J. Johnston Thoughts on Joseph E. Johnston

[archieclement]

Over rated, any generals role is to execute national strategy and follow orders from higher up....Its hard to see him as anything but a failure in what should have been his primary role and duty. His duty was to carry out orders, he wasnt commander in chief to set the orders.....

 

[John Fenton]

I would be interested in reading your further explanation of this.

In short pemberton did not follow johnston's Orders but instead reported directly to the war dept. and Davis. Johnston thought Chattanooga more important than Vicksburg and was ready to abandon it. Davis treated it like hitler treated Stalingrad. Pemberton got beat at champions hill and had larger forces than Johnston who lost Jackson and had his forces widely dispersed. All forts and cities attacked so far on the mississippi, Tennessee, and Cumberland had fallen, why would Vicksburg be any different. Johnston wanted men and room to maneuver and to keep Tennessee and Chattanooga the " gateway to the south" even though Bragg was still in command there. It goes deeper than this with personal bitterness and rivalry and the cavalry issue but these should not have been fatal issues if Johnston had had the support that lee did from Davis.

 

[Jamieva]

While we have been all over this subject let me say....
I think Johnston had the correct strategy . Once the fact of a protracted war was realized conservation was the name of the game. Johnston stopped McClellan's offensive at seven pines with about 4000 casulities. Lee had almost as many casulities in the seven days battle as he surrendered to grant. Lee lost Richmond. Hood lost Atlanta. Johnston's army was about the same size as lee's until after bentonville as it included all forces in the southeast besides his own army. Hood left Johnston with about 4500 men which Johnston increased to about 30,000.
Johnston had to fight the union, Davis, Bragg, hood, and others. Lee had Carte Blanche as far as it could be granted.
Johnston had flaws and is at least partly responsible for Vicksburg but pemberton carries the fullest blame.
The entire Georgia/Atlanta campaign was caused by letting grant out of Chattanooga. Bragg's fault.
Johnston was willing to give up territory that was inevitably going to be lost , to conserve manpower and effective
Maneuvering that would force the opponent to spend his resources.
I do not have any proof but believe Johnston hoped to stall for foreign recognition or northern fatigue with the war. Lee thought he could do the job on his own with his army.
These are my thoughts on Johnston, in a butternut shell.

I really don't understand all the causations in regards to Lee in this particular argument. Lee had as many casualties in the 7 days as he surrendered to Grant. Ok...and what does that have to do with Johnston?
Lee lost Richmond. Yup..true..fact. Also fact it was 3 years later. Again no idea how that relates to Johnston.
Atlanta was lost before Hood was even put in charge. Put all the blame you want on Hood for Franklin and Nashville, and he deserves it, but to say Atlanta was lost 100% because of Hood is completely unfair. That's like saying the backup QB lost the game when he was put in to play in the 4th quarter when you were already behind by 3 touchdowns.

So your whole argument to build Johnston up, has been to tear down Lee, Bragg, Hood. So that tells me he doesnt have much of a record to stand on.

 

[alan polk]

Thank you @John Fenton for your response. I find the issue very interesting. I pretty much agree with your estimations. A few questions though.

In short pemberton did not follow johnston's Orders but instead reported directly to the war dept.

Are you referencing orders sent before Johnston removed to Mississippi? In other words, orders sent by Johnston in Tennessee to Pemberton in Mississippi? If so, which orders did Pemberton disobey?

Pemberton got beat at champions hill and had larger forces than Johnston who lost Jackson and had his forces widely dispersed.

I'm not sure what you mean here. I think you are saying it was Pemberton's fault that Johnston's forces became widely dispersed? Is that what you mean? Again, thanks for your response.

 

[John Fenton]

I really don't understand all the causations in regards to Lee in this particular argument. Lee had as many casualties in the 7 days as he surrendered to Grant. Ok...and what does that have to do with Johnston?
Lee lost Richmond. Yup..true..fact. Also fact it was 3 years later. Again no idea how that relates to Johnston.
Atlanta was lost before Hood was even put in charge. Put all the blame you want on Hood for Franklin and Nashville, and he deserves it, but to say Atlanta was lost 100% because of Hood is completely unfair. That's like saying the backup QB lost the game when he was put in to play in the 4th quarter when you were already behind by 3 touchdowns.

So your whole argument to build Johnston up, has been to tear down Lee, Bragg, Hood. So that tells me he doesnt have much of a record to stand on.

