Was Irvin McDowell a bad general?

[Stryker65]

McDowell is most remembered for being defeated at First Man Run, but every source on the battle also describes the great confusion and disorganization caused by the many different uniforms, the huge lack of combat experience on either side, and both sides' relative inexperience with deploying formations larger than regiments in the field. My question is, if both sides had veteran troops, could McDowell have won? Moreover, if McDowell commanded troops in, say, 1863 or 1864, would he have achieved better results?

(He was originally a departmental adjutant and not a field commander, but there were many like officers who did well in field commands)

 

[Sheltowee]

Fared no better as a corps commander. Better in an administrative role.

Got no reason to expect better in '63.

 

[Frank Watson]

Most generals that have the misfortune to lose their first battle are thought of quite poorly, especially if it was a significant battle. If you think about it, McDowell moved his completely green army out of Washington to Manassas and conducted flank march in the dark and surprises his opponent. It's not easy to put your army in a better position for success. But it was hot, and there were Johnston's reinforcements, and there was some guy named Jackson, and it didn't work out. It's harder to manage an army in its first attack than it is in its first defense. Grant lost at Belmont. Lee's turning movements in the 7 Days didn't really land. I can't say McDowell would have done any better later, but he had a lot of things to overcome in 1861.

 

[RedRover]

Though in command of the Army of Northeastern Virginia in the defeat at First Manasssas/Bull Run in July, 1861, it did not finish off Gen. McDowell, as many considered General Patterson more evidently at fault for not simultaneously advancing upon Johnston in the valley, etc.

From July 25, 1861 Gen. McDowell commanded a division about Washington until promoted to Major general of volunteers in March, 1862 and commanded the Department of the Rappahannock, etc.

In June, 1862 General McDowell was assigned command of the Third Army Corps, and led it at Cedar Mountain, Rappahannock Station and Second Manassas... another crushing defeat.

At the close of 1862, at the general's request, etc. the Army held a Court of Inquiry into the circumstances of his command in the late campaigns; the "McDowell Court of Inquiry" at Washington in January, 1863, etc. It concluded that McDowell had not acted in bad faith, etc. But criticized his decision making in action, noting what it considered an ill-timed absence from his command at critical times...

....

Adam Gurowski in Washington circles observed in his journal that the that court of inquiry into McDowell's command, could not make him a good general...despite his staunch self-defense. He had been unfortunate admitted Mr. G., more than most, but if he had been a good general disasters might have been rendered simple defeats... Also observed that had Gen. McDowell come out of Second Bull Run with a wound, even a scratch, he would have come off in better graces. But apparently to have rode off entire from the same battleground twice amidst disaster was quietly considered bad form... No "Rock of Bull Run" moniker for General McDowell.



He was subsequently assigned staff duties and command in the west...

 

[7thWisconsin]

I don´t think he was one of the more talented generals of the war, but he was not able to rise above his circumstances. He had all of Washington clamoring for an attack, and not taking ¨we´re not ready¨ for an answer. The Bull Run plan, though ambitious and mostly completed, exhausted those green troops. He was also not lucky - things didn´t fall his way. A word often used for this condition is ¨hapless.¨ Finally, McDowell was a victim of bad optics. I don´t think he was a commander well-liked by his men. Stories about his gargantuan appetite got around, as well as the rumor that the sun hat he wore was a signal to the enemy. I would say the Peter principle worked out for McDowell: he rose to the level of his incompetence, and was not charismatic enough to rise above it.

 

[jackt62]

As was McClellan, McDowell was probably not suited for senior battlefield command positions based on his pre-war experience and overall personality attributes. Nevertheless, his efforts in developing a realistic tactical plan were based on traditional concepts of defeating the enemy by flanking, diversionary movements, and disrupting its logistics. McDowell pleaded with the Lincoln administration to delay any offensive given the utter lack of time to train and mold an undisciplined civilian mob into an effective fighting force. But public opinion demanded immediate action. Accordingly, and with the failure of Patterson to hold Johnston in the Valley, I wouldn't be so harsh on McDowell for the fiasco at Bull Run.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

McDowell would have been a fine staff officer. He was certainly more competent than many political generals.

But he was consistently unlucky, didn't know how to delegate, and something about his personality made him a hard person to like, especially to the rank & file. The man made an army hate him by designing his own hat! His testimony in the Porter court martial is also rather shameful.

He seems like it would be very interesting to get inside his head, but his personal papers didn't survive. There's more to McDowell's story that we'll probably never know.

