The War that Never Was: Britain, the U.S. and the Trent Affair

[CanadianCanuck]

Back at ya....

Very glad to see the quality of your input remains the same

 

[TFSmith121]

Really? Except all that evidence your dismiss out of hand for the spurious reason of "it disproves [TFSmith121's] argument", that is. You've still provided no evidence on the topic in hand whatsoever.

The sledge route indeed did continue to operate until 13th March 1862, as Campbell mentions. When the route shut down all the troops that went by the route had gone down the route, as Campbell mentions. What Campbell does not mention is when units traveled, apart from the first units starting on 1st January.

Since only five battalions (plus other bits and bobs) crossed it should be easy to look up, thus:

1/Grenadier Gds: started 9th January, paraded complete at Montreal 1st February
2/ Scots Fusilier Gds: started 23rd January, complete at Montreal 13th February (for both see the journal)
62nd: via St Andrews starting 1st January (as per Campbell)
63rd: date not located, went after the 62nd and before the Guards though
1/Rifle Brigade: started 6th January (history), departed from Montreal 31st January

(the company of the 1/16th what didn't make it off the boat at Riviere du Loup started on 20th January)

The last unit to arrive at Montreal was the Scots Fusiliers, who arrived 13th February. So what units crossed after the Scots Fusiliers?

Again, your links refer to the rebels (or your own blog, which is what it is); or date from later than December 1861, much later in the case of Sherman's 1864 order, of course, as well as McClellan's postwar apologia; or they don't even link to what you describe.

Grant's comments, of course, refer only to his command during the battle of Shiloh, not 90 days earlier and before both the Donelson-Henry campaign and the reorganization and movement to Pittsburg Landing.

So, again, you have linked to nothing that is of direct relevance to the correlation of forces in December, 1861.

That date, of course, is where the 527,80o troops to 218,000 troops equation that is the foundation of the discussion cons from... So until or unless reliable, official figures can be brought forward that breaks the status of the British troops into the same three categories as the US reports do, and with common definitions, the only comparison of like to like is total strength, period. If that can be achieved, then the next point of comparison is location. Then organization, leadership, equipment, etc.

But unless there is a common foundation, the above is so much apples to oranges. The only like to like provided by official records in this entire discussion is 527,800 US Army (regulars and USVs) active duty in North America to 218,000 British regulars, world-wide. Again, period, end of story, unless someone arguing against that can provide officially sourced numbers for both sides that indicate otherwise. Can you? If so, please post links to such, and thanks in advance.

And far as the British regular army reinforcements of Lower Canada, appreciate the sourcing. What is the source for suggesting the 63rd went before the two Guards battalions? Need a source for that, of course. Thanks in advance.

Even if true, however, it suggests it took at least six weeks to get a total of five battalions overland from New Brunswick to Montreal; of those, two were already in the Martime colonies and the other three came by sea from the UK. At that rate, they might get the equivalent of what, 8-10 battalions from the Maritimes to the Canadas by April 1, to join the equivalent in regulars and Canadian Provincial reserve (Volunteer) battalions that actually existed prior to 1862 into the field? So that's, maybe, four to six mixed brigades (in which the Provincials are at less that Ridgeway-Fort Erie levels of readiness and effectiveness) for the planned invasion of upstate New York, defending the borders along those of western Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, the entirety of the New York-Upper Canada border along the St. Lawrence, the Niagara border, the Michigan border, etc? Not seeing that going any better than Burgoyne's attempt to do the same thing in 1777, actually... And if Williams or Russell or whoever matches south with such, the rest of the Province is essentially wide open...

Of course, this was also in peacetime, and absent any opposition, overt or covert, or British troops being diverted to the eastern border of Maine with New Brunswick, or preparing for the proposed Portland operation, or anything else - much less anything as diverting as a US Army-US Navy force setting sail from the Gulf or Port Royal, (or, for that matter, Hampton Roads, Annapolis, or Boston) towards an unknown destination) - which is likely to upset the applecart entirely, of course.

Given the vulnerability of the British forces in the West Indies , for example, (Bourne goes into significant detail on that) the examples of Stringham's and DuPont's expeditions of 1861, the obvious gathering of resources for those of Burnside and Butler in 1862 (as historical), and the precedents going back to Esek Hopkins and Nassau during the Revolution, it is unlikely that a short of war situation would include the exact same deployments that the British ordered, much less executed, historically.