Please see the comment i was responding to.
I was simply comparing johnston's Strategy and tactics to lee's and lee's freedom to make decisions by Davis compared to davis's Interference with Johnston.
I agree that Atlanta was lost before hood was put in charge, in fact imo Atlanta was lost with the union breakout at Chattanooga . To finish your analogy of being down by 3 touchdowns and putting in the backup, this was johnston's Lot in every theater. And then after spectacular losses was put back in charge to clean up the messes. Had Johnston remained in charge Atlanta might have taken much more time to fall and taking a larger toll on the union. Hood himself said he should not be in charge at Atlanta. Sherman said something to the effect that Johnston was more than able and could not be criticized for his performance.
Johnston got a bad rap by being cautious when mistakes could cost the war. He still had an effective fighting force with room to maneuver when lee surrendered. This has all been discussed in the Johnston forum.

 

[John Fenton]

Thank you @John Fenton for your response. I find the issue very interesting. I pretty much agree with your estimations. A few questions though.



Are you referencing orders sent before Johnston removed to Mississippi? In other words, orders sent by Johnston in Tennessee to Pemberton in Mississippi? If so, which orders did Pemberton disobey?



I'm not sure what you mean here. I think you are saying it was Pemberton's fault that Johnston's forces became widely dispersed? Is that what you mean? Again, thanks for your response.

Johnston ordered pemberton out of Vicksburg to join forces with him. He did not.

I am saying pemberton could not win at champion hill or black creek bridge so why in the world could Johnston who had smaller forces that had been beaten and widely dispersed at and around Jackson ?

 

[Saruman]

Thoughts on Joseph E. Johnston

View attachment 319550
(Wikipedia)

Joseph E. Johnston, or as his critics call him 'Retreatin Joe", is one of the more controversial commanders of the war. He was thought of favorably by many contemporary figures such as Sherman, Grant and Longstreet. Grant thought his strategy of conserving Confederate resources was the correct one and Longstreet regarded him as a greater general than Lee. Today opinions seem to be turning firmly against Johnston, other Confederate commander such as Bragg and Hood are being rehabilitated to the determent of him.

Johnston's art of war was Fabian in nature. He would give ground to concentrate resources for a decisive attack such as he attempted at Fair Oaks and Bentonville. Johnston also favored fighting on the defensive as at 1st Manassas and Kennesaw Mountain. Less favorable he could be hesitant when decisive action was needed as at Vicksburg. Johnston's reaction to Lee's victory at Fredericksburg is one of the more revealing as to his style of generalship: "What luck some people have, nobody will ever come to attack me in such a place."[1]

What do you think of Johnston? Should he be viewed as one of the top Confederate commanders along with Lee, Jackson and Longstreet? Or was he rather worse and inferior to Bragg, Beauregard and Hood?


[1] Craig L. Symonds, Joseph E. Johnston: A Civil War Biography (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), 192.

I think Johnston was possibly the greatest detriment to the South's military command. Some reasons:

1) He put his own ego before the good of the country. Davis and the Confederate Congress correctly determined the order of rank of the Confederate Generals based on line rank rather than staff rank, and Johnston was naturally placed fourth. Unfortunately Johnston never reconciled to this fact. It is amazing to me that he actually wrote: "I now and here declare my claim that, notwithstanding these nominations made by the President, and their confirmation by Congress, I still rightfully hold the rank of first general in the armies of the Southern Confederacy."

2) Abandoning a large quantity of materials and machinery at Harpers Ferry. Luckily for the Confederacy, a small working party remained behind without interruption from the enemy, and removed much valuable property including the heaviest part of the machinery.

3) Ignorant of the topography of the country in his rear (both during the Peninsula Campaign and the Atlanta Campaign).

4) Destroying valuable artillery, a large depot of provisions, blankets, shoes, saddles etc. at Centreville.

5) Poor articulation of orders at Seven Pines, leading to significant confusion amongst subordinates.

6) Failure to remove Bragg after Murfreesboro.

7) Dooming Vicksburg by stripping all the cavalry from Mississippi. This caused Pemberton to scatter his infantry in an attempt to defend the whole region and resulted in Pemberton's inability to respond to Union movements.

8) Not even attempting to relieve the siege of Vicksburg with his "Army of Relief".

9) Losing about ninety irreplaceable locomotives and several hundred cars in his abandonment of Jackson, Mississippi.

10) Failure to defend Snake Creek Gap. He had all winter to scout the area and learn of the enemy's likely approaches but did nothing. Once the Federals got through Snake Creek Gap, there were no more tall mountain ridges for the Confederates to use as a defensive barrier and Atlanta was doomed.

11) Excessive losses during the Atlanta Campaign. Johnston lost about 16,000 of his 66,000 men defending Atlanta from May to July, whereas Hood lost about 13,000 of his 50,000 men defending Atlanta from July to September, so their performance is roughly equivalent (around 25% losses).

12) Far too secretive and would not inform the Government of his plans (if any).

13) Never grasping the political context of the Confederacy. The abandonment of territory to Union forces, while he waited for an "opportunity" to strike may have been tactically sound, but strategically it was a disaster. Territory lost to the Union could never be reclaimed as the South was fighting to preserve slavery and would never have been able to re-implement the system afterwards. Plus territorial losses destroyed the South's capacity to produce food, recruit soldiers, and manufacture war materials.

