Member Review What really happened at Gettysburg?

[wausaubob]

Everyone's opinion is valid. But do you think its just a coincidence that General Lee ordered a long odds attack on the center of the US line at Gettysburg on the same day Pemberton opened negotiations with his federal opponent?
It could have been a coincidence, but in the alternative Lee may have a had a good estimate of how long the Confederates could last at Vicksburg. He might have known already by June 17, 1863, when he lost effective communication with Richmond.
Grant seemed to know also. He may have known that July 3 was about as long as the Confederates could last. He planned his assault on the Confederate lines for July 6, hoping that he would not have to give the order.
When given the opportunity to take the city without a further battle Grant offered parole to the Confederates. That avoided any further US fatalities and meant there weren't going to be thousands of US and Confederate wounded men to care for and transport to Memphis and St. Louis.
General Lee had to have known that things had not worked out as he had hoped. The invasion of Pennsylvania had not dislodged the siege at Vicksburg. In the east, the US Army of the Potomac had delayed giving battle but was also too close to the Confederates to allow Lee's army to remain disbursed.
Happy 4th of July to all you folks.

 

[infomanpa]

Everyone's opinion is valid. But do you think its just a coincidence that General Lee ordered a long odds attack on the center of the US line at Gettysburg on the same day Pemberton opened negotiations with his federal opponent?
It could have been a coincidence, but in the alternative Lee may have a had a good estimate of how long the Confederates could last at Vicksburg. He might have known already by June 17, 1863, when he lost effective communication with Richmond.
Grant seemed to know also. He may known that July 3 was about as long as the Confederates could last. He planned his assault on the Confederate lines for July 6, hoping that he would not have to give the order.
When given the opportunity to take the city without a further battle Grant offered parole to the Confederates. That avoided any further US fatalities and meant there weren't going to be thousands of US and Confederate wounded men to care for and transport to Memphis and St. Louis.
General Lee had to have known that things had not worked out as he had hoped. The invasion of Pennsylvania had not dislodged the siege at Vicksburg. In the east, the US Army of the Potomac had delayed giving battle but was also too close to the Confederates to allow Lee's army to remain disbursed.
Happy 4th of July to all you folks.

Yep. I would vote "coincidence," without any evidence to the contrary.

 

[Irishtom29]

As I recall Grant's communication with Washington was pretty sketchy and a message had to go by steamboat to Cairo and from there be telegraphed to Washington. And vice versa.

 

[SSVilla]

It was coincidental from Grant's part at least. His army had been digging approaches and menacing Pemberton for weeks. He would have taken Vicksburg sooner if that was possible, as his assaults showed in May.

Lee had more agency in the timing however, He had counseled Davis against reinforcing Vicksburg, essentially abandoning them to their fate. He would have known then that "it was only a matter of time." I think he had gambled that his best chance to relieve Vicksburg was to win the war (or force an armistice which was the same thing) by crushing his own nemesis, the AoP. If he could do that before Vicksburg fell, perhaps they could even keep Vicksburg.

I think one of the problems of an armistice would have been the part where the "two countries" negotiate which lands they each get to keep etc. Would anyone imagine the U.S. would concede any territory within their control to any version of the confederacy that survived? Nope. There's times Grant writes in his memoirs that the U.S. could only be a peaceful people as one nation (and that without slavery) and I think the reason he believed that was that if there was a recognized confederacy, territory disputes would continue to cause trouble… more Kansas-Nebraska like terrorism, guerrillas, etc. Already the confederacy was claiming two states within their government that they had no control over.

Anyway, all this chat to say, I think Lee definitely wanted to defeat the AoP before Vicksburg fell. Alas too late, for Vicksburg and for him, thankfully. It was pure coincidence that the victories came in the same day, but Lee's desperation was the catalyst in that synchronicity if that makes sense.

 

[wausaubob]

As I recall Grant's communication with Washington was pretty sketchy and a message had to go by steamboat to Cairo and from there be telegraphed to Washington. And vice versa.

Grant's opinion would have been formed on the information provided by Confederate soldiers surrendering at Vicksburg as the days wore on. Lee would have had the information in the final messages sent by Pemberton. We don't know which letters were intercepted by US agents

 

[wausaubob]

It was coincidental from Grant's part at least. His army had been digging approaches and menacing Pemberton for weeks. He would have taken Vicksburg sooner if that was possible, as his assaults showed in May.

Lee had more agency in the timing however, He had counseled Davis against reinforcing Vicksburg, essentially abandoning them to their fate. He would have known then that "it was only a matter of time." I think he had gambled that his best chance to relieve Vicksburg was to win the war (or force an armistice which was the same thing) by crushing his own nemesis, the AoP. If he could do that before Vicksburg fell, perhaps they could even keep Vicksburg.

