Why Didn't The Union Prioritize Wilmington?

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Wilmington, NC was the largest city in the state, one of the largest Confederate ports, and had a railroad connection to Richmond. It was also probably the hardest Confederate port to blockade because the Cape Fear River had two inlets separated by a large and dangerous shoal.

By mid-1862, the Union had captured or effectively closed: Norfolk, New Bern, Port Royal, Savannah, Jacksonville, St. Augustine, Pensacola, Ship Island, and New Orleans. There were only three ports of note left east of the Mississippi: Wilmington, Charleston, and Mobile.

The Union spent a lot of time and resources against Charleston in 1863, more because of the morale/PR value. Because of the shape of the channel it seems like an easier port to blockade, especially following the seizure of Morris Island.

Grant seemed to recognize the importance of Mobile, but the Mississippi River was prioritized (understandably) then there were delays for political reasons that involved operations against Texas, including the Red River Campaign.

Yet few Union leaders seemed to recognize Wilmington's importance. Even once Grant came east he wanted to spend his resources elsewhere. This despite having suggested cutting the railroad via a major offensive from New Bern then repeatedly trying to cut the railroads once he got the AotP to Petersburg. An operation against Fort Fisher didn't get underway until December 1864 and even then Grant seemed more concerned with the port's benefit to Sherman than it's importance to the Confederacy.

Overall, it seems like once the easier targets were taken, the Union lost sight of the value of the Anaconda Plan. The seizure of Wilmington (and an earlier closing of Mobile Bay) would surely have made the war end sooner. It seems like one of the greatest Union strategic blunders of the war.

Why didn't the Union prioritize Wilmington?
Was this as big of a mistake as it seems?

 

[Scott1967]

I don't think Wilmington was forgotten by the Union it was still blockaded but because of the geographical nature of the inlets it meant that the blockade ships could be shelled by Fort Fisher the best defended fort in the Confederacy.

In the end it took well over 10K union troops to finally take the Fort and that's a lot of resources in the early war period I would think the Union just did not consider it a priority in 62/63 , It might well be they thought it would take a hell of a lot more troops because of the nature of Fort fisher which was considered impregnable.

I would be also interested to know why the Union did not give this a very high priority but I suspect at the start of the war when things were going bad for the Union they didn't want another disaster on their hands in throwing men at an impregnable Earthwork.

 

[jackt62]

Wilmington was important and in fact, was probably the last open port by which the Confederacy could cling too. So the question really asks why the Union "waited" until late 1864 to assault Ft. Fisher and the approaches to Wilmington. To some extent, that question was answered by @Joshism, who noted that other waterborne routes and locations (Mississippi, Mobile) were given higher priority by the Union leadership. From the start of the war until Vicksburg fell in July 1863, the main focus of federal efforts in the west was penetrating and securing the riverine routes leading southward including the Tennessee, Cumberland, and Mississippi rivers and associated ports such as New Orleans, Memphis, and Nashville. Wilmington's importance was magnified after those ports and others (Mobile, Galveston) were finally secured by the Union. Moreover, Union efforts in the east were heavily focused on the Washington-Richmond axis. Beyond securing a tentative foothold along the North Carolina coast in 1862, Union resources were mostly aimed at defending Washington and defeating the ANV in a succession of futile campaigns.

 

[A. Roy]

Yes, I've wondered about this question, too. Probably the defensibility of Wilmington was an important factor, as @Scott1967 points out.

Also, just looking at the map of the NC coastline: Having established bases at New Bern, "Little" Washington, and Plymouth, the Federals might have felt that was enough. It gave them control of the vast Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds. It gave them control of a very large area of agricultural land, and deprived the Confederates of the same resource. Maybe you can see what I'm talking about on the map below.

The Federals might have felt that Wilmington and the Cape Fear River were minor in comparison. Nevertheless, Union forces did make forays further west from their coastal bases to try to disrupt the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad, an important supply line from Wilmington and its blockade runners.

(This map is cropped and marked up, based on the 1861 Colton map, accessed from the Library of Congress.)

Roy B.

