Was Bearss right?

JohnG0609

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Decades ago while reading "Decision In Mississippi" (1962) I made a mental note of Bearss' assertion that Higgins could hold Vicksburg. But I've not found any real analysis of Pemberton's troop dispositions. I'm interested to know the collective wisdom of the group on that point. Is Bearss correct?



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Decades ago while reading "Decision In Mississippi" (1962) I made a mental note of Bearss' assertion that Higgins could hold Vicksburg. But I've not found any real analysis of Pemberton's troop dispositions. I'm interested to know the collective wisdom of the group on that point. Is Bearss correct?



screenshot-2026-03-13-at-6-07-29%E2%80%AFpm-webp.576606

I think it was just an observation, given Grant's forces were concentrating upon Pemberton's army, more than upon Vicksburg itself... Consequently, Col. Higgins' small garrison force at the River Batteries might have been sufficient to hold the town, were M.L. Smith's and Forney's divisions, combined numbering several thousand, to have added their weight to the fighting force of Pemberton at Champion's Hill, etc.

Instead, they were distributed between Vicksburg, Haines' Bluff and Warrenton...

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Grant's forces were moving more against Pemberton's army, about Champions Hill, etc. etc. than direct upon Vicksburg at the time...

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Amidst the disaster after Champion's Hill, Vicksburg engineer Samuel H. Lockett later observed Gen. Pemberton's one advantage was those two divisions he had left behind at and about Vicksburg were yet intact, and as the defeated army of Pemberton marched in and reorganized, they could hold the lines against Grant's pursuit toward the city...

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....
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In the Union forces' first attacks upon the defenses at Vicksburg, it was portions of Smith's and Forney's divisions which held the lines.

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Col. Samuel H. Lockett, CSA.
 
I think it was just an observation, given Grant's forces were concentrating upon Pemberton's army, more than upon Vicksburg itself... Consequently, Col. Higgins' small garrison force at the River Batteries might have been sufficient to hold the town, were M.L. Smith's and Forney's divisions, combined numbering several thousand, to have added their weight to the fighting force of Pemberton at Champion's Hill, etc.

Instead, they were distributed between Vicksburg, Haines' Bluff and Warrenton...

View attachment 576616


Grant's forces were moving more against Pemberton's army, about Champions Hill, etc. etc. than direct upon Vicksburg at the time...

View attachment 576615

Amidst the disaster after Champion's Hill, Vicksburg engineer Samuel H. Lockett later observed Gen. Pemberton's one advantage was those two divisions he had left behind at and about Vicksburg were yet intact, and as the defeated army of Pemberton marched in and reorganized, they could hold the lines against Grant's pursuit toward the city...

View attachment 576617
....
View attachment 576618

In the Union forces' first attacks upon the defenses at Vicksburg, it was portions of Smith's and Forney's divisions which held the lines.

View attachment 576619


View attachment 576620
Col. Samuel H. Lockett, CSA.
But I do wonder that if Smith's and Forney's divisions had been utilized, perhaps no such retreat would have occurred? I haven't studied the campaign in detail but with Grant's army being the size that it was, I would have thought that indeed Smith and Forney should have been sent.
 
Decades ago while reading "Decision In Mississippi" (1962) I made a mental note of Bearss' assertion that Higgins could hold Vicksburg. But I've not found any real analysis of Pemberton's troop dispositions. I'm interested to know the collective wisdom of the group on that point. Is Bearss correct?



screenshot-2026-03-13-at-6-07-29%E2%80%AFpm-webp.576606
I don't know what his troop dispositions were exactly, but remember that Pemberton had extended the fortifications north and south from Vicksburg in a line 20 miles long from Snyder's Bluff to Warrenton. And he didn't know for certain how many troops were remaining on the river.

In hindsight, it was very few and Higgins absolutely could have held Vicksburg.
 
But I do wonder that if Smith's and Forney's divisions had been utilized, perhaps no such retreat would have occurred? I haven't studied the campaign in detail but with Grant's army being the size that it was, I would have thought that indeed Smith and Forney should have been sent.

According to General Pemberton's dispatch to Gen. Johnston on May 12, if he felt he could not have left the strong force at and about Vicksburg, he would not have sallied forth against Grant's army at all...

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General Pemberton, besides the two divisions of Smith and Forney (and the other troops left about the river defenses) apparently felt he had mustered "sufficient force" besides them for the movement, among the three divisions employed.


Grant says he presumed ca. 25,000 under Pemberton were moving upon him...

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Gen. Badeau of Grant's staff says on this intelligence, Grant made provision to concentrate his own forces to meet such a large force...


