Just simple curiosity shows the truth about Prentiss's trip from Washington, D.C. to Chicago.

Prentiss and the other prisoners arrived in Washington D.C. on October 17, 1862. Prentiss had an audience with President Lincoln and spent the day relating their experiences in the prisons in the South. That night a serenade was held in the prisoners' honor and Prentiss gave a speech detailing their experiences and with no claims to having saved the army. Prentiss and a group of other prisoners boarded a train that night and headed to Chicago through Harrisburg, PA, Pittsburg and then probably Indianapolis to Chicago. That is a distance of over 700 miles.

Prentiss was scheduled to arrive in Chicago on October 20 in time for a planned serenade. But the train was late, and the city requested that Prentiss and the others stay over so that the serenade could be rescheduled for October 21.

A search through newspapers for the time and along the train's route found accounts only of the Washington, D.C. and Chicago speeches. Had Prentiss spoken in many other cities to huge crowds the accounts would have been in the newspapers. The mere time constraints show that the Shiloh revisionists just made it up. If it was true, the revisionists could have told us what those other cities were. Were the other cities New York, Boston, Philadelphia, or different ones? On one of my visits to Shiloh it was disheartening to hear a question from the audience about how Prentiss went on a speaking tour. The Shiloh revisionists just made it up to push their narrative. That is what they do.

Another thing Shiloh revisionists do is cherry-pick words out of a speech or report in a way that promotes their false narratives. That is done here with the revisionists' account about Prentiss's speech in Chicago. For those interested in the truth about Shiloh it is important to know what the revisionists leave out.

For that reason, here is the full text of the beginning of Prentiss's Chicago speech on October 21, 1862, along with the paper's description of the event at Bryan Hall. The speech was printed in a special edition of the Chicago Tribune. Here is the opening paragraph followed by the beginning of Prentiss's speech.
"Bryan Hall, last evening, was the scene of one of the largest and most enthusiastic Union meetings of the campaign. The Hall was densely packed, and hundreds upon hundreds were unable to gain admittance, or even get into the hall-way. The occasion was of unusual interest, from the fact that that the gallant Gen. Ben. Prentiss, Col. Lynch and Capt. Gregg, of the 58th Illinois, and other prisoners captured upon the hard-fought field of Shiloh, were present and promised to address the meeting. Dr. Brainard, War Democrat, was called to preside over the meeting and was received with hearty enthusiasm. The President briefly and appropriately introduced Gen. Prentiss as the first speaker. The General came forward amid a very whirlwind of applause. Hats were tossed aloft, handkerchiefs waved by the ladies, and cheer after cheer given for the gallant hero. Few men ever received such an ovation; one so spontaneous, so enthusiastic and jubilant. As soon as order was restored, the General spoke as follows: GEN. PRENTISS SPEECH

"My friends, I feel free to-night; I am at home in Illinois. [Cheers] I have been six and a half months confined in Southern dungeons, as I believe, by the efforts of demagogues North and South. [Applause] Permit me, my friends, to place myself and these officers right, upon the record concerning our captivity.
It was represented, as I have learned since my arrival here, and as was reported previously to us in prison, that we were taken at the battle of Shiloh, on the morning of the sixth day of April last. The true history of that battle is yet to be written. On the morning of the sixth day of last April, the Sixth Division, which I had the honor to command, was in line of battle fully one quarter of a mile in advance of my camp, before the hour of six o'clock—perhaps at half past five.

We were driven from that position to the front of our camp, at which time, unfortunately for us, some other regiment—not from Illinois, not from Iowa, not from Missouri—left that field and permitted the enemy to flank us on our right. We were then compelled to retire a short distance, perhaps three or five hundred yards, to the rear taking a position upon the left of General Wallace and right of General Hurlbut, thereby becoming the centre of our army on that day, and at precisely half past nine o'clock, having been under fire from half past five o'clock till that time, and having witnessed hundreds of my men "bite the dust," if I may use the term, in defending our government, (Cheers) we took our position and we held it, thank heaven, until a quarter after six in the evening. [Great applause]

Here let me say, what I have not said in public before, but what I claim the right of saying, calling upon my Maker to witness that I tell the truth, that it is my opinion that none but the gallant wounded who lay around us, and the prisoners, who are represented here tonight, were left at that hour on that hard fought field. We remained until half-past five before we moved from the line. At that hour, or just before, that brave and noble soldier, Gen. Wallace, fell. I had been conferring with him only a few minutes before he went down in the fight. We [Prentiss and Wallace] had determined to hold our position; we determined to sustain our government; we determined there to save the army of Gen. Grant. I think we did it. My officers think we did it. I care not what others may think. [Loud applause]"

The Shiloh revisionists have made it extremely time consuming to scrutiny their work. It takes time to discover what they are saying that is not true and what they do not tell you.

The first sentence from the paragraph above describing Prentiss's speech in Chicago is, "Playing on the emotions of the crowd, Prentiss began a speech in Chicago with, "My friends, I feel free to-night; I am at home in Illinois." Prentiss is accused of manipulating the crowd because he played on the crowd's emotions when he expressed appreciation for being released from prison and being home in Illinois. The Shiloh revisionists make these types of judgments against Prentiss all the time and eventually you get immune to it because you realize it is just part of their false narrative.

The second sentence is, "Near the end of his oration, Prentiss spoke of meeting with Wallace." This sentence makes you wonder why the Shiloh revisionists can't be honest and what the revisionists expect to gain by misstating the facts. The words above were made at the beginning of the speech, not the end. Prentiss told us why. Upon arrival in Chicago, it was represented that Prentiss and his men were taken prisoners at Shiloh on the morning of April 6. Prentiss wanted to address that libel first, so he began his speech with it. It is that simple. Why can't the revisionists be honest about it? It is because they are constructing a narrative.

The next two sentences are, "We had determined to hold our position," he thundered, "We determined to sustain our government; we determined there to save the army of Gen. Grant. I think we did it." "Loud applause filled the building." Now we know why the Shiloh revisionists aren't telling the truth. They want readers to think that Prentiss ended his speech by thundering out how they had saved Grant's army. When, in fact, Prentiss made those comments at the start of his speech and he was probably not thundering at that point. He was just getting started.

The Shiloh revisionists will not tell you anything that does not fit their false narrative. An example is found in the speech when Prentiss told the crowd, "Here let me say, what I have not said in public before." Prentiss is informing the crowd that he had not publicly claimed that he and the men with him had saved Grant's army. Research shows that that is a true statement. But the revisionists want you to believe that Prentiss was traveling around the country telling everyone that he was the big hero of Shiloh.

There are accounts from other participants who credited the Hornets' Nest defenders with saving the army. Capt. Kiner of the 14th Iowa felt so and Lt. S. D. Thompson of the 3rd Iowa emphasized it was so, but Prentiss would not have known of their beliefs. Henry Halleck arrived at Pittsburg Landing after the battle of Shiloh and did a review of what had happened. When Prentiss arrived in Washington D.C. on October 17 he and other prisoners were greeted by Halleck. One of those officers, Capt. W. C. Jones from Mount Pleasant, Iowa said; "Before I take my seat allow me to glance at our reception at Washington, Harrisburg, Pittsburg, Chicago and other places through which we passed. The name of a Shiloh prisoner was sufficient passport to give us access to the best of the land. General Halleck received us warmly and ordered a special paymaster to pay us which was done; and it is with pride I recall the remark made by him to General Prentiss, "By sacrificing yourselves you saved the army of the West."

Prentiss made no mention of Halleck's remark in either the Washington, D.C. or the Chicago speech. But he was aware of Halleck's statement when he defended the actions of himself and the men who had fought with him in the Hornets' Nest and stated their belief that they had saved the army of the West.
Those interested in the truth about Shiloh and approach the subject with an unprejudiced mind should note how the final two sentences of what Prentiss said are truncated. Missing from the description of Prentiss's speech in "Shiloh's False Hero" after Prentiss said "I think we did it" are the next two sentences. They are "My officers think we did it. I care not what others may think."

The Shiloh revisionists promote the narrative that Prentiss spent a lot of his time claiming that he himself had saved the army. Therefore, Prentiss's statement that the officers also felt that way is kept from you. But the revisionists never source a speech, a report, or a document where Prentiss made such a claim after his speech in Chicago.

