Hood's Plan -- Hood's Failure

[EricJacobson]

If you want to understand why this is important, then you need to look at Forrest's idea. If Schofield is going to try to hold the line of the Harpeth a bit, the proper plan is to outflank him and trap him against the Harpeth -- not to launch a bloody, near-suicidal frontal assault. All this "Hood knew" stuff is designed to say there was only one possible choice, when there was more than one.

Tim,

This is where you and I will part ways. If you haven't read my book you might want to. This idea about Forrest being able to flank Schofield is utter nonsense. Forrest got across the Harpeth without any trouble and his two divisions got thumped and shoved right back across the river.

I never opted to be a Hood supporter or defender. But this constant griping about what a fool or idiot he was is ridiculous. It's easy to say what he shouldn't have done. It's a little harder to try and understand why he did what he did. That has been my sole purpose and, in my opinion, gets me a little closer to the truth than Monday morning quarterbacking.

Eric

 

[EricJacobson]

Hmm, I don't think so. Beauregard, Hood, and Davis all seem to be thinking they are going to bring Sherman back to TN up until the moment they receive word that Sherman has left Atlanta on his way to Savannah. In the case of Hood and Beauregard, this is November 20.

Yeah right. If you think Hood was sitting at Florence, AL with any intent other than driving into Tennessee you have missed much of what we've been discussing. To be honest, Hood did not communicate his change of plans well at all, but by Nov 1st he had his head turned toward Tennessee. Sherman is not part of the equation in his mind.

Eric

 

[EricJacobson]

I'm glad we agree. Hood did not "know" Schofield was going to retreat at 6 Pm because Schofield didn't know it either when Hood was deciding to attack.

Again, semantics. Field commanders have to make assessments, judgements, decisions, etc based on what they have in front of them. Hood was right about Schofield evacuating and I think it just burns you to have to admit that fact.

Eric

 

[cw1865]

Foote, Hood, GA

Unfortunately I moved on 6/16 and all of my books are in storage, but I THINK I recall a reference in one of Foote's works that Hood was essentially talking to some Confederate soldiers in TN basically informing them that the Army would be moving that way. Davis was, I think, present. This is before Sherman dives for Savannah.....

Actually, Eric I have read your book and as you know I enjoyed it very much.

The problem that I have with Hood's decisions from the time that he takes command through Nashville, is that the plans he makes are not in accordance with the resources at his disposal and reflect a poor understanding of the political situation (importance of Atlanta's fall prior to election of 1864)

Once Sherman dives for the coast, he goes up into TN, but that isn't the only plan, he wants to drive north, through the Federals of course, to essentially continue on until Ohio, drive east and wind up landing in Grant's rear to relieve Lee. Its a grandiose plan that is a pipe dream.

 

[trice]

This is where you and I will part ways. If you haven't read my book you might want to. This idea about Forrest being able to flank Schofield is utter nonsense. Forrest got across the Harpeth without any trouble and his two divisions got thumped and shoved right back across the river.

I would disagree.

For example, Forrest's proposal was to make that move with all three of his cavalry divisions and an infantry division. You say he used two divisions. In reality, he only used one (Jackson's), because the other two (Chalmers and Buford) were on the flanks of Hood's attack at Franklin.

Would Forrest with 4 divisions have made more progress than Forrest with 1? Unknowable. But clearly his chances would be better.

In any case, if Hood or a substitute is going to try such a course, the only reason for it is to defeat Schofield north of the Harpeth on Dec. 1. If you are doing that, what you want is two Corps north of the river that morning and one south.

The one on the South bank guards the trains and pressures anything left in Franklin. if Schofield has abandoned the place, they cross as quickly as they can and pursue.

The rest of the army on the North bank tries to slam into Schofield as he marches. Forrest and the cavalry try to get ahead of him, even briefly, to stop the columns and bunch them up. If they can't get in front, they try to attack at weak points and split the column into pieces(standard tactical work). The infantry tries to attack East-to-West as Schofield marches South-to-North. Oh, yeah, Forrest and whatever advance guard he has try to cut the road down from Nashville to slow or stop Thomas' relief force.