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And that Grant thought he was facing up to 25K...

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Pemberton's force was more like 17,500 (and intending to join with Johnston at some point), and of these, the body actually engaged against Grant was estimated by some to be about 15,000 (after detaching a large brigade of Stevenson's Division back to Edwards Depot)...

Grant, on the Federals' part:

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In Pemberton's report, he suggests "vastly superior" enemy forces against some of his commands at Champion's Hill, which may have been the case at some points. But the total numbers engaged on each side, actively, were not much different.

In the aftermath of the battle, Pemberton speaks of the position on the Big Black, and inability to hold it was not due to lack of numbers (even with his losses at Champions Hill), but only that many of his troops did not do their duty as they should have...

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...
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I would speculate that all considered, even if Pemberton had the 7,500 or so of Smith's and Forney's Divisions at Champion Hill, however they might have altered the battle as fought, say as in continuing it longer, past the mid-afternoon, it would not have ultimately mattered, as throughout the action Grant's forces were arriving and stragglers coming up, etc. And besides much of McClernand's 13th Army Corps, the better part of 15,000 men, which was not particularly engaged, might have been gotten into the action in time so as to counter any particular advantage Pemberton might have had in holding the ground longer with the two extra divisions of several thousand. As it was, they were finally coming into action as the Confederates abandoned the field...

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Pemberton's force was more like 17,500 (and intending to join with Johnston at some point), and of these, the body actually engaged against Grant was estimated by some to be about 15,000 (after detaching a large brigade of Stevenson's Division back to Edwards Depot)...
That seems like an undercount for Pemberton at Champion Hill. Going by memory, Stevenson's division was about 10,000, Bowen's about 4,000, Loring about 7,200, Wirt Adams 800, 21,800 total. Vaughn guarding the railroad bridge 8 miles back.

If we subtract Reynolds being sent away to escort the supply train, that's still a little over 19,000.

If you're just talking about the forces initially engaged, that's Hovey+Logan (12,000) vs Barton+Lee+Cummings+Wirt Adams (8,100).
 
But I do wonder that if Smith's and Forney's divisions had been utilized
That's sort of the issue I found. I've not found any real analysis of Pemberton's troop dispositions. I've started working on it and I have my ideas but the question to me comes down to prudent versus justified. I am inclined to give credence to Johnston's characterization of Pemberton in a letter to his brother on May 7. 1863. I think it sets the foundational strategy of Pemberton.
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But in fairness to Pemberton, he was constrained by what Vicksburg had become. An assessment by Johnston (Dec 1862) described Vicksburg as:

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I don't know what his troop dispositions were exactly, but remember that Pemberton had extended the fortifications north and south from Vicksburg in a line 20 miles long from Snyder's Bluff to Warrenton. And he didn't know for certain how many troops were remaining on the river.

In hindsight, it was very few and Higgins absolutely could have held Vicksburg.
A sketch, without validating it, is:
South of Vicksburg - Moore back of Warrenton, Baldwin opposite Baldwin's Ferry, and Waul's Legion

Vicksburg - Higgin's River Defense Force, Shoup Just North of the city

Snyder's Bluff - Hebert

BBR Bridge - Vaughn

Wagon train - A.W. Reynolds

Edward's Depot - Loring, Stevenson, Bowen

Please correct me if I've missed something
 
A sketch, without validating it, is:
South of Vicksburg - Moore back of Warrenton, Baldwin opposite Baldwin's Ferry, and Waul's Legion

Vicksburg - Higgin's River Defense Force, Shoup Just North of the city

Snyder's Bluff - Hebert

BBR Bridge - Vaughn

Wagon train - A.W. Reynolds

Edward's Depot - Loring, Stevenson, Bowen

Please correct me if I've missed something
And the only force remaining on the river that could be concentrated against these positions was a single brigade under McArthur, but Pemberton didn't know that.
 
And the only force remaining on the river that could be concentrated against these positions was a single brigade under McArthur, but Pemberton didn't know that.
Scrolling back to 05/13 Pemberton knew Smith was threatening Baldwin's Ferry correct? McArthur was not known to him, but did he have any SA on Blair?
 
That seems like an undercount for Pemberton at Champion Hill. Going by memory, Stevenson's division was about 10,000, Bowen's about 4,000, Loring about 7,200, Wirt Adams 800, 21,800 total. Vaughn guarding the railroad bridge 8 miles back.

If we subtract Reynolds being sent away to escort the supply train, that's still a little over 19,000.

If you're just talking about the forces initially engaged, that's Hovey+Logan (12,000) vs Barton+Lee+Cummings+Wirt Adams (8,100).

