Captain William H. Paine's Map

cwbuff

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I watched this Chuck Teague Ranger Walk video (
) and became intrigued by the recently discovered map produced by Captain William H. Paine, a cartographer on Meade's staff. The map was produced by Paine about 5am on July 2nd and purports to show where Meade expects his troops to be deployed and where the Confederates are deployed. Teague noted the position of the 6th Corps and the 3rd Corps and also that there was no "fishhook" line at this point in time. I'd be interested in what people think about this?
Captain William H Paine's Map 2 July 5am.png
 
Thanks for posting & asking the question. I had noted this before & have also watched the video. The map is intriguing.... This is certainly not the famous "fishhook." I am iinterested in seeing what others think about this.

My thoughts....

* Paine drew a rough map while riding with Meade on his survey of the Cemetery Ridge position (Meade rode from Cemetery Hill to the base of Little Round Top) between approximately 2:00 am and 4:00 on the morning of July 2 (perhaps Tom Elmore has a better grip on the time frame, an area I struggle with). Later, at Meade's headquarters, Paine & his staff (particularly Lt. Bissell I believe) completed the map & made copies. This was between 4:00 and 5:30 I believe.

* At this point the 2nd & 5th corps were not yet on the field but would arrive around 7:00. The 6th Corps was still far away. Meade seemed to expect the 6th Corps to arrive sometime late that morning or early in the afternoon -- obviously a overestimate.

* I'm not sure how long it would take to finish the map and make copies for all the corps commanders. I'm guessing at least a couple of hours, possibly more. So let's say the maps are completed by mid-morning or even as late as noon.

* The map seems to show the position Meade intends his corps to occupy once the army is totally concentrated, which won't happen until that afternoon -- and not the position to be occupied that morning before the concentration is completed.

* Is this a 2nd map?

* The position assigned to the 3rd corps obviously contradicts Meade's verbal instructions to Sickles to occupy a position from Hancock's left to Little Round Top. The position indicated on the map is forward of that line.

* It is interesting to me that the 6th Corps is assigned to the left of the line with the 5th Corps remaining in reserve. It would make sense to me for the 5th Corps (already on the field) to be assigned to the left and the 6th Corps to be placed in reserve. Did Meade want Sedgwick to command the left of the line to keep Sickles under control?

* How much did this map contribute to Sickles's "confusion" and his decision to advance to the Emmitsburg Road? Was this map the one Meade intended to distribute or (as mentioned before) was this a 2nd map to take effect once the 6th Corps arrived?

* Hunt noted in Battles and Leaders that the Peach Orchard area was the only area of the battlefield where the Army of the Potomac could go over from defensive to offensive operations with any prospect of success. Meade noted in his afternoon message to Halleck he was considering an offensive move if Lee did not attack first. Were the positions marked on this map prepatory to an offensive movement on the southern part of the field under Sedgwick's direction?
 
Paine was prescient in placing Confederates in force opposite the Peach Orchard at that early hour, when their actual right was at least 1.5 miles to the north. The Second Corps by my calculations was moving into position before 6 a.m. and the Third Corps was in bivouac off to their left, with the 63rd Pennsylvania occupying a skirmish line at the Peach Orchard since the previous night. It was hard to miss the Round Tops, so the fact that Paine puts the intended line well to the northwest of there - nearly to the Emmitsburg Road - would have been welcome news to Dan Sickles in justifying his decision to push out his corps. The Sixth Corps would supposedly have used the Granite Schoolhouse road to reach and extend the Federal left.

Paine also has the Twelfth Corps already in place on Culp's Hill, when at that hour portions of it were still on the way there from the base of Little Round Top. That suggests the more immediate concern was the Federal right. The Fifth Corps placement is also interesting as being held in a convenient position to assist either the right or left of the line. It also begs the question as to why the Fifth Corps was not moved immediately to the Union left if it was thought the Confederates were, or would soon be, in force on that flank.

I was unaware Meade was out near Little Round Top early on July 2, but would certainly like the sourcing details. I had imagined him catching a little rest at the Leister cottage at that hour (0500), having met with Stannard before dawn (perhaps as late as 3 a.m.?). Meade's earliest confirmed appearance that I know of is on Webb's line a little prior to 9 a.m., when he ordered a reconnaissance out as far as Seminary Ridge (made by a company of the 106th Pennsylvania) to see if he could stir up any Confederates thought to be in that vicinity, which by the way Meade might have thought the Confederate right lay. Another hour would pass before Ward's reconnaissance (1 USSS and 3 ME) established that the Confederates (Wilcox) were extending their line southward beyond Spangler's woods.
 