This is all a mad pell-mell dash, with chaotic meeting engagements, attacks and counter-attacks. No one knows how those things come out in advance. But this sort of wild tactical action is actually the best chance the Confederates have. A Lee or a Jackson would take it in a second. Essentially, it would play to the strongpoints of men like Hood, Forrest and Cleburne; it is pure Hell for the commander trying to get his column through.

Of course, if Forrest can't get across the Harpeth on the 30th, and Hood can't get most of his troops across the river by the morning of the 1st, Schofield will probably get away. But that's what happened in Hood's plan, without most of the casualties.

Of course, none of that is a particularly original thought on my part. Set the map up, place the units, and ask just about any trained military officer what to do next in that December 1 scenario after the river is crossed and you'll get the same general outline my civilian brain came up with. People like Napoleon, Frederick the Great, Caesar, Hannibal, and Alexander the Great all learned how to do those things from other soldiers long ago. I merely read about it.

I never opted to be a Hood supporter or defender. But this constant griping about what a fool or idiot he was is ridiculous. It's easy to say what he shouldn't have done. It's a little harder to try and understand why he did what he did. That has been my sole purpose and, in my opinion, gets me a little closer to the truth than Monday morning quarterbacking.

Hood, as I said, was an excellent brigade and division commander -- probably one of the three best division commanders in the Confederacy. His work as a Corps commander certainly doesn't stand out as anything special. His record as an Army commander is bad. His attack at Franklin offers little chance of success. His position at Nashville offers none.

None of that's unusual; it is, in fact, a normal progression seen in many military situations. As the pyramid narrows, it gets harder and harder to pick who can, or can not, fill the requirements. Hood is simply another talented officer who was advanced too far.

This isn't "Monday Morning Quarterbacking". This is just reasonable historical analysis and observation. Hood as an Army commander performs poorly. Hood as a divisiobn commander performs superbly. The difference between the two is almost entirely that Hood is beyond his ability, IMHO, and does not actually do the things that mark a successful independent commander.

Tim

 

[OpnDownfall]

Hood's Plan--Hood's Failure

Does anyone know when and where Forrest and his cavalry joined up with Hood?
The reason's for Hood's invasion of Tn was no more grandiose than Lee's Invasion of Pa or Md.
Once again on Sept. 26, 1864, while visiting the army, Davis spoke to the Tn. troops

"Be of good cheer, for within a short while your faces will be turned homeward and your feet pressing Tennessee soil."

Some historians accept this as the First hint a plan (from the very top)for the long desired recovery of Tn.
Beauregard's letter to Davis, Dec. 6th, 1864, explains the rationale for the campaign into Tennessee. and concluding ..."Under the circumstances, after consultation with General Hood, I concluded to allow him to prosecute with vigor his campaign into Tennessee and Kentucky, hoping that by defeating Thomas' army and such other forces as might hastily be sent against him, he would compel Sherman, should he reach the coast of Georgia or South Carolina, to repair at once to the defense of Kentucky and, perhaps, Ohio and thus prevent him from reinforcing Grant. Meanwhile supplies might be sent to Virginia from Middle and East Tennessee, thus relieving Georgia from the present constant drain upon its limited resources." Fanciful, certainly, but are they really all that different from the benefits expected by Lee concerning his movements into Md or Pa.?
Is there really all that much proof that Davis or Beauregard were unawaare of Hood's intent or that they really disapproved?


P.S. Gettysburg was, Lee's Plan--Lee's Failure. Catchy, but totally lacking any relevance to to the question of Hood's competence as army commander. Unless Of Course being defeated is the criteria for incompetence.

 

[EricJacobson]

I would disagree.

For example, Forrest's proposal was to make that move with all three of his cavalry divisions and an infantry division. You say he used two divisions. In reality, he only used one (Jackson's), because the other two (Chalmers and Buford) were on the flanks of Hood's attack at Franklin.

Would Forrest with 4 divisions have made more progress than Forrest with 1? Unknowable. But clearly his chances would be better.

