Tried by war and Lincoln

jason73

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Jun 6, 2010
Location
massachusetts
I have been listening to the audio version of James Mccpherson's Tried by war the last week on my drives to work and i am almost finished with it.It's pretty good.I do have one question I would love to share with all my civil war friends here.It seems to me that Lincoln was not happy with any major general he had.From Buell to hooker to meade to even grant before he took Vicksburg.I used to think it was mainly mcclellan but it seems everyone was too slow to him.Was Lincoln a milatery genius or was he trying too hard to manage something from washington when these generals were in the field commanding?:confused:
 
Well he wasn't a military genius.

I think Lincoln saw the military objective (Lee's Army) and he saw that several union generals were missing that objective. I don't think it's more complicated than that. In retrospect, it was obvious. Outside of Grant, most of the early Union generals just didn't get it.
 
I think the problem (for Lincoln) is - more or less- this.

Its not necessarily about smashing enemy armies.

Lincoln also was an unusually broad minded (as in, wide viewpoint) sort of guy, and understood the relationship between politics and military issues in a way most generals didn't/couldn't.

Between those things, you have a president demanding a lot from his generals. Grant happened to be a general who could see what made Lincoln so demanding (as well as the other good stuff). But if you thought that the idea of "please the public by making a move, any move, just to show that we're accomplishing stuff" was ridiculous, you wouldn't understand that to Lincoln it was a very real - however ridiculous in some tidy abstract realm - force that had to be dealt with as part of preserving the Union.

And as such, you'd wind up on Lincoln's dung list.
 
I think the problem was that Lincoln's generals, aside from Grant, were not necessarily focused on the concept of destroying the enemy's army. Lincoln wanted the complete defeat of the enemy's army, not the 'defense' of this or that piece of geography, and only Grant seemed to be able to grasp this idea.

When Meade wrote to Lincoln after Gettysburg, that he had (paraphrasing here) "driven the enemy from our soil", Lincoln was reportedly infuriated and beside himself with frustration that Meade also had failed to grasp that "it is all our soil" (now paraphasing Lincoln), and allowed Lee to safely get away to fight another day. Lincoln always maintained that the enemy army would have to be found, attacked and destroyed before the war would come to an end, and he was right. But until Grant came along he couldn't get any of his previous commanding generals to truly recognize and pursue that goal.
 
I think the problem was that Lincoln's generals, aside from Grant, were not necessarily focused on the concept of destroying the enemy's army. Lincoln wanted the complete defeat of the enemy's army, not the 'defense' of this or that piece of geography, and only Grant seemed to be able to grasp this idea.

When Meade wrote to Lincoln after Gettysburg, that he had (paraphrasing here) "driven the enemy from our soil", Lincoln was reportedly infuriated and beside himself with frustration that Meade also had failed to grasp that "it is all our soil" (now paraphasing Lincoln), and allowed Lee to safely get away to fight another day. Lincoln always maintained that the enemy army would have to be found, attacked and destroyed before the war would come to an end, and he was right. But until Grant came along he couldn't get any of his previous commanding generals to truly recognize and pursue that goal.

I'm not sure how true that is, though. Meade was perfectly willing to fight and hunt Lee - his statement on "our soil" was a "we have achieved victory over the invader and driven him away" about the battle of Gettysburg, not a statement of his objectives.

McClellan had other issues, Buell seems to have genuinely believed in taking cities over fighting armies, Pope and Hooker seem to be willing enough to fight armies (able enough, not so much...), Burnside and Rosecrans I'm not sure.
 
Lincoln never replaced Mead, he simply promoted Grant, (with the approval of Congress) to Lt. General, (3 stars) over all the armies of the U.S. Mead remained the commander of the Army of the Potomac, under Grant's control. Grant, nor Lincoln were military geniuse's they simply saw that to defeat the Southern Confederacy the Southern armys had to be defeated on the field of battle, (regardless of the cost) other Northern generals were obsessed with taking Richmond. If there was a Northern general that Lincoln, Grant, and Mead hated, it had to have been Ben Butler, (a man very much politicaly connected and almost impossible to get rid of).
 
I read somewhere, and darn it, I can't remember...

Anyway, the idea is that in fact the decisive Union victories were mostly about taking cities and other geographic objectives, not the destruction of the Southern armies. Grant seizes Donaldson and Henry, then Vicksburg. Farragut seizes New Orleans(this isn't in order).
Grant wins by taking Richmond, and the ANV collapses soon after. Sherman takes Atlanta, ignores Hood's army to advance across Georgia, then up through South Carolina. Grant and Lincoln said they were going for Lee, but in fact, Grant besieging Richmond and Petersburg worn down the ANV.

