Confederate Strength 1862

[Saphroneth]

Has it crossed your mind that the massive difference between the numbers is the point?

If the numbers Connelly used were not correct then the conclusions would be based on a false premise. That, of course, leads to false conclusions.

Hundreds of thousands of his readers know that Connelly's research was meticulous. You have now joined that host. Welcome to the club.

You can now read the books secure in the knowledge that Connelly's reputation as a first class scholar is deserved. After reading the books you will understand why Connelly used those citations, which is after all, the whole point of the exercise.

Well, what you were saying was that Wheeler's reports were "confusing" and "wildly inaccurate" (and "inaccurate"), and that there was an "extreme" difference between the numbers Wheeler reported and the numbers he actually had.

But it now appears that what you actually meant - and do forgive me if I'm wrong, I'm trying my best - is that the effective strength on Wheeler's reports is much lower than the Present and Absent on Wheeler's reports.

If that's the case, then it's not that Wheeler's reports were inaccurate - they are, after all, accurately reporting his effective strength. It's that Wheeler's effectives to P&A ratio was very low.


That's something different. It means that the reports are correct, not "wildly inaccurate", and that there's not an "extreme" difference between what Wheeler reported and what he had, because he reported what he had - it just means that Wheeler was not good at converting muster strength into effectives, which appears partly to have been the result of serious and ongoing horse shortages (given that his PFD is much higher in the April 30 1864 report than his effectives, which means he has a lot of men with his unit and reporting for duty but not effective combatants).


That a report has a major difference between Present and Absent and Effectives is... well, normal. Look at Sherman's March:

120,000 AP&A and only 63,000 PFD; Sherman doesn't even report his effectives.

Look at the Dept. of the South:

18,000 AP&A and they generate 7,500 PFD (again, not even giving an effective strength). The 2nd Separate Brigade is particularly notable, from 2,900 AP&A they generate less than 800 PFD.


Look at the Union armies on June 30 1864:

Meade has 86,500 PFD on almost 200,000 Aggregate Present and Absent; that doesn't mean his reports are inaccurate, it means they are accurately reflecting a situation where his force is diminished more than we would normally expect.


I think for reports to be inaccurate they have to be not reflecting the true situation. I think it's quite plausible that Wheeler's report was not reflecting the true situation, but the source you pointed me at was using Wheeler's strength report as the true situation, and now you seem to be agreeing that Wheeler's report is indeed the true situation and that it's the nature of that true situation (the small Effectives for a large AP&A) which is the point.

So... how is Wheeler's report inaccurate? What am I missing?

 

[Rhea Cole]

Well, what you were saying was that Wheeler's reports were "confusing" and "wildly inaccurate" (and "inaccurate"), and that there was an "extreme" difference between the numbers Wheeler reported and the numbers he actually had.

But it now appears that what you actually meant - and do forgive me if I'm wrong, I'm trying my best - is that the effective strength on Wheeler's reports is much lower than the Present and Absent on Wheeler's reports.

If that's the case, then it's not that Wheeler's reports were inaccurate - they are, after all, accurately reporting his effective strength. It's that Wheeler's effectives to P&A ratio was very low.


That's something different. It means that the reports are correct, not "wildly inaccurate", and that there's not an "extreme" difference between what Wheeler reported and what he had, because he reported what he had - it just means that Wheeler was not good at converting muster strength into effectives, which appears partly to have been the result of serious and ongoing horse shortages (given that his PFD is much higher in the April 30 1864 report than his effectives, which means he has a lot of men with his unit and reporting for duty but not effective combatants).


That a report has a major difference between Present and Absent and Effectives is... well, normal. Look at Sherman's March:


View attachment 402344


120,000 AP&A and only 63,000 PFD; Sherman doesn't even report his effectives.

Look at the Dept. of the South:

View attachment 402345

18,000 AP&A and they generate 7,500 PFD (again, not even giving an effective strength). The 2nd Separate Brigade is particularly notable, from 2,900 AP&A they generate less than 800 PFD.


Look at the Union armies on June 30 1864:

View attachment 402348


Meade has 86,500 PFD on almost 200,000 Aggregate Present and Absent; that doesn't mean his reports are inaccurate, it means they are accurately reflecting a situation where his force is diminished more than we would normally expect.


I think for reports to be inaccurate they have to be not reflecting the true situation. I think it's quite plausible that Wheeler's report was not reflecting the true situation, but the source you pointed me at was using Wheeler's strength report as the true situation, and now you seem to be agreeing that Wheeler's report is indeed the true situation and that it's the nature of that true situation (the small Effectives for a large AP&A) which is the point.

So... how is Wheeler's report inaccurate? What am I missing?

View attachment 402349

How many times must I have to repeat myself… putting words into my mouth & ideas into my head that only exist on your imagination isn't what this is about.