If the British are going launch an unprecedented series of miltary operations in the Western Hemisphere in the winter of 1862, 3,000 miles across the North Atlantic and including but not limited to not one but two separate armies being deployed into theaters as much as 700 miles apart, after all, it is entirely appropriate to suggest the Americans may do something more about it than stand by and wait for them all to show up...they have been mobilizing since April, 1861, after all.

 

[TFSmith121]

Very glad to see the quality of your input remains the same

Stunning, given that you are, after all, the one who introduced that particular set of emoticons.

And no actual response to the two defeats of the Canadian Provincials in 1866, despite 54 months of training and supervision by the British regulars, including (of course) the world-beating combination of muzzle-loading rifle muskets and "Hythe tactics" against 500, 600, or even 800 non-state actor irregulars, where the Canadians were fighting on their own ground and on the defensive, and yet still got bowled over twice? How did that work out for Booker, by the way?

More importantly, how are the Canadian Provincials - assuming any are actually mobilized in the winter of 1862 - going to fare in battle against the Americans absent those 54 months of training?

And, of course, there's the question that, given the results of, and impact upon, the 1854-55 and 1880-81 conflicts regarding that same British regular army, one can make an informed judgement that even the redcoats, in fact, (absent the French, Turks, Sardinians, and looming threat of the Austrians) may not have all that great an impact in North America in 1862-??.

At least based on the actual results when the redcoats, you know, actually faced a comparable enemy on the field in this era, as opposed to on the rifle range or in one's imagination.

Best,

 

[CanadianCanuck]

Though as I've been thinking here's (from my own reading) my views on the whole advantages and disadvantages* in a Trent War scenario

British:

Advantages

• Already existing large professional long term service army and experienced officer corps who have handled large scale mobilization and expeditions since 1854
• Local "allies" in the forces of the Confederacy which tie down Union troops
• Uncontested control of the high seas and the ability to ship for ship outbuild the Union
• Recent experience in assaulting fortified positions from the sea (Kinburn, Bmorsund, Sveaborg) and add to that bases at Halifax and Bermuda which allow for close blockade, and the ability to seize placed like Portland in order to press the blockade tighter
• No European rivals in a position to take advantage of British distraction[1]
• Largest merchant marine on earth which makes the transport of men and materials rather easy
• No possible way for the Union to strike at the truly vital areas of the Empire
• Previous experience in the construction of ironclad batteries and recent experience in constructing ironclad vessels

Disadvantages

• With the exception of possible strikes at New York and Washington the British have no possible way of striking at the vital heartlands of the Union
• The loss of US trade is a blow to the economy which is only going to be marginally made up by Confederate trade and their need for arms and ammunition
• Control of littoral waters in the Union is far from certain as Union batteries, ironclads, and mines will present a significant challenge due to the home field advantage
• Certain economic damage from commerce raiders and all the hike in insurance that guarantees
• Rise in food prices. Just like in the Russian War where food prices rose, there will be discomfort to the British consumer which is political trouble
• Numerical disadvantage. Despite the presence of the Confederacy the British will, without a doubt, almost always find themselves facing superior numbers. The most they can hope for is gaining parity or lowering that down to 1.5 to 1 odds.
• 3,000 miles to move men and supplies. As evidenced by history, not insurmountable, but never convenient

Union:

Advantages

• Numerical superiority. 477,000 men present for duty January 1st 1862. That number is only going to go up
• Home field advantage. In terms of communications, supply, and organization the Union will be fighting on its home turf and so will have the advantage of their own railroads and telegraph system to move and coordinate their forces
• Self sufficiency in foodstuffs.
• The ability to effectively contest the control of the littoral waters by being able to build and repair ships right at the theater of war, while the British ships have to either retreat to Halifax or Bermuda.
• Commerce raiders to tie down British supplies can be converted and dispatched almost immediately thus weakening RN efforts
• On the coasts they are fighting on the defensive