Tim,

The problem with Forrest using all three of his divisions was that Chalmers was on the far left, or western, flank and could not feasibly be swung to the right, or east, in any sort of reasonable time. Also, that leaves the left flank of the entire army "in the air." It's also not true that only one division got across the river because half of Buford's did as - Bell's Brigade. Moreover, what Forrest and his men faced east of the Harpeth was a comparable number of Federal troops and they handily forced Forrest's men back across the river.

So let's say Hood sends two of Forrest's divisions in their entirety and gives him Loring's infantry division. There is still all of the Federal cavalry to deal with, plus T. J. Wood's entire division of infantry, and about three dozen pieces of artillery. Is is true we will never know how Forrest would have fared had he gotten his way, but the facts are stacked against his success.

Eric

 

[EricJacobson]

This isn't "Monday Morning Quarterbacking". This is just reasonable historical analysis and observation. Hood as an Army commander performs poorly. Hood as a divisiobn commander performs superbly. The difference between the two is almost entirely that Hood is beyond his ability, IMHO, and does not actually do the things that mark a successful independent commander.

Tim

Tim,

We will not disagree that Hood as army commander was in over his head. My main point is that he did what he thought best. Failure is what failure is. I'm not all that interested in what Hood might have done. I am much more interested in analyzing what he actually did.

Eric

 

[EricJacobson]

Does anyone know when and where Forrest and his cavalry joined up with Hood?

Mid-November is when Forrest finally joins the Army of Tennessee. Just another delay Hood could ill afford.

 

[EricJacobson]

Unfortunately I moved on 6/16 and all of my books are in storage, but I THINK I recall a reference in one of Foote's works that Hood was essentially talking to some Confederate soldiers in TN basically informing them that the Army would be moving that way. Davis was, I think, present. This is before Sherman dives for Savannah.....

Actually, Eric I have read your book and as you know I enjoyed it very much.

The problem that I have with Hood's decisions from the time that he takes command through Nashville, is that the plans he makes are not in accordance with the resources at his disposal and reflect a poor understanding of the political situation (importance of Atlanta's fall prior to election of 1864)

Once Sherman dives for the coast, he goes up into TN, but that isn't the only plan, he wants to drive north, through the Federals of course, to essentially continue on until Ohio, drive east and wind up landing in Grant's rear to relieve Lee. Its a grandiose plan that is a pipe dream.

No doubt the idea of joining up with Lee was a pipe dream. I even mentioned that silliness in my book.

 

[cw1865]

Ga

I am sorry, I wrote TN, Hood was in GA when he addressed troops from TN (I believe)

 

[trice]

Again, semantics. Field commanders have to make assessments, judgements, decisions, etc based on what they have in front of them. Hood was right about Schofield evacuating and I think it just burns you to have to admit that fact.

Actually, Eric, I have been admitting all along that Hood guessed at Schofield's intentions. I understand that Schofield preferred to retreat, I have pointed out the discussion between Thomas and Schofield on the matter, and the eventual permission to retreat Schofield received. Other people imply -- and say -- that Hood attacked because he knew that Schofield was retreating and so Hood had no other option.

For example, people say things like "Hood knew full well the Federals were going to try and slip away under cover of darkness unless he did something." But reading the dispatches, we know that Hood didn't know that, and his reading of Schofield's intentions would have been completely wrong if Thomas had simply told Schofield to stay there. If Thomas is the deciding voice, then Hood is doing the wrong thing in guessing about what his old classmate Schofield will do.

We are not limited to acting as Hood did. We can examine other alternatives.

Tim

 

[cw1865]

Hmmm

Actually I have been reading this exchange with interest. Under the circumstances I think it would be fair to say that Hood 'accurately predicted' Schofeld's withdrawal.

So, was it a 'lucky guess' or was it 'prescience'?

Don't we often blame McDowell and Pope at 2nd Bull Run for failing to correctly surmise Lee's intentions?

Both of you agree that Hood had no actual knowledge of Schofeld's intentions.....