 

[WinterLeia]

Most historians I've read say he put together a good plan. But the problem was that it was too complicated for his green troops. Many of them had never even fired a rifle. They were also not used to marching long distances, especially in blazing hot weather. So by the time they got to the battle they were already very tired, whereas the Confederate soldiers got to ride in on railcars. There's even a humorous episode that Threads of the National Tapestry told where they got to a place that they had to cross over water or some sort of natural formation, and there was only a single plank of wood that had been laid across. The men, numbering into the hundreds, then proceeded to cross the plank one at a time until some officer finally came by and realized what they were doing. And according to Patterson, who was responsible for keeping Johnston's forces from joining up with Beauregard's, the three months troops were deserting him enmasse, and they were not properly equipped. At the start of the war, the Union was having supply problems that were just as serious, if not more so, as the Confederates.

About the only general that got multiple chances to prove himself as a competent leader in battle, at least in the Eastern Theater, is McClellan. And his failure made it that much harder for others that came after to be given the chance to overcome the learning curve, while Grant benefited from being in the Western Theater. However, that's not really something that's peculiar to the Civil War. Nobody nowadays would have ever probably heard of Napoléon if he had not begun his career much as Grant did, far from where the main fighting was going on. His early attempts were also failures.

In the end the part that McDowell played in the Battle of Bull Run is both tragic and ironic. He knew he wasn't qualified. He knew his troops weren't ready. He didn't want the position and he didn't want to fight the battle, at least not at the time. And then when things went as he had both feared and predicted, everybody criticized him and conveniently forgot that patriotism and necessity had motivated him to step into a role he neither wanted nor was qualified for.

 

[tony_gunter]

Grant lost at Belmont.

Every time I see this I scratch my head. How does one "lose" a raid?

He landed, he tore some stuff up, he left. That's a successful raid.

 

[jackt62]

Most historians I've read say he put together a good plan. But the problem was that it was too complicated for his green troops.

Very true. But was there any alternative? Even with trained troops, time and time again, the execution of good plans was thwarted by problems in communications and coordination. Lee and Bragg found that out to their regret.

 

[WinterLeia]

Very true. But was there any alternative? Even with trained troops, time and time again, the execution of good plans was thwarted by problems in communications and coordination. Lee and Bragg found that out to their regret.

And there are conflicts where vastly inferior troops won over seasoned soldiers. But success is more likely with a well-trained army than an armed mob. Hence, I think they should have taken the time to train the troops. It's not like the Confederates were knocking on the gates of Washington. They did have the time. However, that wasn't McDowell's fault. The press was egging on the public, who was then pressuring the government to open hostilities, and the government caved into the pressure. Many believed that they could defeat the Rebels handily, anyway. and they paid a terrible price for their arrogance. As Johnny Horton sang: "Don't count your chickens before they hatch or your work until it's done Remember, yes, remember long the Battle of Bull Run."

 

[Stryker65]

McDowell never got to command veteran troops, either. First Man Run he had mostly three-month men and militia, and at Second Man Run he had an entire corps of new troops from DC that hadn't fought in the Peninsula Campaign.

 

[Belfoured]

McDowell never got to command veteran troops, either. First Man Run he had mostly three-month men and militia, and at Second Man Run he had an entire corps of new troops from DC that hadn't fought in the Peninsula Campaign.

My own take has always been that First Bull Run should be treated as irrelevant to assessing him. I don't know who in 1861 could have held that position and succeeded after being required to stage an offensive with inexperienced and barely-trained troops. As for Second Bull Run, and noting both your point and the complete command "cluster" involving Pope, McClellan, etc etc etc, he displayed some flaws that probably made him ill-suited, at least for a level beyond division.

 

[J. Stanley]

Honestly, attempts to improve McDowell's reputation rather fall flat for me when you go into the weeds of the battles he fought in. McDowell strikes me as being an Alexander McCook, unlucky and unskilled.

Starting with First Bull Run, he indeed came up with a good plan, but most people skip over his handling of the attacks at Henry Hill. Raw though his troops were, nothing necessitated that McDowell squandered his initial numerical superiority with a series of small attacks rather than a potentially overpowering assault. Of course, the inexperience of his troops and officers had some contribution to the issues.

With Second Bull Run, McDowell was something of an adviser to Pope, though Pope frequently disrespected McDowell behind his back and ignored his advice. In as much as Pope is to blame for the defeat at Second Bull Run, McDowell made several errors that contributed to the defeat.

McDowell basically enabled Pope's delusions by folding and going along with Pope's plans despite knowledge of the contrary. He left his troops and couldn't be found in a critical moment on August 29.