Disadvantages

• Immediate loss of both British weaponry and British iron, and many British goods in general. British Enfields were first class weapons and highly sought after by all sides. In 1860 the Union consumed some 1,216,000 tons of iron in its industrial expansion, yet domestically only produced some 821,000 tons. The remaining 395,000 tons were imported from abroad, mainly Britain. Saltpeter was also imported in vast quantities, and blockade will make getting the necessary supplies in quantity difficult. Unlike the CSA the Union has yet to begin trying to implement a way to minimize this dependency in 1861-62 and so will probably face a shortfall sometime in 1862 before they can gear things up in 1863-64.
• Economic dislocation. Historically there was a run on banks and a suspension of specie payments at the threat of war with Britain. Now coupled with the loss of trade revenues, the government in early 1862 will be scrambling to pay its bills. Greenbacks will work, but inflation will be guaranteed. Tied to that will be the sudden hit farmers are going to take from being unable to sell their exports abroad, which will be a political problem.
• No way of striking at the parts vital to Britain. Canada is not vital to Britain, and so long as Britannia rules the waves she will be in a position to haggle it back come the peace talks.
• The certain destruction of the Union merchant marine as it is either caught, or reflags.
• Distraction from the main fight with the Confederacy. Any distraction from the main struggle is a bad thing as it gives the Confederacy breathing room it desperately needed.
• Tens of thousands of men will now be tied down in static positions on the coast or be moved north invading Canada.
• Inexperienced general officers. Not a huge disadvantage, but there were many organization mistakes and problems that needed sorting out in 1862, and they will still be present here.
• Certainty of European powers to want to muck around in North America[2]

Now these are just really broad strokes things. It's always impossible to make 100% accurate judgement calls in alternate history since it really is the ultimate unknowable. But with all this, I am comfortable saying neither side is in a position to run the board in 1862 and you would probably end up with a long war.

*Saying pros and cons is kind of macabre and really inacurate in my opinion
1] With the exception of France (who is already engaged in an adventure contrary to American interests) there really isn't a European power able or interested in mucking about in British affairs
2] France is already engaged in operations against American interests. Spain is mucking around in the Caribbean. Historically the Mexican adventure drew in Austrian and Belgian interference as well, so there's no shortage of people who are interested in American distraction. If they find its in their interests that could be a boon for the CSA too.

 

[67th Tigers]

So, again, you have linked to nothing that is of direct relevance to the correlation of forces in December, 1861.

So you can't provide any contradictory evidence? You can't actually really refute any of my evidence?

Then it stands that the returns were filled out correctly and the "present for duty" column included all those on extra, daily and special duty. That will stand until you show differently, with actual evidence.

So, excluding the lost expeditions and the forces on the west coast, and adjusting Halleck's command pro rata from present to PFD there are roughly 380,000 officers and men Present for Duty. This includes quartermasters detachments etc., which equates to about 285,000-304,000 in the way British counted strength - "Present Under Arms", only those carrying weapons into action.

The British planned to send 75,000 troops. I will absolutely stipulate that there will be four combat effective US volunteers for every British regular in America.

The question now is how does the US take their, say, 300,000 combat effectives (plus their logistics etc.) and distribute them against, say, 75,000 British regulars and their provincial auxiliaries in the north (say the same again in April), the RN along the coast, and say 200,000 Confederates.

 

[TFSmith121]

So you can't provide any contradictory evidence? You can't actually really refute any of my evidence?

Then it stands that the returns were filled out correctly and the "present for duty" column included all those on extra, daily and special duty. That will stand until you show differently, with actual evidence.

So, excluding the lost expeditions and the forces on the west coast, and adjusting Halleck's command pro rata from present to PFD there are roughly 380,000 officers and men Present for Duty. This includes quartermasters detachments etc., which equates to about 285,000-304,000 in the way British counted strength - "Present Under Arms", only those carrying weapons into action.

The British planned to send 75,000 troops. I will absolutely stipulate that there will be four combat effective US volunteers for every British regular in America.

The question now is how does the US take their, say, 300,000 combat effectives (plus their logistics etc.) and distribute them against, say, 75,000 British regulars and their provincial auxiliaries in the north (say the same again in April), the RN along the coast, and say 200,000 Confederates.

Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, after all, and NONE of your links (those that actually work and have anything to do with the US Army) date from December, 1861, and so have no bearing on the strategic balance as of that point.

Until or unless you can provide anything official that does, your links have no evidentiary value at all, and your opinions are just that. Guesswork, at best.

History is hard. So is strategic analysis. So is building a persuasive case.