 

[Carronade]

1) He put his own ego before the good of the country. Davis and the Confederate Congress correctly determined the order of rank of the Confederate Generals based on line rank rather than staff rank, and Johnston was naturally placed fourth. Unfortunately Johnston never reconciled to this fact. It is amazing to me that he actually wrote: "I now and here declare my claim that, notwithstanding these nominations made by the President, and their confirmation by Congress, I still rightfully hold the rank of first general in the armies of the Southern Confederacy."

Amazing indeed. Who did he write that to, and was there any response, or did people just ignore this little rant?

 

[Saruman]

Amazing indeed. Who did he write that to, and was there any response, or did people just ignore this little rant?

It was in his 12th September 1861 letter to Davis.

Davis replied: "I have just received and read your letter of the 12th instant. Its language is, as you say, unusual; its arguments and statements utterly one-sided, and its insinuations as unfounded as they are unbecoming."

 

[Will Carry]

"Fightin' Joe" is very underrated in my humble opinion. I won't rehash the previous posts and I realize their knowledge exceeds mine by a long shot, but he received a lot of criticism for not stopping Sherman in North Georgia. The AOT were tough fighters but their ranks had thinned considerably. I don't think they were capable of a prolonged complex assault and they felt much better fighting from trenches and breastworks. I think Johnston recognized this and used his troops accordingly. Sun Sue or (Tsun Tsu) I have no idea why they use a silent T or X to translating Chinese. Indian names are pronounced phonetically. Tsun Tsu said "If you cannot defeat your enemy, it is next best to remain undefeated." I think that is what Old Joe had in mind. Who would you want to too lead you in to combat, Johnston or Hood? I'll take Johnston and fight in the trenches. Them Yankees are thick as flies and mean as a hornet's nest.

 

[archieclement]

The obvious comparison to me would be Longstreet at Gettysburg

One can debate till the cows come home if his wishing to fight elsewhere defensively was a better strategy or course of action then Lee's wanting to force the issue there and now. It doesn't really matter how correct one thinks Longstreet position on what should be done was, as its irrelevant....

It was Lees role and decision to make, not Longstreet's........Longstreet's role was to simply follow and support what Lee has decided as the proper course of action.

Where JJ fails dismally, in not realizing his job was still to carry out the orders he received, not assume roles that weren't his to make

 

[jackt62]

I can't remember where, but I have read that Hood's aggressive tactics hastened the fall of Atlanta. Johnston's ability to keep his army intact caused Sherman to maintain a cautious approach and led to Sherman's positive assessment of Johnston after the war.

My recollection is that Hood's aggressive tactics in front of Atlanta simply delayed that city's fall by no more than about 2 months, from the time that Hood took over from Johnston. Sherman's strategy to cut off Atlanta's rail links and shift his forces around the city were temporarily stymied by Hood's decision to seek battle with Sherman at every opportunity. That being said, I do not agree that Hood's strategy was either wise or ultimately effective; Johnston's slow withdrawal to the outskirts of Atlanta was probably the best that could be achieved by the Confederacy. Had Johnston remained in command instead of Hood, the city would still have fallen, perhaps sooner than it did, but Johnston might have preserved a relatively intact AOT as a fighting force that could have forestalled Sherman's subsequent March through Georgia.

 

[Belfoured]

I agree fighting a decisive engagement at Yorktown would have given McClellan exactly what he wanted. McClellan would have loved it if Johnston filled up the fortress with as many soldiers as possible to be besieged and captured.

In regard to the Atlanta campaign, I am particularly impressed by Johnston's maneuvers in the lead up to Cassville. Sherman fell for Johnston's ruse pursuing with Hardee corps while leaving Schofield to face the bulk of Johnston's army alone. Had Butterfield not disrupted Hood's attack he may have struck a significant blow.



Stephen Davis in his work on Atlanta takes the opposing view. He thinks that Johnston would have simply given up Atlanta if his initial attack at Peace Tree Creek failed citing his letter to Davis that mentioned leaving the city to militia. Davis thinks Hood held it longer by repeated attacks such as the near success on the Battle of July 22nd that killed McPherson.

Johnston's claim in Fall 1864 was that he planned both the attack on the Peach Tree line and, if that failed, a retreat to Atlanta but then an attack on Sherman's flank, If true, that sounds very much like what Hood actually did except for the fact that Hood collapsed the timing of the two attacks into 48 hours. Of course, an entirely different question is whether we believe Johnston's claim several months after the fact that he actually had these plans. I'm unaware of any contemporary evidence that he disclosed them to anyone else - Hood, Hardee, Davis, Bragg, etc. - at the time even though it was no secret that his job was on the line based on the perception that he had no intention of attacking Sherman.