I think one of the problems of an armistice would have been the part where the "two countries" negotiate which lands they each get to keep etc. Would anyone imagine the U.S. would concede any territory within their control to any version of the confederacy that survived? Nope. There's times Grant writes in his memoirs that the U.S. could only be a peaceful people as one nation (and that without slavery) and I think the reason he believed that was that if there was a recognized confederacy, territory disputes would continue to cause trouble… more Kansas-Nebraska like terrorism, guerrillas, etc. Already the confederacy was claiming two states within their government that they had no control over.

Anyway, all this chat to say, I think Lee definitely wanted to defeat the AoP before Vicksburg fell. Alas too late, for Vicksburg and for him, thankfully. It was pure coincidence that the victories came in the same day, but Lee's desperation was the catalyst in that synchronicity if that makes sense.

I think Grant was stalling. The calculation was that it would be faster to reinforce Banks at Port Hudson if Grant could capture Vicksburg without a fight and without having to deal with the Confederate prisoners. I think the July weather in Mississippi and the prevalence of typhus and other warm weather diseases was a considerable factor.
I think the saps were very close by July 1.

 

[wausaubob]

Yep. I would vote "coincidence," without any evidence to the contrary.

One would have to know how many men Grant was losing to disease. I think he could have ordered an attack after he relieved McClernand and Ord took over that corps.

 

[LondonLincoln]

Everyone's opinion is valid. But do you think its just a coincidence that General Lee ordered a long odds attack on the center of the US line at Gettysburg on the same day Pemberton opened negotiations with his federal opponent?
It could have been a coincidence, but in the alternative Lee may have a had a good estimate of how long the Confederates could last at Vicksburg. He might have known already by June 17, 1863, when he lost effective communication with Richmond.
Grant seemed to know also. He may have known that July 3 was about as long as the Confederates could last. He planned his assault on the Confederate lines for July 6, hoping that he would not have to give the order.
When given the opportunity to take the city without a further battle Grant offered parole to the Confederates. That avoided any further US fatalities and meant there weren't going to be thousands of US and Confederate wounded men to care for and transport to Memphis and St. Louis.
General Lee had to have known that things had not worked out as he had hoped. The invasion of Pennsylvania had not dislodged the siege at Vicksburg. In the east, the US Army of the Potomac had delayed giving battle but was also too close to the Confederates to allow Lee's army to remain disbursed.
Happy 4th of July to all you folks.

Very interesting post food for thought

 

[JerryD]

Coincidence.

 

[Reconstructed Rebel]

We don't know which letters were intercepted by US agents

This could be the crux of the matter. I think July 1863 was clearly understood by everyone to be a point in the war when the scales could tip-

Written from Memphis by an officer of the 63rd Ohio OVI:

July 4th, 1863. Everything quiet here. Our armies are in a critical position east and west. General Grant makes little apparent headway against Vicksburg. Lee, the rebel, is advancing northward. Perhaps a few days will decide the fate of our government.
July 7th, 1863. Glorious news. Vicksburg is beneath the Star Spangled Banner. General Meade has defeated the enemy at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania and driven their hordes southward with great slaughter. Thank God! Liberty may yet survive this rebellion.


Source:

The colonel's diary; journals kept before and during the civil war by the late Colonel Oscar L. Jackson...sometime commander of the 63rd regiment O. V. I : Jackson, Oscar L. (Oscar Lawrence), 1840-1920 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Interne

3 p. l., 232 p., 1 l., 233-262 p. 23 cm

archive.org

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Everyone's opinion is valid. But do you think its just a coincidence that General Lee ordered a long odds attack on the center of the US line at Gettysburg on the same day Pemberton opened negotiations with his federal opponent?
It could have been a coincidence, but in the alternative Lee may have a had a good estimate of how long the Confederates could last at Vicksburg. He might have known already by June 17, 1863, when he lost effective communication with Richmond.
Grant seemed to know also. He may have known that July 3 was about as long as the Confederates could last. He planned his assault on the Confederate lines for July 6, hoping that he would not have to give the order.
When given the opportunity to take the city without a further battle Grant offered parole to the Confederates. That avoided any further US fatalities and meant there weren't going to be thousands of US and Confederate wounded men to care for and transport to Memphis and St. Louis.
General Lee had to have known that things had not worked out as he had hoped. The invasion of Pennsylvania had not dislodged the siege at Vicksburg. In the east, the US Army of the Potomac had delayed giving battle but was also too close to the Confederates to allow Lee's army to remain disbursed.
Happy 4th of July to all you folks.