And so is erring on the side of caution, as Burgoyne, Cornwallis, Ross, Prevost, Downie, Pakenham, Gibbs, Price, Raglan, Bingham, Brudenell, Hope, Booker, Thesiger, Colley, Buller, Aitken, Townshend, Hamilton, etc. et al all found out ...

But keep trying.

When and if one can provide British official sources that split the 218,000 regulars into the same categories - AND use the same definitions - as those in the US official sources as of December, 1861, AND one can provide said definitions, AND all of the above is sourced to official sources in both armies from the time, one could "try" and build a case that 527,800 is somehow equivalent to 300,000...

Or even 477,000 is somehow equivalent to 300,000. Or even that - somehow - 425,000 is equivalent to 300,000...

Or even that "no" means "yes" or whatever else one wishes to argue, on the Internet or elsewhere, in a court of law, public opinion, or a professional journal. Doesn't mean it's true, of course.

And, of course, without actual evidence, no one will buy ANY of it until said official sources and said official definitions are provided.

Until then, the only like to like number provided by anyone in this thread, as of December, 1861, and linked to in official sources dating from the day, is the 527,800 US and 218,000 British. One could, if those numbers are accepted as foundational, try and move forward with a discussion, but until or unless the actual evidence that is available and has been presented is accepted by both sides to the debate, there's little point.

Still waiting for a source that confirms the 63rd Regiment moved from New Brunswick to Rivière du Loup before the Guards battalions. Thanks in advance for that...

 

[galveston bay]

So you can't provide any contradictory evidence? You can't actually really refute any of my evidence?

Then it stands that the returns were filled out correctly and the "present for duty" column included all those on extra, daily and special duty. That will stand until you show differently, with actual evidence.

So, excluding the lost expeditions and the forces on the west coast, and adjusting Halleck's command pro rata from present to PFD there are roughly 380,000 officers and men Present for Duty. This includes quartermasters detachments etc., which equates to about 285,000-304,000 in the way British counted strength - "Present Under Arms", only those carrying weapons into action.

The British planned to send 75,000 troops. I will absolutely stipulate that there will be four combat effective US volunteers for every British regular in America.

The question now is how does the US take their, say, 300,000 combat effectives (plus their logistics etc.) and distribute them against, say, 75,000 British regulars and their provincial auxiliaries in the north (say the same again in April), the RN along the coast, and say 200,000 Confederates.

you haven't really provided evidence...you have provided a lot of links to your blog, and while I have read it and seen those numbers there, in this forum and indeed in other forums, I have to concur that you have not made your case

 

[galveston bay]

A question on operational field forces.... I am going to assume that a British brigade and Union Division are roughly about 4,000 men (as the British battalions are more or less at full strength, while the American regiments have already been winnowed severely by camp diseases within their first year of existence).

So based on what is present as of March 1862, how many American infantry divisions, cavalry brigades and field artillery battalions, along with how many Heavy Artillery regiments (which are in essence fortress artillery with some infantry)

VS

How many Confederate infantry divisions, cavalry brigades and field artillery batteries
and

How many British infantry brigades, cavalry regiments and field artillery batteries

And how many of these various field forces are ready to begin marching as of April 1862 when the roads presumably allow such along the Canadian border

Because really those figures are far more important than how many troops are in service (although that does tell you how many are being used for garrison duty)

At sea, what forces were in theater as of March 1862, as that is when most of the RN ships that were initially allocated were on station or near enough to it for us to consider them immediately available (information on the US Navy is already readily available)

What if any French organized combat forces were available for deployment and how many had already been deployed and what were their likely deployments

If there is going to be a serious military analysis then the above is far more important than bean counting of ration strengths

 

[67th Tigers]

A question on operational field forces.... I am going to assume that a British brigade and Union Division are roughly about 4,000 men (as the British battalions are more or less at full strength, while the American regiments have already been winnowed severely by camp diseases within their first year of existence).

A British brigade is 3 battalions, roughly 2,500 in line of battle. A division has two brigades.

A Union brigade of 4 regiments of about 500-600 in line of battle, hence about 2,200 in line of battle.

A British division is hence about 5,000 in line of battle vs ca. 6,600 in a US division.

