When Victory is actually a Defeat

[NH Civil War Gal]

First, please list what you think, despite it appearing to be a dazzling success was actually a strategic defeat for battles for either side. And because I'm not up on all the battles (except the most major) please list who appeared to win.

Second, please indicate if the officers in the know, really knew that the "win" was a defeat strategically vs. the moral boosting an apparent win gave at home.

 

[Taylin]

Jubal Early's victory at the battle of Monocacy was a strategic defeat in that it delayed him long enough for the forts around DC to be refurnished with troops/reinforced. Had the battle not taken place he could have raided DC and caused a good bit of havoc.

Lew Wallace in command of the union forces was aware that what his men had done was "save the national capital"

Early if I'm not mistaken was very aware that the delay thwarted his plans but he also admits that it was more or less inevitable as he couldn't have simply bypassed the union force, leaving it in his rear would have been too risky.

 

[jackt62]

Antietam appeared to be a tactical tie or even a victory for the confederacy given that the AOTP was unable to carry the positions held by the ANV, and which continued to hold those positions on September 18th following the battle. Nevertheless, Antietam was a clear strategic defeat for the confederacy in that it effectively ended Lee's Maryland incursion, resulted in grievous casualties for the ANV, and set the stage for the promulgation of the Emancipation Proclamation.

 

[jackt62]

Wilson's Creek in Missouri was a tactical confederate victory, but a union strategic victory. Sterling Price's Missouri State Guard and Benjamin McCullough's Texans defeated Nathaniel Lyon and Franz Sigel's federals in the field, but were unable to hold onto Missouri for the confederacy in the short and long term.

 

[jackt62]

With the exception of Gaines Mill, most of the Seven Days battles were tactical wins or draws for the AOTP. But strategically, the ANV gained the upper hand by relieving the threat against Richmond, eventually leading to the withdrawal of the AOTP from the Penninsula.

 

[archieclement]

Wilson's Creek in Missouri was a tactical confederate victory, but a union strategic victory. Sterling Price's Missouri State Guard and Benjamin McCullough's Texans defeated Nathaniel Lyon and Franz Sigel's federals in the field, but were unable to hold onto Missouri for the confederacy in the short and long term.

That has always seemed somewhat a myth to me, In reality far from being a defeated the MSG advanced over 150 miles north and defeated and captured another of army of 3500 at Lexington. Wilsons Creek accomplished nothing for the Union or control of Missouri. That was done General Fremont months later who did drive the MSG from the state, who afterwards couldn't return for any substantial time, so it would seem control of Missouri and any associated victory in its accomplishment really should go to General Fremont and his orchestrating the forces that actually did drive the MSG from the state, not Lyon who only provided a Union defeat personally that then left the door open for another defeat to follow.

 

[kevikens]

The fall of Fort Sumter. The Southern victory of capturing the fortress came at the price of legions of Unionists swarming out of their hives to sting the Confederacy to death.

 

[jackt62]

That has always seemed somewhat a myth to me, In reality far from being a defeated the MSG advanced over 150 miles north and defeated and captured another of army of 3500 at Lexington. Wilsons Creek accomplished nothing for the Union or control of Missouri. That was done General Fremont months later who did drive the MSG from the state, who afterwards couldn't return for any substantial time, so it would seem control of Missouri and any associated victory in its accomplishment really should go to General Fremont and his orchestrating the forces that actually did drive the MSG from the state, not Lyon who only provided a Union defeat personally that then left the door open for another defeat to follow.

But still, if the measure of strategic victory was ultimate confederate control of Missouri, the victory at Wilson's Creek did not offer any long lasting benefit in that regard.

 

[archieclement]

But still, if the measure of strategic victory was ultimate confederate control of Missouri, the victory at Wilson's Creek did not offer any long lasting benefit in that regard.

it certainly didn't provide any lasting benefit for Union Control....The MSG advanced afterwards not retreated, fought and won another substantial victory and was increasing its numbers, to spin it as a Union victory is not realistic, it neither defeated the MSG nor gained control of Missouri, that was done months later by Fremont.

For years it seems theres this loose analogy to Antietam, but it ignores instead of blunting and seeing the ANV retreat....WC just emboldened the MSG to the offensive to win other victories, it was a setback not accomplishing anything other then providing some much needed arms to the MSG, and allowed more much needed arms afterwards with the capture of Mulligan.

There was in effect 3 campaigns, Lyons pursuit of a portion of the MSG to WC, which ends in defeat, then Prices campaign north with culminates in victory at Lexington and consolidation of most of the MSG. which is defeated in a largely bloodless campaign by Fremont who had gathered the forces to secure the state from the top down and force by maneuver Price to have to retreat out of the state.

