Lee Robert E. Lee as Grand Strategist

Henry Hunt

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Robert E. Lee as Grand Strategist

220px-Robert_Edward_Lee.jpg

(Wikipedia)

Spillover from my Joseph Johnston thread, where many of the posters have been debating the merits of Lee as a grand strategist. No one doubts Lee's tactical ability as demonstrated at 2nd Bull Run and Chancellorsville however how good of a grand strategist was he?

Alan Nolan's in his work Lee Considered: General Robert E. Lee and Civil War History takes the viewpoint that Lee's grand strategy of the offense was ultimately too costly for the Confederacy. Additionally, Richard McMurry in his works concludes that the AoT lost in large part because it did not receive the same resources as AoNV. Pre Joseph Harsh Lee had 112,000 men, the largest Confederate army ever fielded, under his command on June 26th, 1862. With this army, he pushed the Union back from Richmond but failed to destroy the AoP and lost some 20,000 men. The invasions of Maryland and Pennsylvania thereafter were costly ventures.

Was Lee's grand strategy of the offense too costly for the Confederacy? Should the AoT have gotten more resources? Did Lee focus too much on Virginia and ignore the crisis situation in the West? Should he have dispatched manpower to the West instead of attempting the Maryland and Pennsylvania campaigns? How did Lee expect to win the Maryland campaign? Would a victory at Gettysburg have even brought the war to an end? What was his overall grand strategic vision? Was he as good a strategist as McClellan and Grant?

(Note not my views just what has been floating around, I'm not an anti-Lee partisan or anything.:help:)
 
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Without diving deeply into the subject. I'll observe that Lee always had Jeff Davis looking over his shoulder - much as did McClellan, et al. with Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck - and not until 1865 was he able to enforce his will on other theatres than that of Northern Virginia. However, acting as Davis' military advisor in early 1862 he was able to at least influence some activities such as Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign which he encouraged.
 
Robert E. Lee as Grand Strategist

View attachment 319864

(Wikipedia)


In my opinion:

Was Lee's grand strategy of the offense too costly for the Confederacy? Yes
Should the AoT have gotten more resources? Yes
Did Lee focus too much on Virginia and ignore the crisis situation in the West? Yes
Should he have dispatched manpower to the West instead of attempting the Maryland and Pennsylvania campaigns? Yes
How did Lee expect to win the Maryland campaign? He thought Confederate sympathizers would rise up and help him.
Would a victory at Gettysburg have even brought the war to an end? No
What was his overall grand strategic vision? To wear out the Union so it would sue for peace on Confederate terms.
Was he as good a strategist as McClellan and Grant? No

I've read Nolan's book and find it pretty persuasive. Haven't read McMurry yet.
 
Yes, it was the best option to win. Lee focused on attacking the war support in the north. The only realistic option the south had was a fairly quick end to the war. The longer the war went on the more the south would be ground down and stangled.

Lee came as close to dividing the US as any one person could. He pushed the mighty US to the brink. No one else could have done that.

A guerilla style war would never had worked in the south and was not realistic.

In summation, strategy seems to favor the big battalions. What Lee did with what he had was amazing.
 
Second James N.'s comment. Influential as he was, for most of the war Lee was the commander of one army and, like most commanders, focused on the issues and opportunities in his own theater of operations. If he was allowed to excessively dominate Confederate strategy, that was the fault of the national command authorities.

As I've bored most of you with before, one of the Confederacy's key advantages was operating on interior lines. It shouldn't be a question of which army has which resources but how effectively forces can be concentrated as needed for maximum effect. The classic example is Chickamauga, their only major victory outside the Virginia theater, achieved by shifting forces from the ANV. The idea that troops "belonged" to a particular general or department was highly detrimental.
 
Yes, it was the best option to win. Lee focused on attacking the war support in the north. The only realistic option the south had was a fairly quick end to the war. The longer the war went on the more the south would be ground down and stangled.

Lee came as close to dividing the US as any one person could. He pushed the mighty US to the brink. No one else could have done that.

A guerilla style war would never had worked in the south and was not realistic.

In summation, strategy seems to favor the big battalions. What Lee did with what he had was amazing.
Welcome to the forums from the host of the Stonewall Jackson Forum!
 
I cant recommend enough Joseph Harsh's Confederate Tide Rising (as well as Taken at the Flood).

Harsh dispenses with a lot of the preconception of Davis and Lee and goes back to the scholarship. In EXCRUCIATING detail (theres an entire companion book just filled with things like daily temperature data and company rolls). While in theory these books are focused on the Maryland Campaign, they delve into the Why, specifically the mindset of Davis and Lee on the war, with unshakeably well supported evidence.

