The War that Never Was: Britain, the U.S. and the Trent Affair

[67th Tigers]

As to cavalry, so what, two brigades of cavalry? Allocated presumably either to a single army or would it be allocated a brigade to each of two field armies? That isn't a lot of cavalry... enough for screening duties but hardly a mighty arm of decision.

No, that's the first tranche that was under orders to go.

The Corps d'Armee as defined in establishment charts of the time had a cavalry brigade with each corps. Since the number of troops planned to be sent is 5 Corps, then 5 brigades follows.

There was also orders to raise significant bodies of Canadian cavalry.

It's worth remember that the US had very, very little effective cavalry at this time. As of December '61 only 167 companies of volunteer cavalry had been raised. As of December '61 recruitment had been:

December: 167 coys mustered in during the month
November: 117 coys mustered in
October: 116 coys mustered in
September: 20 coys mustered in
August: 1 coy mustered in

Given the time taken to make really effective cavalry (2-3 years) there's a long way to go. In 1863-4 the Federal cavalry actually started to become useful and use the sabre. This largely stems from an ex-British regular, Robert Minty, who knew all this nonsense with carbines was a problem and had his regiment (and later brigade) charge with the sabre and consistently overthrow their rebel opponents. By 1864 the rebels were complaining they couldn't match the Federals with their sabres using rifles and carbines.

In a putative Trent War I suspect any Federal cavalry will get a rude shock and the British cavalry will re-enact the Charge of the Heavy Brigade many times...

 

[galveston bay]

No, that's the first tranche that was under orders to go.

The Corps d'Armee as defined in establishment charts of the time had a cavalry brigade with each corps. Since the number of troops planned to be sent is 5 Corps, then 5 brigades follows.

There was also orders to raise significant bodies of Canadian cavalry.

It's worth remember that the US had very, very little effective cavalry at this time. As of December '61 only 167 companies of volunteer cavalry had been raised. As of December '61 recruitment had been:

December: 167 coys mustered in during the month
November: 117 coys mustered in
October: 116 coys mustered in
September: 20 coys mustered in
August: 1 coy mustered in

Given the time taken to make really effective cavalry (2-3 years) there's a long way to go. In 1863-4 the Federal cavalry actually started to become useful and use the sabre. This largely stems from an ex-British regular, Robert Minty, who knew all this nonsense with carbines was a problem and had his regiment (and later brigade) charge with the sabre and consistently overthrow their rebel opponents. By 1864 the rebels were complaining they couldn't match the Federals with their sabres using rifles and carbines.

In a putative Trent War I suspect any Federal cavalry will get a rude shock and the British cavalry will re-enact the Charge of the Heavy Brigade many times...

sure, shocked that the British provided it so many great targets....

 

[TFSmith121]

sure, shocked that the British provided it so many great targets....

Given that the British were still wearing red tunics as late as South Africa in 1880-81, especially good targets.

Best,

 

[67th Tigers]

sure, shocked that the British provided it so many great targets....

Which is why the Federals will lose badly. Sabre trumped carbine by a massive margin in mounted combat. Until 1863-4 the Federals won't have anything that can go toe-to-toe with regular European cavalry.

 

[TFSmith121]

Which is why the Federals will lose badly. Sabre trumped carbine by a massive margin in mounted combat. Until 1863-4 the Federals won't have anything that can go toe-to-toe with regular European cavalry.

Says who?

Anyone who tried to fight mounted waving a saber or lance in an era of revolvers, rifles, and breechloading carbines was, as the troopers under the command of Brudenell and Bingham had learned, laboring under a significantly bloody handicap. The British cavalry accomplished nothing besides dying gallantly in the Crimea, where the decision (such as it was) that finally forced the Russians to withdraw from Sevastopol (not surrender in, of course, unlike Williams et al at Kars) was due (at Sevastopol) to the French and Sardinian infantry. The British infantry, of course, failed at the Great Redan in the same period the French and Italians won on their end of the line.

Beyond that, given how few troopers the three brigades of British cavalry ostensibly in the Crimea actually amounted to, who cares? They may as well be home riding down protestors at Peterloo.

As it as, even going by British reports, the heavy cavalry suffered 100 casualties of 300 engaged: in return, the Russians suffered 250 casualties - going by British reports. At that rate (10 for every 25) the British will run through their 3-6 brigades of regular cavalry quite rapidly, at which point all they have are volunteers. It's also worth pointing out that apparently the Russians suffered so few casualties because the British sabers, those "trumps" as weapons compared to a .52 caliber carbine or .36 or .44 caliber pistol bullet, were turned aside by the Russians' winter coats, among other issues ... Hardly sporting, after all.