A review of the public speeches Prentiss made about Shiloh helps to understand why the revisionists never provide any evidence to back up their claims that Prentiss took credit from WHL Wallace by declaring himself the hero of Shiloh. That Prentiss walked over the grave of Peabody and took credit for sending out Powell's patrol. That Prentiss wrote the history of Shiloh. That Prentiss stole valor for himself.

Here is a list of the day and location of the public speeches Prentiss made about Shiloh after being released from Southern prisons.

October 17, 1862 – Washington D.C.
October 21, 1862 -- Chicago, Illinois
January 12, 1882, -- Cincinnati, Ohio​

The fact that Prentiss went nearly 20 years after his speech in Chicago before he made another one is reflected in the line from his Chicago speech, "I care not what others may think." Prentiss made no public statements about Shiloh for almost 20 years after the battle as he felt no need to defend his actions and left that for others. He had little to no influence on how historians wrote about the battle.

The Shiloh revisionist narrative that Prentiss was a major force in how historians wrote about the battle and that is the reason why Peabody did not receive the recognition he deserved is not supported by the facts. If you are a Shiloh revisionist and believe Prentiss was a major factor in how historians wrote about Shiloh, then prove it. Provide documented statements by Prentiss where he took credit for Powell's patrol; took credit from Wallace; influenced historians to incorrectly write about the battle; and stole valor for himself.

The American Battlefield Trust provides the best example of how the Shiloh revisionists just make things up to support their narrative. The American Battlefield Trust thundered in their Shiloh video that Prentiss took credit from Peabody for sending out Major Powell's patrol. The source cited that proved Prentiss was a liar was Major Powell's report in the ORs. Really? You can't make this stuff up. Powell died in the battle and made no report.

Five years after first accusing Prentiss of stolen valor there is a new charge in Rethinking Shiloh published in 2013. This comports with the revisionist technique of making accusations against Prentiss and then looking for "evidence" to support the charges.

On page 71 starts the following paragraph, "The animosity between Prentiss and Peabody was evident in Prentiss's report, which conveniently failed to mention that Peabody had sent out the patrol. Prentiss took subtle credit, writing that the patrol "proceeded to the front" but never saying who sent it. Even worse, Prentiss failed to mention Peabody in the general narrative of his report, except merely to say that he had commanded one of his brigades. In a long list of adulation for other officers under his command, which included high praise for his other brigade commander Madison Miller (Prentiss says he "acted during the day with distinguished courage, coolness and ability"), Prentiss never once mentioned that Peabody found the enemy first, made a desperate stand at his camps, and died from five bullets while trying to hold his line."

The paragraph's first sentence is "The animosity between Prentiss and Peabody was evident in Prentiss's report, which conveniently failed to mention that Peabody had sent out the patrol."

Animosity between Prentiss and Peabody is evident only in the imaginations of the Shiloh revisionists. There is no evidence of animosity between Prentiss and Peabody. They traveled together on a steamer from Paducah, Kentucky to Savannah, Tennessee arriving there on March 28. If you Shiloh revisionists have any evidence of animosity between Prentiss and Peabody let's see it. I am not aware of any angry encounter between Prentiss and Peabody described prior to the morning of April 6. Peabody's last letter on March 31 stated he was in Prentiss's division with "everything working smoothly."

The Shiloh revisionists project themselves onto Prentiss and place nefarious motives to the fact that Prentiss failed to note that Peabody had sent out Powell's patrol. The revisionists want you to believe that Prentiss hated Peabody's guts and decided to take the credit himself for Powell's patrol. Fortunately, a few words ("proceeded to the front") of Prentiss's report are quoted so we can go to that portion of Prentiss's report to see what he actually wrote. Here is the section from Prentiss's report.

"At 3 o'clock on the morning of Sunday, April 6, Col. David Moore, Twenty-first Missouri, with five companies of his infantry regiment, proceeded to the front, and at break of day the advance pickets were driven in, whereupon Colonel Moore pushed forward and engaged the enemy's advance, commanded by General Hardee."

Note that Prentiss did not mention Powell or a patrol or the 25th Missouri. Yet the Shiloh revisionists want you to believe their next sentence. "Prentiss took subtle credit, writing that the patrol "proceeded to the front" but never saying who sent it."

This makes no sense. But it is another good example of how the Shiloh revisionists twist the facts to fit their narrative leaving the truth behind.
What Prentiss wrote makes sense if you know what happened the morning of April 6, 1862, regarding Colonel Moore and the 21st Missouri. The reason you do not know is that the revisionists won't tell you because it conflicts with their false narrative.

When Prentiss spoke in Cincinnati, Ohio, at the Seventh Annual Re-Union and Supper of the Cincinnati Society of Ex-Army and Navy Officers on January 12, 1882, he spoke almost entirely from memory. Prentiss was not a student of Shiloh like Sherman was. Sherman read and collected everything he could find about the battle, but Prentiss did not.

Following is a portion of Prentiss's speech relating to the strengthening of the pickets on the night of April 5 and the receipt of a message at his headquarters from Colonel Moore to send the rest of the 21st Missouri to Moore because he had met the enemy and was going to lick them. Prentiss recalled: "Early in the morning, on the 6th of April, 1862, it was my duty, from what I had learned, to feel the enemy. I had been admonished on the Friday evening before that battle that an enemy of some force was in our front. Not at 3 o'clock, but on the evening of Saturday, before the sun had set, the details were made, and the order given throughout my division to advance the pickets and strengthen them with additional numbers. I did send to the front the gallant Moore, with five of his companies—three at first, and doubting their ability to meet the enemy, I sent two more on my right. On my left two companies of the 18th Wisconsin were advanced one mile to the front. In the center, one company of the 61st Illinois and one of the 18th Missouri were sent forward as extra pickets, with instructions to remain until daylight and see if they could not capture some of the marauders that had been engaged in committing depredations immediately in our vicinity. Early on that Sabbath morning, before (while seated at my breakfast news came to me from the gallant Moore) I had heard the musketry fired in front, and heard the skirmishing, an orderly came galloping into camp and said: "General, the compliments of Gen. Moore. He requests me to say to you that he has met the enemy. Send his other five companies and he will lick them." That is the language that came to me."

Part of the revisionists' narrative is that Prentiss ignored Peabody and others and did nothing about their concerns. But research shows that of the 40 infantry regiments in Peabody's brigade at least 15 of them were sent out on picket duty the night of April 5. In Prentiss's official report he wrote "Saturday evening, pursuant to instructions received when I was assigned to duty with the Army of West Tennessee, the usual advance guard was posted, and in view of information received from the commandant thereof, I sent forward five companies of the Twenty-fifth Missouri and five companies of the Twenty-first Missouri Infantry, under command of Col. David Moore, Twenty-first Missouri."

In his speech Prentiss revealed that the instructions to the pickets were "to remain until daylight and see if they could not capture some of the marauders that had been engaged in committing depredations immediately in our vicinity." Prentiss made no mention of Major Powell and his patrol. The point to realize is that Prentiss sent Moore and five companies out on picket duty with instructions to stay out till daylight.

On the morning of April 6 Peabody ordered Powell's patrol to move out at 3:00 a.m. Peabody sent word to Prentiss about Powell's patrol, but the messenger could not locate Prentiss's headquarters. Once Peabody became aware that Major Powell needed assistance, he ordered Moore to take five companies from the 21st Missouri and go to the support of Powell. Moore wrote this in his report. Moore met Powell falling back east of Seay Field and halted his men and Powell's. Moore was determined to move forward and engage the Confederates, but he wanted the rest of his regiment before advancing. Moore sent a messenger back with the request for the rest of his regiment. But that messenger did not follow the chain of command for whatever reason. The messenger did not go to Peabody, the messenger went all the way to Prentiss at his headquarters. The first information received by Prentiss did not come from Peabody, it did not come from Powell, it came from Colonel David Moore stating he had met the enemy and if Prentiss would send the last five companies from the 21st Missouri he would lick them.