So based on what is present as of March 1862, how many American infantry divisions, cavalry brigades and field artillery battalions, along with how many Heavy Artillery regiments (which are in essence fortress artillery with some infantry)

VS

How many Confederate infantry divisions, cavalry brigades and field artillery batteries
and

How many British infantry brigades, cavalry regiments and field artillery batteries

Oh, we dealt with that long ago.

 

[67th Tigers]

Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, after all, and NONE of your links (those that actually work and have anything to do with the US Army) date from December, 1861, and so have no bearing on the strategic balance as of that point.

Okay, so you dismiss Grant, McClellan, Carman, Palfrey et al. This does not surprise me.

Can you provide any evidence at all to support your position?

 

[TFSmith121]

Okay, so you dismiss Grant, McClellan, Carman, Palfrey et al. This does not surprise me.
Can you provide any evidence at all to support your position?

One more time - NONE of what you gave linked to dates from December, 1861; hence, none of it has any evidentiary value whatsoever in terms of the strategic balance at that date.

The only sources that describe anything factual in terms of this date that have been provided in this entire thread are the US Official Records - the source of the 527,800 figure - and Petrie and James (official British Army record), which provides the 218,000 figure.

Until or unless anything is provided from official sources that date from December, 1861, that supports any of your contentions, guess what? That's all they remain, your contentions; in other words, your guesswork, to be charitable.

 

[TFSmith121]

A question on operational field forces.... I am going to assume that a British brigade and Union Division are roughly about 4,000 men (as the British battalions are more or less at full strength, while the American regiments have already been winnowed severely by camp diseases within their first year of existence).

So based on what is present as of March 1862, how many American infantry divisions, cavalry brigades and field artillery battalions, along with how many Heavy Artillery regiments (which are in essence fortress artillery with some infantry)

VS

How many Confederate infantry divisions, cavalry brigades and field artillery batteries
and

How many British infantry brigades, cavalry regiments and field artillery batteries

And how many of these various field forces are ready to begin marching as of April 1862 when the roads presumably allow such along the Canadian border

Because really those figures are far more important than how many troops are in service (although that does tell you how many are being used for garrison duty)

At sea, what forces were in theater as of March 1862, as that is when most of the RN ships that were initially allocated were on station or near enough to it for us to consider them immediately available (information on the US Navy is already readily available)

What if any French organized combat forces were available for deployment and how many had already been deployed and what were their likely deployments

If there is going to be a serious military analysis then the above is far more important than bean counting of ration strengths

The reality is none of this discussion even approaches "serious military analysis" by about an astronomical unit...

But, the organized US forces available in the winter of 1861-62 are easily 26 to 1 over the high point of British regulars in North America at the same time. (527,000 as opposed to ~20,000). The rebels can scrape up ~300,000 for active service in roughly the same period. The high point of the French expeditionary force in Mexico in 1863-64 was about 40,000 French regulars (not including European mercenaries, Mexican auxiliaries, or irregulars).

The British can ship in more troops by stripping their regulars from every garrison touched by the Atlantic, and asking (politely) for the Upper and Lower Canadian population and the New Brunswickers, Nova Scotians, etc to volunteer for active service, but the US can mobilize more troops as well; as it was, 420,000 men responded to the 1862 call for 300,000 three-year volunteers and 86,000 to the 1862 call for 300,000 nine-month volunteers, historically, so the US essentially had what would amount to 100 percent replacements for the order of battle organized from the 1861 USVs and the regulars (the 527,800 on active duty in December, 1861) simply by asking for volunteers...

As far as orders of battle go, the US divisions in and on the Army of the Potomac TO&E (three brigades, 3-4 regiments each, plus a divisional artillery battalion of 3-4 batteries) numbered about 9,000 each, according to the strengths in B&L (drawn from the OR) as late as the Seven Days. Grant's and Buell's divisions were organized along similar lines, although division strengths in Grant's army were closer to 7,000-8,000 each by the time of Shiloh. Pope's forces organized for his initial 1862 campaign (Island Number 10) were much lighter, and his divisions were closer to brigades as organized farther east.

British divisions, at least the one at Aldershot, which was the only field division per se in the UK in peacetime, had three brigades. In the Crimea, the British had deployed six infantry divisions with two brigades each, for a total of 12; toward the end of the campaign, the Cavalry Division in the Crimea had three brigades.