 

[CanadianCanuck]

How many British infantry brigades, cavalry regiments and field artillery batteries

I'll take a crack at this. Let's assume then that the British continue funneling troops to North American after January 1862 and they charter the transports to send them. Assuming this we know that in North American in December 1861 you had the 1st battalion 17th Foot, 30th Foot, 47th Foot, and the 4th battalion of the Rifle Brigade, as well as the Royal Canadian Rifles. In the Maritimes were the 1st battalion 16th Foot and the 63rd Foot. There was one battery of field artillery in December 1862. (for simplicity sake from here on out when referring to battalions I'll just go number/regiment)

Dispatched to Canada (before the cancellation of mobilization) from then on were: 1/Grenadier Guards, 2/Scots Fusilier Guards, 2/16th, 2/17th, 62nd, 96th, and 1/Rifle Brigade and also dispatched were 5 field batteries.

According to the Times at least there were also on standby the: 2/Coldstream Guards, 1/10th, 1/11th, 2/12th, 2/20th, 45th, 55th, 58th, and 76th.

Presumably there were also field batteries on standby. As for cavalry the Times mentions that the Lancers (9th, 12th, 16th) and a single horse battery were also on standby.

So just under orders are 22 battalions of infantry (well if you split the RCR into 2 you get 24 so lets say that) and we know six batteries of field artillery, one of horse, and a brigade of cavalry. That's enough for (going by the Crimean pattern) four divisions and one brigade of cavalry, or 8 brigades of infantry and one brigade of cavalry. So roughly 24,000 troops or a force similar in size to the one initially dispatched to the Crimea.

That is of course not all the British could conceivably send. We can presume that more battalions could be ordered out and a similar force could be created.

Of course this discounts the Canadian militia, so I'll take a brief crack at that one:

We know that by April 1862 there were 14,000 Volunteer Militia under arms. We also know that in December the Canadian provincial government sent out orders to call up men from the sedentary militia to form battalions. For the sake of argument let's assume this continues and the government makes the effort to call up one flank company of 75 privates each to get 38,000 men (for simplicity sake I will include the already historical 14,000 Volunteers in this number) that they wished to muster and the order is not cancelled at the end of December. That translates to roughly 506 companies of infantry exclusive of officers. Now John A. Macdonald and the men he called to form a committee to discuss this issue wanted to form these into battalions, which with officers, would muster a strength of 840 men. So 506 companies translates into roughly 56 battalions, 840 men each, but let's just round this number down to 800 men each in order to account for desertion and sickness understrength, ect. So with pure infantry you get about 44,000 men.

For cavalry and artillery, well cavalry was in 1866, and 1885 that last thing the Provincial Government thought to call out, so let's assume they make a massive oversight like they did historically and we will stick at the 1600 men who were in the Volunteer cavalry historically. With artillery we shall assume the same and the 1600 men who were enrolled in April is the same (as a note I'm excluding garrison artillery here, an oversight yes, but we're looking at field operations).

So all in all there's roughly 48,000 militia we can assume the government in the Province of Canada can drum up if all goes well.

The Maritimes is a different story. While I have been unable to get my hands on a list of militia regiments for Nova Scotia (though I did find a book which contains officers of the militia, but can't find a physical or digital copy) I was able to find a list of New Brunswick militia for 1866.

Now there were four battalions organized in the City of Saint Johns, seven companies of cavalry (under the overall regimental command of the New Brunswick Regiment of Yeomanry Cavalry), 9 batteries of artillery, and militia regiments organized by county, each of the 15 counties containing 3-4 regiments of infantry. This gave some 32,000 men registered in the militia (sedentary) as a whole, but only some 2,000 Volunteers in early 1862. Let's assume New Brunswick makes a similar effort to embody volunteer battalions from the existing regiments. Since it would be prohibitively expensive to muster all the battalions let's assume, including the battalions in Saint Johns, for a total of 19 Battalions of infantry, and the same number of cavalry/artillery as before. Assuming similar size to the ones in the Province of Canada you have roughly 17,000 men mustered in New Brunswick. Let's assume a similar structure in Nova Scotia, one battalion of infantry for each county and four for the city of Halifax, unknown number of artillery and cavalry but purely infantry you get 17,000 men, perhaps 19,000 all told if a similar number of artillery and cavalry exist.

Assume Newfoundland and PEI muster some 2,000 each.

So let's say assuming effort expended from December to April 1862 you've got give or take 88,000 militia in all of British North America. That would free up regulars for field work, and presumably allow some militia to be brigaded with the regulars to thicken the ranks.

Assuming the British send two "Army of the East" sized forces, for a total of 48,000 men, you have 136,000 British/Colonial troops in theater come May.

And how many of these various field forces are ready to begin marching as of April 1862 when the roads presumably allow such along the Canadian border

More realistically, May. The roads and rivers were still flooded quite badly through much of April in this period, and many of the rivers will remain resolutely iced over until mid-to late April meaning that the necessary shipping to support more than a brigade sized force won't be available until at least late April early May 1862.

At sea, what forces were in theater as of March 1862, as that is when most of the RN ships that were initially allocated were on station or near enough to it for us to consider them immediately available (information on the US Navy is already readily available)

Hard to say. The British pretty much cancelled all mobilization orders at the end of December so the exact number of RN ships on station by March in a continued situation could be anywhere from 50-60 vessels going by conjecture. There were, roughly 38 vessels already in North American waters come January 1862.