It is true that Pemberton, like other Confederate commanders, was certainly giving in his narrative reports his "force", "strength" etc. as his total "effective" force on hand, which generally excluded officers, and regarded only men in the rank and file, armed, in line considered fit for combat; irrespective of the actual number present for duty, which included numbers of men detailed, detached, sick, unarmed, straggling, etc. etc.

Col. William Allen, late of the CS Army, observed that the present for duty strength on the returns, included numbers of men attached to the trains, other than the "effective" combat force/strength...

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And that the term "effective" relative to strength, force, etc. regards only enlisted men, among those present for duty, with their units...

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So we see as a general estimate, that Pemberton's commands employed in the march to Champion's Hill, included something like 22,000 all told. But not all were "effectives" which were described as somewhat less, about 17-18,000.

General S.D. Lee suggests just so post-war, in the 1893 speech unveiling the Vicksburg defender's monument, whatever the total number of officers and men with Pemberton's army on May 16, it included about 17,000 effectives...

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As did General Johnston in an 1870 letter..., quoting Pemberton as to 17,500 effectives...

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...
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...
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...
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And that of the over 22,000 troops of all ranks which were as likely as not marching with Pemberton, a certain proportion were officers, and among the men were not effectives, or though present for duty, were detailed or employed outside the ranks, as with the baggage, besides the sick, stragglers, etc. How many exactly is not recorded. Pemberton's trains by May 15-16, I've seen described as large, and to number in the hundreds of wagons.


On that score, Pemberton himself stated (apparently excluding officers and ineffective, etc.) as of the 14th of May, he was actively maneuvering a force of "about 16,000" excluding Vaughn and Tilghman with about 3,000 between them. And by appearances he expected significant straggling in the next days threatened to reduce that force...

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That night, he reported he would march toward Dillons on the 15th once he gathered a column of 17,000 "men..." (apparently excluding officers)...

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Which march he commenced about 1:00 P.M. on the 15th (after some delay), with strict orders to prevent straggling which might reduce that force...

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General Pemberton reported on May 17, his whole "disposable force" in these movements was about 17,500...

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James H. Wilson's journal, on General Grant's staff, reports from intelligence, that the aggregate of Pemberton's force which had marched on May 13 was estimated at 25,000 aggregate with at least 20,000 soldiers reaching Edward's by May 14:

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Of which force, as Pemberton noted, he formed on the 15th a column of ca. 17,000 effective men.


Whatever total number of officers and men with Pemberton's command were marching to or about the battlefield on the 16th, in the ranks, with the trains, or straggling, etc. which as you mention was likely, all told, in excess of 20K officers and men; not all of the troops of Pemberton's army were engaged in the battle that day for the customary reasons.

Among them Captain Wilson of the 2nd Missouri...

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Pemberton's aide-de-camp J.C. Taylor noted spending much of the action on May 16 attempting "pushing up" stragglers to the field of battle...

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Gen. J.H. Taylor, with Pemberton, noted straggling from the field of battle at the close of the action particularly...

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Pvt. John G. Earnest of the 60th Tennessee Volunteers posted in the rear with Vaughn's brigade, noted as the mass of stragglers from the battle moved rearward, so did the large Trains of the Army (with all of the men attached to it)...

"About ten o'clock A.M. the firing was terrific on our left and continued until about three in the evening, prisoners coming in all the time. At this time the stragglers commenced arriving and then came the wagon train in a perfect rush. I knew what was up. We were falling back--but in pretty good order. Our company was posted on the rail road to stop stragglers but they came so fast we had quite a time of it. At length the enemy came right up in sight when one of General Pemberton's staff ordered us back to Big Black Bridge--here we were posted for the same purpose as the evening before. Remained on duty all night."



Just as General Grant stated he was certain not more than 15,000 of his own troops were seriously engaged on May 16 (excluding most of McClernand's corps, much of which was involved in more or less skirmishing before reaching the scene of the general action at its close); General Pemberton, in a post-war explanation, excluded from his engaged force General Loring's Division (which faced McClernand, etc. and broke off to join Johnston's army)... and calculated less than 11,000 of the men of Stevenson's and Bowen's Divisions, etc. were in the fighting...

1773511168115.webp


Presuming in the above Pemberton is giving just the effective force, excluding officers, from those in the fighting (less than 11K), per Livermore (p. 99) recommending addition of about 8 percent for officers, so by that probably about the better part of a thousand, or ca. 12K officers and men in the actual fighting.
 
[
And the only force remaining on the river that could be concentrated against these positions was a single brigade under McArthur, but Pemberton didn't know that.