 

[wausaubob]

North Carolina was well defended.
The blockade had an aspect of gamesmanship to it. Catching and adjudicating the blockade runners was a bit of business.
A complete blockade was never desired. Some trading at Memphis and Wilmington was tolerated so that some US cotton got out to NE and old England. That changed once Lincoln was re-elected and the end of the war was in sight.

 

[DaveBrt]

North Carolina was well defended.

Once the NC Sound was taken in early 1862, the defense of NC was based on quickly running troops to any threatened point from SC and VA. In '63 and '64, ironclads were built on river banks with NO meaningful defenses.

There were 2 major pressure points in NC -- Wilmington and Weldon. Wilmington could have been taken during most of the war, with little trouble, by a beach assault north of Ft. Fisher and a quick march to the city. Both of the Ft. Fisher attacks used one of the many possible beaches in the area.

Weldon was the Richmond/Lee killer -- everything that went to Richmond went through Knoxville or Weldon. Both cities would have been easily taken, if the Union made the effort. Supplying Knoxville would have been a challenge, but proved doable. Attacking both places would have forced Lee to defend his supply lines with meaningful number of troops drawn from his army.

The Union high command seems to have thought in terms of Confederate armies and battles. Attacking supply lines, with the intent of destroying the line, not just tearing up rail, was rarely discussed.

The standard reply to this is that the Union did not have enough troops to do this and everything else. To which I reply, the President makes the priorities. Especially right after Vicksburg, the Union could have found the troops. The AOP could have contributed to the effort, knowing that Lee would have to reduce the ANV to counter these moves.

 

[Carronade]

One thing I find curious is that while ports like Charleston, Savannah, or Mobile were defended by large Third System masonry forts , the principal work at Wilmington, Fort Fisher, did not exist at the beginning of the war. Batteries and bulwarks on the ironically named Federal Point were slowly built up and connected over a couple of years while the Union navy watched offshore.

 

[Scott1967]

North Carolina was well defended.
The blockade had an aspect of gamesmanship to it. Catching and adjudicating the blockade runners was a bit of business.
A complete blockade was never desired. Some trading at Memphis and Wilmington was tolerated so that some US cotton got out to NE and old England. That changed once Lincoln was re-elected and the end of the war was in sight.

You make a valid point N. Carolina was one of the better defended states and they had to be as the state being split between Union and Confederate support even more so than Tennessee in west NC.

I always get the impression they succeeded with a heavy heart I wonder is Sherman went easy on NC because of that reason

Once the NC Sound was taken in early 1862, the defense of NC was based on quickly running troops to any threatened point from SC and VA. In '63 and '64, ironclads were built on river banks with NO meaningful defenses.

There were 2 major pressure points in NC -- Wilmington and Weldon. Wilmington could have been taken during most of the war, with little trouble, by a beach assault north of Ft. Fisher and a quick march to the city. Both of the Ft. Fisher attacks used one of the many possible beaches in the area.

Weldon was the Richmond/Lee killer -- everything that went to Richmond went through Knoxville or Weldon. Both cities would have been easily taken, if the Union made the effort. Supplying Knoxville would have been a challenge, but proved doable. Attacking both places would have forced Lee to defend his supply lines with meaningful number of troops drawn from his army.

The Union high command seems to have thought in terms of Confederate armies and battles. Attacking supply lines, with the intent of destroying the line, not just tearing up rail, was rarely discussed.

The standard reply to this is that the Union did not have enough troops to do this and everything else. To which I reply, the President makes the priorities. Especially right after Vicksburg, the Union could have found the troops. The AOP could have contributed to the effort, knowing that Lee would have to reduce the ANV to counter these moves.

Thx Dave good read.

I always thought in the earlier part of the War the focus on supply routes and railroads was a bit lax from the Union side they never seemed to make it a high priority this of course changed when Grant took command both he and Sherman were obsessed with supply chains and the cutting of them and rightly so.

I also think out of all the States in the South North Carolina seemed to be the best run state in terms of supply and care for its soldiers I could be wrong and will stand corrected.

I also agree with https://civilwartalk.com/members/wausaubob.20113/ the state was very well defended in the East but in the west they had major problems with Union partisans in the mountains , Im not sure to what extent these partisans were disrupting supply but I do know over 25k joined the Union a very large chunk of men.