The conclusion is that Davis and Lee, running the war while Johnston defended Virginia, were watching the Union dismember and starve the Confederacy to death. By May of 1862, the rebels were on the verge of defeat. Defending the frontiers of the Confederacy was not working. Defending its most important points was not working. The Union advantage in numbers and engineering was bad enough, but its naval supremacy allowed the Union to pick off vital Southern ports, cutting off their lifeline of trade, and it also allowed them to drop armies all over the Eastern Seaboard and get behind the Confederate armies (which was always McClellans intention, and later Grants strategy as well).

Lee was no dummy, he understood the math better than anyone. He understood the value of the defense as well. But more importantly, he and Davis talked extensively about the danger of being pinned down to static defenses, surrounded, and destroyed. That was the mindset they were sharing in June of 1862 when Lee took command.

Combine that with the revelation that the Union would move heaven and earth to defend against any perceived threat to Washington (thank you General Jackson), the importance of Northern Virginia and the Shenandoah to feeding the confederacy, and Lee's strategy isnt just obvious, its inevitable. The South had to change the theater of war one way or another, create opportunity with maneuver, and find some way to destroy a major army in the field and hope to force a peace. And time was not on their side.
 
Robert E. Lee as Grand Strategist

View attachment 319864

(Wikipedia)

Spillover from my Joseph Johnston thread, where many of the posters have been debating the merits of Lee as a grand strategist. No one doubts Lee's tactical ability as demonstrated at 2nd Bull Run and Chancellorsville however how good of a grand strategist was he?

Alan Nolan's in his work Lee Considered: General Robert E. Lee and Civil War History takes the viewpoint that Lee's grand strategy of the offense was ultimately too costly for the Confederacy. Additionally, Richard McMurry in his works concludes that the AoT lost in large part because it did not receive the same resources as AoNV. Pre Joseph Harsh Lee had 112,000 men, the largest Confederate army ever fielded, under his command on June 26th, 1862. With this army, he pushed the Union back from Richmond but failed to destroy the AoP and lost some 20,000 men. The invasions of Maryland and Pennsylvania thereafter were costly ventures.

Was Lee's grand strategy of the offense too costly for the Confederacy? Should the AoT have gotten more resources? Did Lee focus too much on Virginia and ignore the crisis situation in the West? Should he have dispatched manpower to the West instead of attempting the Maryland and Pennsylvania campaigns? How did Lee expect to win the Maryland campaign? Would a victory at Gettysburg have even brought the war to an end? What was his overall grand strategic vision? Was he as good a strategist as McClellan and Grant?

(Note not my views just what has been floating around, I'm not an anti-Lee partisan or anything.:help:)
I do think Gen. Lee focused too much on Virginia.
 
Second James N.'s comment. Influential as he was, for most of the war Lee was the commander of one army and, like most commanders, focused on the issues and opportunities in his own theater of operations. If he was allowed to excessively dominate Confederate strategy, that was the fault of the national command authorities.

As I've bored most of you with before, one of the Confederacy's key advantages was operating on interior lines. It shouldn't be a question of which army has which resources but how effectively forces can be concentrated as needed for maximum effect. The classic example is Chickamauga, their only major victory outside the Virginia theater, achieved by shifting forces from the ANV. The idea that troops "belonged" to a particular general or department was highly detrimental.

Great observation. Seconded.
 
I cant recommend enough Joseph Harsh's Confederate Tide Rising (as well as Taken at the Flood).

Harsh dispenses with a lot of the preconception of Davis and Lee and goes back to the scholarship. In EXCRUCIATING detail (theres an entire companion book just filled with things like daily temperature data and company rolls). While in theory these books are focused on the Maryland Campaign, they delve into the Why, specifically the mindset of Davis and Lee on the war, with unshakeably well supported evidence.

The conclusion is that Davis and Lee, running the war while Johnston defended Virginia, were watching the Union dismember and starve the Confederacy to death. By May of 1862, the rebels were on the verge of defeat. Defending the frontiers of the Confederacy was not working. Defending its most important points was not working. The Union advantage in numbers and engineering was bad enough, but its naval supremacy allowed the Union to pick off vital Southern ports, cutting off their lifeline of trade, and it also allowed them to drop armies all over the Eastern Seaboard and get behind the Confederate armies (which was always McClellans intention, and later Grants strategy as well).

Lee was no dummy, he understood the math better than anyone. He understood the value of the defense as well. But more importantly, he and Davis talked extensively about the danger of being pinned down to static defenses, surrounded, and destroyed. That was the mindset they were sharing in June of 1862 when Lee took command.

Combine that with the revelation that the Union would move heaven and earth to defend against any perceived threat to Washington (thank you General Jackson), the importance of Northern Virginia and the Shenandoah to feeding the confederacy, and Lee's strategy isnt just obvious, its inevitable. The South had to change the theater of war one way or another, create opportunity with maneuver, and find some way to destroy a major army in the field and hope to force a peace. And time was not on their side.
Thank you @MBuehner for this excellent post and your summary along the lines of what I was intending to say. I too would recommend Harsh's books, I think I have a better understanding of Lee from them than from anything else I've read.