On April 5 Powell had taken out two patrols and Moore one. Powell took out a late evening patrol and upon return to camp he planned to take out a larger patrol at 3:00 a.m. For all of you who think that Peabody sent Powell out without orders and against permission the following statement by Wm. J. Hahn, 1st Lt., Co. H., 25th Missouri should interest you. Hahn was there and wrote "With the assistance of Colonel Everitt Peabody commanding the 1st Brigade of the 6th Division, Major Powell finally got General Prentiss's permission to reconnoiter Sunday morning, but under no circumstances to bring on a general engagement. Major Powell explained these points to me at 10 P.M. Saturday, April 5th and directed me to visit every tent of Co. H and instruct the men to be fully dressed and be ready to march at 3 A.M. Sunday, April 6th……If ever a man deserved a monument it is our brave Major Powell….."

Prentiss did not subtly take credit for sending out Powell's patrol as alleged by the Shiloh revisionists so they can accuse Prentiss of stolen valor. Prentiss did not know that Powell's patrol had preceded Moore's advance to the front. He did not know about Powell's patrol at all. What he first knew was that Moore had taken five companies to the front and a messenger from Moore arrived at his tent requesting the other five companies. Prentiss heard the musketry from the front and immediately rode to the camp of the 21st Missouri to make sure the five companies were moving out to Colonel Moore. Lieutenant Colonel Woodyard noted in his report the presence of Prentiss in camp when Lieutenant Menn, sent by Colonel Moore, arrived to check on the whereabouts of the other five companies. Prentiss then ordered Woodyard to take the five companies and join Moore at the front.

The distance from the camp of the 21st Missouri to Seay Field is approximately three-fourths of a mile. Prentiss wrote in his report, "At 3 o'clock on the morning of Sunday, April 6, Col. David Moore, Twenty-first Missouri, with five companies of his infantry regiment, proceeded to the front, and at break of day the advance pickets were driven in, whereupon Colonel Moore pushed forward and engaged the enemy's advance, commanded by General Hardee."

The message from Moore's messenger alerted Prentiss that Moore was at the front and wanted his other five companies. There is nothing despicable in what he wrote. Prentiss could not state who had sent Moore to the front because he did not know. Prentiss wrote what he believed had happened. "And at break of day the advance pickets were driven in.'' Prentiss did not know the "advance pickets" were, in fact, Powell's patrol. But Prentiss did note that after the advance pickets [Powell's patrol] were driven in Moore moved forward and engaged the enemy. Why Prentiss set the time of Moore's advance at 3:00 a.m. is not known but Prentiss did not identify Moore's movement to the front as a patrol. Prentiss was told Moore had met the enemy.

The Shiloh revisionist's claim that Prentiss took the credit for sending out Powell's patrol is just part of their false narrative based on no evidence. If the Shiloh revisionists have any evidence such as a speech, report, diary, newspaper article or something other than just a guess, let's see it. Provide a piece of evidence that shows Prentiss even knew about Powell's patrol because every time Prentiss spoke, or wrote, about the battle of Shiloh he always attributed the start of the fight to Colonel Moore's movement to the front. Prentiss never mentioned Powell's patrol because he never knew what had actually happened.

The building of a false narrative is always complicated and can be identified by the fact that the builders of a false narrative whine about everything. Apparently, the more falsehoods thrown out there the more likely the false narrative will be believed.

The Shiloh revisionists want you to believe that Prentiss "failed to mention Peabody in the general narrative of his report except to say that he had commanded one of his brigades" because he hated Peabody's guts because Peabody had embarrassed him by sending out a patrol against his orders which discovered the enemy and gave advance warning to the rest of the army. Once again, the revisionists project themselves upon Prentiss. Again, this is just an opinion. The revisionists have offered no evidence that Prentiss left Peabody out of the narrative of his report for any other reason than Prentiss could not describe Peabody's actions in his report because Prentiss did not know.

To whine about and put vile reasons to what Prentiss wrote, or did not write, in his official report is just part of the construction of the false narrative. The revisionists ignore the handicaps Prentiss faced when writing his report. Prentiss had been a prisoner for over seven months. There were no officers in the prisoner pool from the 25th Missouri who could, maybe, shed light on what happened the morning of April 6. When Prentiss prepared his report, he did not have access to, or had read, any of the other reports from any of his officers.

Prentiss had never read Major James E. Powell's report which, according to the American Battlefield Trust and not refuted by the Shiloh National Military Park, was used by Shiloh historians to prove Prentiss was a liar.

The last time Prentiss saw Peabody was in the camp of the 25th Missouri when Prentiss rode up to Peabody and said he would hold Peabody responsible for bringing on the engagement. Prentiss did not come back to a division headquarters where battle participants and his staff could have filled Prentiss in on what had happened. Prentiss went home to Quincy and there was no one there to help Prentiss prepare his report.

So, the revisionists whine about Prentiss not giving credit to Peabody for first finding the enemy. They whine about Prentiss not praising Peabody for the defense of his camp. How would Prentiss know what Peabody had done in defense of his camps unless someone told him? At one point Peabody rode off to find Prentiss but failed to do so. Then the revisionists complain that Prentiss did not describe the five bullet wounds Peabody received before falling dead from his horse.

Charles Morton of the 25th Missouri reported they saw Peabody's riderless horse bolt through the camp. But Peabody's fate was not discovered until the camp of the 25th Missouri was recovered the next day. Word was sent to Peabody's family in Massachusetts that Everett had been wounded. His brother, Frank, immediately left for Shiloh to aid his brother. But at Paducah Frank was informed that Everett had been killed in the battle. Frank proceeded to the battlefield and made arrangements to send Everett Peabody's body home for burial.

The Shiloh revisionists project dastardly motives for the fact that Prentiss made no note of Peabody's death in his report. But there is no evidence that Prentiss knew Peabody had been killed when he wrote his report. How would Prentiss have known Peabody was killed? By the time Peabody was found on April 7 Prentiss was already at Corinth headed for seven months in Confederate prisons.

There are five regimental reports for Peabody's brigade. These reports were prepared by officers who would have known of Peabody's death. Yet only one mentions it. Colonel Francis Quinn of the 12th Michigan wrote the only regimental report that contained notice of Peabody's death. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Van Horn wrote the report for the 25th Missouri and he didn't mention Peabody's death in it. Grant didn't mention the death of Peabody or Colonel Julius Raith in his report but there are several sentences about Sherman's boo-boo.

The Shiloh revisionists complain that Prentiss merely recognized Peabody as a brigade commander but wrote excessive praise for other officers in his command. Such excessive praise as this for Colonel J. S. Alban of the 18th Wisconsin. "Col. J. S. Alban and his lieutenant-colonel, Beall, of the Eighteenth Wisconsin, were, until they were wounded, ever to the front, encouraging their command." Excessive praise indeed. For Colonel Tindall of the 23rd Missouri Prentiss wrote, "Colonel Tindall, Lieutenant-Colonel Morton, and Major McCullough, of the Twenty-third Missouri are entitled to high meed of praise for gallant conduct." Tindall is mentioned along with two other officers from the 23rd Missouri. To a Shiloh revisionist the fact that Prentiss described the actions by the three officers from the 23rd Missouri as gallant is excessive.

History did not record the reactions of Tindall and Alban upon reading the excessive praise Prentiss had bestowed on them in his report. Neither is there recognition of how the praise benefitted their military careers. The reason history did not record such details is that Colonel Tindall and Colonel Alban were both dead.

Prentiss did not note the deaths of Tindall and Alban in his report. Why not? He knew they had been wounded but he did not know they had died. The last time Prentiss saw Peabody was in the camp of the 25th Missouri early on the morning of April 6. Prentiss knew nothing of what had happened to Peabody, including his death, after that encounter when he wrote his report. If Prentiss did not know Tindall and Alban had died of their wounds then it is very unlikely he knew Peabody's fate.

If you are a Shiloh revisionist and believe Prentiss did not mention Peabody in his report because he hated him, then prove it. We are not interested in just your feelings. Prove it. Tell us how Prentiss would have been told about Peabody's actions at Shiloh while he was a prisoner for seven months. Tell us who might have told Prentiss about Peabody on the trip from Washington, D.C. to Quincy, Illinois. Tell us who might have been in Quincy, Illinois while Prentiss spent the balance of his leave of absence there before he wrote his report.

