Was Lee wrong

[atlantis]

Lee was of the opinion that if confined to defensive trench warfare the confederacy would ultimately lose, was he wrong.
I say yes. The confederacy had less men and the only way to influence northern public opinion was to pile up union bodies until the north gave up.
Using interior lines, terrain and field works would allow confederates to achieve victory.
What do you say.

 

[leftyhunter]

That's a much cooler idea than gorilla war, I'm interested if there's a good argument trench would've been better but my gut says gorilla, Lee used to say in the mountains he could fight for 20 years.

The Confederacy used guerrilla war since the beginning of the ACW. The Union also used guerrilla warfare. Union counter insurgency forces defeated Confederate guerillas over and over again. Guerrilla warfare isn't magic and guerrillas cant defend slave owners from loosing their slaves.
Leftyhunter

 

[atlantis]

At Fredericksburg and Cold Harbor, we see what confederates could achieve.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Lee famously remarked before Petersburg that once the conflict became a "war of posts," the ANV and the Confederacy were doomed. Which is exactly what happened. Interesting to note that before Petersburg, the Confederacy relied on heavy concentrations of fortified positions and entrenchments, notably around Vicksburg, Richmond, Atlanta, and Nashville. In none of those circumstances did the reliance on fixed lines succeed. Northern strategy and tactical methods throughout were heavily dependent on maneuver and movement, one of the major contributors to Union victory.

He said this in 1862 also when McClellan approached Richmond.

 

[atlantis]

Lee famously remarked before Petersburg that once the conflict became a "war of posts," the ANV and the Confederacy were doomed. Which is exactly what happened. Interesting to note that before Petersburg, the Confederacy relied on heavy concentrations of fortified positions and entrenchments, notably around Vicksburg, Richmond, Atlanta, and Nashville. In none of those circumstances did the reliance on fixed lines succeed. Northern strategy and tactical methods throughout were heavily dependent on maneuver and movement, one of the major contributors to Union victory.

The USA was trying to conquer the CSA, so it had to pursue an offensive approach and measure progress by miles of territory. The CSA on the other hand was not trying to conquer the USA and would need a different strategy and measurement of progress.

 

[atlantis]

He said this in 1862 also when McClellan approached Richmond.

And he was wrong.

 

[Reconstructed Rebel]

By 1864 Sherman, Sheridan and Grant faced a weakened foe.

And the gloves came off, so double whammy.

 

[atlantis]

For the record I respect Lee, Grant and the others who played a major role. Given how small the prewar army was that was a heck of a learning curve for these guys from maybe commanding a regiment to an army of 40,50,100,000 men. All the while the press and politicians are second guessing, making unreasonable demands.

 

[kGs]

And he was wrong.

If he'd allowed his forces surrounded in Petersburg/Richmond instead of at Appomattox he could've kept his fortifications and keep killing, how long would he have provisions?

 

[atlantis]

If he'd allowed his forces surrounded in Petersburg/Richmond instead of at Appomattox he could've kept his fortifications and keep killing, how long would he have provisions?

I don't see enough forces to encircle Lee at Richmond/Petersburg in 62 or 64 thus it is possible to keep his army supplied.

 

[kGs]

I don't see enough forces to encircle Lee at Richmond/Petersburg in 62 or 64 thus it is possible to keep his army supplied.

Would he stay in place the whole war or turn the whole war into a overland campaign re-entrenching as he goes.

 

[J C J Barefoot]

An entrenched army is a stuck army just begging to be besieged.

I'm of the opinion that the only chance was to emulate Washington and Greene, fight when strong and evade when weak, drag it out as long as possible and don't allow the Union any decisive and morale-boosting victories like Vicksburg. Then you can potentially win even with fewer bodies.

Yes. I agree in part with your Washington/Greene "strike and run" comment That strategy ultimately drove Cornwallis out of the Carolinas and back to Virginia. Yet there are major differences where such a strategy could not work for Lee /AONV. Cornwallis had no ability to promptly dispatch reinforcements. Grant had no such problem. Cornwallis got trapped at Yorktown , a fatal event. There is no logistic possibility that Lee could trap the entire AOP and force its surrender. Even The North Anna didn't work.

One might think of The Overland as Lee's "strike and run" actual effort—and it got him stuck in Petersburg.