The one that won the state for the Union was Fremonts, and in spite of Lyons failed campaign, not because of it

That Fremont had fell in disfavor and was being replaced even as he secured the state, doesn't change he was the one who did secure Missouri for the Union

 

[OpnCoronet]

I think the Battles of 2d Manassass and Chancellors ville, could be regarded as strategic victories, if viewed alone, i.e., both appeared to drive Federal Authority out of Va. But, in fact they were tactical, because both successes encouraged Lee to overreach himself and led directly to the two stunning Union victories of Antietam and Gettysburg, Bot, considered by many historians as turning points of the Civil War.

 

[1SGDan]

Iuka. See my posts https://www.civilwartalk.com/threads/iuka-victory-as-failure.69613/#post-409968

 

[davidh26]

The Battle of Chancellorsville. Lee's greatest victory, but he lost his "right arm".

 

[19thGeorgia]

Jubal Early's victory at the battle of Monocacy was a strategic defeat in that it delayed him long enough for the forts around DC to be refurnished with troops/reinforced. Had the battle not taken place he could have raided DC and caused a good bit of havoc.

Lew Wallace in command of the union forces was aware that what his men had done was "save the national capital"

Early if I'm not mistaken was very aware that the delay thwarted his plans but he also admits that it was more or less inevitable as he couldn't have simply bypassed the union force, leaving it in his rear would have been too risky.

The aim was to draw Union troops away from Lee. Early never intended to capture Washington with a bare 10,000 men.

The department of Washington had 33,000 troops on June 30, 1864-

 

[19thGeorgia]

The fall of Fort Sumter. The Southern victory of capturing the fortress

Added four states to the Confederacy and doubled its population.

came at the price of legions of Unionists swarming out of their hives

War was inevitable.

 

[mofederal]

Wilson's Creek had benefits for the Missouri State Guard. Price moved North after the victory and was victorious at Lexington. The Federal forces retreated after Wilson's Creek, first to Springfield and then Rolla, taking itself out of the campaign. Fremont was fired not long after, and he deserved it for his conduct while in control of Missouri. The state contended with the MSG until after Pea Ridge when Price took his forces across the Mississippi River. Wilson's Creek insured that Federal forces would never totally control Missouri until the end of the war. Occupation does not mean you control something, and Missouri was far from controlled during the entire war.

 

[James N.]

I was discussing Stonewall Jackson's very first battle of his Shenandoah Valley Campaign on another thread and Kernstown certainly qualifies. Jackson's defeat there alerted the Lincoln administration in Washington to Jackson's presence as a potential threat, putting brakes on the dispatch of McDowell's Corps at Fredericksburg to McClellan's army on the Peninsula thereby drastically altering the course of that campaign and paving the way for the emergence of Robert E. Lee. When asked his opinion of the failed battle later that evening by a brash cavalryman Jackson was said to have replied, "I think I may say I am satisfied, sir!" As Jackson elaborated in his official report, "Though Winchester was not recovered, yet the more important object for the present, that of calling back troops that were leaving the valley, and thus preventing a junction of Banks' command with other forces, was accomplished. I feel justified in saying that though the battlefield is in the possession of the enemy, yet the most essential fruits of the victory are ours."

 

[diane]

I'd suggest the Holly Springs Raid by Van Dorn and Forrest was a good example of unintended and unforeseeable consequences. The two cavalrymen succeeded very well in achieving their objective - the destruction of the massive Union depot at Holly Springs and the withdrawal of Grant's army from an advance against Vicksburg. However, the long term effect was a defeat for the entire South. Grant, not having much available because of the destruction of the depot, had to live off the land he withdrew across. He was amazed at how rich a war-torn country was! The Union made several small scale tests and saw how well an invading army could do without logistics to worry about - mostly successful. This eye-opener was the seed of what became Sherman's March.

 

[James N.]

I'm surprised no one has yet used the term Pyrrhic Victory; of course it has been suggested, since many if not most of Lee's - and some of Grant's later battles - certainly fall within that category, resulting in losses the Confederacy simply couldn't compensate for. Chickamauga was certainly one such "victory", purchased at such a cost its victor Braxton Bragg couldn't believe he'd actually won!

 

[James N.]

Wilson's Creek had benefits for the Missouri State Guard. Price moved North after the victory and was victorious at Lexington. The Federal forces retreated after Wilson's Creek, first to Springfield and then Rolla, taking itself out of the campaign. Fremont was fired not long after, and he deserved it for his conduct while in control of Missouri. The state contended with the MSG until after Pea Ridge when Price took his forces across the Mississippi River. Wilson's Creek insured that Federal forces would never totally control Missouri until the end of the war. Occupation does not mean you control something, and Missouri was far from controlled during the entire war.

Agreed; the subsequent failure of the Confederates in Missouri in 1861 had less to do with Price after Wilson's Creek than it did with the refusal of Ben McCullough to cooperate with Price, similar to the way Jeff Davis dropped the ball in the wake of Bull Run/Manassas.

 

[NH Civil War Gal]

I'm surprised no one has yet used the term Pyrrhic Victory;

Because we don't read the classics often enough!

Do you think Lee recognized that his wins were mostly Pyrrhic Victories? What about Bragg? And others.