Based - very roughly - on the number of infantry battalions in BNA, the West Indies, Great Britain, Ireland, the Channel Islands, and 2/5ths of those in the Med in 1861 (drawing upon the 1861 and 1862 Army Lists, which are available for free on-line, so anyone who wishes to do so can go through the exercise themselves), the British could have scraped up the equivalent of eight infantry divisions of three brigades each, each with (roughly) three infantry battalions each, but that would have taken all the regular battalions mentioned above and then some.

That gives them the equivalent (roughly) of a British Crimean-sized army (absent the French, Turks, and Sardinians, of course) each for Lower Canada and New Brunswick (or Lower Canada and Maine, if the rather idiotic strategy of trying to capture Portland is followed) ... But they have to get there, of course.

That's it, as far as the existing British regulars anywhere in the Atlantic littoral goes, absent wartime expansion - which, obviously, brings significant costs and uncertain returns, as the record of 1855-56 shows. There's a reason the efforts to recruit German, Swiss, and Italian mercenaries went forward, and why they failed to generate forces the British were willing to commit to combat.

The US field forces, at the same time, total out to about 48 equivalent divisions in 16 nominal three division corps, plus various independent division-sized and smaller forces for garrison and secondary areas. The above does not include state troops, of course.

The point of the emphasis on numbers is to get some sort of foundation comparing like to like; there's a reason the US used notional "armored division equivalents" or ADEs, in terms of the NATO-Pact balance, rather than trying to pretend a Pact Motor Rifle or Tank division could be compared directly to a US or German heavy division or a French or Brotish light division.

Best,

 

[67th Tigers]

One more time - NONE of what you gave linked to dates from December, 1861; hence, none of it has any evidentiary value whatsoever in terms of the strategic balance at that date.

Edited by Chellers. We're discussing how the US Army (and to an extent the CS Army) defined "Present for Duty".

We have McClellan and Grant saying, of this period (within a few months), that it included the extra duty men etc., we have Palfrey and Carman both referring to the same definition at later dates (September '62). We know that some armies changed their definitions to exclude it, but there are none that went the other way.

The only army it can be demonstrated counted their PFD as only their combat effectives in December '61 was Joe Johnston's. It can be demonstrated that at previous and later dates the main Federal armies counted non-combatants under PFD. That none of these is specifically December '61 is neither here nor there.

I invite you to produce any evidence to contradict this.

 

[galveston bay]

A British brigade is 3 battalions, roughly 2,500 in line of battle. A division has two brigades.

A Union brigade of 4 regiments of about 500-600 in line of battle, hence about 2,200 in line of battle.

A British division is hence about 5,000 in line of battle vs ca. 6,600 in a US division.



Oh, we dealt with that long ago.

well we see your views on the Union Army, how about how many divisions and brigades available to the Confederate and British Army as well

ok, so basically a Union and British brigade are essentially identical in strength (near enough anyway), as one would assume that the British (based on Crimea and every other war they fought in the 19th Century) will lose some men to disease early on in theater

How much cavalry can the British send to and more importantly support logistically in the North American theater by April 1862

 

[TFSmith121]

Edited by Chellers. We're discussing how the US Army (and to an extent the CS Army) defined "Present for Duty". We have McClellan and Grant saying, of this period (within a few months), that it included the extra duty men etc., we have Palfrey and Carman both referring to the same definition at later dates (September '62). We know that some armies changed their definitions to exclude it, but there are none that went the other way. The only army it can be demonstrated counted their PFD as only their combat effectives in December '61 was Joe Johnston's. It can be demonstrated that at previous and later dates the main Federal armies counted non-combatants under PFD. That none of these is specifically December '61 is neither here nor there. I invite you to produce any evidence to contradict this.

No need; the OR quite clearly list ~527,800 regulars and long-service volunteers on active duty as of December, 1861; that is further split into ~477,000 present in the various departmental commands (no separate number for those attached to non-departmental duty, other than those on duty within Pennsylvania, which is quite clearly referred to as "not in any department," and some ~425,000 officers and men present for duty. None of these categories are defined as such in December, 1861, so absent speculation, one can only interpret them as what they are, no more and no less. They certainly do not present any figures remotely close to 300,00 or anything equivalent.