Once Lee dug in the dirt it was nothing more than a delaying tactic. Lee knew no later than mid March 1865 the South was doomed and should have surrendered then.

 

[Krieger]

Except that's not how the ARW was won. The ARW was won with foreign troops and ships encircling British troops at Yorktown, Virginia. Davis knew from the very beginning of the war the Confederacy needed foreign allies but foreign nations didn't mind selling arms to the Confederacy but they weren't going ti fight for the Confederacy.
Leftyhunter

I would argue that the British had no real chance of winning the war by mid-1781 leading up to Yorktown. Their strategy of raising loyalists in the south and conquering the rest of the colonies in detail from the bottom up had gotten so bogged down that Yorktown's biggest contribution was to convince the British government of that fact.

I will say, however, that if the Union invading most of the Confederacy resulted in them recruiting many more Southern Unionists then my idea probably wouldn't work out, but there's no telling if that would have been the case. It's hard to know how many men were pressured/conscripted into the Confederate army versus how many were true believers.

Yes. I agree in part with your Washington/Greene "strike and run" comment That strategy ultimately drove Cornwallis out of the Carolinas and back to Virginia. Yet there are major differences where such a strategy could not work for Lee /AONV. Cornwallis had no ability to promptly dispatch reinforcements. Grant had no such problem. Cornwallis got trapped at Yorktown , a fatal event. There is no logistic possibility that Lee could trap the entire AOP and force its surrender. Even The North Anna didn't work.

One might think of The Overland as Lee's "strike and run" actual effort—and it got him stuck in Petersburg.

Once Lee dug in the dirt it was nothing more than a delaying tactic. Lee knew no later than mid March 1865 the South was doomed and should have surrendered then.

The original question I was responding to wasn't about 1864, specifically. I was more stating that the Confederate strategy all along should have been far more flexible. I actually think that had the Confederates lost at first Bull Run it might have been a blessing in disguise, since it's not as if they'd simply surrender after losing their capital. They'd say "Washington lost Philadelphia and still won in the end." and adapt their strategy accordingly.

In no scenario would it be easy, however. I just think this is their only plausible option in retrospect and it's not too much of a surprise that they didn't want to risk it. I'm certainly not saying they were dumb or anything, you only get one chance to fight a war and they started off strong, much stronger than the Continental Army did.

 

[Library Lady]

And the nawth had a stronger economy and the politics, well, no foreign nation wanted to support slavery. That was the brilliance of the Emancipation Proclaimation. Both were not in the South's favor.

Unless Lee magically had AK-47s, WW II artillery with Time-on-target and radio communications, he wasn't going to win.

In Guns of the South, Harry Turtledove thought they could win with only AK-47s, but when Lee found out the Afrikaners had radios and hadn't shared them, he was a tad aggravated. Yes, I know, alternate history of the sci-fi variety, but still a good read if you're in the mood.

 

[JeffBrooks]

In Guns of the South, Harry Turtledove thought they could win with only AK-47s, but when Lee found out the Afrikaners had radios and hadn't shared them, he was a tad aggravated. Yes, I know, alternate history of the sci-fi variety, but still a good read if you're in the mood.

People who write alternate history novels are not to be trusted. They're not right in the head.

 

[leftyhunter]

I would argue that the British had no real chance of winning the war by mid-1781 leading up to Yorktown. Their strategy of raising loyalists in the south and conquering the rest of the colonies in detail from the bottom up had gotten so bogged down that Yorktown's biggest contribution was to convince the British government of that fact.

I will say, however, that if the Union invading most of the Confederacy resulted in them recruiting many more Southern Unionists then my idea probably wouldn't work out, but there's no telling if that would have been the case. It's hard to know how many men were pressured/conscripted into the Confederate army versus how many were true believers.



The original question I was responding to wasn't about 1864, specifically. I was more stating that the Confederate strategy all along should have been far more flexible. I actually think that had the Confederates lost at first Bull Run it might have been a blessing in disguise, since it's not as if they'd simply surrender after losing their capital. They'd say "Washington lost Philadelphia and still won in the end." and adapt their strategy accordingly.

