Willard's Brigade on July 2, Part 3

[jameswoods]

The following is a map oriented description of the critical role played by Willard's brigade on July 2, taking into consideration the other forces at play while it was so engaged.

Part 3: Maps 8:00 p.m., 8:15 p.m. 9:15 p.m.

By 8:00 p.m., Willard's brigade had arrived back at the point from which it had first advanced against Barksdale's brigade. Colonel Eliakim Sherrill had assumed command on the death of Willard and, as darkness started to fall over the battlefield, the 39th​ New York, spared the losses experienced by its fellow regiments, rejoined the brigade. On their way back, the "Garibaldi Guards" dropped off Watson's four guns with Dow's 6th​ Maine battery for safekeeping.

Perhaps influenced by the arrival of reinforcements surging into this sector and the cessation of fighting due to darkness, at about 8:15 p.m. Sherrill decided to take his brigade back to the right and report to General Hays. The brigade had not gone far when an infuriated General Hancock stopped it and, placing Sherrill under arrest, turned command over to Colonel McDougall who was ordered to immediately return it to its initial deployment position.

Once there, skirmishers were sent forward but they were recalled a half hour later when the brigade received permission to rejoin the Division. By this time the 1st​ Corps brigades of Coulter and Baxter had arrived and were in place to their immediate front.

By 9:15 p.m., the brigade had taken up a reserve position behind the 12th​ New Jersey, Smyth's brigade.

Chaplain Stevens, 14th Connecticut, objecting to the placement of the 111th New York's monument on the same line as Smyth's brigade recalled, "...When the 3d brigade of our division, in which was the 111 N.Y., returned from their gallant and bloody struggle...it was placed as is proper and customary for a command that has had severe service, in a position of protection and rest, at the rear of our brigade, the 111th New York being located about in rear of the 12th New Jersey."

Confirming the good Chaplain's memory, Captain Richardson, 126th New York, recalled that, "...At dusk firing ceased and our brigade was marched back to Cemetery Hill and halted for the night in the rear of some battery, between some stone walls that ran at right angles with the line occupied in the p.m....in the morning went into line at right of house...."

 

[infomanpa]

I wonder how many have visited Willard's marker in the Plum Run brush.

 

[infomanpa]

You and @Tom Elmore should compare your timelines and locations. Great job.

 

[jameswoods]

Thanks,

While most serious students of the battle pretty much agree on what happened, and approximately when, there is still plenty of room for differences of opinion on the exact sequence certain activity occurred (e.g., Anderson's brigade's attack and the arrival of Sweitzer's and Tilton's brigade's on Stony hill).

The forum provides a great place to debate and challenge these opinions. And everyone is welcome.

Jim

 

[Reconstructed Rebel]

I can never figure out exactly how a battle unfolds until I see a map of it. Thank you so much for sharing this.

 

[ErnieMac]

I wonder how many have visited Willard's marker in the Plum Run brush.

Photo taken in March 2014. It was a bit of a slog to get to it.

 

[Peace Society]

Thank you! Very well done! Very informative. I do better visually than with just words.

 

[Cavalier]

Jameswoods Willard's story, and that of his brigade, is a fascinating one in my opinion. Thanks for posting this. Willard's marker is kinda out of the way so it doesn't get much attention I guess.

As I remember the story, while recuperating from his wound Hancock later told Hays he owed Sherill an apology for arresting him and Hays was supposed to have answered something to the effect, "Like all your apologies Hancock, it comes too late, he's already dead". Hays and Hancock had been cadets together at West Point.

John

 

[Cavalier]

Jameswoods I have a special interest in Willard's Brigade, (an ancestor in the 111th.). Thank you very much for posting all this.

John

 

[MattD1972]

I wonder how many have visited Willard's marker in the Plum Run brush.

The quietness of the spot reminds me a lot of Antietam.

 

[Robby House]

The following is a map oriented description of the critical role played by Willard's brigade on July 2, taking into consideration the other forces at play while it was so engaged.

View attachment 425082

Part 3: Maps 8:00 p.m., 8:15 p.m. 9:15 p.m.

By 8:00 p.m., Willard's brigade had arrived back at the point from which it had first advanced against Barksdale's brigade. Colonel Eliakim Sherrill had assumed command on the death of Willard and, as darkness started to fall over the battlefield, the 39th​ New York, spared the losses experienced by its fellow regiments, rejoined the brigade. On their way back, the "Garibaldi Guards" dropped off Watson's four guns with Dow's 6th​ Maine battery for safekeeping.

Perhaps influenced by the arrival of reinforcements surging into this sector and the cessation of fighting due to darkness, at about 8:15 p.m. Sherrill decided to take his brigade back to the right and report to General Hays. The brigade had not gone far when an infuriated General Hancock stopped it and, placing Sherrill under arrest, turned command over to Colonel McDougall who was ordered to immediately return it to its initial deployment position.

Once there, skirmishers were sent forward but they were recalled a half hour later when the brigade received permission to rejoin the Division. By this time the 1st​ Corps brigades of Coulter and Baxter had arrived and were in place to their immediate front.

