Sherman What Credit Does Sherman deserve?

[hanna260]

Alright, this is NOT meant to be a Sherman bashing thread or a discussion of whether or not Sherman was evil or ate kids for breakfast.

Lately, I've been thinking about Sherman and the oft-repeated claim that he was one of the best, if not THE best general the Union had to offer. He is often credited with defining and carrying out modern total warfare, with much success. It's fairly common to assume that Lincoln would not have been re-elected had Sherman's March to the Sea not shown real progress, and he's often credited as an inventive strategist.

On the other hand, he wasn't a very good tactician: he didn't perform to the utmost ability when faced with commanding battles (Kennesaw Mountain for prime example, though are definitely others). Could it be argued that total war was something already being used by guerrillas in the war, and Sherman just had the good luck to define it? Does he deserve the credit given for strategizing and conceptualizing the March to the Sea: his observations were echoed by other Union generals like Grant and even Pope earlier in the war.

Again, not attempting to "bash" Sherman, just wondering what everyone thinks of his skills in general and where he stands a commander.

 

[Bee]

Could it be argued that total war was something already being used by guerrillas in the war, and Sherman just had the good luck to define it? e

My initial comment would be that it has been my understanding from reading, and further clarifications by @cash (and a recent conference that I attended,) that "total war" was not used by Sherman, rather he used "hard war".

 

[hanna260]

My initial comment would be that it has been my understanding from reading, and further clarifications by @cash and a recent conference that I attended, that "total war" was not used by Sherman, rather he used "hard war".

That is my understanding too, Bee, since he didn't target civilians. I have often seen people say, however, that he was one of the first major generals to define civilians as part of the war effort, which is the whole point of total war, even if he didn't practice it fully.

 

[Bee]

There has been a lot of discussion on this topic. Here is an interesting commentary/review of Mark Grimesley' The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865

Grimsely makes a strong case for the relative restraint of even the hardest of the Union's hard war policies, including the rarity at which occupied (i.e. not abandoned) civilian dwellings were burned and the dearth of outright crimes committed against civilians. Sherman's decision to evacuate the inhabitants of Atlanta, unique as it was, affected a population that had by 1864 shrunk to a mere 3,000, and only about half of these actually complied with Sherman's order. Grimsley does not gloss over regrettable instances of outright arson and plunder, yet he also reveals numerous Union soldiers deplored it as well. In one instance, amidst the plundering of Fredericksburg in December 1862 (after the town had been held by Confederate sharpshooters, driven out only after intense street fighting, a Union general invited the 1st Minnesota to loot the home of his Confederate brother-in-law. Instead, Grimsley observes, the Minnesotans "spontaneously established a protective guard around the house and saved it from destruction by other troops" (108-09). A subtheme of The Hard Hand of War actually testifies to the morality and restraint of the common Union soldier. The North's "rank and file recognized and understood" policy distinctions between loyal, neutral, and rebellious Southern civilians in part because they were products of politically astute and values-oriented communities (185), "neither barbarians, brutalized by war, nor 'realists,' unleashing indiscriminate violence" (225).

Grimsley further brings sophisticated analysis not only to actual Union policy and conduct but to its broader historical context as well. He pays considerable attention to the theories of military conduct based on European and early American precedent which guided policy makers. Notably, though the Union officially regarded the Civil War as a war against a rebellion, it treated Confederate soldiers and civilians as members of a state in all but name, rather than treating the rebellion as an insurgency which would have warranted harsher policies under the rules of war. Historical context from the Thirty Years War to World War II illustrates that Union hard war policy was notably tame and set hardly any true precedent in the evolution of "total war." Grimsley reveals that American and European military thinkers saw little remarkable in the evolution of Union hard war policy immediately after the Civil War. Only reading history backwards from the tragedies of the twentieth century or distorted through the lens of the Lost Cause does the Union's hard hand of war bear any hallmarks of "total war." The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865. By Mark Grimsley. 1997; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.​

 

[wausaubob]

The campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta was amazing. It was impossible to build and maintain the railroad connection all the way back to Louisville, but he managed.
He kept his subordinates on their toes, but he got superb work from them,
The March to the Sea was even a finer demonstration of logistical control.
Rather than worry about how the March to the Sea was conducted, one might wonder, why was the war continuing?

 

[chucksr]

I would add to the above to study his action/reaction to Hood's attacks from Peach Tree Creek to Jonesboro--Sherman played Hood like fish--destroying the AoT. Give Sherman credit for those strategic decisions as well as his march to North Carolina that was conducted with a minimum of casualties. No general Union or Rebel went as far, did so much damage (actual and psychological) to the enemy with fewer losses.

 

[Aussie Billy Sherman]

I think he'd be enjoying the fact he is still considered by some in the South to be a terrorist, war criminal or The Devil.