 

[Carronade]

It was in his 12th September 1861 letter to Davis.

Davis replied: "I have just received and read your letter of the 12th instant. Its language is, as you say, unusual; its arguments and statements utterly one-sided, and its insinuations as unfounded as they are unbecoming."

Thanks. Was that the end of it, other than the reservoir of ill-feeling between the two?

btw I think you made a good point about the destruction of supplies at Centreville. Even if there was a legitimate need to pull back, I've never understood why he made it so precipitious, destroying so much material that the Confederacy had accumulated at considerable cost and effort.

 

[Henry Hunt]

btw I think you made a good point about the destruction of supplies at Centreville. Even if there was a legitimate need to pull back, I've never understood why he made it so precipitious, destroying so much material that the Confederacy had accumulated at considerable cost and effort.

4) Destroying valuable artillery, a large depot of provisions, blankets, shoes, saddles etc. at Centreville.

This is an interesting point I don't know enough about it myself. However the other day was looking at reviews of Steven H. Newton's book Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond. One of the reviewers mentioned that Newton wrote how Johnston burned the supplies because he was order to do it not out of choice. I don't have the the book myself so can't look at the footnote. Anyone have this particular work?

Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond (Modern War Studies): Newton, Steven H.: 9780700609215: Amazon.com: Books

Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond (Modern War Studies) [Newton, Steven H.] on Amazon.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond (Modern War Studies)

www.amazon.com

 

[John Fenton]

johnston and davis were at odds from the beginning. one thought the army was most important and one thought territory most important. johnston did in fact have an ego and carried resentment but so did davis who never really wanted the presidency but wanted a field command. to johnston's credit , davis gave lee command freedom but micromanaged and interfered with johnston's command. while he would not do so to lee , davis vicariously commanded in the field through johnston and others.
johnston's wife prophetically said to him that davis hated him and would ruin him.

 

[Dead Parrott]

Lots of excellent thoughts and analysis here - a pleasure to read these opinons.

My take - I like Johnston and I think he was a skillful general in MOST instances. I think he was right in his defense of Atlanta, but his continued tactics on the Peninsula would have failed (let's be honest, it would probably require a Lee to keep the East from falling).

I think Johnston was right about Vicksburg, but I do agree with a previous poster that he was NOT fulfilling Davis's expectations, and that is a big problem for a general.

Mixed results, but I think Johnston was a skillful commander. And much much superior army commander than Hood!

 

[BillO]

My "Thoughts on Johnston", IMO he was a by the book general formerly trained in the French school of military strategic thinking. The Vauban school which thought that battle could be broken down into the hard mathematics of the numbers and siege warfare was the highest form of tactical brilliance.
His thought process seems very similar to McClellan's as to the proper way to make war. His problem was that he wasn't leading an army in the French Empire. He was out gunned and the proper response is to fall back and wait for a better opportunity, it's all very proper and easily understood. His superior, in rank only, Mr. Davis simply refused to see how proper it all was.

 

[leftyhunter]

My "Thoughts on Johnston", IMO he was a by the book general formerly trained in the French school of military strategic thinking. The Vauban school which thought that battle could be broken down into the hard mathematics of the numbers and siege warfare was the highest form of tactical brilliance.
His thought process seems very similar to McClellan's as to the proper way to make war. His problem was that he wasn't leading an army in the French Empire. He was out gunned and the proper response is to fall back and wait for a better opportunity, it's all very proper and easily understood. His superior, in rank only, Mr. Davis simply refused to see how proper it all was.

In defense of Davis ; Davis was correct. Conventional warfare is a zero sum game. Either one side sizes and holds enemy territory or it doesn't. If it can't and the other side can then the side that can't looses.
The Confederacy can not trade space for time sine if it looses territory the Union can and most definitely will recruit Unionists and freed slaves for its army and gain agricultural resources including growing cotton for export.
It does snow in the South here and there but not enough to cause the problems Napoleon had in Russia.
Of course Johnston never has enough troops to go in for the big win and seize and hold Union territory so yes Johnston is in a quandary.
Leftyhunter

 

[leftyhunter]

Thanks. Was that the end of it, other than the reservoir of ill-feeling between the two?

btw I think you made a good point about the destruction of supplies at Centreville. Even if there was a legitimate need to pull back, I've never understood why he made it so precipitious, destroying so much material that the Confederacy had accumulated at considerable cost and effort.

Did Johnston have enough wagons and draft animals to transport the items that he burned? A major problem for the AnV is not only where they often short of food for the troops but a draft horse requires something like si many pounds of grain plus hay a day to maintain it's strength plus so many gallons of clean water as well. Just finding non contaminated water in the ACW is not easy. Our horse experts can give the appropriate figures of feed per day per horse. It must be fairly substantial.
Leftyhunter