What if any French organized combat forces were available for deployment and how many had already been deployed and what were their likely deployments

The French were too tied up in Mexico to really contribute by May 1862. Unless Nappy III felt like abandoning the whole thing for an even more expensive war.

 

[CanadianCanuck]

lets start with all of it (North America), as even Canada has flies and mosquitoes aplenty (like you wouldn't believe) but some areas are worse than others. Comparing troops stationed in permanent stations is disingenuous at the very least. Prepared sanitation and sleeping indoors does not remotely compared with campaign conditions in the 19th century or for that matter the 21st Century. Some areas in the US are however worse than others, such as the entire Mississippi River Valley system which is notable for its swamps (and remained notable for malaria well into the 20th Century) so comparing the Army of Tennessee (which also had a fair number of Regular Infantry and Cavalry regiments assigned to it over its career) to the Army of the Potomac which spent only 3 months in the Tidewater (another swamp) is also apples to oranges comparison. Indeed that brief period in the swamp was enough to give McClellan himself malaria.

Sure, there is plenty of fodder available in barns in Upper Canada and indeed could be shipped across the Atlantic... although moving it after that runs into the usual issues of poor roads and a single rail line to that is very limited in what it services. The US on the other hand has plenty of rail in the US and only runs into problems if it invades Upper Canada, but in that event would certainly dominate the Great Lakes and could move fodder and other supplies that way

Sorry, but based on the Crimea, which you might want to note is a relatively dry steppe during the summer and a rainy wet mud hole in the winter (thus hardly different from most of North America at this point in history) would leave a reasonable assumption that like is likely to create like in terms of conditions and thus losses. Although at least the British and Union had the resources to build decent hospitals in 1862 and had the concept of hospital trains

The disease rates in the Crimea were largely because of climate, and the amazingly horrible sanitation conditions of the allied army.

Climate wise Canada is more than a little different from the Crimea. There aren't very many disease epidemics in Canadian history. The biggest ones were the cholera epidemics in Montreal (which declined after the 1840s) and the typhoid epidemic of 1847 brought on when Irish immigrants died in droves after arriving on the infamous coffin ships.

The United States Sanitary Commission was literally cribbing from the British model devised in the Crimean War and post Mutiny. The British, in terms of not losing men to disease, probably have a pretty good leg up in that regard over the Union Army.

 

[TFSmith121]

I'll take a crack at this. Let's assume then that the British continue funneling troops to North American after January 1862 and they charter the transports to send them. Assuming this we know that in North American in December 1861 you had the 1st battalion 17th Foot, 30th Foot, 47th Foot, and the 4th battalion of the Rifle Brigade, as well as the Royal Canadian Rifles. In the Maritimes were the 1st battalion 16th Foot and the 63rd Foot. There was one battery of field artillery in December 1862. (for simplicity sake from here on out when referring to battalions I'll just go number/regiment)

Dispatched to Canada (before the cancellation of mobilization) from then on were: 1/Grenadier Guards, 2/Scots Fusilier Guards, 2/16th, 2/17th, 62nd, 96th, and 1/Rifle Brigade and also dispatched were 5 field batteries.

According to the Times at least there were also on standby the: 2/Coldstream Guards, 1/10th, 1/11th, 2/12th, 2/20th, 45th, 55th, 58th, and 76th.

Presumably there were also field batteries on standby. As for cavalry the Times mentions that the Lancers (9th, 12th, 16th) and a single horse battery were also on standby.

So just under orders are 22 battalions of infantry (well if you split the RCR into 2 you get 24 so lets say that) and we know six batteries of field artillery, one of horse, and a brigade of cavalry. That's enough for (going by the Crimean pattern) four divisions and one brigade of cavalry, or 8 brigades of infantry and one brigade of cavalry. So roughly 24,000 troops or a force similar in size to the one initially dispatched to the Crimea.

That is of course not all the British could conceivably send. We can presume that more battalions could be ordered out and a similar force could be created.

Of course this discounts the Canadian militia, so I'll take a brief crack at that one:

We know that by April 1862 there were 14,000 Volunteer Militia under arms. We also know that in December the Canadian provincial government sent out orders to call up men from the sedentary militia to form battalions. For the sake of argument let's assume this continues and the government makes the effort to call up one flank company of 75 privates each to get 38,000 men (for simplicity sake I will include the already historical 14,000 Volunteers in this number) that they wished to muster and the order is not cancelled at the end of December. That translates to roughly 506 companies of infantry exclusive of officers. Now John A. Macdonald and the men he called to form a committee to discuss this issue wanted to form these into battalions, which with officers, would muster a strength of 840 men. So 506 companies translates into roughly 56 battalions, 840 men each, but let's just round this number down to 800 men each in order to account for desertion and sickness understrength, ect. So with pure infantry you get about 44,000 men.

For cavalry and artillery, well cavalry was in 1866, and 1885 that last thing the Provincial Government thought to call out, so let's assume they make a massive oversight like they did historically and we will stick at the 1600 men who were in the Volunteer cavalry historically. With artillery we shall assume the same and the 1600 men who were enrolled in April is the same (as a note I'm excluding garrison artillery here, an oversight yes, but we're looking at field operations).