 

[WJC]

Alright, this is NOT meant to be a Sherman bashing thread or a discussion of whether or not Sherman was evil or ate kids for breakfast.

Lately, I've been thinking about Sherman and the oft-repeated claim that he was one of the best, if not THE best general the Union had to offer. He is often credited with defining and carrying out modern total warfare, with much success. It's fairly common to assume that Lincoln would not have been re-elected had Sherman's March to the Sea not shown real progress, and he's often credited as an inventive strategist.

On the other hand, he wasn't a very good tactician: he didn't perform to the utmost ability when faced with commanding battles (Kennesaw Mountain for prime example, though are definitely others). Could it be argued that total war was something already being used by guerrillas in the war, and Sherman just had the good luck to define it? Does he deserve the credit given for strategizing and conceptualizing the March to the Sea: his observations were echoed by other Union generals like Grant and even Pope earlier in the war.

Again, not attempting to "bash" Sherman, just wondering what everyone thinks of his skills in general and where he stands a commander.

Credit for planning and executing a brilliant campaign which was a major factor in defeating the rebellion.

 

[WJC]

There has been a lot of discussion on this topic. Here is an interesting commentary/review of Mark Grimesley' The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865

Grimsely makes a strong case for the relative restraint of even the hardest of the Union's hard war policies, including the rarity at which occupied (i.e. not abandoned) civilian dwellings were burned and the dearth of outright crimes committed against civilians. Sherman's decision to evacuate the inhabitants of Atlanta, unique as it was, affected a population that had by 1864 shrunk to a mere 3,000, and only about half of these actually complied with Sherman's order. Grimsley does not gloss over regrettable instances of outright arson and plunder, yet he also reveals numerous Union soldiers deplored it as well. In one instance, amidst the plundering of Fredericksburg in December 1862 (after the town had been held by Confederate sharpshooters, driven out only after intense street fighting, a Union general invited the 1st Minnesota to loot the home of his Confederate brother-in-law. Instead, Grimsley observes, the Minnesotans "spontaneously established a protective guard around the house and saved it from destruction by other troops" (108-09). A subtheme of The Hard Hand of War actually testifies to the morality and restraint of the common Union soldier. The North's "rank and file recognized and understood" policy distinctions between loyal, neutral, and rebellious Southern civilians in part because they were products of politically astute and values-oriented communities (185), "neither barbarians, brutalized by war, nor 'realists,' unleashing indiscriminate violence" (225).

Grimsley further brings sophisticated analysis not only to actual Union policy and conduct but to its broader historical context as well. He pays considerable attention to the theories of military conduct based on European and early American precedent which guided policy makers. Notably, though the Union officially regarded the Civil War as a war against a rebellion, it treated Confederate soldiers and civilians as members of a state in all but name, rather than treating the rebellion as an insurgency which would have warranted harsher policies under the rules of war. Historical context from the Thirty Years War to World War II illustrates that Union hard war policy was notably tame and set hardly any true precedent in the evolution of "total war." Grimsley reveals that American and European military thinkers saw little remarkable in the evolution of Union hard war policy immediately after the Civil War. Only reading history backwards from the tragedies of the twentieth century or distorted through the lens of the Lost Cause does the Union's hard hand of war bear any hallmarks of "total war." The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865. By Mark Grimsley. 1997; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.​

That's refreshing! Thanks for posting!

 

[General Butterfield]

In my view Sherman is somewhere between Grant and Thomas.

 

[CW3O]

Love him, hate him or something in between, Sherman was undeniably one of the contributing architects to the Union victory.

 

[Jimklag]

Alright, this is NOT meant to be a Sherman bashing thread or a discussion of whether or not Sherman was evil or ate kids for breakfast.

Lately, I've been thinking about Sherman and the oft-repeated claim that he was one of the best, if not THE best general the Union had to offer. He is often credited with defining and carrying out modern total warfare, with much success. It's fairly common to assume that Lincoln would not have been re-elected had Sherman's March to the Sea not shown real progress, and he's often credited as an inventive strategist.

On the other hand, he wasn't a very good tactician: he didn't perform to the utmost ability when faced with commanding battles (Kennesaw Mountain for prime example, though are definitely others). Could it be argued that total war was something already being used by guerrillas in the war, and Sherman just had the good luck to define it? Does he deserve the credit given for strategizing and conceptualizing the March to the Sea: his observations were echoed by other Union generals like Grant and even Pope earlier in the war.

Again, not attempting to "bash" Sherman, just wondering what everyone thinks of his skills in general and where he stands a commander.

Sherman certainly deserves credit for the conception and execution of the March. Grant was initially against it and the administration was always against it but bowed to Grant once Grant was on board. As to the "hard war" "total war" debate, I fall on the hard war side. But there were elements of total war in that March.