If anyone knows about the partisans in NC and their military operational stance I would like to know?.

 

[leftyhunter]

Once the NC Sound was taken in early 1862, the defense of NC was based on quickly running troops to any threatened point from SC and VA. In '63 and '64, ironclads were built on river banks with NO meaningful defenses.

There were 2 major pressure points in NC -- Wilmington and Weldon. Wilmington could have been taken during most of the war, with little trouble, by a beach assault north of Ft. Fisher and a quick march to the city. Both of the Ft. Fisher attacks used one of the many possible beaches in the area.

Weldon was the Richmond/Lee killer -- everything that went to Richmond went through Knoxville or Weldon. Both cities would have been easily taken, if the Union made the effort. Supplying Knoxville would have been a challenge, but proved doable. Attacking both places would have forced Lee to defend his supply lines with meaningful number of troops drawn from his army.

The Union high command seems to have thought in terms of Confederate armies and battles. Attacking supply lines, with the intent of destroying the line, not just tearing up rail, was rarely discussed.

The standard reply to this is that the Union did not have enough troops to do this and everything else. To which I reply, the President makes the priorities. Especially right after Vicksburg, the Union could have found the troops. The AOP could have contributed to the effort, knowing that Lee would have to reduce the ANV to counter these moves.

General Burnside did have a plan to seize Weldon after he siezed New Berne, but President Lincoln ordered Burnside to ship his troops to Virginia to assist General McCelllan's Peninsula Campaign.
Leftyhunter

 

[leftyhunter]

You make a valid point N. Carolina was one of the better defended states and they had to be as the state being split between Union and Confederate support even more so than Tennessee in west NC.

I always get the impression they succeeded with a heavy heart I wonder is Sherman went easy on NC because of that reason


Thx Dave good read.

I always thought in the earlier part of the War the focus on supply routes and railroads was a bit lax from the Union side they never seemed to make it a high priority this of course changed when Grant took command both he and Sherman were obsessed with supply chains and the cutting of them and rightly so.

I also think out of all the States in the South North Carolina seemed to be the best run state in terms of supply and care for its soldiers I could be wrong and will stand corrected.

I also agree with https://civilwartalk.com/members/wausaubob.20113/ the state was very well defended in the East but in the west they had major problems with Union partisans in the mountains , Im not sure to what extent these partisans were disrupting supply but I do know over 25k joined the Union a very large chunk of men.

If anyone knows about the partisans in NC and their military operational stance I would like to know?.

I have a thread on insurgency that I can bump up it has various sources.
Leftyhunter

 

[DaveBrt]

You make a valid point N. Carolina was one of the better defended states and they had to be as the state being split between Union and Confederate support even more so than Tennessee in west NC.

I always get the impression they succeeded with a heavy heart I wonder is Sherman went easy on NC because of that reason


Thx Dave good read.

I always thought in the earlier part of the War the focus on supply routes and railroads was a bit lax from the Union side they never seemed to make it a high priority this of course changed when Grant took command both he and Sherman were obsessed with supply chains and the cutting of them and rightly so.

I also think out of all the States in the South North Carolina seemed to be the best run state in terms of supply and care for its soldiers I could be wrong and will stand corrected.

I also agree with https://civilwartalk.com/members/wausaubob.20113/ the state was very well defended in the East but in the west they had major problems with Union partisans in the mountains , Im not sure to what extent these partisans were disrupting supply but I do know over 25k joined the Union a very large chunk of men.

If anyone knows about the partisans in NC and their military operational stance I would like to know?.

Please explain how you see NC as being well defended. Offensive operations only took place when out-of-state troops were available and Wilmington was only defended when troops were sent south by Lee.

 

[A. Roy]

You make a valid point N. Carolina was one of the better defended states and they had to be as the state being split between Union and Confederate support even more so than Tennessee in west NC.

I always get the impression they succeeded with a heavy heart I wonder is Sherman went easy on NC because of that reason

This is an interesting point, too. Zebulon B. Vance, Governor during the war, had been a Unionist before the war. William W. Holden was a prominent newspaper editor in Raleigh and known as a peace advocate and critic of the Confederacy (elected governor in 1868). Although I think Vance made noises about resisting to the end, he took off as Sherman's forces came near and left Raleigh to be peacefully surrendered. That's not to say there wasn't a lot of conflict and bitterness post-war and during reconstruction.