So all in all there's roughly 48,000 militia we can assume the government in the Province of Canada can drum up if all goes well.

The Maritimes is a different story. While I have been unable to get my hands on a list of militia regiments for Nova Scotia (though I did find a book which contains officers of the militia, but can't find a physical or digital copy) I was able to find a list of New Brunswick militia for 1866.

Now there were four battalions organized in the City of Saint Johns, seven companies of cavalry (under the overall regimental command of the New Brunswick Regiment of Yeomanry Cavalry), 9 batteries of artillery, and militia regiments organized by county, each of the 15 counties containing 3-4 regiments of infantry. This gave some 32,000 men registered in the militia (sedentary) as a whole, but only some 2,000 Volunteers in early 1862. Let's assume New Brunswick makes a similar effort to embody volunteer battalions from the existing regiments. Since it would be prohibitively expensive to muster all the battalions let's assume, including the battalions in Saint Johns, for a total of 19 Battalions of infantry, and the same number of cavalry/artillery as before. Assuming similar size to the ones in the Province of Canada you have roughly 17,000 men mustered in New Brunswick. Let's assume a similar structure in Nova Scotia, one battalion of infantry for each county and four for the city of Halifax, unknown number of artillery and cavalry but purely infantry you get 17,000 men, perhaps 19,000 all told if a similar number of artillery and cavalry exist.

Assume Newfoundland and PEI muster some 2,000 each.

So let's say assuming effort expended from December to April 1862 you've got give or take 88,000 militia in all of British North America. That would free up regulars for field work, and presumably allow some militia to be brigaded with the regulars to thicken the ranks.

Assuming the British send two "Army of the East" sized forces, for a total of 48,000 men, you have 136,000 British/Colonial troops in theater come May.



More realistically, May. The roads and rivers were still flooded quite badly through much of April in this period, and many of the rivers will remain resolutely iced over until mid-to late April meaning that the necessary shipping to support more than a brigade sized force won't be available until at least late April early May 1862.



Hard to say. The British pretty much cancelled all mobilization orders at the end of December so the exact number of RN ships on station by March in a continued situation could be anywhere from 50-60 vessels going by conjecture. There were, roughly 38 vessels already in North American waters come January 1862.



The French were too tied up in Mexico to really contribute by May 1862. Unless Nappy III felt like abandoning the whole thing for an even more expensive war.

The problem with throwing men together into companies and then throwing companies together and calling the result a battalion should be obvious - unit cohesion, as in the lack thereof. Men who don't know each other, and don't know their officers, and vice-versa, need time to train and shakedown. Otherwise, they are simply mobs at worst, bands of irregulars at best, not unlike the Fenians of 1866...

The difference with Americans, north and south, who had begun to mobilize in April of 1861, are a few weeks to eight months of active service experience and the resultant shakedown; in some cases, the American units have actually been blooded, as well.

The only useful forces the Province of Canada can immediately contribute - if, in fact, they show when called - are the less than 5,000 first line reservists of the Volunteers, who amounted to about three organized infantry battalions and a number of separate companies, troops, and batteries in December, 1861. They also, of course, amount to what passes for the training and administrative cadre for any wartime mobilization units, and can either be dedicated to that task, or filling in the gaps in the British regular field forces, but not both - certainly not simultaneously, and certainly not all 5,000 at once - they have to split up, and once the basic points like Quebec City, the GT and other railroads, the canals, Montreal, Prescott, Kingston, etc. get some sort of presence, those 5,000 are rapidly dispersed and there's next to nothing for the field forces in Upper or Lower Canada.

The volunteer reservist units in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, etc, are even weaker; the 1862 report by Petrie and James lists perhaps 6,000 volunteers across all the Maritimes (at the same time 15,000 Volunteers and 10,000 useful Militia are listed in the Province of Canada), so beyond garrisons and training cadre, there's next to nothing for any field force in New Brunswick, either.

The other problem, of course, is that while militia can be ordered into service in their home colonies, they have to volunteer for service outside of such ... Which delays mobilization of any effective field forces even more and, of course, weakens unit cohesion even more when some reservists volunteer and others do not.

Realistically, other than the less than 5,000 first line Volunteer reservists in the Province of Canada (East/West, Upper/Lower) which the British so memorably referred to as "a miserably small force" the defenders of BNA amount to the handful of British regulars there in December; anything or anyone else is subject to the vagaries of winter weather (as in the case of the 96th Regiment) and war, the obvious one being what the enemy does...

In which case, it is worth remembering the DuPont-Sherman expedition had assembled a force of ~13,000 troops aboard a fleet of 77 transports and escorts as recently as November, 1861, and landed them sucessfully at Port Royal... The British garrison in the entire West Indies amounted to three battalions of British regulars and 4-6 battalions of the West Indian regiments, in 1-2 battalion garrisons from Jamaica to the Antilles to Bermuda. Be rather a challenge if the Americans showed up off Bermuda with an expeditionary force and fleet...