 

[EricJacobson]

Actually I have been reading this exchange with interest. Under the circumstances I think it would be fair to say that Hood 'accurately predicted' Schofeld's withdrawal.

So, was it a 'lucky guess' or was it 'prescience'?

Don't we often blame McDowell and Pope at 2nd Bull Run for failing to correctly surmise Lee's intentions?

Both of you agree that Hood had no actual knowledge of Schofeld's intentions.....

Yes, I think accurately predicted is a good term. Hope you've had fun watching Tim and I bang it out.

 

[trice]

Does anyone know when and where Forrest and his cavalry joined up with Hood?

Forrest arrived on November 14th.

The reason's for Hood's invasion of Tn was no more grandiose than Lee's Invasion of Pa or Md.

The difference between the two is very simple.

If you take the details of it to any professional military organization for analysis, they may or may not agree with Lee's chances for success, but they will see a professionally prepared plan of operations. It is clearly risky, but based on valid and recognized military principles. It fails, essentially, because the Confederates did not execute as well as they should have, and the Union executed better than expected (i.e., Lee got beat).

If you take Hood's plan to them, they'll see a plan that is not well prepared, is based on unsound ideas, and is not carried out in a professional manner by the commanding officer. The AoT fought with great courage, but executed erratically. While Lee's command did not do well in PA, you will find nothing as embarrassing as Spring Hill or Nashville there, and no near-suicidal attacks into the teeth of fortified lines.

If Lee wins his battle, he might possibly have changed the future of the Confederacy. If Hood wins at Franklin, all that happens is that a few more men die and perhaps the Confederacy would limp along another week or two.

Some historians accept this as the First hint a plan (from the very top)for the long desired recovery of Tn.
Beauregard's letter to Davis, Dec. 6th, 1864, explains the rationale for the campaign into Tennessee. and concluding ..."Under the circumstances, after consultation with General Hood, I concluded to allow him to prosecute with vigor his campaign into Tennessee and Kentucky, hoping that by defeating Thomas' army and such other forces as might hastily be sent against him, he would compel Sherman, should he reach the coast of Georgia or South Carolina, to repair at once to the defense of Kentucky and, perhaps, Ohio and thus prevent him from reinforcing Grant. Meanwhile supplies might be sent to Virginia from Middle and East Tennessee, thus relieving Georgia from the present constant drain upon its limited resources." Fanciful, certainly, but are they really all that different from the benefits expected by Lee concerning his movements into Md or Pa?
Is there really all that much proof that Davis or Beauregard were unawaare of Hood's intent or that they really disapproved?

On about Nov. 16, Beauregard began to suspect Sherman was going to move. By the 17th, he had a telegram from Cobb telling him Sherman had left Atlanta.

Beauregard then tries to get Hood to send Jackson's cavalry division to Georgia. Hood refuses on the 18th. Beauregard is on his way back from Corinth that day.

On November 21, Hood moved forward on his invasion of TN. On Nov. 24, Beauregard telegraphs Davis that he has ordered Hood to take the immediate offensive in TN to "relieve General Lee". On Nov. 30, Davis (having just received this), wires back, wanting to know why the heck Beauregard has sent Hood off on this silly inavsion of TN.

Hood's response of Dec. 6th says this:
=====
On the 6th day of December, in answer to a telegram from the President, I addressed him, from Augusta, a communication, stating that all had been done practicable under existing conditions, with the limited means at command, to oppose the advance of Sherman toward the Atlantic coast, and that I had deemed it inexpedient to countermand the campaign of General Hood into Tennessee to attempt the pursuit of Sherman, for the following reasons, namely:

First. The roads and creeks from the Tennessee to the Coosa River across Sand and Lookout Mountains had been rendered impassable by the prevailing rains.

Second. Sherman, with an army better appointed and of superior numbers, had the start of about 275 miles on comparatively good roads.

Third. To pursue Sherman, the march of the Army of Tennessee would necessarily have been over roads with all the bridges destroyed, and through a desolated country, affording neither subsistence nor forage, while a retrograde movement of the army must have seriously depleted its ranks by desertions.