Just a thought. It's not my thought, but I can't recall who came up with it.
 
I have been listening to the audio version of James Mccpherson's Tried by war the last week on my drives to work and i am almost finished with it.It's pretty good.I do have one question I would love to share with all my civil war friends here.It seems to me that Lincoln was not happy with any major general he had.From Buell to hooker to meade to even grant before he took Vicksburg.I used to think it was mainly mcclellan but it seems everyone was too slow to him.Was Lincoln a milatery genius or was he trying too hard to manage something from washington when these generals were in the field commanding?:confused:

Lincoln did not have a problem, because as the commander-in-chief, he did exactly what he was supposed to do, and that was to know and implement the overall objective of the war, to preserve the Union. In order to reach that goal, he had a number of clear objectives that he had to attain in order to reach the overall goal. One was the destruction of Lee's army. The other was to retake the seceded states. In order to accomplish these objectives, Lincoln also came to the conclusion that slavery had to go.

The problem was, in my own view, that the Union army commanders, up until Sherman, Grant, and Sheridan, only thought with a tactical, local sense of objectives, that they could not see beyond the battlefield in front of them at the time. Lincoln was the only one, and after a time, some of his cabinet (Seward in particular), that had an overall, strategic goal for the war, the preservation of the Union.

This vision is clearly reflected in Lincoln's thinking when he expresses his frustration at General Meade's message after the battle of Gettysburg, when Meade stated in a telegram that "the enemy had been driven from our soil." Lincoln reacted with anger and frustration at these words, "Is that all? It is all our soil." He realized Meade's thoughts and actions were not on the overall goal of restoring the Union, that he thought, as many others did, there were two separate countries involved in the conflict, when he refused to acknowledge such.

We were all one country and Lincoln was determined that it remained so.

Sincerely,
Unionblue
 
I read somewhere, and darn it, I can't remember...

Anyway, the idea is that in fact the decisive Union victories were mostly about taking cities and other geographic objectives, not the destruction of the Southern armies. Grant seizes Donaldson and Henry, then Vicksburg. Farragut seizes New Orleans(this isn't in order).
Grant wins by taking Richmond, and the ANV collapses soon after. Sherman takes Atlanta, ignores Hood's army to advance across Georgia, then up through South Carolina. Grant and Lincoln said they were going for Lee, but in fact, Grant besieging Richmond and Petersburg worn down the ANV.

Just a thought. It's not my thought, but I can't recall who came up with it.

Yes, Grant attacked across the Rapahannock to engage the ANV, things didn't exactly go as planned, (he wanted to position his army between Lee and Richmond, forcing it to battle). He then kept shifting his right corps around and behind to the left trying to breach Lees flank, (it never really worked out as Lee always seemed to either be ahead of him, or meet his troops at about the same time ending up in the trenchs at Petersburg). Grant had several things working in his favor, the draft, the "heavies" formerly posted around Washington, ( both meaning an almost unlimited scorce of men) and a very eager cavalry commander, Phil Sherridan who along with the 6th Corp would form the Army of the Shenandoah and "Peal the Shenandoah Valley like an orange". There's no doubt about it...Grant was agressive.
 
I read somewhere, and darn it, I can't remember...

Anyway, the idea is that in fact the decisive Union victories were mostly about taking cities and other geographic objectives, not the destruction of the Southern armies. Grant seizes Donaldson and Henry, then Vicksburg. Farragut seizes New Orleans(this isn't in order).
Grant wins by taking Richmond, and the ANV collapses soon after. Sherman takes Atlanta, ignores Hood's army to advance across Georgia, then up through South Carolina. Grant and Lincoln said they were going for Lee, but in fact, Grant besieging Richmond and Petersburg worn down the ANV.

Just a thought. It's not my thought, but I can't recall who came up with it.

I think the idea of seizing cities is true for everyone except Grant. Donelson and Henry weren't cities, and Vicksburg, Petersburg and Richmond were just the anvils that he smashed Lee's and Pemberton's armies on. If those armies had been sitting out in the middle of a desert, Grant would have gone after them and left Richmond and Vicksburg alone, IMO.
 
Going after the army instead of territory has always sounded a little strange. When you go after important territory, the enemy is going to be there; so whichever you go for has the same result.