He made a nearly fatal mistake by ordering off Reynold's Pennsylvania Reserves off Chinn Ridge to bolster Porter's retreating men on August 30 - leaving just 2,500 men in two brigades to face Longstreet's onslaught. To his credit, he did recognize his error and rushed troops to Chinn Ridge, buying critical time for a stand at Henry's Hill - but then again this is giving him credit for a situation he created. McDowell's leadership was definitely mixed: some saw him as heroic as he rode around, others saw insanity.

A general theme of McDowell's generalship appears to be poor impulse control and excitability. He tended to lose his composure under the stress of battle, tunnel vision and then micromanage his subordinates. Whether he could have improved upon that is an unanswerable hypothetical.

With respect to his troops at Second Bull Run, I really don't think it would have made a difference if they were regulars or veterans considering his mistakes as a general. Besides, McDowell's corps was hardly a formation of raw men. John Reynolds' division saw action in the Peninsula and his other two divisions were well drilled. I don't think one would pass up on the Iron Brigade.

 

[WinterLeia]

I wasn't trying to lift his reputation as a general. I even said several times he wasn't qualified and didn't have the experience. But I think the difficult position he was put in should be acknowledged and the fact that he was self-aware enough to know that he wasn't the best person for the job. And nothing could have been lost by taking the time to train the troops. So, I for one, do not judge him too harshly. I consider McClellan to be worse because he thought he was Napoleon, wouldn't accept advice or criticism, treated everyone from Lincoln to Winfield Scott with utter disrespect, and yet still failed to deliver.

 

[RedRover]

From a post-war notice of General McDowell, which noted his military skills, but also his too well demonstrated limitations... the author concluded the general had all the experience and brains to have excelled in the war... but did not due to faults in his character that limited his efficiency in the field as a commander, his popularity with volunteer troops, and his usefulness to the Political administration: All in all making his services an excellent study for young officers...

...

 

[USS ALASKA]

University of New Mexico
UNM Digital Repository
History ETDs
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
6-3-1968

Irvin Mcdowell, Storm Center Of Union Command, 1861-1862
Ronald Francis Locher

ABSTRACT
Irvin McDowell is an important figure of the Civil War era because the role he played made him a storm center within the Union command structure. His career, therefore, is indicative of certain problems encountered by the North which ultimately prolonged the war. Those command problems, which affected overall federal strategy in the early years of the war, largely centered around four areas: unpreparedness, political intrigue, undefined civil/military functions, and cautious generals. Unpreparedness, the bane of the North's military existence during the early stages of the war, was also a hindrance to McDowell for his talents had previously been restricted almost exclusively to paperwork. The result of this lack of preparedness was McDoweil's violation of many of the principles of warfare at the disastrous battle of Bull Run.

Political intrigue, another block to cohesive federal strategy, reared its ugly head through constant efforts on the part of the radical Republicans to control the conduct of the war. McDowell, identified with the Radicals through his friendship with their cohort, Secretary of the Treasury Chase, became embroiled in certain of their political maneuverings and, thus, added to the problems inherent within the Union command structure. With regard to undefined civil/military functions, also, McDowell's role as a field commander is indicative of the North's failure to end the war sooner than it did. The most glaring example of this breach of etiquette is Lincoln's policy of formulating strategy and dabbling in tactics in connection with McDowell's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley against Stonewall Jackson. The President not only infringed upon the realm of the military due to his lack of confidence in their ability but he also hampered the effectiveness of McDowell's effort against a cagy rebel commander.

As a cautious general, too, McDowell was an indicator of command inadequacies, for his indecision, inaction, excuses, and delay at Second Manassas typified the Union policy of fighting a limited war for limited ends with limited means. The balance sheet of McDowell's career as a field commander suggests that unskilled mediocrity, augmented by the pressures of time and circumstance, fused with conditions beyond his control to bring about disastrous results both for him and for the Union cause. Further, by taking advantage of political opportunities when they arose he allowed himself to be willingly thrust forward as a pawn on the Radicals' political chessboard. The result was that, although by no means a political lackey, he was not always the master of his own destiny.

Thrust into the midst of the conflict almost from its inception, he emerged as a puppet-like figure of controversy around whom many of the Union command problems revolved. His meagre ability as a field commander and his involvement with politics---both of which are indicative of factors which prolonged the war because they are not unique to McDowell---could not overcome the fate which the wheel of fortune seems to have spun for him. The siren call of destiny had summoned him into obscurity.

https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1368&context=hist_etds

File too large to attach, please use above link.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[Saint Jude]

If--a big if-- Beauregard had not been reinforced, I think McDowell probably could have won. Things were going very well for him in the morning. He wasn't one of the best field commanders, but he wasn't one of the worst, either.