Now we come to the most puzzling claim of all. Five years after accusing Prentiss of stolen valor at Shiloh the Shiloh revisionists suddenly devised a way to claim that it was WHL Wallace who commanded the vast majority (nearly 90 percent – Rethinking Shiloh – page 73) of the troops in the Hornets' Nest and if anybody should be known as "the Hero of Shiloh" it should be WHL Wallace, not Prentiss. The revisionists claim Wallace and Peabody went unrecognized because Prentiss stole their valor.

Note how the Shiloh revisionists have fabricated the narrative. First, in 2008, they accuse Prentiss of stolen valor using their false claim that Prentiss went on a speaking tour upon release from prison. Prentiss is accused of hogging all the credit at Shiloh by walking on the graves of Wallace and Peabody.
The Shiloh revisionists chose to make the controversial claim about Prentiss and stolen valor. For what reason is not clear. The revisionists have yet to realize that Prentiss never went on a speaking tour. That refutes the "evidence" they provided in 2008.

The format of first creating the narrative and then fabricating "evidence" to back it up is evident with the attempt to accuse Prentiss of taking credit for sending out Powell's patrol as previously discussed. Now to go along with that claim is the claim that it was WHL Wallace who commanded the most troops in the Hornets' Nest. No, it wasn't. Prentiss commanded the most men in the Hornets' Nest.

It was stunning to see in 2013 that the Shiloh revisionists constructed a false narrative by stating that there were 8,850 Federal soldiers in the Hornets' Nest and that 90 percent of them were from the brigades of James Tuttle and Thomas Sweeny of Wallace's division. (Rethinking Shiloh – page 73). The number of 8,850 Federals in the Hornets' Nest line was promoted to be a most detailed analysis by Stacy Allen.

Stacy Allen has the SNMP interpret the Hornets' Nest as being the area from the northwest edge of Duncan Field, where the 7th Illinois of Wallace's division tried to maintain contact with the 8th Illinois of McClernand's division, along the Sunken Road to the vicinity of the northwest corner of Sarah Bell's field. This is a distance of approximately 2600 feet (867 yards). (Information is from a short document titled "For interpretive staff use – Hornet's Nest Configuration by Stacy Allen dated 1993. There might be an update but the information from 1993 correlates with the claims in Rethinking Shiloh.)

Again, this makes no sense and the Shiloh revisionists do not explain the vast area they use as the Hornets' Nest versus the much smaller area where most of the fighting occurred and where Prentiss was most active.

Reading that there were 8,850 Federals in the Hornets' Nest is in direct conflict with what I first read, and remembered, in James Lee McDonough's Shiloh—in Hell before Night, page 143 "The Confederates flung a total of 18,000 attackers at the Hornets' Nest, which at no time was manned by more than 4,300 Union troops." Larry J. Daniel used the same number on page 209 of his book Shiloh – The Battle That Changed the Civil War "If the Federals, who numbered at least 4,300 troops and nineteen guns in that sector at that time, could have been dislodged, it would have occurred at this time." The report done by Major F. John Semley, "A Historical Analysis – The Battle of Shiloh April 6-7, 1862, completed in 1984 for the Air Command and Staff College uses the 4,300 number on page 11. The source cited is McDonough's book.

The original source of the 4,300 is Shiloh historian Donny Dosch's estimate contained in his article about the Hornets' Nest in the Tennessee Historical Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Summer 1978). A review of how Dosch analyzed the number of defenders in the Hornets' Nest shows that the estimate is about 500 troops too high.

Dosch estimated the number of men Prentiss rallied from his camps and the addition of the 23rd Missouri that joined the remnants in the Hornets' Nest at 1,000 men. To that Dosch added the regiments from WHL Wallace's division that took position along the Sunken Road and through Duncan Field. The units from right to left were the 7th IL (546), 58th IL (552), 2nd IA, (490), 7th IA (383), 12th IA (489), 14th IA (442), and 8th IA (689). The total is 3,652. Dosch added Prentiss's 1,000 and deducted 352 as noncombatants to derive his total of 4,300. Dosch ended his calculations with the 23rd Missouri and did not include the 31st and 44th Indiana regiments from Hurlbut's division.

While some of the Confederate assaults extended west into Duncan Field all the attacks included the eastern edge of Duncan Field and extended east to include the two Indiana regiments from Hurlbut's division for some of the attacks. This area has been designated as the Hornet's Nest on the SNMP pamphlet about the Hornets' Nest myth for over 20 years. Specifically, the SNMP pinpoints the Hornets' Nest with the following statement, "The terms "Hornet's Nest" and "Sunken Road" are loosely used to mean the same geographical area. In reality, they are much different entities. The Sunken Road, meaning Duncan's farm road, extended for three-fifths of a mile, connecting the Corinth Road and the River Road. The actual Hornet's Nest, by comparison, refers to the nearly six-hundred-yard-stretch of road in the center. This position, atop a small rise and fronting an almost impenetrable undergrowth, became the target of the numerous Confederate attacks on April 6."

In 2013 the revisionists doubled the number of Hornets' Nest defenders to 8,850 with no explanation that the number includes regiments that fought in Duncan Field outside of the true Hornets' Nest. The number also includes reserve regiments that simply were stationed in the area before being sent to Hurlbut's aid east of the Hamburg-Savannah Road. The 8th Illinois of McClernand's division is also included in the total. It appears that even two regiments from Prentiss's division (61st IL and 16th WI) are included in the total. This information comes from an order of battle prepared by Stacy Allen in 1992. The source for the 8,850 comes from a report, "Hornet's Nest Federal Line" by Stacy Allen in the SNMP archives. The report claims the front line is a distance of 2,500 feet, or 867 yards.

This is why the Shiloh revisionists make no sense. Their narrative is full of inconsistencies. This happens when you first devise a narrative and then shape the "evidence" to fit the narrative as opposed to searching for the truth. If the revisionists own facts get in the way they just ignore them.

The Shiloh pamphlet of the Hornets' Nest Myth clearly states the length of the Hornets' Nest is 600 yards, or 1800 feet. There is confusion amongst participants as to the exact location of the Hornets' Nest. But as the pamphlet states the Hornets' Nest is part of the Sunken Road. It is not the entire Sunken Road. Duncan Field is not the Hornets' Nest. It is Duncan Field. The 12th Iowa deployed across the Eastern Corinth Road with approximately one third of regiment west of the road extending northerly into Duncan Field. The 7th and 2nd Iowa regiments and the 58th Illinois were in the Sunken Road bordering Duncan Field. These three regiments were not in the Hornets' Nest but supported the troops that were. The 7th Illinois extended the line in Duncan Field, but the Sunken Road ended at the Corinth Road.

Six hundred yards is approximately one-third of a mile. Using the Trailheads Graphics map of Shiloh the distance from the 12th Iowa monument to the 44th Indiana monument is approximately one-third of a mile. Eight hundred sixty-seven yards is approximately one-half of a mile. That is the distance along the Sunken Road starting at the Corinth Road to where the short trail to the 44th Indiana monument begins.

The Shiloh revisionists do not explain what they use for the limits of the Hornets' Nest. Once you understand the revisionists' limits and the fact that they include regiments that were never even in the Hornets' Nest you can figure out how they came up with the exaggerated number of 8,850 versus Dosch's estimate of 4,300.

But Dosch's estimate is also too high. Dosch included the 7th and 58th Illinois and the 2nd and 4th Iowa while excluding the 31st and 44th Indiana regiments. The correct lineup for the men who fought in the Hornets' Nest is 12th Iowa (489), 14th Iowa (442), 8th Iowa (689), Prentiss's division remnants (500), 23rd Missouri (575), 31st Indiana (594), and the 44th Indiana (528). The correct total for the number of men in the Hornets' Nest is 3,817.
But now, 151 years after the battle, men who were not there claimed that if anyone should be considered the hero of the Hornets' Nest it is WHL Wallace, not Benjamin Prentiss. The revisionists claim that the only reason Prentiss became a hero of Shiloh was because he walked over WHL Wallace's grave and stole valor from Wallace. The first time the stolen valor charge was levelled at Prentiss was in 2008. Now, in 2013, the Shiloh revisionists provide "evidence" that most of the men in the Hornets' Nest were commanded by WHL Wallace.

