Western Kentucky

[atlantis]

Should the confederates have made early on securing control of the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers a goal. 61/62 confederate policy with regards to western Kentucky seems a little unfocused.

 

[American87]

Should the confederates have made early on securing control of the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers a goal. 61/62 confederate policy with regards to western Kentucky seems a little unfocused.

Yes, but they didn't have the gunboats, from what I've read, and the officer in charge of Fort Henry blew the construction process.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Should the confederates have made early on securing control of the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers a goal. 61/62 confederate policy with regards to western Kentucky seems a little unfocused.

Yes. Pillow/Polk had their eyes set on Columbus due to its defensive valley for the Mississippi but when they cross the border in Septemebr 1861 they failed to have a plan in place for getting to Paducah before Grant

 

[Rhea Cole]

The situation in Western Kentucky was "complex & complicated." Kentucky's declaration of neutrality was one factor.

The topography is sliced into north south sections by the Tennessee & Cumberland Rivers. They enter the Ohio only a few miles apart. A short ways down stream, the Ohio meets the Mississippi. East-West movement by land was all but impossible.

The job of defending the Tennessee-Kentucky border was in the hands of one man, Albert Sydney Johnston. Despite the worshipful regard he is held in by some, Johnston had never show any real executive abilities throughout his life. When faced with complex problems, Johnston fixated on one element & all but disregarded the rest. He believed with all his heart that his HQ at Bowling Green was the focus of Union offensive operations.

As a result of Johnston's myopia, Nashville was not fortified; Fort Donelson was constructed on an absurdly large scale; Columbus KY was turned into a massive fortress & the officer's in charge of these isolated fortifications were allowed to indulge in their personal aggrandizement. An already complex problem was made even worse by Johnston's inability to conceive of a coordinated plan & impose his will on his subordinates.

It is way too complicated to go into in this format, but the simple fact is that what would become the cream of the US commanders confronted a collection of dunderheads. Loosing Western Kentucky, which meant loosing Nashville & Middle Tennessee, was arguably a fatal blow to the CSA in the West.

'Army of the Heartland' by Connelly would be my suggestion for the first step in understanding Western Kentucky from the CSA perspective.

 

[Lubliner]

The situation in Western Kentucky was "complex & complicated." Kentucky's declaration of neutrality was one factor.

The topography is sliced into north south sections by the Tennessee & Cumberland Rivers. They enter the Ohio only a few miles apart. A short ways down stream, the Ohio meets the Mississippi. East-West movement by land was all but impossible.

The job of defending the Tennessee-Kentucky border was in the hands of one man, Albert Sydney Johnston. Despite the worshipful regard he is held in by some, Johnston had never show any real executive abilities throughout his life. When faced with complex problems, Johnston fixated on one element & all but disregarded the rest. He believed with all his heart that his HQ at Bowling Green was the focus of Union offensive operations.

As a result of Johnston's myopia, Nashville was not fortified; Fort Donelson was constructed on an absurdly large scale; Columbus KY was turned into a massive fortress & the officer's in charge of these isolated fortifications were allowed to indulge in their personal aggrandizement. An already complex problem was made even worse by Johnston's inability to conceive of a coordinated plan & impose his will on his subordinates.

It is way too complicated to go into in this format, but the simple fact is that what would become the cream of the US commanders confronted a collection of dunderheads. Loosing Western Kentucky, which meant loosing Nashville & Middle Tennessee, was arguably a fatal blow to the CSA in the West.

'Army of the Heartland' by Connelly would be my suggestion for the first step in understanding Western Kentucky from the CSA perspective.

I agree 100 %. Before the Civil War he was sent on a campaign to quell the Mormons from separating into their own 'Deseret'. The campaign got bogged down in wintry snow, the men suffered severe hardships, and the campaign was called off. There was no excellence in any material performance I can note. Except maybe the ability to mediate among the high ranks, where Bragg, Beauregard, and J. E. Johnston were so disruptive or absent-oriented, he may have achieved cohesion among the confederate forces. Shiloh put an end to that.
Lubliner.