By 9:15 p.m., the brigade had taken up a reserve position behind the 12th​ New Jersey, Smyth's brigade.

Chaplain Stevens, 14th Connecticut, objecting to the placement of the 111th New York's monument on the same line as Smyth's brigade recalled, "...When the 3d brigade of our division, in which was the 111 N.Y., returned from their gallant and bloody struggle...it was placed as is proper and customary for a command that has had severe service, in a position of protection and rest, at the rear of our brigade, the 111th New York being located about in rear of the 12th New Jersey."

Confirming the good Chaplain's memory, Captain Richardson, 126th New York, recalled that, "...At dusk firing ceased and our brigade was marched back to Cemetery Hill and halted for the night in the rear of some battery, between some stone walls that ran at right angles with the line occupied in the p.m....in the morning went into line at right of house...."

Excellent tactical maps. They give the dispositions of both sides' brigades and regiments about an hour after Lee's attack-in-echelon became derailed at a very critical point in the developing battle when Wright's brigade of 1,400 Georgians had crossed Emmitsburg Road and advanced into a yawning gap in the Union center. Wright was keen to exploit this vulnerable Union predicament but he knew his brigade alone wouldn't be enough. Lee's attack-in-echelon that had been progressing from south to north up Emmitsburg Road saw brigade after brigade launch against the Union line in roughly 15 minute increments. All he needed was support from Posey's brigade that had been deployed directly north of his starting off position on Seminary Ridge but that help needed to come soon as Union commanders like Hancock were well aware of the hole and were doing everything to plug the hole. Wright instinctively looked over his left shoulder expecting to see Posey's 1,400 Mississippians advancing east in his general directing but Posey wasn't following.

The success of the day's fighting now fell squarely on the shoulders of Carnot Posey. General Posey had discovered too late as it turned out that he had lost effective control of his brigade due to ever larger portions of his four Mississippi regiments having gotten themselves more and more committed to a protracted "battle within a battle" at the Bliss Farm located between the Union and Confederate lines. Beginning in the late morning small numbers of Union infantry infiltrated the Bliss Farm and started taking pot shots at Confederate dispositions that Posey's brigade occupied. Posey responded in kind sending small bands of men to root out the Yankey troublemakers and before long a see-saw fight for the farm had developed with both sides committing ever larger numbers of men into the afternoon. By early evening the attack-in-echelon had reached his brigade but by that point the Bliss Farm Donnybrook had consumed two of his four brigades in irregular fighting throughout the sprawling 30 acre farmstead. Desperate to keep the battle on schedule Posey advanced his two unengaged brigades forward but halted the advance near Emmitburg Road buy the presence of Union picketers on a line roughly located along modern day Long Lane to his north. With his left already feeling the sting of musketry from those picketers he knew if he advanced across Emmitsburg Road towards Wright's position his entire rear would be vulnerable to Union pickets. Much to Posey's annoyance there appeared to be a general absence of a corresponding Confederate picket line to the north along the rest of Anderson's Division and Pender's Division up to the city of Gettysburg itself.

Back in the Union gap which incidentally was steadily closing with Hancock pushing anyone with a pulse to fill in the gap Wright had been frantically sending couriers to urge the men to come forward before the gift he's stumbled into vanished. Pleas for help hit Posey's men halted at Emmitsburg Road the hardest with most deciding to risk a vulnerable rear to support Wright. Next the couriers along with messengers from Posey's brigade began hounding Mahone and his brigade, the last of Anderson's Division yet to commit to battle before it moving north into Pender's Division to continue the assault. Inexplicable Mahone refused to budge from his position near the McMillan Farm on Seminary Ridge. Mahone kept giving unconvincing reasons for his refusal to budge. It was outright insubordination and he got away with it suffering no damage to his reputation which I've always found curious.

All of these events occured within a short period of time from around 7-7:15 PM. Wright's position in the Union center quickly became untenable and he was forced to withdraw back over Emmitsburg Road with the Posey regiment. Had Wright's men been promptly reinforced with follow-on troops the story might have been different for how Day 2 ended. Unfortunately for the Confederates, even if Posey had never encountered his problems at the Bliss Farm and if Mahone had been in line with the game plan there were problems with how Anderson's Division had been deployed on Seminary Ridge which complicated matters involving follow-on forces. That being there would be no follow on forces coming in from behind. Anderson's deployment on Seminary Ridge was in a side by side manner and not two in the front and two behind like was the case with Hood and McLaw's divisions or Pender's Division to the north. The deployment lacked tactical depth. How the 2 x 2 method worked was the two front brigades advanced with its regiments and engaged with the enemy. The division commander could then send the regiments of the two rear brigades to positions in the line where they were best suited to support the fight that had developed. In Wright's case any help he could get would come from Posey at Posey's expense of the front or line his brigade was to cover.

It was a missed opportunity for the Confederates. The streak of bad luck continued when Pender, determined to put the attack back on schedule resolved to lead his division forward only to get taken out with a Union artillery shell. That pretty much was the closest the Confederates came to victory at Gettysburg.