The only figures available for the British Army on active duty at the same time is ~25,000 assigned to "garrison and depot" duty in the UK and the remainder, ~193,000, assigned to various commands in the UK,and elsewhere.

So absent any reliable sources that provide definitions or any sort of like to like figures, the ONLY like to like comparison is ~527,800 Americans to ~218,000 British.

One can suggest otherwise, but - based on the actual, official source evidence presented in this thread, that is all such comments are - suggestions. Guesswork, in fact.

To put it bluntly, in trial, if the evidence being examined dates from the period of a given incident, it is pertinent; if it dates from a period months to years later, even decades later, it is not. This is not especially controversial. If, for example, policy in a given department is changed as of a given date, the policy in place - before or after the change - is what any trier of fact has to rely upon in determining responsibility. A defendant can not, for example, be found to be responsible for violating a policy that does not exist at the time of the alleged violation, and if the only evidence regarding the policy presented post-dates the incident being examined, there's no way to find the defendant responsible for violating a policy that didn't exist.

As yet another an example, in an institutional setting (absent criminal acts, of course) if there is an accusation of - say - sexual harassment, if there is not a set institutional policy on sexual harassment and definitions thereof at the time of the alleged incident, arbitrarily using a policy that post dated the alleged incident to move forward with a job action is not justifiable.

The same holds true; absent any definitions of what was presented or meant by "present and absent," "present," or "present for duty," one can only use the consolidated "present and absent" figures; likewise, since absolutely nothing is defined regarding the two British Army figures, of 193,000 or 25,000, the only like to like comparison possible with the total American figure of 527,800 is the consolidated 218,000.

As has been said, history is hard. Evidence is required, and timely evidence is necessary for any comparisons based on a given date.

 

[67th Tigers]

ok, so basically a Union and British brigade are essentially identical in strength (near enough anyway), as one would assume that the British (based on Crimea and every other war they fought in the 19th Century) will lose some men to disease early on in theater

Are the British landing at the Cholera ridden Varna Bay in Bulgaria, or on Walcheren Island?

Is there somewhere in Canada or the US that is rampant with infectious diseases? Somewhere the British are likely to go?

The British Army of course suffered from disease as much as any army, but apart from the poor buggers who'd been to Varna or Walcheren the disease rates amongst long-service regulars was low. Now newly raised regiments and volunteers had much, much higher sick rates. There was a lot of sickness early on in a soldiers career as he got exposed to various camp diseases, and this is why long service regulars (in combination with better discipline for sanitation) had very low sick rates compared to new troops.

In the ACW Union "old regulars" had much lower sick rates than volunteers (about 5% vs 11%), and new regulars were much closer to the old regulars (ca. 6%) than the volunteers. In the disciplined Army of the Potomac sick rates were still relatively low, but in the comparatively undisciplined Army of the Tennessee very high. Army of the Potomac sick rates averaged 6-7%, but those operating in the West were usually 11-12%. This is indicative of much better camp discipline in McClellan's army - literally not defecating to contaminate the water supply etc.

British regulars in Canada had a sick rate (average % in hospital) of 2.8%, and in the Maritimes of 2.2% in 1859. In a force of 75,000 you can reckon on about 1,875 being sick at any one time. This was much better than the Army at Home (where the sick rate of infantry was 5%) or in the West Indies (down to 5% due to major improvements in the understanding of disease). Canada was a particularly healthy station.

How much cavalry can the British send to and more importantly support logistically in the North American theater by April 1862

Logistically support, probably all of it. Shipping troops to America is trivial and fodder is plentiful. They could easily ship 5 or maybe even 6 brigades (45-54 squadrons). When the US backed down a cavalry division consisting of the 4th Light Dragoons (renamed Hussars in February), 11th Hussars, 15th Hussars, 5th Lancers, 16th Lancers, 18th Lancers and Horse Batteries G and K was under orders to embark.

 

[67th Tigers]

absent any definitions of what was presented or meant by "present and absent," "present," or "present for duty," one can only use the consolidated "present and absent" figures;

McClellan tells us that "Present for Duty" included extra-duty etc., and he was the Commanding General of the Army at that time. Care to offer any evidence to contradict him?