In no scenario would it be easy, however. I just think this is their only plausible option in retrospect and it's not too much of a surprise that they didn't want to risk it. I'm certainly not saying they were dumb or anything, you only get one chance to fight a war and they started off strong, much stronger than the Continental Army did.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-French_War_(1778–1783)#Antilles_War,_1781-1783
Actually for Great Britain recruiting enough Loyalists was the least of their problems. The British military was stretched extremely thin fighting in the Indian Subcontinent, the Caribbean and North America. The ARW was so unpopular in Great Britain that the British had to pay various Germanic Principalities to send soldiers to North America with Hesse supplying the most men.
One hundred and four thousand Southern white men enlisted in the Union Army and this figure does not include Unionist guerrillas or milita.

Lincoln's loyalists : Union soldiers from the Confederacy : Current, Richard Nelson : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

ix, 253 p. ; 24 cm

archive.org

Leftyhunter

 

[Krieger]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-French_War_(1778–1783)#Antilles_War,_1781-1783
Actually for Great Britain recruiting enough Loyalists was the least of their problems. The British military was stretched extremely thin fighting in the Indian Subcontinent, the Caribbean and North America. The ARW was so unpopular in Great Britain that the British had to pay various Germanic Principalities to send soldiers to North America with Hesse supplying the most men.
One hundred and four thousand Southern white men enlisted in the Union Army and this figure does not include Unionist guerrillas or milita.

Lincoln's loyalists : Union soldiers from the Confederacy : Current, Richard Nelson : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

ix, 253 p. ; 24 cm

archive.org

Leftyhunter

Their strategy for winning the war in 1780-81 was based around the idea that they could secure the southern colonies by recruiting as many loyalists as possible and then push north. Part of that was due to being stretched thin, but it's also easier to pacify a rebellious territory with local support than without it.

I'm aware of how many southerners fought for the Union army, which is why I brought them up. My point is that if the Confederates did attempt my idea, it necessarily means allowing the Union army to occupy more territory and thus have access to potentially more fence-sitting southerners. The morale drop from committing to a Fabian strategy might very well result in more southerners throwing in their lot with the Union, but it's not possible to know how many or much of an effect it would have had.

 

[leftyhunter]

Their strategy for winning the war in 1780-81 was based around the idea that they could secure the southern colonies by recruiting as many loyalists as possible and then push north. Part of that was due to being stretched thin, but it's also easier to pacify a rebellious territory with local support than without it.

I'm aware of how many southerners fought for the Union army, which is why I brought them up. My point is that if the Confederates did attempt my idea, it necessarily means allowing the Union army to occupy more territory and thus have access to potentially more fence-sitting southerners. The morale drop from committing to a Fabian strategy might very well result in more southerners throwing in their lot with the Union, but it's not possible to know how many or much of an effect it would have had.

Yes in counterinsurgency its always advantageous to recruit as many local troops as possible. Still the British had an unsolvable diellema as they had limited resources and if a choice had to be made what was more important the Caribbean ( at least preserving what they could in the Caribbean ) and gaining the Indian Subcontinent vs loosing the thirteen colonies but keeping Canada then choice was clear.
The Colonial Rebels won because they did fight well but the British were overstretched fighting as the underdog.
Davis desperately wanted foreign military assistance but was a bridge to far.
Leftyhunter

 

[Piedone]

…, but by 1864, after the blood, death, and horror had hardened them, their other hand came out in the form of the harshness that was embraced to end the conflict. Sherman, Sheridan, and Grant made fairly quick work of it then.

I'd see it more as a continuous process - the US had VERY restricted military capabilities in the first years and it took them years to gear up the machine before they could field that massive armies and support and move them wherever needed and at the same time could cover all the supply routes.

Even as late as 1863 the federals would have found it hard to replace the losses the AoP suffered in the Wilderness campaign - as they rather easily could in 1864…

Regarding their stance towards the South I'd guess there were quite some differences - for example between Grant and Sherman…To me Grant seems to have been rather lenient towards the South though his troops suffered quite much - Sherman had it rather easy in comparision but seemingly was of a much different nature…

 

[Piedone]

By 1864 Sherman, Sheridan and Grant faced a weakened foe.

In certain aspects (as example cavalry yes) - but… well I cannot help…. considering the Wilderness campaign…I'd say the ANV in 1864 was maybe at it's finest trim as a fighting unit…

 

[atlantis]

Would he stay in place the whole war or turn the whole war into a overland campaign re-entrenching as he goes.

Good question, personally I think an overland campaign re entrenching would be best, but you do have to consider the military industrial complex in Richmond. Can you relocate it, if not, no choice but stay in place.