I have looked for a timeline of when and where the Union troops arrived but have not been able to find one (at least quickly). As Teague points out, there is a difference between bivouac and deployment. A better understanding of all the moving pieces would help sort this out. Another issue that I have is that lots of people provide quotes about these events, but do not put them in context or filter out other things that are said that counter the point they are trying to make. For example, Meade later testified in hearings that he intended to deploy at least part of his troops to go on the offensive. But did he believe that on July 2nd or did he need to say that to ward off criticism about the perceived lack of follow-up on the ANV.
 
Paine was prescient in placing Confederates in force opposite the Peach Orchard at that early hour, when their actual right was at least 1.5 miles to the north. The Second Corps by my calculations was moving into position before 6 a.m. and the Third Corps was in bivouac off to their left, with the 63rd Pennsylvania occupying a skirmish line at the Peach Orchard since the previous night. It was hard to miss the Round Tops, so the fact that Paine puts the intended line well to the northwest of there - nearly to the Emmitsburg Road - would have been welcome news to Dan Sickles in justifying his decision to push out his corps. The Sixth Corps would supposedly have used the Granite Schoolhouse road to reach and extend the Federal left.

Paine also has the Twelfth Corps already in place on Culp's Hill, when at that hour portions of it were still on the way there from the base of Little Round Top. That suggests the more immediate concern was the Federal right. The Fifth Corps placement is also interesting as being held in a convenient position to assist either the right or left of the line. It also begs the question as to why the Fifth Corps was not moved immediately to the Union left if it was thought the Confederates were, or would soon be, in force on that flank.

I was unaware Meade was out near Little Round Top early on July 2, but would certainly like the sourcing details. I had imagined him catching a little rest at the Leister cottage at that hour (0500), having met with Stannard before dawn (perhaps as late as 3 a.m.?). Meade's earliest confirmed appearance that I know of is on Webb's line a little prior to 9 a.m., when he ordered a reconnaissance out as far as Seminary Ridge (made by a company of the 106th Pennsylvania) to see if he could stir up any Confederates thought to be in that vicinity, which by the way Meade might have thought the Confederate right lay. Another hour would pass before Ward's reconnaissance (1 USSS and 3 ME) established that the Confederates (Wilcox) were extending their line southward beyond Spangler's woods.
The source for Meade reaching the Little Round Top area is his sons account as published in Life & Letters:

Before, however, it had yet become daylight, he mounted his horse, and accompanied by Generals Howard and Hunt, and by Captain Paine, of the engineer staff, rode off to examine the lines. Riding slowly along the rear of the sleeping line of soldiers around Cemetery Hill, and along its continuation as Cemetery Ridge, and beyond, to where the land dips before it rises abruptly at the base of Little Round Top, he obtained a general knowledge of the features of the ground and of the chief accidents of its surface. As it was still dark when he had started along the lines, of course only the most salient features of the ground could be recognized. Before, however, he had finished the examination, day began to break, and he concluded it by an inspection of the right, around Chip's Hill, to the crossing of Rock Creek by the Baltimore Pike. He finally indicated on Captain Paine's sketch of the ground just gone over the position to be held by each corps, and Captain Paine thereupon, by his orders, made from the sketch, and during the morning transmitted to each corps, a tracing showing the positions."

In addition, Schultz & Mingus in The Second Day at Gettysburg give an account of Meade's morning reconnaissance. The describe how Hunt spoke to Lt. John Kinzie (Battery K, 5th U.S.) while Meade & Howard spoke to Geary near Little Round Top. Not sure if the battery was with Geary's brigades in the area that morning. They cite a letter from Hunt to Howard (dated Dec. 29, 1876). I'm not familiar with this primary source, so I can't comment on it other than what I've read in the book.

My guess is that the map was created to show where the corps were to be positioned once the entire army reached the field -- which didn't happen until late in the day. The Confederate attack began before the positions indicated were taken up. Alternatively, there was an earlier map showing the initial deployment and,this is map #2 showing a later planned deployment.
 
The source for Meade reaching the Little Round Top area is his sons account as published in Life & Letters:

Before, however, it had yet become daylight, he mounted his horse, and accompanied by Generals Howard and Hunt, and by Captain Paine, of the engineer staff, rode off to examine the lines. Riding slowly along the rear of the sleeping line of soldiers around Cemetery Hill, and along its continuation as Cemetery Ridge, and beyond, to where the land dips before it rises abruptly at the base of Little Round Top, he obtained a general knowledge of the features of the ground and of the chief accidents of its surface. As it was still dark when he had started along the lines, of course only the most salient features of the ground could be recognized. Before, however, he had finished the examination, day began to break, and he concluded it by an inspection of the right, around Chip's Hill, to the crossing of Rock Creek by the Baltimore Pike. He finally indicated on Captain Paine's sketch of the ground just gone over the position to be held by each corps, and Captain Paine thereupon, by his orders, made from the sketch, and during the morning transmitted to each corps, a tracing showing the positions."