Roy B.

 

[leftyhunter]

This is an interesting point, too. Zebulon B. Vance, Governor during the war, had been a Unionist before the war. William W. Holden was a prominent newspaper editor in Raleigh and known as a peace advocate and critic of the Confederacy (elected governor in 1868). Although I think Vance made noises about resisting to the end, he took off as Sherman's forces came near and left Raleigh to be peacefully surrendered. That's not to say there wasn't a lot of conflict and bitterness post-war and during reconstruction.

Roy B.

The Kirk-Holden War comes to mind and is discussed in detail in " Kirk's Raiders a notorious bunch of scoundrels and thieves" George Bumgardner Tar Heel Press. @Scott1967 might also find this book interesting as Col.Kirk recruited North Carolina Unionist gurrillas.
Leftyhunter

 

[Scott1967]

Please explain how you see NC as being well defended. Offensive operations only took place when out-of-state troops were available and Wilmington was only defended when troops were sent south by Lee.

NC was well connected via Railroad and those rail connections never really got pressured by the Union as they were helping supply Lees army all the way up-to 1865 and apart from New Bern and Plymouth , Fisher and Bentonville later in the war I don't think the Union really did anything significant in NC.

Im not sure off the top of my head but I'm pretty sure NC had a couple of divisions on station I think Hoke was always poncing about NC , Not only that but NC had great natural defences Mountains , Rivers and it borders three friendly states.

 

[DaveBrt]

NC was well connected via Railroad and those rail connections never really got pressured by the Union as they were helping supply Lees army all the way up-to 1865 and apart from New Bern and Plymouth , Fisher and Bentonville later in the war I don't think the Union really did anything significant in NC.

Im not sure off the top of my head but I'm pretty sure NC had a couple of divisions on station I think Hoke was always poncing about NC , Not only that but NC had great natural defences Mountains , Rivers and it borders three friendly states.

well connected via railroad -- only through Weldon toward Richmond. There was a line up from Columbia SC to Wilmington and one from Columbia to Charlotte, but both went through Weldon when going to Richmond.

NC never had two divisions in the state, except when sent there from Lee for an operation (retaking Washington, defending against an attack on Wilmington). The state's main defensive weakness was the Union's strength -- a long and vulnerable ocean coast line.

Sounds like you might find my web site of interest: Confederate Railroads, www.csa-railroads.com.

 

[Scott1967]

well connected via railroad -- only through Weldon toward Richmond. There was a line up from Columbia SC to Wilmington and one from Columbia to Charlotte, but both went through Weldon when going to Richmond.

NC never had two divisions in the state, except when sent there from Lee for an operation (retaking Washington, defending against an attack on Wilmington). The state's main defensive weakness was the Union's strength -- a long and vulnerable ocean coast line.

Sounds like you might find my web site of interest: Confederate Railroads, www.csa-railroads.com.

Thx for that info Dave although I find railroads boring sorry but true for myself anyway.

Wasn't their 3 routes into Virginia?.

One route went via Goldsboro another via Raleigh and the last via Greensboro could you enlighten me on that subject , I'm aware that Beaufort and Wilmington merged somewhere down the line.

Could you shed some light on this as far as I can see going by maps NC was full or rail roads

Thx.

 

[A. Roy]

Thx for that info Dave although I find railroads boring sorry but true for myself anyway.

Ooh, don't let @DaveBrt hear you say railroads are boring!

Roy B.

 

[DaveBrt]

Thx for that info Dave although I find railroads boring sorry but true for myself anyway.

Wasn't their 3 routes into Virginia?.

One route went via Goldsboro another via Raleigh and the last via Greensboro could you enlighten me on that subject , I'm aware that Beaufort and Wilmington merged somewhere down the line.

Could you shed some light on this as far as I can see going by maps NC was full or rail roads

Thx.

The Greensboro to Danville route (the Piedmont RR) was completed in the late spring of 1864. It was constructed because of the vulnerability of the two lines from the rest of the South into Virginia.