That is why the number of defenders in the Hornets' Nest grew to 8,850 as opposed to the 4,300 number used in McDonough's and Daniel's books. The revisionists don't explain the new boundaries they used as opposed to ones Dosch used. The Shiloh revisionists are constructing a narrative. They claim Prentiss is guilty of stolen valor and are presenting their "evidence" in a manner to promote that conclusion.

But it doesn't work because the facts are stubborn things. To arrive at a total of 8,850 men in the Hornets' Nest the revisionists include a regiment from McClernand's division, regiments that never even fought in the Hornets' Nest, and regiments that fought in Duncan Field but not in the area designated by the SNMP itself as being in the 600-yard segment of the Sunken Road stretching from approximately the monument for the 12th Iowa to the monument for the 44th Indiana. That is the area where Prentiss had influence during the seven hours from approximately 9:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. In this area WHL Wallace had influence only with the 12th and 14th Iowa regiments. The major portion of WHL Wallace's influence dealt with his other regiments in Duncan Field and those originally held in reserve but dispersed to other areas of the battlefield where they were needed.

The Shiloh revisionists highlight the percentage of troops that were from Prentiss's division and the 23rd Missouri. To fit their narrative the revisionists take Prentiss's 1,100 men and divide it by 8,850 to arrive at a percentage of 12 percent. A pretty low sounding number. The Shiloh revisionists increased the number of men in the Hornets' Nest to show a much lower percentage for Prentiss than it actually was.

But the facts show that Prentiss's men numbered 1,100 of a total of 3,817. That works out to 29 percent for Prentiss. WHL Wallace (913) had 24 percent. Lauman (1,122) had 29 percent. The remaining balance of 18 percent rests with the special case of the 8th Iowa.

The 8th Iowa with 689 men filled a gap in the Hornets' Nest between Prentiss and the 14th Iowa when Prentiss asked Wallace for support. The 8th Iowa was from Wallace's division, and he ordered them into the position but afterwards issued them no orders. Colonel James Geddes, commander of the 8th Iowa, wrote in his report that once he took position in the Hornets' Nest, he received no orders from either his brigade commander (Sweeny) or his division commander (Wallace). But Prentiss gave orders to, and fought with, the 8th Iowa in the Hornets' Nest.

The facts, using the figures from David Wilson Reed's book, show that Prentiss commanded 47 percent of the men in the Hornets' Nest. Lauman commanded 29 percent, and Wallace came in third at 24 percent, less than one-quarter of the Hornets' Nest troops.

But you would never get that from the Shiloh revisionists as they pushed the false narrative that WHL Wallace commanded more men than Prentiss in the Hornets' Nest. The facts aren't on their side, so they increased the boundaries of the Hornets' Nest until it was large enough in size to fit their narrative. Then they conveniently ignored the fact that the 8th Iowa was commanded by Prentiss, not Wallace, in the Hornets' Nest.

But it didn't stop there. In Rethinking Shiloh, pages 73-74 we find the revisionists' mathematical skills at work with the following sentence, "In actuality, the majority of the troops (nearly 90 percent) in the Hornet's Nest were from Sweeny's and James Tuttle's brigades under Wallace, who commanded them until his wound at 5:00 p.m. (a mere thirty minutes before the surrender), with the extreme right units of Jacob's Lauman's brigade of Stephen Hurlbut's Division in the Peach Orchard also in the line."

For those familiar with Shiloh, it should instantly appear that the revisionist narrative in the above paragraph makes no sense. Ninety percent of 8,850 is 7,967. Sweeny had a large brigade with six regiments totaling 3,571 men. Tuttle's brigade had four smaller regiments totaling 1804 men. The two brigades had 5,375 troops. The difference between what the revisionists said they had and what they actually had is 2,608. The revisionists' claimed that only 10 percent of the 8,850 were not from either Sweeny's or Tuttle's brigade. Ten percent is 885 men and when you add that to the 2,608 it is calculated that 3,493 men were from other divisions than Wallace's.

Prentiss had 1,100 men and Lauman 1,122 for a total of 2,222. That leaves 1,271 mystery men from divisions other than Prentiss's, Wallace's, and Hurlbut's that were in the Hornets' Nest according to the revisionists. The intent of the revisionists' false narrative is to convince people that Prentiss was inconsequential in the Hornets' Nest, but Prentiss got to tell his story and steal the glory that rightfully should have gone to Wallace. So, they pad the Hornets' Nest number of troops with men from somewhere other than the divisions of Prentiss, Wallace, and Hurlbut according to the figures presented by the revisionists.

But not content with just falsifying the number of men in the Hornets' Nest there is the statement about Wallace being shot at 5:00 p.m., "(a mere thirty minutes before the surrender)." It is difficult to pinpoint the times of certain events, but Wallace was shot while the Iowa regiments (8th, 12th, 14th) still remained in the Hornets' Nest. Those regiments then retreated from the Hornets' Nest to Hell's Hollow and beyond. The last stand is generally thought to have lasted an hour to an hour and a half. These kinds of false statements are always made with the intention of denigrating Prentiss. Wallace was not shot a mere thirty minutes before the surrender of Prentiss and the remaining defenders. Wallace was probably shot closer to 4:00 p.m. than 5:00 p.m.

The following sentences from Rethinking Shiloh repeat the false narrative that Prentiss should not be known as a hero because he only commanded a slight minority in the Hornets' Nest. "Then, too, as the importance of the Hornet's Nest grew through the decades after the Civil War, so did Prentiss's defense. When historians concluded that the Hornet's Nest defense allowed Grant to form a new line and thus saved the Federal army from destruction, the fame heaped upon Prentiss only increased, despite the fact that he commanded only a slight minority of the men who fought in the Hornet's Nest."

Just because the Shiloh revisionists concoct a false narrative by using a different definition of the Hornets' Nest than the SNMP does, does not make it a fact. The heaviest fighting along the Sunken Road and Duncan Field occurred in the 600-yard section of the road known as the Hornets' Nest. There Prentiss commanded nearly twice as many men as did Wallace. That is a fact.

The Shiloh revisionists blame the men who were there for why historians got the public's view of Shiloh wrong and created a Prentiss myth. From Rethinking Shiloh we learn, "Historians who painted the picture of Prentiss as the hero of Shiloh were not culpable of weak research or shoddy work because in almost every case they were working from primary sources that literally instituted the Prentiss myth a hundred years prior. The early historiography of Shiloh thus sheds critical light on how and why historians have wrongly shaped the general public's view of Shiloh."

According to the Shiloh revisionists historians who wrote about Shiloh such as Colonel William Preston Johnston's 1879 biography of his father, The Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston; Manning Force's 1881 Campaigns of the Civil War: From Fort Henry to Corinth; David Wilson Reed's 1902 The Battle of Shiloh and the Organizations Engaged; Joseph Rich's 1911 The Battle of Shiloh; Otto Eisenschiml's 1946 The Story of Shiloh; all got it wrong. How fortunate we are that over 150 years after the battle the Shiloh revisionists have come along and determined that men who were there and were used as primary sources were the ones who instituted the Prentiss myth

The first miscreant is Brevet Brigadier General Andrew Hickenlooper who had the audacity to remember his impressions of Brigadier General Benjamin Prentiss's actions while he fought with him for over ten hours on April 6, 1862. Hickenlooper wrote an extensive paper on Shiloh that was published in Sketches of War History, 1861-1865, for the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, Ohio Commandery, Vol. 5, 1903. Here are two segments from the paper where Hickenlooper discussed Prentiss. The first segment notes Hickenlooper's observations upon taking a new position for his battery in the Hornets' Nest.