In addition, Schultz & Mingus in The Second Day at Gettysburg give an account of Meade's morning reconnaissance. The describe how Hunt spoke to Lt. John Kinzie (Battery K, 5th U.S.) while Meade & Howard spoke to Geary near Little Round Top. Not sure if the battery was with Geary's brigades in the area that morning. They cite a letter from Hunt to Howard (dated Dec. 29, 1876). I'm not familiar with this primary source, so I can't comment on it other than what I've read in the book.

My guess is that the map was created to show where the corps were to be positioned once the entire army reached the field -- which didn't happen until late in the day. The Confederate attack began before the positions indicated were taken up. Alternatively, there was an earlier map showing the initial deployment and,this is map #2 showing a later planned deployment.

Thanks! It sounds like Meade covered roughly 3.5 miles until he reached Rock Creek, which between a walk and trot on a horse would take about 45 minutes. Allowing for brief conversations the entire inspection may have lasted an hour. So I expect it was undertaken, give or take a few minutes, from about 3:30 until 4:30 a.m., sunrise coming around 4:35 a.m. I figure it would have been 4:15 a.m. before one could see any distance, when Meade would have been on the final stretch of his inspection.
 
Thanks! It sounds like Meade covered roughly 3.5 miles until he reached Rock Creek, which between a walk and trot on a horse would take about 45 minutes. Allowing for brief conversations the entire inspection may have lasted an hour. So I expect it was undertaken, give or take a few minutes, from about 3:30 until 4:30 a.m., sunrise coming around 4:35 a.m. I figure it would have been 4:15 a.m. before one could see any distance, when Meade would have been on the final stretch of his inspection.
Thanks for the times; I had always figured 1 1/2 to 2 hours. It sounds like the reconnaissance was completed in much shorter time.
 
Some random thoughts.....There is no provenance for Chuck's map being THE map Paine drew in the saddle. All we know is that it appears to have been made in 1863. There are problems with the map depicting things that havent yet happened at that point (some which have already been pointed out above). It's also worth noting that Paine almost always made his diary entries at the end of the day rather than the beginning - The map in his diary does seemingly match the one in question and so this also points to it probably being drawn up at the end of the day rather than the beginning. We also know that late in the evening of July 1, Meade ordered Sedgwick to take the Baltimore Pike to Gettysburg....so why would he expect him to arrive via the Taneytown Road? I'm not aware of a single III corps account which mentions either the map or word that Sixth Corps was coming up on the left....it would have been a perfect defense for moving out there. I hope Chuck is no longer claiming that Rich Rollins discovered the map down at the archives, because it was actually published by McElfresh back in the early 90's (see the back of the Gettysburg day 2 watercolor map).
 
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Some random thoughts.....There is no provenance for Chuck's map being THE map Paine drew in the saddle. All we know is that it appears to have been made in 1863. There are problems with the map depicting things that havent yet happened at that point (some which have already been pointed out above). It's also worth noting that Paine almost always made his diary entries at the end of the day rather than the beginning - The map in his diary does seemingly match the one in question and so this also points to it probably being drawn up at the end of the day rather than the beginning. We also know that late in the evening of July 1, Meade ordered Sedgwick to take the Baltimore Pike to Gettysburg....so why would he expect him to arrive via the Taneytown Road? I'm not aware of a single III corps account which mentions either the map or word that Sixth Corps was coming up on the left....it would have been a perfect defense for moving out there. I hope Chuck is no longer claiming that Rich Rollins discovered the map down at the archives, because it was actually published by McElfresh back in the early 90's (see the back of the Gettysburg day 2 watercolor map).
With you, I don't believe this was the original Paine map. Most accounts are pretty consistent in saying that Sickles was to take position from,Hancock's left and extend toward Little Round Top. The position on the map is well in front of that. Also, as Tom Elmore pointed out, the Confederate positions depicted on the map are much more accurate than what was known on the morning of July 2.

My guess is that this represents a 2nd map. Was this map to be passed out at Meade's 3:00 meeting with his generals? Were the positions shoen to be taken up late on July 2 if Lee did not attack, in preparation for July 3?
 
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