Along those same lines, it's worth noting the Americans had ground and naval forces on station in the Gulf and the southeastern Atlantic coast, at this point, and Burnside's expeditionary division was formed up in December and embarked for Roanoke in January.

Best,

 

[galveston bay]

The disease rates in the Crimea were largely because of climate, and the amazingly horrible sanitation conditions of the allied army.

Climate wise Canada is more than a little different from the Crimea. There aren't very many disease epidemics in Canadian history. The biggest ones were the cholera epidemics in Montreal (which declined after the 1840s) and the typhoid epidemic of 1847 brought on when Irish immigrants died in droves after arriving on the infamous coffin ships.

The United States Sanitary Commission was literally cribbing from the British model devised in the Crimean War and post Mutiny. The British, in terms of not losing men to disease, probably have a pretty good leg up in that regard over the Union Army.

as the historical record makes it pretty clear that disease attrition remained high outside of the various Prussian wars in the 19th Century and that initial logistical arrangements for the British are going to be pretty ad hoc, I suspect that once campaigning begins that there will be significant British attrition. What that actual number is ... who knows... but I would suspect better than the Union the first year of the war but still enough to inflict some pretty serious losses.

On the plus side, most of the British troops had all the child hood ailments that gave the Union Eastern regiments an advantage over Union Western regiments (urban vs rural life makes a big difference on how you deal with the measles and mumps, both of which, among others, where serious epidemics in Western and for that matter Southern regiments). The Canadian militia however are going to be in the same boat as the Union Western and Confederate regiments. A bunch of healthy farm and small town men tossed together into camps where a single case of any childhood disease becomes epidemic.

This is being ignored as a matter of fact in the discussion thus far. While disease from sanitation are greatly reduced when actual sanitation practices are instituted (and more importantly, discipline enforced to keep them) but the vulnerability of pre vaccination populations to childhood diseases is a real factor in the Civil War, greatly contributing to the sick list.

A common vulnerability to all of the men from rural and small town North America. Kind of made up for the fact that they were generally in better health than a lot of the urban men (better diet, less air and water pollution etc)

 

[TFSmith121]

as the historical record makes it pretty clear that disease attrition remained high outside of the various Prussian wars in the 19th Century and that initial logistical arrangements for the British are going to be pretty ad hoc, I suspect that once campaigning begins that there will be significant British attrition. What that actual number is ... who knows... but I would suspect better than the Union the first year of the war but still enough to inflict some pretty serious losses.

On the plus side, most of the British troops had all the child hood ailments that gave the Union Eastern regiments an advantage over Union Western regiments (urban vs rural life makes a big difference on how you deal with the measles and mumps, both of which, among others, where serious epidemics in Western and for that matter Southern regiments). The Canadian militia however are going to be in the same boat as the Union Western and Confederate regiments. A bunch of healthy farm and small town men tossed together into camps where a single case of any childhood disease becomes epidemic.

This is being ignored as a matter of fact in the discussion thus far. While disease from sanitation are greatly reduced when actual sanitation practices are instituted (and more importantly, discipline enforced to keep them) but the vulnerability of pre vaccination populations to childhood diseases is a real factor in the Civil War, greatly contributing to the sick list.

A common vulnerability to all of the men from rural and small town North America. Kind of made up for the fact that they were generally in better health than a lot of the urban men (better diet, less air and water pollution etc)

Good points... Human factors tend to be overlooked by many, but are as deadly as or more so than bullets and shells, certainly in the Nineteenth Century.

Even in the late Twentieth, throw a bunch of healthy young men together in boot camp in open bay barracks and the various boot camp cruds and coughs run through ... Personal experience.

Another advantage of the American mobilization beginning the previous April, of course, is that most of the "first time sicks" would have come and gone by the winter of 1862; the BNAers, not so much.

Best,

 

[CanadianCanuck]

The problem with throwing men together into companies and then throwing companies together and calling the result a battalion should be obvious - unit cohesion, as in the lack thereof. Men who don't know each other, and don't know their officers, and vice-versa, need time to train and shakedown. Otherwise, they are simply mobs at worst, bands of irregulars at best, not unlike the Fenians of 1866...

The difference with Americans, north and south, who had begun to mobilize in April of 1861, are a few weeks to eight months of active service experience and the resultant shakedown; in some cases, the American units have actually been blooded, as well.

The only useful forces the Province of Canada can immediately contribute - if, in fact, they show when called - are the less than 5,000 first line reservists of the Volunteers, who amounted to about three organized infantry battalions and a number of separate companies, troops, and batteries in December, 1861. They also, of course, amount to what passes for the training and administrative cadre for any wartime mobilization units, and can either be dedicated to that task, or filling in the gaps in the British regular field forces, but not both - certainly not simultaneously, and certainly not all 5,000 at once - they have to split up, and once the basic points like Quebec City, the GT and other railroads, the canals, Montreal, Prescott, Kingston, etc. get some sort of presence, those 5,000 are rapidly dispersed and there's next to nothing for the field forces in Upper or Lower Canada.