Good speculation. Lee did know that the war was going badly for the South, but his battle plans were (in my opinion) independent of anything going on in Vicksburg or anywhere else.

 

[SSVilla]

Lee had been considering a second invasion of the North for months, but putting it in action was precipitated by the siege of Vicksburg. In May 1863,

"Lee had to overcome competing visions of what Confederate strategy should be. Grant was closing in on Vicksburg; Rosecrans threatened General Braxton Bragg's position in middle Tennessee; a Union army/navy task force threatened General P.G.T. Beauregard at Charleston. Longstreet suggested that he take Hood's and Pickett's divisions to reinforce Bragg for an offensive against Rosecrans, which might also force Grant to release his tightening grip on Vicksburg. Secretary of War James Seddon and Postmaster-General John Reagan gained a hearing from Jefferson Davis for their proposal that Longstreet's two divisions go directly to General John C. Pemberton's support at Vicksburg.

"In conversations and correspondence during the second and third weeks of May, however, Lee strongly opposed these proposals. It would take too long for Longstreet's men to get to Vicksburg for them to do any good, he said, and it was not clear that Pemberton and Joseph Johnston would know what to do with them if they did get there. Besides, the heat and diseases of a Deep South summer would loosen Grant's grip. Even if Vicksburg fell, a successful invasion of Pennsylvania would more than compensate for that loss. If Longstreet's two divisions went west, Lee warned, he might have to retreat into the Richmond defenses."

To Conquer a Peace: Lee’s Goals in the Gettysburg Campaign

Battlefield victory may not have officially been part of the Confederate plan in Pennsylvania, but Robert E. Lee saw opportunity—and for him strategic and

www.historynet.com

It's evident there were political concerns and a desire to counteract Pemberton's defeat that led to the Vicksburg siege. Lee couldn't have timed his defeat at Gettysburg to the day, (and he wouldn't have known he'd be defeated, in fact he was counting against it,) but the fate of Vicksburg and political pressures definitely influenced his choices.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Lee had been considering a second invasion of the North for months, but putting it in action was precipitated by the siege of Vicksburg. In May 1863,

"Lee had to overcome competing visions of what Confederate strategy should be. Grant was closing in on Vicksburg; Rosecrans threatened General Braxton Bragg's position in middle Tennessee; a Union army/navy task force threatened General P.G.T. Beauregard at Charleston. Longstreet suggested that he take Hood's and Pickett's divisions to reinforce Bragg for an offensive against Rosecrans, which might also force Grant to release his tightening grip on Vicksburg. Secretary of War James Seddon and Postmaster-General John Reagan gained a hearing from Jefferson Davis for their proposal that Longstreet's two divisions go directly to General John C. Pemberton's support at Vicksburg.

"In conversations and correspondence during the second and third weeks of May, however, Lee strongly opposed these proposals. It would take too long for Longstreet's men to get to Vicksburg for them to do any good, he said, and it was not clear that Pemberton and Joseph Johnston would know what to do with them if they did get there. Besides, the heat and diseases of a Deep South summer would loosen Grant's grip. Even if Vicksburg fell, a successful invasion of Pennsylvania would more than compensate for that loss. If Longstreet's two divisions went west, Lee warned, he might have to retreat into the Richmond defenses."

To Conquer a Peace: Lee’s Goals in the Gettysburg Campaign

Battlefield victory may not have officially been part of the Confederate plan in Pennsylvania, but Robert E. Lee saw opportunity—and for him strategic and

www.historynet.com

It's evident there were political concerns and a desire to counteract Pemberton's defeat that led to the Vicksburg siege. Lee couldn't have timed his defeat at Gettysburg to the day, (and he wouldn't have known he'd be defeated, in fact he was counting against it,) but the fate of Vicksburg and political pressures definitely influenced his choices.

Yes, but the question that I was addressing was "But do you think its just a coincidence that General Lee ordered a long odds attack on the center of the US line at Gettysburg on the same day Pemberton opened negotiations with his federal opponent?" I say again that in my opinion Lee's tactical battle plan decision to attack the center of the US line had nothing to do with Vicksburg or anything else. It was Lee's way. On the strategic side, you have addressed that properly.