"When the battery reached this position I was brought into closer touch and more intimate relations with General Prentiss; had more time to contemplate his restless energy and terrible earnestness; saw the long line of determined men extending to the right and left as far as the eye could reach; observed regiments moving to the front instead of to the rear…The day wore on, gradually weakening our powers of resistance; the line was slowly melting away; our ammunition, several times replenished, was nearly exhausted, and the rebel lines could be plainly seen crossing the "peach orchard" in our rear, toward the only road over which escape seemed possible. It was then General Prentiss informed me that he feared it was too late for him to make the attempt to withdraw his infantry, but that I must pull out, and, if possible, reach the reserves, or forces forming in the rear. I bade the General—as brave a little man as ever lived (bold added)—good-by, and, under whip and spur, the remnant of our battery dashed down the road, barely escaping capture. He remained with his devoted followers, and with them accepted captivity rather than abandon the position he had been ordered to hold to the last."

The next segment is Hickenlooper's conclusion to his paper.

"Had Beauregard been given three or four hours more of daylight, is it not possible that he would have won the fight? Is it not certain that the Confederate advance was delayed for twice this length of time at the "Hornets' Nest" by the heroism of General Prentiss and his Sixth Division?
Had not Prentiss, without orders from his superiors, sent his gallant Colonel Moore by a night march far to the front; and had not the Fifth Battery, in thundering tones, awakened the slumbering camps in the rear; had not Prentiss held to the "Hornets' Nest for eight long hours, repulsing repeated desperate assaults, is it not probable that General Johnston would not only have "watered his horses in the Tennessee," but in the course of a brief period of time would have quenched his own thirst in the Ohio?

Similar devotion to duty upon the part of General George H. Thomas at the battle of Chickamauga gave him the credit of saving the Army of the Cumberland, and the enduring title of "The Rock of Chickamauga."

For identically the same reason, I claim for General B. M. Prentiss the title of "The Savior of the Army of the Tennessee at Shiloh, April 6th, 1862."

Colonel Francis Quinn of the 12th Michigan gave his opinion of Prentiss in his official report:

"At this time General Prentiss must have been taken prisoner. He was a brave man, and cheered his men to duty during the whole day. Where the fight was thickest and danger the greatest there was he found, and his presence gave renewed confidence."

Brigadier General Stephan Hurlbut observed Prentiss as the Sixth Division retreated from their camps:

"As we drew near the rear and left of General Prentiss' line his regiments, in broken masses, drifted through my advance, that gallant officer making every effort to rally them."

Later Hurlbut noted Prentiss had rallied some men and took position in the Hornets' Nest:

"General Prentiss having succeeded in rallying a considerable portion of his command, I permitted him to pass to the front of the right of my Third Brigade, where they redeemed their honor by maintaining that line for some time while ammunition was supplied to my regiments."
Lieutenant. S. D. Thompson of the 3rd Iowa wrote Recollections with the Third Iowa Regiment, and it was published in 1864. Thompson witnessed Prentiss trying to hold the enemy in check until nightfall. Thompson was aware of how Prentiss and the men with him were labelled cowards after the battle. Here are four excerpts of the book of a primary source who was there and whom the Shiloh revisionists blame for an incorrect analysis of Prentiss and the Hornets' Nest. The first excerpt describes the situation after Hurlbut had withdrawn and Prentiss had changed his line in order to face the Confederates pursuing Hurlbut's men.

"General Prentiss was now to our right with five regiments of Smith's division, endeavoring to hold the enemy in check. He rode up to the Major (Stone) and explained to him what he was trying to do—to hold the enemy in check, if possible, till the army could again form in the rear, or till night should put an end to the battle. He asked the Major to assist him, and that our regiment should become his left. The Major readily assented, and agreed to obey his orders."

Thompson described the fighting as the Confederates turned from Hurlbut to attack Prentiss's line.

"Here, then, if the spectacle of the field was appalling, it was sublime. Six regiments disputing the field with the enemy's army, and delaying his expected triumph. He crowded furiously on, assailing us in front and flank, his soldiers howling with mingled exultation and rage, their voices rising even above the din of battle. He no longer came in lines nor in columns, but in confused masses, broken in pursuit as our army had been in retreat. His missiles swept the field in all directions. Our dead fell thickly. Our wounded streamed to the rear. We no longer had lines of battle, but fought in squads and clusters. The settling smoke obscured the vision. Comrades knew not who stood or fell. All was confusion and chaos around us."

Thompson described the moment Prentiss's line was pierced by the Confederate attackers.

"A mass of the enemy broke the regiment [23rd Missouri] on our right and separated us from Prentiss. We were again compelled to retreat."
Thompson noted the situation Prentiss faced near the camp of the 3rd Iowa.

"Soon after, General Prentiss retreating with the remainder of his troops, came upon our camp ground, and looking forward, saw the gap closed through which he had hoped to escape. Exposed to a concentrated fire from all sides, his regiments completely broken, there was no alternative but to surrender…"

Thompson had not fought in the Hornets' Nest but credited Prentiss and the men with him for saving the army. Thompson wrote in 1864 how Prentiss and his men were branded as cowards after the battle. It took years for the true story of the Shiloh battle to finally emerge and the stigma of cowardice was removed from Prentiss and his men. Now the Shiloh revisionists declare such eyewitnesses as Lieutenant Thompson incorrect.

"The capture of General Prentiss affords a most striking example of the reward the most meritorious conduct may sometimes receive at the hands of public opinion. Because he held the field with a handful of troops, regardless of the number against him, and finally retreated, not to escape danger, but, when he saw the enemy surrounding him, to escape capture;--because he was thus willing to sacrifice himself, if necessary, to hold the enemy in check and save the army, the imputation of cowardice was cast upon him and the brave men who were captured with him. His fault consisted alone in not knowing when to retreat; theirs in obeying their general too well."

In 1890 James Price, Capt. of Company K, 18th Missouri applied for a pension and requested an affidavit from Jesse Abel as a witness to Price's service. The two men fought with Prentiss in the Hornets' Nest at Shiloh. It was that experience Abel wrote about in the affidavit dated July 3, 1890.

"I was a corporal in Company K, 18 Mo. Volunteer Infantry at the time of the battle of Shiloh. Jas. A. Price was the Captain of that company. Toward evening of the 6th of April 1862, the day of the battle I was with Capt. Price when Genl Prentiss rode by and told Capt. Price that if he ever expected to get out of his position he must get out within five minutes, as the enemy were then on both flanks and in our rear. Genl Prentiss rode on and in less than five minutes was made a prisoner. After considerable persuasion Capt. Price was induced to leave his position and attempt to escape through the rebel forces which were fast closing around us. The Captain and myself and fifteen others were all of our company together at this time. 12 of us ??? that escaped capture, and in fact nearly all of Gen. Prentiss command that escaped. No braver man ever looked into the muzzles of Rebel muskets than Capt. James A. Price. I was with him in the times that tried mens souls and I know whereof I speak."
Jesse A. Abel

After over twenty-eight years Abel remembered Prentiss riding amongst the men encouraging them to get out. To Jesse Abel and my great-great grandfather, Benjamin Prentiss is a hero, and they were there.

Prentiss was popular and respected by the men who knew the truth about Shiloh. Confirmation of that fact is found in an 1863 publication titled Beyond the Lines: A Yankee Prisoner Loose in Dixie by Captain J. J. Geer. Geer was captured at Shiloh on April 4, 1862, while outside the camps. He met Prentiss as they both were being held in Southern prisons and wrote of Prentiss in his book.

"I soon formed an agreeable acquaintance with General Prentiss, who was taken prisoner on Sunday, April 6th, 1862 at Shiloh. It had generally been reported that the General had surrendered early in the morning; but this was false, for I now learned that he did not give up until five o'clock in the afternoon, thus holding at least five or six times his own number in check the whole of that dreadful day. Without doubt, history will do the gallant hero justice; for on that bloody field he displayed coolness and heroism seldom equaled, and never excelled."

"I found General Prentiss not one of your half-hearted war men, who fight conditionally, but a whole-souled patriot, who would destroy the institution that is the root of the war. He would not see the glorious banner trailed in the dust to uphold a few Southern aristocrats in perpetuating their horrid system of human bondage."

"General Prentiss was kind and affable to all around him, and among fifteen hundred men of his command with whom I freely conversed, there was not one who did not love and respect him."

The esteem held for Prentiss by his colleagues is reflected in the following photograph of a group of Shiloh survivors at a reunion at the newly formed Shiloh National Military Park in 1896. Prentiss is proudly centered and elevated in the center of the picture wearing a black hat.