Fourth. Moreover, to have recalled the army to follow Sherman, would have opened to Thomas the richest portions of Alabama. Montgomery, Mobile, and Selma would have easily fallen, without insuring the defeat of Sherman.
=====

There's more, but it all comes down to CYA: the mere fact that Sherman headed East shows Hood was totally out of the picture, so he might as well go up to TN.

P.S. Gettysburg was, Lee's Plan--Lee's Failure. Catchy, but totally lacking any relevance to to the question of Hood's competence as army commander. Unless Of Course being defeated is the criteria for incompetence.

The problem is that Hood's plan offers no opportunity for success. If he wins and takes Nashville, Sherman still rumbles through three states and comes up to take Lee in the rear. OTOH, if Lee wins in 1863, the entire Union war effort would have to be rearranged (Vicksburg and Port Hudson still fall, but TN will have to be robbed for troops, the RRs are broken, etc.). It doesn't win the war, but it does a lot more than anything than can be imagined from Hood's plan.

Tim

 

[trice]

BTW, one of the excuses constantly mentioned for Hood's delays is the bad weather.

We are talking here about the first half of November in northern Alabama along the Tennessee River. This is long before the TVA, when the Tennessee was wild and uncontrolled, given to rapid rises and falls. Is there anyone familiar with the area who'd give us some insight into what kind of weather Hood should have been expecting to find at that time of the year?

Another factor to remember is that the good roads in the area all tended to run north-south (the turnpikes, which were generally along the routes to Nashville). East-west roads tended to be much worse. After four years of war, heavy usage and low maintenance, the roads were generally in bad shape.

Tim

 

[OpnDownfall]

Hood's Plan--Hood's Failure

Forrest and his cavalry finally joins up with Hood, and almost immediately moves north into Tn. Could Hood have been waiting for supplies AND his cavalry?
Hood was in the West because that was where he was hoping to draw Sherman. The plan was working fairly well (Sherman was dispersing parts of his army, trying to cover all bases) until Sherrman felt that Grants reluctance to OK Sherman's proposed march to the sea, was weakening.
With Sherman moving East, and the Union building another army around Thomas in Nashville.
The strategic picture has changed,. Is marching east between two armies each nearly twice as numerous as your own really a 'best' or even a 'good' strategy?
Keeping in mind that by now even a Lee would be facing choosing the best of bad choices. Is not the better course to move North and try to destroy the only viable Union military force in the West, Before it can be concentrated and try to defeat it in detail?
Lee's war record certainly indicates which bad choice would appeal to Lee And Davis too, for that matter.

 

[EricJacobson]

BTW, one of the excuses constantly mentioned for Hood's delays is the bad weather.

We are talking here about the first half of November in northern Alabama along the Tennessee River. This is long before the TVA, when the Tennessee was wild and uncontrolled, given to rapid rises and falls. Is there anyone familiar with the area who'd give us some insight into what kind of weather Hood should have been expecting to find at that time of the year?

Another factor to remember is that the good roads in the area all tended to run north-south (the turnpikes, which were generally along the routes to Nashville). East-west roads tended to be much worse. After four years of war, heavy usage and low maintenance, the roads were generally in bad shape.

Tim

The weather isn't an excuse - it was reality. Some locals said it was the worst weather they ever remembered. That said, I live in Middle Tennessee and the weather in the mid-South during late October and early November is usually quite nice. Warm days - crisp nights. Excessive rain is not the norm - even in northern Alabama.

Sounds to me like you are looking for another reason to stick it to Hood.

Eric

 

[trice]

Forrest and his cavalry finally joins up with Hood, and almost immediately moves north into Tn. Could Hood have been waiting for supplies AND his cavalry?