The Roanoke RR (SE VA to essentially Weldon) was useless and was taken up to help build the above Piedmont RR.

The Western RR, the short one west from Fayetteville, was good only to bring coal and a little iron to Wilmington.

The Wilmington, Charlotte & Rutherford RR went west from Wilmington toward Charlotte, but did not make the connection until after the war. The part west from Charlotte was of no value. The whole road had little impact on the war, just bringing produce from a sparsely settled area of the state.

The Western North Carolina RR went west from Salisbury (the road heading into the mountains). It brought in farm produce.

The Atlantic & NC RR (from the coast to the Wilmington & Weldon at Goldsboro) lost its eastern terminus early and played little part in the war.

Now, the significant roads:
Charlotte & South Carolina RR connected Columbia SC to the North Carolina RR. It was a vital road in the Richmond supply line, but, until the Piedmont RR was finished, its freight had to be used in NC or go through Weldon.

North Carolina RR was the east-west backbone of the state was of of vital importance. It connected to the Wilmington & Weldon RR in Goldsboro and to Weldon again through the Raleigh & Gaston RR. In the west, it connected to the Piedmont RR, the Western NC RR and the Charlotte & SC RR.

The Raleigh & Gaston RR was the first RR in the state. It connected the NC RR to Weldon.

Lastly, the Wilmington & Weldon carried freight that came up from eastern SC and from the blockaderunners to Weldon.

Sooooo, yes there were a lot of railroads, but only 2 routes to Virginia (and one only the last year of the war).

Please not that everything that got to Weldon had to be carried by the Petersburg RR (the so called Weldon RR). The north-eastern Confederacy lived off the Wilmington-Weldon-Petersburg-Richmond line, with an assist from the Charlotte & SC and NC RRs. This was Lee's jugular and Lincoln should have gone for it in late 1862 instead of going to Fredericksburg.

 

[Scott1967]

The Greensboro to Danville route (the Piedmont RR) was completed in the late spring of 1864. It was constructed because of the vulnerability of the two lines from the rest of the South into Virginia.

The Roanoke RR (SE VA to essentially Weldon) was useless and was taken up to help build the above Piedmont RR.

The Western RR, the short one west from Fayetteville, was good only to bring coal and a little iron to Wilmington.

The Wilmington, Charlotte & Rutherford RR went west from Wilmington toward Charlotte, but did not make the connection until after the war. The part west from Charlotte was of no value. The whole road had little impact on the war, just bringing produce from a sparsely settled area of the state.

The Western North Carolina RR went west from Salisbury (the road heading into the mountains). It brought in farm produce.

The Atlantic & NC RR (from the coast to the Wilmington & Weldon at Goldsboro) lost its eastern terminus early and played little part in the war.

Now, the significant roads:
Charlotte & South Carolina RR connected Columbia SC to the North Carolina RR. It was a vital road in the Richmond supply line, but, until the Piedmont RR was finished, its freight had to be used in NC or go through Weldon.

North Carolina RR was the east-west backbone of the state was of of vital importance. It connected to the Wilmington & Weldon RR in Goldsboro and to Weldon again through the Raleigh & Gaston RR. In the west, it connected to the Piedmont RR, the Western NC RR and the Charlotte & SC RR.

The Raleigh & Gaston RR was the first RR in the state. It connected the NC RR to Weldon.

Lastly, the Wilmington & Weldon carried freight that came up from eastern SC and from the blockaderunners to Weldon.

Sooooo, yes there were a lot of railroads, but only 2 routes to Virginia (and one only the last year of the war).

Please not that everything that got to Weldon had to be carried by the Petersburg RR (the so called Weldon RR). The north-eastern Confederacy lived off the Wilmington-Weldon-Petersburg-Richmond line, with an assist from the Charlotte & SC and NC RRs. This was Lee's jugular and Lincoln should have gone for it in late 1862 instead of going to Fredericksburg.

Well that clears that up then I could not ask for a more detailed explanation thx.

 

[Greywolf]

Hokes division was present in NC for parts of 1864 and 1865. There were multiple forts along the cafe fear river other than Ft. Fisher. Other regiments such as the 50th NC spent most of the war in eastern NC.