And Henry, Donelson, Corinth, Memphis, Vicksburg, Atlanta, etc., really weren't territory so much as they were stragetic points, the taking of which would severely harm the enemy. Henry controlled the Tennessee; Donelson controlled the Cumberland; Corinth was a point at which the two major railroads crossed. When those failed, Nashville and Memphis failed -- Tennessee was under Federal control. (Will save Larry the trouble by adding: except where Forrest rode.)

The fall of Memphis and New Orleans meant that only Vicksburg and Port Hudson remained in the way of completely separating the Transmissippi from the Gulf Squadron. Taking Atlanta further peeled away much of Georgia and Alabama. Let Rosecrans chase Bragg all over Tennessee, the severing of lifelines to an army is as good as smashing it.

When Lee retired to Petersburg, there was no longer much reason to smash the AoNV -- it was smashed but hadn't yet admitted it.
 
Ole, I think Grant's intention in April of 1864 was to wedge himself between the ANV and Richmond forcing Lee to attack on ground of Grants choosing, thus creating a killing zone to wear down the ANV, then smashing it in one offensive move. I beleive that's why Grant kept trying to flank Lee on his left.
 
Going after the army instead of territory has always sounded a little strange. When you go after important territory, the enemy is going to be there; so whichever you go for has the same result.

And Henry, Donelson, Corinth, Memphis, Vicksburg, Atlanta, etc., really weren't territory so much as they were stragetic points, the taking of which would severely harm the enemy. Henry controlled the Tennessee; Donelson controlled the Cumberland; Corinth was a point at which the two major railroads crossed. When those failed, Nashville and Memphis failed -- Tennessee was under Federal control. (Will save Larry the trouble by adding: except where Forrest rode.)

The fall of Memphis and New Orleans meant that only Vicksburg and Port Hudson remained in the way of completely separating the Transmissippi from the Gulf Squadron. Taking Atlanta further peeled away much of Georgia and Alabama. Let Rosecrans chase Bragg all over Tennessee, the severing of lifelines to an army is as good as smashing it.

When Lee retired to Petersburg, tUnfortunately for those who champion the effort of the Confederate armies, you are essentially correct. here was no longer much reason to smash the AoNV -- it was smashed but hadn't yet admitted it.

Unfortunately for those who champion the effort of the Confederate armies, you are essentially correct. Alabama and Mississippi remained Confederate territory until Wilson's "invasion" in 1865. By then, as you correctly inferred, the war was all over militarily except for the admission. The real test of the people's ability to survive was about to begin. Reconstruction was hell in the South.
 
Unfortunately for those who champion the effort of the Confederate armies, you are essentially correct. Alabama and Mississippi remained Confederate territory until Wilson's "invasion" in 1865. By then, as you correctly inferred, the war was all over militarily except for the admission. The real test of the people's ability to survive was about to begin. Reconstruction was hell in the South.

For blacks and republicans.

Unless of course we have some organization going around lynching (conservative/nonRepublican) whites for daring to exercise their rights as citizens, burning down their schools and churches and otherwise ensuring that those that survived the war would be persecuted with the full force of popularly accepted terrorism.

That's not to say Reconstruction was an easy period for those Southerners, but it wasn't "hell".
 
For blacks and republicans.

Unless of course we have some organization going around lynching (conservative/nonRepublican) whites for daring to exercise their rights as citizens, burning down their schools and churches and otherwise ensuring that those that survived the war would be persecuted with the full force of popularly accepted terrorism.

That's not to say Reconstruction was an easy period for those Southerners, but it wasn't "hell".

I guess you weren't there. Welcome back!
 
I guess you weren't there.

Unless I'm very much mistaken on your age, you weren't either. Two generations closer, but not there.

And as stated, where are the groups going around killing whites for voting for the Democrats? Where are the groups making exercising the rights of a citizen impossible unless you were willing to risk your life for returning Confederate soldiers?

If you can find evidence of some on a level anywhere nearly equivalant to the ones doing the same to blacks and Republicans, I will withdraw my statement and eat a plateful of crow, without ketchup.
 
And while he made mistakes, he rose to the occasion like few men of his day or any other could have.

A recent visit to his tomb reinforced the notion that I had acquired years ago. While being overburdened with the will of a politician and the sharp wit of an attorney, this man was indeed as you state, an American icon with few peers. Only perhaps Washington was in his class. Jefferson Davis was no match for him.
 

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