The volunteer reservist units in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, etc, are even weaker; the 1862 report by Petrie and James lists perhaps 6,000 volunteers across all the Maritimes (at the same time 15,000 Volunteers and 10,000 useful Militia are listed in the Province of Canada), so beyond garrisons and training cadre, there's next to nothing for any field force in New Brunswick, either.

This whole argument of only 5000 volunteers of course assumes that between December 1861 and May 1862 the various colonial governments do absolutely nothing to expand their militias. Based on the frantic activity seen in December 1861 historically, this can be rather easily set aside.

As to unit cohesion , if the Canadians are expanding their militia forces and putting them to drill for roughly 4-5 months continuously under British tutelage (as opposed to the mere few days a month or one week twice a year from 1862-1866 historically) then I would say that there's not too much to worry about. The northern and southern armies managed to pull off enough cohesion to fight First Bull Run, and that was with 2-3 months of training. I would say that the Colonials can pull off similar if not slightly better cohesion in a similar time frame.

as the historical record makes it pretty clear that disease attrition remained high outside of the various Prussian wars in the 19th Century and that initial logistical arrangements for the British are going to be pretty ad hoc, I suspect that once campaigning begins that there will be significant British attrition. What that actual number is ... who knows... but I would suspect better than the Union the first year of the war but still enough to inflict some pretty serious losses.

On the plus side, most of the British troops had all the child hood ailments that gave the Union Eastern regiments an advantage over Union Western regiments (urban vs rural life makes a big difference on how you deal with the measles and mumps, both of which, among others, where serious epidemics in Western and for that matter Southern regiments). The Canadian militia however are going to be in the same boat as the Union Western and Confederate regiments. A bunch of healthy farm and small town men tossed together into camps where a single case of any childhood disease becomes epidemic.

The historical transport of troops overland to Canada was incredibly ad hoc, but even cramming all those men into steamers and sending them through a nasty Canadian winter you had less than ten cases of frostbite. They were well provided for. True these were long service regulars who were used to campaign conditions, and even when mixed in as a field force there will be some...but the British regulars will have it a bit better off than the Union troops who are just entering service.

The Canadians, aside from the contingents that come from the cities and towns, will have similar sick rates to the Union troops.

Even still, I suspect that as a percentage of the army sick there would be much fewer than a comparable north or south army, if only because the British have more experience in dealing with this fact of war.

A common vulnerability to all of the men from rural and small town North America. Kind of made up for the fact that they were generally in better health than a lot of the urban men (better diet, less air and water pollution etc)

God evens it out in the end it seems

 

[TFSmith121]

This whole argument of only 5000 volunteers of course assumes that between December 1861 and May 1862 the various colonial governments do absolutely nothing to expand their militias. Based on the frantic activity seen in December 1861 historically, this can be rather easily set aside.

As to unit cohesion , if the Canadians are expanding their militia forces and putting them to drill for roughly 4-5 months continuously under British tutelage (as opposed to the mere few days a month or one week twice a year from 1862-1866 historically) then I would say that there's not too much to worry about. The northern and southern armies managed to pull off enough cohesion to fight First Bull Run, and that was with 2-3 months of training. I would say that the Colonials can pull off similar if not slightly better cohesion in a similar time frame.



The historical transport of troops overland to Canada was incredibly ad hoc, but even cramming all those men into steamers and sending them through a nasty Canadian winter you had less than ten cases of frostbite. They were well provided for. True these were long service regulars who were used to campaign conditions, and even when mixed in as a field force there will be some...but the British regulars will have it a bit better off than the Union troops who are just entering service.

The Canadians, aside from the contingents that come from the cities and towns, will have similar sick rates to the Union troops.

Even still, I suspect that as a percentage of the army sick there would be much fewer than a comparable north or south army, if only because the British have more experience in dealing with this fact of war.



God evens it out in the end it seems

No, I quite specifically wrote that the (less than) 5,000 reservists of the Provincial Volunteers (if they mobilize) are what are available in DECEMBER, 1861, along with the 5,000 or so British regulars in the Province of Canada and the 2,000 or so in the Maritimes; this is, of course, the same month the US ALREADY has 527,800 regulars and USVs under arms.

The British can attempt to raise more troops in BNA, of course, beginning in January, 1862, but the training cadre and administrative personnel for any "additional" Provincial troops on active duty are going to be drawn from those same 5,000. The US, of course, can raise more troops as well; historically, 420,000 3-year volunteers were raised in response to the 1862 call for 300,000, and 86,000 nine-month volunteers were as well. These figures are from the OR; however, they do not include various state troops mobilized for local or national needs with federal or state funds, or the more specialized units recruited under federal aegis; the USCTs and their predecessors, the IHGs, and the "federal" USVs, although these manpower sources were, in fact, available to be drawn upon in the winter of 1861-62, if policy changed to provide for such recruitment.

So given the realities of the respective population bases, for every one BNAer potentially mobilized in 1862, there are seven Americans - of which a reasonable number are ALREADY in uniform, equipped, and organized in the winter of 1861-62. Quite a few have ALREADY heard a shot or two fired in anger since April, 1861, in fact.