Forrest was not Hood's cavalry at this point. Forrest is part of Taylor's command, and has spent the last two months raiding into TN to attack Sherman's supply line (the only effective raids on it in 1864.) On November 5, Forrest was at Johnsonville on the Tennessee River, blowing the depot there to Hell. He had just received instructions to finish that mission up and report to Hood -- in the general area of Columbia. That was because Hood was supposedly going to be in motion towards Nashville by that point. But Hood didn't move, and so Forrest traveled to meet Hood below the Tennessee instead. However, Hood did have Jackson's division of cavalry with him

On supplies -- Hood's supplies for the AoT were supposed to be coming from Hood's Department. But Hood had marched clear out of his Department when he came to Alabama and into Taylor's territory. You'll find that a large part of the reason he is short on supplies is he didn't handle his own responsibilities well -- and that in November Beauregard and his staff are trying to find out from Hood "Where are your supplies?" because they have come up with RR cars to transport them -- and getting a lot of silence from Hood.

Hood was in the West because that was where he was hoping to draw Sherman. The plan was working fairly well (Sherman was dispersing parts of his army, trying to cover all bases) until Sherrman felt that Grants reluctance to OK Sherman's proposed march to the sea, was weakening.

The original idea for a march on Savannah seems to be traced to a map with potential ideas from Grant, sent to Sherman before the armies moved in May. I have never seen that Grant was particularly reluctant to authorize it, other than to make sure Sherman could handle Hood with what he left behind. On September 12-20, Sherman and Grant are discussing this, but the emphasis is on Grant taking action on the Savannah River if Sherman is to attempt it.

What happens is that Hood moves to the other side of Atlanta, starting on September 29. By mid-October, he is moving more and more out of the way. Now Sherman decides he can make the march. He actually makes his definitive proposal to march on Savannah on October 9. On October 11, Grant says he will be unable to mount a mission to meet him. Grant prefers going after Hood, but acquiesces to Sherman. Before Midnight, Sherman has permission.

Sherman then takes the next month to get ready to start on his march.

With Sherman moving East, and the Union building another army around Thomas in Nashville.
The strategic picture has changed,. Is marching east between two armies each nearly twice as numerous as your own really a 'best' or even a 'good' strategy?

By the time Sherman moves, Hood is 275 miles West of him. This would be moving over the hills of north Alabama and GA, with Sherman constantly marching East. Hood cannot catch him. He has suckered himself out of the picture.

There is also no viable way for Thomas to pursue Hood into GA. Sherman has destroyed the RR south from Chatanooga, and rendered Atlanta fairly useless as a potential base.

Keeping in mind that by now even a Lee would be facing choosing the best of bad choices. Is not the better course to move North and try to destroy the only viable Union military force in the West, Before it can be concentrated and try to defeat it in detail?

This is basically saying: "Hood blew it, landed himself in a mess, where his Army was meaningless in the larger picture -- so it is a sign of his brilliance that he launched a useless invasion of Tennessee". if that's your position, and you ignore what Hood did from October 9 to November 20, then I suppose he did OK.

But that leaves us with the fiasco at Spring Hill, the disaster at Franklin, and the wait for the finishing stroke at Nashville.

Lee's war record certainly indicates which bad choice would appeal to Lee And Davis too, for that matter.

I really can't see this. Where do you see an example of Lee losing contact with his opponent for six weeks, giving his enemy complete freedom to do whatever he wanted? Or anything at all similar?

Davis -- well, Davis shows signs of living in a never-never land on the realistic military situation. IMHO. The plans flying about from the beginning of 1864 on (from Beauregard, Davis, Longstreet, etc.) are pretty unrealistic. But then the handwriting was already beginning to show on the wall by then, and most people have trouble seeing their dreams crumble.

Tim

 

[trice]

The weather isn't an excuse - it was reality. Some locals said it was the worst weather they ever remembered. That said, I live in Middle Tennessee and the weather in the mid-South during late October and early November is usually quite nice. Warm days - crisp nights. Excessive rain is not the norm - even in northern Alabama.

Sounds to me like you are looking for another reason to stick it to Hood.

Eric, you are reaching pretty hard here. Hood himself was using the weather as an excuse for the delays in November 1864. All I did is ask what the weather in early November was likely to be like at a normal time.

Tim