 

[Southern Unionist]

He proved he could run an army after its adversary had been reduced to a shadow of its former self. That's about it.

 

[BarryR]

Was he not responsible for the thousands of desertions from the Army of Northern Virginia, thereby bringing the combat to the end at Appomattox..?

 

[Greywolf]

His early career wasn't that great. I think he did a very good job in the Atlanta campaign other than Kennesaw. However, I may be one of the few in that I believe the March to the Sea is over-rated. Then he got overconfident in NC and could have been in real trouble had Johnston had a large army. I think he also did a very good job at the end of the war also.

 

[Greywolf]

He proved he could run an army after its adversary had been reduced to a shadow of its former self. That's about it.

Agreed, and my Grandmother could lead an army of 60K through Georgia to Savannah facing virtually no opposition.

 

[diane]

Was he not responsible for the thousands of desertions from the Army of Northern Virginia, thereby bringing the combat to the end at Appomattox..?

He did - lots of Lee's soldiers took off home if they lived in Georgia or South Carolina. The most notable loss this way, and arguably a critical one, was Wade Hampton. On the other hand, Sherman was nervous as a cat about Lee breaking out and landing on him - which would have been epic. Sherman had a surprisingly fragile plan that could have gone awry at the least tug - yet it worked.

I think Sherman deserves a lot of credit for being willing to deliver what turned out to be the coup de grace. In fact, he was the only one 'crazy' enough to do this! If Hood had turned back on him, if Forrest had been the cavalryman sent to harass him, if Hardee had got together at least one firm battle... There were enough what-ifs that Sherman was the only general who stepped up and said, I'll do this lunatic thing - if I succeed the war is over! He deserves a lot of credit for sticking his neck out when no one else would or could.

 

[General Butterfield]

His early career wasn't that great. I think he did a very good job in the Atlanta campaign other than Kennesaw. However, I may be one of the few in that I believe the March to the Sea is over-rated. Then he got overconfident in NC and could have been in real trouble had Johnston had a large army. I think he also did a very good job at the end of the war also.

Agreed, and my Grandmother could lead an army of 60K through Georgia to Savannah facing virtually no opposition.

I am in agreement. I think the Atlanta campaign was overall well run. My main complaints are: failure at Snake Creek Gap, frontal assault at Kennesaw Mountain, open flank on July 22nd battle, but they didn't ruin the campaign or anything of that nature. I think he did miss a few opportunities to destroy the AoT and prevent the Franklin-Nashville campaign but no disaster resulted from it.

The March of the Sea was brilliant from the strategic point of view but wasn't a very difficult operation. He was barley opposed and Hardee was allowed to escape. North Carolina he did get a bit overconfident and again left his flank in the air leading to Bentonville. The fact that retreat happy Joseph Johnston launched an attack when outnumbered 3 to 1 and then stayed around to beat off Sherman's counter attacks, amazes me.

Despite the issue he probably is the second best Union commander of the war.

 

[wausaubob]

He did - lots of Lee's soldiers took off home if they lived in Georgia or South Carolina. The most notable loss this way, and arguably a critical one, was Wade Hampton. On the other hand, Sherman was nervous as a cat about Lee breaking out and landing on him - which would have been epic. Sherman had a surprisingly fragile plan that could have gone awry at the least tug - yet it worked.

I think Sherman deserves a lot of credit for being willing to deliver what turned out to be the coup de grace. In fact, he was the only one 'crazy' enough to do this! If Hood had turned back on him, if Forrest had been the cavalryman sent to harass him, if Hardee had got together at least one firm battle... There were enough what-ifs that Sherman was the only general who stepped up and said, I'll do this lunatic thing - if I succeed the war is over! He deserves a lot of credit for sticking his neck out when no one else would or could.

The essential purpose of Sherman's Savannah and South Carolina campaigns was to fight the war, target the plantation owners, but not to fight any more battles, especially against boys and old men.
Grant's goal was similar. He wanted to force Lee out of the Petersburg lines based on Grant's choice and not wait until Lee made a break for it.
Both Grant and Sherman were worried that there might be another campaign in the summer of 1865.

 

[Bruce Vail]

Hard war should be understood as a determination to attack the society that supports a war, not just the armed forces mobilized to prosecute the war.

So civilians are a target, although the 19th century notions of gentlemanly conduct would forbid the murder of civilians or the indiscriminate destruction of private property (these niceties all went by the wayside in the 20th century).

"Until we can repopulate Georgia it is useless to occupy it, but utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people will cripple their military resources. By attempting to hold the roads we will lose a thousand men monthly and will gain no result. I can make the march and make Georgia howl." -- W.T. Sherman