When you have finished reading the books you will, in all likelihood, understand the point I was making.

 

[Saphroneth]

How many times must I have to repeat myself… putting words into my mouth & ideas into my head that only exist on your imagination isn't what this is about.

I have bolded here the key points.

Spoiler: You Said:

The king of confusing returns was Joe Wheeler. At one point, IG found that the number of troopers mounted & ready for duty was 10% of Wheeler's reported strength.

Folks who study Wheeler report that as usual, his returns are wildly inaccurate.

Nobody who is at all familiar with Wheeler's returns takes a one of them at face value, e.g. The extreme difference between what Wheeler reported & the numbers he actually had drives historians to distraction. Drilling down to actual numbers is, I am assured, vexing in the extreme.

I haven't studied Wheeler's operations in detail for quite a while, but everything I ever read took note of both his inaccurate returns & magical thinking style reports.

Do you mean by this that Wheeler's numerical returns were, in fact, accurate representations of the strength he had at the time? If not, what do you mean?

 

[Rhea Cole]

You said:








I have bolded here the key points.


Do you mean by this that Wheeler's numerical returns were, in fact, accurate representations of the strength he had at the time? If not, what do you mean?

READ THE BOOKS. THAT IS, IN FACT, WHAT I AM SAYING.


Note:
If, as it appears, all you want to do is some kind of accounting exercise, people have been going over Connelly's Army of Tennessee duo with a fine tooth comb for 60 years. You really should find one of them to compare notes with

 

[Saphroneth]

READ THE BOOKS. THAT IS, IN FACT, WHAT I AM SAYING.

At this point I have read quite a lot of the book which you directed me to. I looked up Wheeler in the book, as you directed me, and have examined the detailed analysis and followed the footnotes (as you told me to do):

Connelly, 'Autumn of Glory' I am not at home, but it won't take you very long to look up Wheeler in the back & turn to Connelly's detailed analysis & footnotes. As usual, Connelly was very thorough. I made copies of AG reports, which are especially damning. My copy has blue post it notes marking the pages & some very tattered hard copies from the OR enter leaved. Definitely a relic of another age of the world.

I haven't studied Wheeler's operations in detail for quite a while, but everything I ever read took note of both his inaccurate returns & magical thinking style reports.

I have not yet run into any case where Connelly describes Wheeler's returns as inaccurate. I've run into plenty of cases where Wheeler is described as being a poor commander and making bad decisions, but nothing about his returns being inaccurate and several places where Connelly cites Wheeler's returns as his (sole) source for his statement about Wheeler's numerical strength at that time.

Is there a section I missed where Connelly explains that, actually, when he says how many men Wheeler had (and cites Wheeler's returns in the OR) he means Wheeler had half as many men as that but he's not going to bother explaining that?

Because otherwise you're just telling me to read a whole book, and then I'll understand you, and if I don't then I just need to read the book again... but I have read the relevant sections of the book by any reasonable measure (i.e. the sections where Connelly talks about Wheeler's strength and references his returns) and it seems clear to me that Connelly is using Wheeler's returns as a true picture of Wheeler's strength.

 

[Rhea Cole]

At this point I have read quite a lot of the book which you directed me to. I looked up Wheeler in the book, as you directed me, and have examined the detailed analysis and followed the footnotes (as you told me to do):



I have not yet run into any case where Connelly describes Wheeler's returns as inaccurate. I've run into plenty of cases where Wheeler is described as being a poor commander and making bad decisions, but nothing about his returns being inaccurate and several places where Connelly cites Wheeler's returns as his (sole) source for his statement about Wheeler's numerical strength at that time.

Is there a section I missed where Connelly explains that, actually, when he says how many men Wheeler had (and cites Wheeler's returns in the OR) he means Wheeler had half as many men as that but he's not going to bother explaining that?

Because otherwise you're just telling me to read a whole book, and then I'll understand you, and if I don't then I just need to read the book again... but I have read the relevant sections of the book by any reasonable measure (i.e. the sections where Connelly talks about Wheeler's strength and references his returns) and it seems clear to me that Connelly is using Wheeler's returns as a true picture of Wheeler's strength.

READ THE BOOKS

 

[Saphroneth]

If, as it appears, all you want to do is some kind of accounting exercise, people have been going over Connelly's Army of Tennessee duo with a fine tooth comb for 60 years. You really should find one of them to compare notes with

What I want to do is to understand the extent to which Wheeler's returns were incorrect; you pointed me at Autumn of Glory, and I've as yet not found an example of Wheeler's returns being treated as incorrect within the pages.

What I have found is:
- Several examples of Wheeler being described as exaggerating the prospects of success from an offensive operation.
- Wheeler reporting his own results in an overly positive tone.
- Wheeler's strength given (without caveat) by reference to returns in the ORs, in multiple places.