​

It took about 20 years for Prentiss and the defenders of the Hornets' Nest to start to receive justice for their actions at Shiloh. After the Shiloh National Military Park was started in 1895 the history of the battle was written and Prentiss and the defenders of the Hornets' Nest were recognized for their conduct during the battle. At the turn of the century it was recognized that Colonel Peabody had sent out Powell's early morning patrol and not Prentiss.
But when the first full-length Shiloh books started coming out in the 1970s the historians accused Prentiss of taking credit from Peabody for sending out Powell's patrol. In addition, the historians started making claims that Prentiss had purposefully omitted Peabody's actions from his official report. The Shiloh National Military Park, rather than defend the true history of the park, piled on instead.

The revisionist history that Prentiss took credit away from Peabody was not sufficient for the Shiloh National Military Park. The SNMP decided around the year 2000 that Prentiss had received, because of his big mouth, more credit in the Hornets' Nest than he deserved. But not only had Prentiss received too much credit, the defenders in the Hornets' Nest had also received too much credit because they too, had big mouths. The Hornets' Nest had to be taken down a peg or two.

Thus, was born the Hornets' Nest myth. The SNMP began to tell the descendants of soldiers who were proud to have fought with Prentiss in the Hornets' Nest that where their ancestors had fought and died was not that important. That David Wilson Reed had incorrectly written about the Hornets' Nest because he had fought there. The Hornets' Nest was really just incidental to the outcome of the battle. The Hornets' Nest was the least fought-over area of the battlefield and there was little action in Duncan Field. The Last Stand was not necessary because Grant had assembled such a strong final line that the Confederates could not have taken it. How could Prentiss have known how strong the final line was and how strong an assault the Confederates could have launched but didn't because of the time lost in subduing the last group of soldiers still fighting?

Not content with just falsely vilifying Prentiss for taking credit from Peabody the Shiloh revisionists decided to add WHL Wallace to the mix. Now Prentiss is vilified for taking credit from WHL Wallace too. This aspect did not arrive until 2013, 151 years after the battle.

But the biggest insult to the descendants of the men who fought in the Hornets' Nest is that the men captured (of which my great-great-grandfather was one) are not considered to be casualties by the SNMP and the Shiloh revisionists. But any man who was captured anywhere else on the battlefield is considered a casualty. This is because the Shiloh revisionists compare only the killed and wounded in the Hornets' Nest against the killed, wounded, and captured elsewhere on the battlefield. By eliminating approximately 2,000 prisoners (many of whom were wounded) from the casualty lists for the regiments that fought in the Hornets' Nest the Shiloh revisionists change the facts so they can say that the fighting in the Hornets' Nest is overemphasized and that other regiments suffered more casualties on other areas of the battlefield. That shows how the narrative was chosen first and then the facts changed to support the narrative.

In the movie The Bridge on the River Kwai (1957) the British Colonel Robinson constructed a strong bridge for the Japanese. A group of allied commandos were sent to blow up the bridge. Colonel Robinson almost thwarts the efforts to blow up the bridge by exposing the commando unit to the Japanese. The commandos are killed and Colonel Robinson wounded. The situation finally dawns on Colonel Robinson and his last words spoken are "What have I done? He then falls dead on the blasting machine and the bridge blows up.

One wonders whether the Shiloh revisionists will ever understand what they have done.

The truth lies with Prentiss and the men, North and South, who fought in the Hornets' Nest.

HeroPrentiss

 

[DanSBHawk]

I think the quoted part of Prentiss' report does in fact show a bit overly-dramatic claim about saving the day:

...General Wallace and myself consulted, and agreed to hold our positions at all hazards, believing that we could thus save the army from destruction; we having been now informed for the first time that all others had fallen back to the vicinity of the river."

With Wallace being dead we have no idea whether he would have supported this account. I noticed that Prentiss claims that Wallace was shot and then his troops began retreating. It's been my understanding that WHL Wallace was shot while trying to retreat with his troops.

 

[DanSBHawk]

A review of the public speeches Prentiss made about Shiloh helps to understand why the revisionists never provide any evidence to back up their claims that Prentiss took credit from WHL Wallace by declaring himself the hero of Shiloh. That Prentiss walked over the grave of Peabody and took credit for sending out Powell's patrol. That Prentiss wrote the history of Shiloh. That Prentiss stole valor for himself.

Here is a list of the day and location of the public speeches Prentiss made about Shiloh after being released from Southern prisons.

October 17, 1862 – Washington D.C.
October 21, 1862 -- Chicago, Illinois
January 12, 1882, -- Cincinnati, Ohio​

How sure of this are you? A quick search suggests he gave more speeches in October 1862.

I understand that you feel very passionate about this, but your attacks against Tim Smith and others is distasteful in my opinion. Tim Smith is a very credible historian. Rather than posting an interminably long post, why not concisely post the specific disagreements you have with Smith and we can debate them one by one?

 

[Northstep]

I appreciate your interminably post and was never bored. However, I know very little about the controversy surrounding Col. Prentiss' service, so your thorough description provides a good foundation for understanding the issues. You present a very compelling argument for many of your opinions and facts. I understand your passion and admire your devotion to your ancestor and desire for the truth to be told. It is obviously you have done a great deal of research.
I, too, would love to see your research findings compared, one-by-one, to those of other historians. A true professional historian or researcher should welcome this challenge. I believe this is the only way for you to be heard and to resolve some of these issues.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

It's been my understanding that WHL Wallace was shot while trying to retreat with his troops.

The circumstances of Wallace's mortal wounding at the Hornet's Nest are contained in the following description:-

…"The Confederates attacked this Federal position that would became known as the Hornet's Nest over and over with infantry and concentrated artillery fire, but the defenders held on. Around 4 p.m., the line began to collapse as the Rebels fought their way around the Union flanks, and placed additional pressure on the center of the Hornet's Nest. With the Rebels closing in, and after fighting a successful six hour delaying action, Wallace decided to have his men fight their way out and pull back towards the river, where the Federals were regrouping and setting up another defensive line.

As his men were fighting their way out, Wallace's aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Cyrus E. Dickey (who was also Wallace's brother-in-law), pointed out some enemy troops to the general. The two were on horseback, and Wallace rose up to get a better view. As he did so, a bullet hit him in the head behind the left ear and exited out his left eye. The general immediately fell to the ground.
Dickey believed Wallace was dead, and along with three others attempted to remove him from the field. They had only carried Wallace about a quarter mile before they were forced to leave him behind, as the group was in the line of intensive fire from both sides and was also in danger of being overrun by the Confederates. Wallace was placed near some ammunition boxes, in the hope he would not be trampled on by horses and soldiers.

A Federal counterattack on April 7th turned the tide of battle, and the Confederates were driven from the field, giving the Union a very costly victory in the Battle of Shiloh. About 9 a.m. that morning, Union soldiers found Wallace where he had been left. Incredibly, despite the severe head wound and the fact that he had lain outside in heavy overnight rains, Wallace was still alive. He was placed on board a river transport and taken to Cherry Mansion, Grant's headquarters in Savannah."…

(Source: The Death of General W.H.L Wallace at the Battle of Shiloh – Iron Brigader )

From this description, a mounted Wallace was shot while in the process of directing his troops who were fighting their way out of the line (and pulling back towards the river).

 

[RedRover]

The first I read of the Prentiss/Hornets nest story as if "myth" concocted by the prisoners of Prentiss' command and promoted by P.'s "politicking" for many decades, was in Horwitz' best-selling "Confederates in the Attic" (1998), 178-179, in which the author records informal conversations on the battlefield park making such suggestions.

 

[TallTallMan]

The first I read of the Prentiss/Hornets nest story as if "myth" concocted by the prisoners of Prentiss' command and promoted by P.'s "politicking" for many decades, was in Horwitz' best-selling "Confederates in the Attic" (1998), 178-179, in which the author records informal conversations on the battlefield park making such suggestions.

Just read that one! Actually I really enjoyed that segment. I'll never view Shiloh the same again.

 

[RedRover]

Just read that one! Actually I really enjoyed that segment. I'll never view Shiloh the same again.

Perhaps that book and its success and suggestions was a big part of the "paradigm shift."

