Would It Have Mattered?

[Hoplite]

Reading the book: Searching for George Gordon Meade
When dissecting the battle, it is always mentioned and bemoaned that his attack was not supported and reinforced.
Would it have mattered?

Assuming the I Corps sent in everything, and for that we would have to get into Reynold's head, and have Franklin buy into his admittingly nebulous orders from Burnside, could Jackson's position have been broken and taken?

Much is made of Birney's refusal to reinforce, but again that is only one more brigade.

 

[Harms88]

Yes, it would have made a difference. Remember that Meade was not supposed to go alone. The original plans had called for a much heavy strike against the Confederate left.

The Confederates had not planned for the eventuality of the Federals emerging from the swamp. We saw that even without support, he threw that section of the Confederate line into chaos until reinforcements were rushed. Even a division may have had a domino effect which would have created a ton of trouble at the very least.

 

[Jamieva]

It could have matterd a ton. The battlefield basically runs north/south. This is on the southern end of the battlefield. If you go visit the Slaughter Pen Farm you get the perspective of just how far south it is from Marye's Heights. If there is a major hole punched there, that grand division is then across Lee's direct south retreat route to Richmond.

Now, Lee could have shift forces to his right because the position on his left could be held with a smaller force than he had. The attack Meade made was supposed to be the major attack of the battle, but the communication between Burnside and Franklin was not interpreted as Burnside meant.

Jackson did have the benefit of a defense in depth, so the attacking Union force would have had to push through 2 or 3 layers of defenders.

 

[JeffBrooks]

It might have turned Fredericksburg into a less one-sided Confederate victory, and Lee would certainly have suffered heavier losses. But I don't see a major Union victory even under these better circumstances.

 

[jackt62]

Yes, it would have mattered had Meade's attack been supported and reinforced. But even in that event, if Meade's Division of I Corps had gained a solid foothold in the vicinity of Prospect Hill the larger outcome of the battle may not have changed. And the reason for that is the confused orders that were generated by Burnside and the timid decisions by the Left Grand Division commander Franklin. The major effort to have been made against Jackson's front in the south, with a corresponding turning movement around Hamilton's Crossing and Prospect Hill was never executed properly. Instead, Sumner's Right Grand Division, intended as a diversionary movement, became the source of futile and costly assaults against Longstreet's entrenched position along Mayre's Heights.

 

[Gwynn Oak Ken]

Assaulting Marye's Heights was the height of folly. The entire weight of the attack ought to have been on Prospect Hill.

 

[SWS]

As Jubal Early relates: "The weak point in our position was on our right, as there was the wide open plain in front of it extending to the [Rappahannock] river and perfectly covered and swept by the enemy's heavy batteries on the opposite [Stafford] heights, and to the right, extending around to our rear, were the open flats of the Massaponax, here quite wide and incapable of being covered by any position we could take. There was very great danger of our right being turned by the enemy's pushing a heavy column down the river across the Massaponax... Had Burnside moved down the river to the Massaponax, after crossing, or had thrown other bridges across at or near the mouth of that stream, and crossed one of his grand divisions there, he would inevitably have forced us to abandon our line of defence, and fight him on other ground."

 

[Jamieva]

Assaulting Marye's Heights was the height of folly. The entire weight of the attack ought to have been on Prospect Hill.

That actually was burnsides plan he just did a really poor job of explaining and implementing it,

 

[rpkennedy]

That actually was burnsides plan he just did a really poor job of explaining and implementing it,

It also didn't help that he was relying on his least aggressive and least capable Grand Division commander.

Ryan

 

[rbasin]

The best way for Burnside to win that battle was to never have put himself into that position. Had he stuck to his original plan, which was to move south farther to the west of Fredericksburg, he had a much better chance of success.

 

[Jamieva]

The best way for Burnside to win that battle was to never have put himself into that position. Had he stuck to his original plan, which was to move south farther to the west of Fredericksburg, he had a much better chance of success.

Hallock disallowed that idea cause he felt it left Washington uncovered.

 

[W Charles Young]

Birney commanded a division.

Much is made of Birney's refusal to reinforce, but again that is only one more brigade.

 

[rbasin]

Hallock disallowed that idea cause he felt it left Washington uncovered.

No. Burnside's original plan was to go west then go to Fredericksburg on the southern bank. That's why the pontoon boats were sent to DC from Harper's Ferry.

Halleck took burnside's plan to Lincoln for approval.

 

[jackt62]

The best way for Burnside to win that battle was to never have put himself into that position.

Burnside was placed in a tough position. He was given command of the AotP at a time of year (November) when the summer/fall campaign season was coming to an end, yet he was expected to commence major operations almost immediately. Moreover, he had almost no time to examine the army's readiness and the capabilities of its divisions and commanders. It certainly didn't help his cause that his proposed crossing of the Rappahannock relied on clockwork movements and the reliance on a logistical pontoon train over which he had limited control.

 

[General JJ]

There's no guarantee that if Meade had been reinforced, the battle would have been won. But it was definitely possible.

Despite the unfortunate gap left in the line at the start of the battle, Stonewall Jackson's position at Fredericksburg was a strong one. His defense in depth strategy worked perfectly. But, Franklin also had multiple divisions that he could have thrown into the battle to expand the breakthrough. If the entire Left Grand Division had been engaged, with support from the Center Grand Division (which for some godforsaken reason, half of it was comitted to support the diversion) there's a very real chance the Union comes out victorious.

 

[rpkennedy]

Burnside was placed in a tough position. He was given command of the AotP at a time of year (November) when the summer/fall campaign season was coming to an end, yet he was expected to commence major operations almost immediately. Moreover, he had almost no time to examine the army's readiness and the capabilities of its divisions and commanders. It certainly didn't help his cause that his proposed crossing of the Rappahannock relied on clockwork movements and the reliance on a logistical pontoon train over which he had limited control.

And it was a command that he didn't want. The only reason he took it was because he was told that if he didn't take it, command was going to be offered to Joseph Hooker and Burnside hated Hooker.

Ryan

 

[jackt62]

If the entire Left Grand Division had been engaged, with support from the Center Grand Division (which for some godforsaken reason, half of it was comitted to support the diversion) there's a very real chance the Union comes out victorious.

As you note, Franklin should have thrown everything into his assault. Franklin understood this to be the case when he discussed the planned assault with Burnside on the preceding night. But when Burnside's written orders were finally transmitted to Franklin in the morning of the assault, the instructions were less definitive and called for "at least a division" to be used. Franklin, not known as the most assertive commander, and not willing to question or at least confirm Burnside's conflicted instructions, watered down the assault seemingly in obedience to Burnside's orders.

 

[W Charles Young]

jackt62 is spot on. It must be remembered that Franklin was viewed in Washington as a rabid McClellanite. Little Mac had elevated Franklin and Fitz John Porter to corps command because he was their close friend. Franklin at Fredericksburg had recently seen what happened to Porter for not following Pope's orders at 2nd Bull Run. (Forget that to execute those orders to hit Jackson's flank Porter would have to first get by Longstreet.) Franklin may have realized that the written orders did not match his verbal orders, he chose to go with the written ones as they would go on the record. His decision may have been influenced by what happened to his friend Porter.

 

[gary]

It could have been done but the leadership was absent.