I went into this expecting to find a case where Connelly cited one of Wheeler's returns and then explained how it was wrong; I have not found that. Are they there and I'm just not looking in the right place?

 

[Rhea Cole]

What I want to do is to understand the extent to which Wheeler's returns were incorrect; you pointed me at Autumn of Glory, and I've as yet not found an example of Wheeler's returns being treated as incorrect within the pages.

What I have found is:
- Several examples of Wheeler being described as exaggerating the prospects of success from an offensive operation.
- Wheeler reporting his own results in an overly positive tone.
- Wheeler's strength given (without caveat) by reference to returns in the ORs, in multiple places.


I went into this expecting to find a case where Connelly cited one of Wheeler's returns and then explained how it was wrong; I have not found that. Are they there and I'm just not looking in the right place?

I haven't a clue what you are trying to do. My interest is in history, not word games. Read the books.

 

[Saphroneth]

I haven't a clue what you are trying to do. My interest is in history, not word games. Read the books.

What I am trying to do is to get an example of where Wheeler's strength returns are inaccurate, and by how much, and how we know it. Is that in the books? If so, where?

 

[atlantis]

Wasn't the army under strength [below authorized strength] thru out 62.

 

[Saphroneth]

Wasn't the army under strength [below authorized strength] thru out 62.

Not sure if the Confederate one was. I believe on paper the Union army was overstrength in early 1862 (i.e. it had too many men on the rolls - Aggregate Present and Absent - even though it had way less than 500,000 PFD) and this led to the closing of recruitment on the grounds the army was overstrength. This however caused huge problems down the line.

 

[atlantis]

Not sure if the Confederate one was. I believe on paper the Union army was overstrength in early 1862 (i.e. it had too many men on the rolls - Aggregate Present and Absent - even though it had way less than 500,000 PFD) and this led to the closing of recruitment on the grounds the army was overstrength. This however caused huge problems down the line.

So should strength be determined by PFD?

 

[Saphroneth]

So should strength be determined by PFD?

I think that if the army is authorized to be up to a certain strength and no higher, that strength shouldn't count men absent - or, at the very least, men absent without leave. It should also not be a "one and done" decision - if the army is authorized to be up to a certain strength and you close down recruitment because you've got more men than that, as soon as you begin losing men you should reexamine that decision.

Fundamentally the problem is a lack of understanding at the highest levels of the difference between 1,000 men PFD, 1,000 effectives and 1,000 men on the rolls. It's quite possible for a regiment (1,000 men, theoretically, meaning on the rolls) to generate only a few hundred men actually in the line of battle, and that process of diminuition begins before the regiment even marches out of camp because some men simply can't endure the stresses of camp life... including all the illnesses that result from large concentrations of the population in one place.


Enlist 50,000 men and you'll get perhaps 42,000 who actually turn up to the first battlefield once they've gone through some training. Or less. And the problem continues from there.


If the question is how to evaluate army strength, then I think any measure will do so long as it's:
1) Consistent (for example, US army regulation PFD, or effective line strength) for whatever forces you are comparing or aggregating.
2) NOT strength on the rolls, as this includes men who aren't with the army (including deserters, prisoners of the enemy and those who have died but not been identified to have done so).


This sometimes involves being careful to catch places where the definitions being used are inconsistent or change in period sources.

 

[Bruce Vail]

"History Net had this to say about the staggering decline in Lee's army.

It is believed that Lee had no more than 40,000 men at Sharpsburg. ... and the 3rd North Carolina, recently augmented with conscripts, numbered 983."

I looked for this article on line but could not find it. Do you have a link?

 

[Saphroneth]

It's worth pointing out that if you go through unit by unit you seem to end up with more like 47,000 effectives at Sharpsburg/Antietam. That's not counting anyone who was still with the army but had straggled away from their unit.

In particular DH Hill claimed his division had 3,000 infantry, which would make the 3rd NC nearly one-third of the entire division.
3rd NC: 983 (from above)

Via Clemens notes:

Rodes brigade: 3rd, 6th, 12th Alabama 840 men, exclusive of officers from the 12th
6th Georgia: 300+
23rd Georgia: 485 men (not officers)
27th Georgia: 400 men (not officers)
28th Georgia: 250 men
5th NC: 625 men at Antietam

This means that these 9 regiments out of the 23 in the division add to more than 3,883 - which is by itself more than DH Hill claimed.


Adding the September 22 return (~36,000, plus cavalry at about 5,700, plus reserve artillery at about 700) to the casualties suffered actually at Antietam (about 12,000) gives around 55,000, which means that 47,000 isn't crazy high.

 

[Bruce Vail]

Col. Hamilton Brown of the 1st NC Infantry Regiment provided a micro view on this issue when he wrote about his experience many years after the war.