Best,

 

[JCM6395]

TFSmith...I agree with much of what you say...just wondering though about arming the troops. We were importing a lot of rifles in first year or so of the war. My ancestors regiment was issued War of 1812 flint locks converted to percussion when they formed up in Oct 1861. They didn't get Enfields and Springfields until late 1862. Would there have been enough muskets in northern arsenals to arm an major expansion of the army?

Question for anyone is when was the North able to produce enough Springfields and other native manufactured rifles to fully support the Union Army?

 

[CanadianCanuck]

Question for anyone is when was the North able to produce enough Springfields and other native manufactured rifles to fully support the Union Army?

I'd encourage you to take a look at these two articles here and here posted on 67thtigers blog by a user I know from another site who is meticulous with his sourcing. The articles are sourced out the wazoo. The conclusions are, like anything in historical studies, open to interpretation, but it raises some interesting questions about the idea of the Union being an autarky in the period.

That being said, historically Springfields came into the main, arming a majority of Union troops, in 1863 once the domestic industry had expanded to catch up with demand of the war from 1862. There were still foreign muskets and rifles in service but they certainly weren't the majority.

 

[jgoodguy]

While we are playing war games here, remember Lincoln can sign a peace treaty with the rebels or simply assume defensive lines. The assumption of the Confederate war is not an assurance.

 

[CanadianCanuck]

While we are playing war games here, remember Lincoln can sign a peace treaty with the rebels or simply assume defensive lines. The assumption of the Confederate war is not an assurance.

The only peace the Confederates are accepting is outright independence. No treaty is possible.

 

[jgoodguy]

The only peace the Confederates are accepting is outright independence. No treaty is possible.

That is not a given in this what if. Anything is possible. say

• Union simply holds the line and makes no offensive moves.
• Union and Confederate sign armistice until British invaders gone.
• Lincoln grants independence, deals with Brits and then invades South.
• Lincoln signs treaty pending negotiations for independence, when Brits are no longer a problem, then breaks off negotiations.

Now not only do you have to argue that the Brits can get their armies over to Canada, raise the militia and all the military stuff you have to deal with the political as well.

You are betting on a very unlikely war. If the probables are such that Lincoln will got to war for US honor, then he is capable of improbable anything.

 

[TFSmith121]

TFSmith...I agree with much of what you say...just wondering though about arming the troops. We were importing a lot of rifles in first year or so of the war. My ancestors regiment was issued War of 1812 flint locks converted to percussion when they formed up in Oct 1861. They didn't get Enfields and Springfields until late 1862. Would there have been enough muskets in northern arsenals to arm an major expansion of the army?

Question for anyone is when was the North able to produce enough Springfields and other native manufactured rifles to fully support the Union Army?

Thanks for the kind words.

There's a difference between producing enough long arms in the US, however, and simply having enough to equip the existing forces as of December, 1861, and any additional forces raised.

The only truly exhaustive and comprehensive lists for the Army would be in the Ordnance Department's records, which are available on microfilm at NARA; they are not on-line, which leads to various individuals using various other sources, including Congressional reports, communications between the Ordnance Department's investigators and various contract manufacturers, etc. That, in itself, is fairly spotty; add in the reality that the Navy and Treasury departments also had wartime procurement responsibilities, much less that in a federal system, every state and even territorial government had an executive branch and military department with the authority to raise and equip troops, entirely separately from the federal government and its departments, and a comprehensive survey of the issue becomes even more problematic. Then add the reality that the civilian arms stockpile and trade in the US was, as always, significant, and the potential sources of supply becomes even more diffuse.

One can come up with various lists, most of which are reasonably sourced in terms of the US Government arsenal production of (for example) the M1855 and M1861 rifle musket; but after that, there is the wartime production by civilian contractors of the M1861, the "Special" Colt 1861 design (which had features both of the M1861 and the British P53 that had been made under license by Robbins & Lawrence for the British Army during the Crimean War because of shortcomings in the British supply chain), the Remington contract design (which had a lot in common with the M1841 rifle, which was a modern percussion weapon that remained in production until well into the 1850s);, and then the changeover to the M1863.... these lines were being set up in 1861-62, began producing in 1862-63, and hit their stride in 1863, but the issues of supply chain for components gets pretty convoluted before deliveries began...

The prewar production numbers for the USG are pretty well known, but how many of those remained in loyal hands in the US vs. those that the rebels took control of in 1861 are another delta; there are estimates that I've read that less than 12,000 M1855 rifle muskets and 15,000 M1841 rifles produced on federal account actually ended up in what became rebel states in 1861 - if so, then the entire remaining stock of these modern weapons - at least 12o,ooo, if not more (150,000 or more is possible) - were in loyal states. Then, in terms of US-made rifles and rifle muskets in the standard calibers (.54 and .58) in US hands by the winter of 1862, when any conflict along these lines might break out, are the M1861s produced at Springfield (~40,000 or more by January, 1862), the R&L made P53s that were not exported to the UK (possibly as many as 10,000 to 15,000, in .577 or .58), the 4,000 or so M1859 Sharps breechloading rifles manufactured before the wartime orders for Berdan et al, etc. There are 200,000 or more weapons, at least, in these categories.