I think Lee enters Maryland in 1862 because it's his best (and possibly only) chance to win. Fortunately or unfortunately (depending on your point of view) his army was just about at the limits of human endurance. After Antietam/Sharpsburg, I'm not sure he could win anymore -- and his strategy was more in view to cause the North to sue for peace or elect peace candidates to office.

As for his overall strategic vision, I'm not sure it's fair to evaluate him as his assignment was to protect Virginia. I think an interesting question would be, how might things have been different if Lee had been a true general in chief for all the Confederate armies in 1862 -- when it might have made a difference.
 
There were no good strategies for the Confederacy, particularly once the Union under the leadership of Lincoln, made the decision to put down the rebellion come what may. So in that sense, Lee was counting on scoring enough battlefield victories to lessen the Northern will to fight and/or to obtain European recognition of the Confederacy. Lee was astute enough to know that his victories nevertheless resulted in diminishing manpower so it was a race against time. Could Lee prevail upon a war weary North to seek a negotiated settlement before he ran out of resources? We all know the answer to that.
 
One example I see author use, of Lee's hesitance to send men West, is May 1863 when Longstreet asked to take his corps to help Johnston with Vicksburg. Lee rejected this as he planned to instead invade the north. Not sure how feasible Longstreet's plan would have been?
I don't think feasible at all. Reinforcing Bragg and advancing into middle Tennessee more so I think.
 
One example I see author use, of Lee's hesitance to send men West, is May 1863 when Longstreet asked to take his corps to help Johnston with Vicksburg. Lee rejected this as he planned to instead invade the north. Not sure how feasible Longstreet's plan would have been?
I don't think feasible at all. Reinforcing Bragg and advancing into middle Tennessee more so I think.

Sending troops all the way from Virginia to Vicksburg in time to help might be problematical, but I once thought up a variant: Send most of Bragg's army to engage Grant, added to all other Confederate forces in the Mississippi area. Leave a small force, largely cavalry (Forrest?) to hold off/delay Rosecrans* until Longstreet can arrive in the "midwest". Hopefully that would forestall Rosecrans' advance before any great harm could be done. Best case, if Grant is decisively defeated, reconcentrate against Rosecrans.

* this is roughly what the Confederates did in 1862, concentrating their main army against one opponent (Buell) while forestalling the other (Grant) indirectly with smaller mobile forces (Van Dorn).

Longstreet with two divisions, Hood's and Pickett's, was away from the ANV at the time of Chancellorsville, available for an operation like this. Historically, after Gettysburg, Lee held the line in Virginia with six divisions while Longstreet moved to Chickamauga, even though the Federals had just won their big victory. So it seems likely that Lee with six divisions could keep things under control in the wake of the Federal defeat at C'ville.

This may seem like a lot of razzle-dazzle, but it's the sort of thing the Confederates needed to pull off to beat the Union.
 
The overall 1862 Confederate Strategy had extensive rewards. Two major Federal Army commanders were sacked, a third one was sidelined. Both theaters of Union advances were beaten back against the Ohio and across the Potomac. How much credit should General Lee be given for responding the the crisis? How much toward General Bragg? Someone within the Confederate hierarchy saw the opportunity to strike a 'one-two blow' against the North. I cannot believe these two northern invasions were matters of happenstance, but a concerted effort directed by Davis or one of his Cabinet, or the supporting generals.
Lubliner.
 
I cannot believe these two northern invasions were matters of happenstance, but a concerted effort directed by Davis or one of his Cabinet, or the supporting generals.
Lubliner.

Davis and Lee absolutely orchestrated the dual advances in 1862. They intentionally stripped other parts of the Confederacy bare of troops (not an easy task dealing with the states) to attempt to win the war. When Lee took over, he had the advantage of an army he personally assembled. He knew the cupboard was bare and didnt waste time and energy calling for more troops. It was also the smallest disparity in troop strength between the armies of the war. Davis and Lee were very conscious that this was their best chance, which probably explains why Lee pushed the Maryland campaign far beyond any plausible hope for victory. It wasn't stubbornness, it was desperation.
 
Davis and Lee absolutely orchestrated the dual advances in 1862. They intentionally stripped other parts of the Confederacy bare of troops (not an easy task dealing with the states) to attempt to win the war. When Lee took over, he had the advantage of an army he personally assembled. He knew the cupboard was bare and didnt waste time and energy calling for more troops. It was also the smallest disparity in troop strength between the armies of the war. Davis and Lee were very conscious that this was their best chance, which probably explains why Lee pushed the Maryland campaign far beyond any plausible hope for victory. It wasn't stubbornness, it was desperation.
Convince the northerners it would be better for them to let the south go was the hope and prayer with Lee and Davis. Also the hope the British and French would condemn the north for provoking such hostility.
Lubliner.
 
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