 

[NFB22]

The "neutrality" of Kentucky early in the war and the lack of action surrounding it seemed to be the downfall for the CSA in regards to the Western Confederacy, in my opinion. I'm not entirely sure who thought this would be some type of shield against aggression from Union forces, whether that came from Richmond or leaders in the west, but to not take Paducah early on, fortify it and protect those vital arteries into the south such as the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, while trying to put a choke hold on the Ohio, put them in a bad spot.

If you're a leader of an army early in the war, I'm not sure why this wasn't considered but I do have to admit, this is an area I have not done extensive reading on. An interesting subject though.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I agree 100 %. Before the Civil War he was sent on a campaign to quell the Mormons from separating into their own 'Deseret'. The campaign got bogged down in wintry snow, the men suffered severe hardships, and the campaign was called off. There was no excellence in any material performance I can note. Except maybe the ability to mediate among the high ranks, where Bragg, Beauregard, and J. E. Johnston were so disruptive or absent-oriented, he may have achieved cohesion among the confederate forces. Shiloh put an end to that.
Lubliner.

I recently read a book about Grant's intel & how it affected his decision making. It was an otherwise failed foray ordered by Halleck that informed Grant's decision to attack Henry & Donelson.

Grant discovered that it would be all but impossible for Polk to send reinforcements or a relieving force overland. The terrain & high water would have bogged down any attempt to use internal line for mutual support. It helped that, like Johnston, Polk was convinced that any offensive from Paduka would focus on him.

Johnston did awake from his Merlin sleep & send troops via Clarksville to Donelson… under command of that gadfly Pillow. We all know how that worked out.

 

[Rhea Cole]

The "neutrality" of Kentucky early in the war and the lack of action surrounding it seemed to be the downfall for the CSA in regards to the Western Confederacy, in my opinion. I'm not entirely sure who thought this would be some type of shield against aggression from Union forces, whether that came from Richmond or leaders in the west, but to not take Paducah early on, fortify it and protect those vital arteries into the south such as the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, while trying to put a choke hold on the Ohio, put them in a bad spot.

If you're a leader of an army early in the war, I'm not sure why this wasn't considered but I do have to admit, this is an area I have not done extensive reading on. An interesting subject though.

As Napoleon said, a fortress is only as secure as its flanks. Isolated fortresses in Western KY without mutual support, as events indicate, were vulnerable to being out flanked. Individual fortresses, such as island #10 were isolated & defeated by highly mobile riverine squadrons.

Given the cast of characters in the CSA side, it is arguable that no plan to hold Western Kentucky would have succeeded.

 

[atlantis]

Were there gunboats that the confederates could have used to close entry from the Ohio river into these two rivers. I am no general staff officer but it seems to me these 2 rivers are the key to unlocking Tennessee.

 

[jackt62]

Securing western Kentucky and the "linchpin" from Cairo, Illinois to Paducah, Kentucky was the key to the Confederacy's western defense. That area comprised the major riverine routes of the Mississippi, Tennessee, and Cumberland rivers. But the so-called neutrality of Kentucky presented a delicate matter in terms of obtaining control of that region. Unfortunately for the Confederacy, Generals Leonidas Polk and Gideon Pillow blinked first, and by occupying Columbus, Kentucky on September 3, 1861 (an important citadel for control of the region), tipped the scales of Kentucky's allegiance firmly towards the Union camp, and allowed Grant to move on Paducah on September 6th. Grant, who had already established a base in Cairo, was then able to advance in time to Belmont and Fts. Henry and Donelson, thereby flanking the Confederate position at Columbus and western Kentucky.

 

[NFB22]

As Napoleon said, a fortress is only as secure as its flanks. Isolated fortresses in Western KY without mutual support, as events indicate, were vulnerable to being out flanked. Individual fortresses, such as island #10 were isolated & defeated by highly mobile riverine squadrons.

Given the cast of characters in the CSA side, it is arguable that no plan to hold Western Kentucky would have succeeded.

I can certainly agree there. In that sense, the move against Columbus would have made sense if there was a thrust towards Paducah. However, there would have needed to be a major push towards Louisville as well I would think.

Logistically and numbers wise, that wouldn't have been possible. However, I think an occupation of Paducah at least would have made things a bit harder for Union forces and at least delayed them while giving Confederate troops more time to get things in order deeper into the heart of the Confederacy.