That shift's accuracy being the point of the original post, I recalled that where Prentiss reported later he held out for victory on April 6, General Grant testified post-war that it was not post-battle bombast; as so far as he observed on the afternoon of April 6, that was indeed General Prentiss' outlook prior to his capture.

 

[SSVilla]

I've never been much interested in Prentiss claims but I was curious to find an account he gave to a meeting of veterans that Grant referenced in his article on Battles and Leaders here:

"THE battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing, fought on Sunday and Monday, the 6th and 7th of April, 1862, has been perhaps less understood, or, to state the case more accurately, more persistently misunderstood, than any other engagement between National and Confederate troops during the entire rebellion. Correct reports of the battle have been published, notably by Sherman, Badeau, and, in a speech before a meeting of veterans, by General Prentiss; but all of these appeared long subsequent to the close of the rebellion, and after public opinion had been most erroneously formed."

Excerpt From Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Vol I,

I looked lightly online for Prentiss' account but couldn't find it and let that go. Instead I found a newspaper report which I didn't save in which Prentiss did make grandiose claims that he saved "Grant's army" at Shiloh. It was given after his release from a confederate prison and most of the article was about his time spent there. He was rather pompous then but he wasn't necessarily inaccurate just perhaps self aggrandized. Prentiss had been under attack in the newspapers as having surrendered early in the day, so I think he was adamant in pointing the opposite.

I wish I'd saved it. I never found the account he gave before the veterans meeting either.

 

[RedRover]

My presumption is that General Grant's memoir (1885) is referring to the below speech by General Prentiss as publicly printed in 1883.

 

[SSVilla]

Perhaps that book and its success and suggestions was a big part of the "paradigm shift."

That shift's accuracy being the point of the original post, I recalled that where Prentiss reported later he held out for victory on April 6, General Grant testified post-war that it was not post-battle bombast; as so far as he observed on the afternoon of April 6, that was indeed General Prentiss' outlook prior to his capture.

View attachment 527117

Ohhh that's insightful. I missed the significance of that tidbit.

It seems Prentiss wanted to be known as the "Rock of Shiloh"
Now that particular little incident is fascinating.

His statement that he was about to save Grant's army in that newspaper really is what he thought he was doing — no exaggeration about it.

I don't know for others, but for me the people of that time are fascinating…

I have an anecdote about General Prentiss that is a little funny but also reveals something about his personality. Excuse my highlights but I saved this one from I think it was from the Memoirs of General John Pope. I wanted to share it in that thread about the Grant's humor.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

"Stolen Valor" refers to the falsification of military service. As there is no question Prentiss served, merely in the accuracy of his description of events and the importance of those events in the outcome of the battle, the term is not applicable here.

I expect a well-researched and cited book about Prentiss would find a willing publisher in Savas Beatie.

For those interested in the truth about Shiloh

But the Shiloh revisionists are not content to label such scurrilous charges just against Prentiss.

This is not language that will encourage people to be open-minded about your claims.

Prentiss wrote that he and Wallace believed that if they held their positions the army would be saved. Prentiss did not claim that he had saved the day for the Union.

These sentences seem contradictory to me.

 

[SSVilla]

"Stolen Valor" refers to the falsification of military service. As there is no question Prentiss served, merely in the accuracy of his description of events and the importance of those events in the outcome of the battle, the term is not applicable here.

I expect a well-researched and cited book about Prentiss would find a willing publisher in Savas Beatie.




This is not language that will encourage people to be open-minded about your claims.



These sentences seem contradictory to me.

For me, understanding the OP was difficult. It was an argumentative piece debating what he terms revisionists. It would have been easier to read an account of what actually happened in terms of Prentiss' original military reports (of which links are provided) and then what Prentiss said afterwards to the Press, and the veterans meetings. Then you'd review the perception through time (which could include other reports, what other people wrote about him, etc. until he takes us to the more recent accounts, what he calls revisionists, etc.) It's quite a historiography of Prentiss, the Hornets nest, Peabody, Wallace, etc. That would be an essay at least, and a well researched, well written piece could find a market. It's just presented here in such a format that it's not easy to understand and he won't persuade people with just such an argumentative tone. After all, we readers want ultimately to understand what did happen first of all, then we can be enlightened about perceptions and reputations, etc.

I realize that sometimes even understanding what did happen is uncertain and conflicting accounts abound…

 

[USS ALASKA]

"Stolen Valor" refers to the falsification of military service. As there is no question Prentiss served, merely in the accuracy of his description of events and the importance of those events in the outcome of the battle, the term is not applicable here.

The current Stolen Valor Act...

The Stolen Valor Act of 2013 is a United States federal law that was passed by the 113th United States Congress. The law amends the federal criminal code to make it a crime for a person to fraudulently claim having received a valor award specified in the Act, with the intention of obtaining money, property, or other tangible benefit by convincing another that they received the award.

The law is a revised version of a previous statute with roughly the same name that had been struck down by the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Alvarez (2012). In that case, the Supreme Court ruled the arrest and prosecution of a citizen for wearing and claiming to have received unearned military awards, who did so without criminal intent, under the 2005 law violates their constitutional right to freedom of speech.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stolen_Valor_Act_of_2013

Under current statues, Prentiss could have worn or stated anything he wanted...until he tried to use false claims for financial gain.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[CSuniforms]

I have been studying the Prentiss-Wallace diatribe on who did save Grant's Army that day and did anyone really save Grant's Army from being overwhelmed the the late Afternoon of the 6th. Sherman says General Sweeny saved him as the Hero of Shiloh! Others say the arrival of some of Buell's Regiments around 4 PM held the line and saved Grant. Some Confederates state that the Hornet's Nest was unbreakable and the delay in taking that position cost them valuable time and a lot casualties. I found an article written 40 years after the Battle that the Artillery were the real Hero's at Shiloh! Others I found talked about the flanks at Shiloh-- Shoup of the Confederate Artillery one of them. He states the only way to move Infantry or Artillery is to flank them. That the Confederates learned early that flanking a position worked. Shoup also states that his Artillery fire by Ruggle's 53 to 62 guns did not move Prenitss and Wallace, --that they were already moving out being flanked by their Infantry. Grant came down around 4 PM and told Prentiss to hold as long as he could and Prentiss told him he would try-- and did hold for another hour until "Flanked". Who was the real Hero of Shiloh-- Well we all have opinions!!! You can say Grant by asking all to hold-- he gave the order which might have saved his Army. He did not order his soldiers to fall back to the Landing but fight and hold!! Is Grant the Hero?? Who get first "dibs" on who was the Hero? Us, years later ---or the soldiers and Officers themselves who fought at Shiloh-- who bestowed that Honor and told us who they believed was responsible for the "saving of the Army" that day. And that man was heralded as General Prentiss and the "Hornet's Nest Brigade" stated they were too! You can accept it or deny it-- A good thing for Historians to ponder and write about. I find that Prentiss at Shiloh was given that Honor or title-- by the men who fought with him. Hickenlooper of the 5th Ohio Battery after the War did in 1903! Prentiss and Wallace held until flanked and surrounded around 5:30 PM-- were rounded up and started South at 6 PM. The Confederates were still a mile or so from the Landing-- Prentiss and Wallace did hold up the CS advance allowing Sweeny, Hurlbut and Stuart to escape into the Federal line at Pittsburg Landing. Some of Tuttle's men got out too! Was Webster a Hero for setting up that last line of defense?? The Confederates attacked that evening and were repulsed-- Great discussion and in the end we will find out who was the "Hero" of Shiloh? Maybe all those Western men who would not give up the day!!! They fought on their own-- It was truly a Soldiers fight-- AMEN.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Great discussion and in the end we will find out who was the "Hero" of Shiloh? Maybe all those Western men who would not give up the day!

Ultimately the pursuit of a single "The Hero of [insert any battle name here]" is usually futile. Rarely is there a single decisive actor or action, and not every heroic act is decisive.

 

[CSuniforms]

No- It was Prentiss-- He got all the accolades-- from his Division and "The Hornet's Nest Brigade"- It was a great toast made-- [lots of toasts to the Hero]-- then more toasts-- Everyone had an opinion. The ones who get to say who-- are the Veterans themselves.