 

[wausaubob]

Lee had been considering a second invasion of the North for months, but putting it in action was precipitated by the siege of Vicksburg. In May 1863,

"Lee had to overcome competing visions of what Confederate strategy should be. Grant was closing in on Vicksburg; Rosecrans threatened General Braxton Bragg's position in middle Tennessee; a Union army/navy task force threatened General P.G.T. Beauregard at Charleston. Longstreet suggested that he take Hood's and Pickett's divisions to reinforce Bragg for an offensive against Rosecrans, which might also force Grant to release his tightening grip on Vicksburg. Secretary of War James Seddon and Postmaster-General John Reagan gained a hearing from Jefferson Davis for their proposal that Longstreet's two divisions go directly to General John C. Pemberton's support at Vicksburg.

"In conversations and correspondence during the second and third weeks of May, however, Lee strongly opposed these proposals. It would take too long for Longstreet's men to get to Vicksburg for them to do any good, he said, and it was not clear that Pemberton and Joseph Johnston would know what to do with them if they did get there. Besides, the heat and diseases of a Deep South summer would loosen Grant's grip. Even if Vicksburg fell, a successful invasion of Pennsylvania would more than compensate for that loss. If Longstreet's two divisions went west, Lee warned, he might have to retreat into the Richmond defenses."

To Conquer a Peace: Lee’s Goals in the Gettysburg Campaign

Battlefield victory may not have officially been part of the Confederate plan in Pennsylvania, but Robert E. Lee saw opportunity—and for him strategic and

www.historynet.com

It's evident there were political concerns and a desire to counteract Pemberton's defeat that led to the Vicksburg siege. Lee couldn't have timed his defeat at Gettysburg to the day, (and he wouldn't have known he'd be defeated, in fact he was counting against it,) but the fate of Vicksburg and political pressures definitely influenced his choices.

But your post suggests that there was a time constraint even in these strategic consultations. I follow Lee's thinking though. If the Confederates send divisions to the west, the US could do the same thing. Of the federal armies could block and flank Lee back down to Richmond.

 

[wausaubob]

Yes, but the question that I was addressing was "But do you think its just a coincidence that General Lee ordered a long odds attack on the center of the US line at Gettysburg on the same day Pemberton opened negotiations with his federal opponent?" I say again that in my opinion Lee's tactical battle plan decision to attack the center of the US line had nothing to do with Vicksburg or anything else. It was Lee's way. On the strategic side, you have addressed that properly.

Good post. But there are some additional considerations. The Confederate lobby in the British parliament was going to make another attempt at forcing mediation. It failed ultimately when John Bright ridiculed their motion. There was also a naval raid on the east coast which successfully damaged New England fishing, even though the Confederate raiders had to abandon their raid.
I would also suspect that there were Confederate agents in NYC successfully exploiting resentment of freedmen being used as longshoremen, which contributed to the draft riots in the city.
There was many things co-ordinated with the Virginia army's invasion of the Pennsylvania.
Thanks for all the fine insights.

 

[Deacon Gordon]

I think there was only one consideration going through the blessed Gen. Lee's mind, if he could defeat Mead's Army Great Britain would intercede and demand some type of mediation. Prime Minister Palmerston had already admitted that the Confederacy was a nation and not a part of the United States. Nothing else would really justify the kind of sacrifice he demanded of his Army during that battle. Pickett's Charge was an all or nothing gamble and I am pretty sure Lee understood that. If he had only listened to Longstreet.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

I think there was only one consideration going through the blessed Gen. Lee's mind, if he could defeat Mead's Army Great Britain would intercede and demand some type of mediation. Prime Minister Palmerston had already admitted that the Confederacy was a nation and not a part of the United States. Nothing else would really justify the kind of sacrifice he demanded of his Army during that battle. Pickett's Charge was an all or nothing gamble and I am pretty sure Lee understood that. If he had only listened to Longstreet.

You may well be correct, Deacon. It was certainly a gamble.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

I think there was only one consideration going through the blessed Gen. Lee's mind, if he could defeat Mead's Army Great Britain would intercede and demand some type of mediation. Prime Minister Palmerston had already admitted that the Confederacy was a nation and not a part of the United States. Nothing else would really justify the kind of sacrifice he demanded of his Army during that battle. Pickett's Charge was an all or nothing gamble and I am pretty sure Lee understood that. If he had only listened to Longstreet.

By the way, Deacon, I noticed that you just joined, and am glad you are contributing. I only joined in January. Enjoy!

 

[CSuniforms]

Great back and forth. Yes, Davis was a lot more concerned about Vicksburg in his head. It was his home. Lee went North to take the War to the Union. Lee needed supplies and the rich fields and valleys of Penn. had the food, clothes, and everything else they needed. A victory in the North was a consideration as part of the invasion-- and as it turned out a Battle. It did not work out for Lee, yet they fought on for another 2 years.