 

[TFSmith121]

well we see your views on the Union Army, how about how many divisions and brigades available to the Confederate and British Army as well

ok, so basically a Union and British brigade are essentially identical in strength (near enough anyway), as one would assume that the British (based on Crimea and every other war they fought in the 19th Century) will lose some men to disease early on in theater

How much cavalry can the British send to and more importantly support logistically in the North American theater by April 1862

Five or six brigades of cavalry would be roughly twice as much as the British sent out to the Crimea (at the end, the Cavalry Division had three brigades) and the record of the British cavalry in the Crimea was mixed, to be charitable.

Perhaps the British will retread Brudenell and Bingham; they made it to field marshal and Lieutenant General, after all, historically. (Or was it the other way around?).

In any event, hardly a war winner.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

McClellan tells us that "Present for Duty" included extra-duty etc., and he was the Commanding General of the Army at that time. Care to offer any evidence to contradict him?

McClellan's comments are those included in his postwar memoirs, correct?

 

[galveston bay]

Is there somewhere in Canada or the US that is rampant with infectious diseases? Somewhere the British are likely to go?.

In the ACW Union "old regulars" had much lower sick rates than volunteers (about 5% vs 11%), and new regulars were much closer to the old regulars (ca. 6%) than the volunteers. In the disciplined Army of the Potomac sick rates were still relatively low, but in the comparatively undisciplined Army of the Tennessee very high. Army of the Potomac sick rates averaged 6-7%, but those operating in the West were usually 11-12%. This is indicative of much better camp discipline in McClellan's army - literally not defecating to contaminate the water supply etc.

British regulars in Canada had a sick rate (average % in hospital) of 2.8%, and in the Maritimes of 2.2% in 1859. In a force of 75,000 you can reckon on about 1,875 being sick at any one time. This was much better than the Army at Home (where the sick rate of infantry was 5%) or in the West Indies (down to 5% due to major improvements in the understanding of disease). Canada was a particularly healthy station.

Logistically support, probably all of it. Shipping troops to America is trivial and fodder is plentiful. They could easily ship 5 or maybe even 6 brigades (45-54 squadrons). When the US backed down a cavalry division consisting of the 4th Light Dragoons (renamed Hussars in February), 11th Hussars, 15th Hussars, 5th Lancers, 16th Lancers, 18th Lancers and Horse Batteries G and K was under orders to embark.

lets start with all of it (North America), as even Canada has flies and mosquitoes aplenty (like you wouldn't believe) but some areas are worse than others. Comparing troops stationed in permanent stations is disingenuous at the very least. Prepared sanitation and sleeping indoors does not remotely compared with campaign conditions in the 19th century or for that matter the 21st Century. Some areas in the US are however worse than others, such as the entire Mississippi River Valley system which is notable for its swamps (and remained notable for malaria well into the 20th Century) so comparing the Army of Tennessee (which also had a fair number of Regular Infantry and Cavalry regiments assigned to it over its career) to the Army of the Potomac which spent only 3 months in the Tidewater (another swamp) is also apples to oranges comparison. Indeed that brief period in the swamp was enough to give McClellan himself malaria.

Sure, there is plenty of fodder available in barns in Upper Canada and indeed could be shipped across the Atlantic... although moving it after that runs into the usual issues of poor roads and a single rail line to that is very limited in what it services. The US on the other hand has plenty of rail in the US and only runs into problems if it invades Upper Canada, but in that event would certainly dominate the Great Lakes and could move fodder and other supplies that way

As to cavalry, so what, two brigades of cavalry? Allocated presumably either to a single army or would it be allocated a brigade to each of two field armies? That isn't a lot of cavalry... enough for screening duties but hardly a mighty arm of decision.

Sorry, but based on the Crimea, which you might want to note is a relatively dry steppe during the summer and a rainy wet mud hole in the winter (thus hardly different from most of North America at this point in history) would leave a reasonable assumption that like is likely to create like in terms of conditions and thus losses. Although at least the British and Union had the resources to build decent hospitals in 1862 and had the concept of hospital trains

Also, regarding the British Army at home and its sick rate.. how much of that is VD and how much of that is because most European and American cities in 1860 would give a modern day Sanitation or Health District administrator nightmares.

Still waiting for how many infantry and cavalry brigades are available to all three major powers (four if you include the French) and for that matter, how much field artillery is available.

For that matter I didn't see the Union heavy artillery regiments included in your count of Union troops available or did I miss it?