The regiment was at full strength in June/July 1861 having been mustered in during the first flush of recruitment with enthusiastic war volunteers. The regiment saw no real combat during its first year, but did suffer some serious losses in the Battle of the Seven Days. After that battle Col. Brown traveled from Richmond to Raleigh in July 1862 to retrieve the company's first batch of conscripts, which he estimated at "about 500."

At 500, the number of replacements thus represented a 40 percent to 50 percent loss in men during the regiment's first year in service. I have no idea whether this percentage was representative of the Army of Northern Virginia, or of the total Confederate armed forces, but it does offer some clue to urgency of an active conscription policy in mid-1862.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Col. Hamilton Brown of the 1st NC Infantry Regiment provided a micro view on this issue when he wrote about his experience many years after the war.

The regiment was at full strength in June/July 1861 having been mustered in during the first flush of recruitment with enthusiastic war volunteers. The regiment saw no real combat during its first year, but did suffer some serious losses in the Battle of the Seven Days. After that battle Col. Brown traveled from Richmond to Raleigh in July 1862 to retrieve the company's first batch of conscripts, which he estimated at "about 500."

At 500, the number of replacements thus represented a 40 percent to 50 percent loss in men during the regiment's first year in service. I have no idea whether this percentage was representative of the Army of Northern Virginia, or of the total Confederate armed forces, but it does offer some clue to urgency of an active conscription policy in mid-1862.

You have raised a good point. Under Lee's command the A of NV suffered abut 240,000 casualties. Under Lee's command my NC relations' regiment lost 80% & my wife's G-G-grandad's 3rd GA 40% at Gettysburg. Benjamin Lester was known as the only man from his country that came home whole.

Here in Rutherford Co TN, virtually the entire cohort that volunteered to fight for the right to hold human beings as property did not survive the first year of the war. A historian with the excellent British CW Roundtable has made a study of the Rock City Guards. His research has led to the conclusion that even if the CSA had not lost control of Middle TN, there weren't replacements to refill the ranks.

It is actually easy to see the practical effect of the absence of replacements in the number of consolidated regiments that come into existence. During 1862. All you have to do is read the orders of battle. In round numbers, 2,000 men were reduced to about 300 -150.

 

[Saphroneth]

You have raised a good point. Under Lee's command the A of NV suffered abut 240,000 casualties.

The count I have is (to nearest 100 for each entry)


Peninsula campaign (McClellan): 29,300
2nd Bull Run campaign (Pope): 9,500
Maryland Campaign (McClellan): 16,900
Fredericksburg Campaign (Burnside): 5,400
Chancellorsville Campaign (Hooker): 19,000
Gettysburg Campaign (Meade): 25,700
Mine Run Campaign (Meade): 3,800
Overland Campaign (Grant): 31,800
Siege of Petersburg (Grant): 22,600
Appomattox Campaign (Grant): 19,600
-Surrendered: 27,800

Which is 183,600 before the surrender and 211,400 counting the surrender; of course, a lot of those were the same men twice (wounded, recovered, then casualties again). This is pretty rough, but I don't think it rises to 240,000 in my count and I don't think any of those is massively off.

 

[NedBaldwin]

The count I have is (to nearest 100 for each entry)


Peninsula campaign (McClellan): 29,300
2nd Bull Run campaign (Pope): 9,500
Maryland Campaign (McClellan): 16,900
Fredericksburg Campaign (Burnside): 5,400
Chancellorsville Campaign (Hooker): 19,000
Gettysburg Campaign (Meade): 25,700
Mine Run Campaign (Meade): 3,800
Overland Campaign (Grant): 31,800
Siege of Petersburg (Grant): 22,600
Appomattox Campaign (Grant): 19,600
-Surrendered: 27,800

Which is 183,600 before the surrender and 211,400 counting the surrender; of course, a lot of those were the same men twice (wounded, recovered, then casualties again). This is pretty rough, but I don't think it rises to 240,000 in my count and I don't think any of those is massively off.

Bristoe? Though I bet the number is small

 

[Rhea Cole]

The count I have is (to nearest 100 for each entry)


Peninsula campaign (McClellan): 29,300
2nd Bull Run campaign (Pope): 9,500
Maryland Campaign (McClellan): 16,900
Fredericksburg Campaign (Burnside): 5,400
Chancellorsville Campaign (Hooker): 19,000
Gettysburg Campaign (Meade): 25,700
Mine Run Campaign (Meade): 3,800
Overland Campaign (Grant): 31,800
Siege of Petersburg (Grant): 22,600
Appomattox Campaign (Grant): 19,600
-Surrendered: 27,800

Which is 183,600 before the surrender and 211,400 counting the surrender; of course, a lot of those were the same men twice (wounded, recovered, then casualties again). This is pretty rough, but I don't think it rises to 240,000 in my count and I don't think any of those is massively off.

As usual your thinking & the accepted casualty figures are not the same. You really should read the books before you speculate.