Then consider the reality the US had begun to mobilize in April, 1861, a full 9-10 months before any Anglo-American conflict would or could break out in the winter of 1862, and consider the flood of British and Belgian made Enfields/P53s (in .577 or .58); Austrian-made M1854s and variants (in .54 or .58), the M1851 "Saxon" rifle in .58, etc. These were all modern rifle muskets, designed for percussion caps and in calibers that were standardized; given that 330,000 P53s and 220,000 M1854s and 25,000 M1851s were imported in 1861-63, the numbers that came into the US and were accepted by Army Ordnance alone in 1861-62 numbered well between 200,000 and 300,000 of those weapons, as well.

Then consider older military rifles, whether US Government procurement (~25,000 M1819 breechloaders and ~60,000 M1803 to M1817 muzzle loaders, all in standard .52 or .54 calibers) or older European weapons (usually in the larger "Minie" calibers in the .69 to .71 range, so heavy, but still useful) all of which had been manufactured as or could be converted to percussion cap, or US civilian manufactured rifles. Then consider the vast stocks of US Government procured muskets, both made as percussion (275,000 M1842) or converted (675,000 M1816/M1822) which in a regiment with mixed weapons, add to the volume of fire and are as deadly in broken country as any rifle, and which, in fact, could be converted to rifled muskets. Then consider carbines (USG production or contract), civilian muskets, and shotguns, all of which could accomplish the goal of sending lead down range in vast quantities.

By the first quarter of 1862, that's a SWAG/ROM of a half million modern percussion rifles and rifle muskets, of US and European manufacture; presumably 100,000 or so older or 2nd-line rifles; and the same or more (~500,000) in US-made percussion muskets, designed as such or converted; etc. That's more than enough to equip an army of a million infantry; certainly more than enough to equip the 527,800 regulars and USVs on active duty in December, 1861 plus as many more of the 506,000 as mobilized historically to the call late in 1862 for additional USVs, plus as many state troops, militia, or auxiliary federal troops as one could wish for...

All of the above is basically just back of the envelope, of course; the only really reliable numbers are in NARA, and until their collections are digitized, they will remain there.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

While we are playing war games here, remember Lincoln can sign a peace treaty with the rebels or simply assume defensive lines. The assumption of the Confederate war is not an assurance.

Simply remaining on the defensive in Virginia and points south easily frees up two to four full corps equivalents, but leaves three to five there to look after JE Johnston; fighting a limited offensive in Tennessee (holding defensively after Nashville falls) frees up at least two more, one each from Buell's and Grant's commands. The historical level of force that secured West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, the Indian Territory, and New Mexico in 1861-63 can be maintained as well, and San Francisco is unassailable by any British force immediately available in the Pacific in December, 1861.

Limited regulars and USVs, plus state troops and militia, along with the Navy, would be enough to protect the major east coast cities, as the experience of New York and Baltimore in 1812-15 make clear.

Best,

 

[CanadianCanuck]

That is not a given in this what if. Anything is possible. say

• Union simply holds the line and makes no offensive moves.
• Union and Confederate sign armistice until British invaders gone.
• Lincoln grants independence, deals with Brits and then invades South.
• Lincoln signs treaty pending negotiations for independence, when Brits are no longer a problem, then breaks off negotiations.

When dealing with what ifs, I tend to deal with what lies within the realm of probability. An Anglo-American war in 1862 is not altogether likely, but not completely outside the realm of possibility. (As a general note there is no agreed upon definition of how this war starts here, we are just really assuming it is over the historical Trent affair it seems).

Lincoln making an offer to the South which does not either a) guarantee independence and end the war or b) guarantee slavery and its expansion will not be accepted by Richmond, hell with the option of outright independence b might not not even be an option in their eyes.

Either way, there'd have to be an armistice, negotiations, ect, and all of this would be taking place in the shadow of a foreign war where the Union is bleeding strength in the north while still having to maintain armies to check the armies of the South. So in effect, almost the same thing if they were still at war with the South anyways, just no dying, but lots of useless men standing around, and the South might well decide they can grab more territory and go on with the war.

In the realm of likelihood, Lincoln doing anything which would grant legitimacy to the South is simply a no go. It sets a precedent he would not have been willing to set.

Now not only do you have to argue that the Brits can get their armies over to Canada, raise the militia and all the military stuff(1) you have to deal with the political as well.(2)

1) I don't have to argue that the British could get their armies to Canada and raise the militia, they most obviously could according to the historical record.

2) The politics is also important. However, we tend to know the stakes that both sides north and south were playing for. How the politics will develop as the situation progresses is really unknowable.

Alternate history is the ultimate unknowable like I said before, but we can make a number of decent assumptions based on historical actors actions. If we assume historical actors are doing something completely contrary to their character and stated aims then the least we ought to be able to do is make a compelling case for why this is.

The issue is that with all the build up to the Civil War and with the blood shed between April 1861 and January 1862, I can't see a compelling reason within the bounds of the desires north and south, for either side to agree to a cease fire.