Yet, if I recall correctly, there were indeed troops at Milliken's Bend and navy transports at or near Grand Gulf. In addition, Pemberton received word around May 9 or so that infantry transports under Lauman had departed Memphis heading down River. His need to keep troops near Vicksburg was not unreasonable in my estimation. But I've offered this before.
 
His need to keep troops near Vicksburg was not unreasonable in my estimation. But I've offered this before.
There is no doubt that troops at Vicksburg was prudent, but the need to quantify that is the analysis I think. Was keeping Moore, Higgins, Shoup, and Hebert manning the fortifications justified, or was Bearss right in saying only Higgins, or is the answer somewhere in between?

Was it prudent and justified to keep Baldwin and Waul at Baldwin's Ferry or could they have been added to the fight?

Was it prudent and justified to keep a full brigade (Vaughn) at BBR Bridge?

Was it prudent and justified to assign an entire brigade to wagon train guarding?


Bottom line is it's a numbers game, how many troops Pemberton could get to the fight. That's the logical inference from Bearss, that Pemberton could have. But he doesn't, nor has anyone else I've found, done any analysis.

Maybe to re-state the question a little better: Could Pemberton have put more men in the field May 13-16?
 
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[

Yet, if I recall correctly, there were indeed troops at Milliken's Bend and navy transports at or near Grand Gulf. In addition, Pemberton received word around May 9 or so that infantry transports under Lauman had departed Memphis heading down River. His need to keep troops near Vicksburg was not unreasonable in my estimation. But I've offered this before.
When Stevenson took off to join his division in the field Forney moved up to District 2 commander. Stevenson had been looking through the telescope at Glass House for 4 months. Makes me wonder if he could have interpreted what was going on across the river differently, and maybe with more accuracy than Forney, who was new to the post. Might have given more decision space to concentrate.
 
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Was keeping Moore, Higgins, Shoup, and Hebert manning the fortifications justified, or was Bearss right in saying only Higgins, or is the answer somewhere in between?

From my opinion, of course, it is only from hindsight that one can look back and say it was not justified. See my above post. Clearly, since in fact Union forces never attacked Vicksburg or its vicinity from the west or south, Pemberton could certainly have used those troops at Bakers. But, again, that's hindsight. We might as well ask why Pemberton didn't stop by the visitor center in the Vicksburg Park to pickup a copy of Bearss's book to figure all this stuff out 😂😂

Was it prudent and justified to keep Baldwin and Waul at Baldwin's Ferry or could they have been added to the fight?

Just to note: Baldwin was between the bridge and the ferry. Baldwin would send the 4th Mississippi forward into the bridgehead across the Big Black on the 14th or 15th.

But anyhow—without adequate cavalry, Pemberton could not reliably track Union troops moving up from Grand Gulf. He knew they were down there and capable of moving into his rear—whether across Hankinson's, Hall's, or Baldwin's. In fact, troop were indeed leaving Grand Gulf and did move east. Had he brought his full force to Bakers, an enemy force could've crossed any of the aforementioned crossings in his rear and simply walked into the city or straight to Snyder's or athwart Big Black Bridge, etc, etc.

Again, in hindsight, this did not happen. But at the time he could not be sure, and thus, to my mind at least, acted prudently enough. I mean, can you imagine how history would've judged him had he left his rear open like that and a force crossed the river behind him and trapped him between the Big Black and Grant's army? I'm certainly no military expert, and perhaps I'm missing something, but I can't really fault him for doing so.

Was it prudent and justified to keep a full brigade (Vaughn) at BBR Bridge?

That's a good question, and I really don't know the answer. However, Vaughn's brigade was made up of only 3 green regiments from East Tennessee. They were largely conscripts from a Union stronghold and their loyalty to the Confederacy was considered, at best, to be nominal. One of those (the 60th Tennessee.) was actually pushed forward from the bridgehead into Edwards Depot on the 15th.

If I recall, Pemberton wanted a force at the bridge in case a union force crossed one of the fords. In such a case, their mission was to race to Snyder's Bluff and help block any advance in that direction.

Was it prudent and justified to assign an entire brigade to wagon train guarding?

It certainly seems that once Pemberton knew he was locked into combat east of the creek, he probably should have committed at least some of the brigade. This likely fails the test of prudence in my mind.

It is my understanding that the movement of the wagon train and the brigade back across Bakers Creek was part of a larger intended movement in response to Johnston's second order received demanding he join him at Clinton. Pemberton was in the process of removing his entire army back across Bakers Creek when Grant hit. The train and brigade were the only units to successfully get across and were well on the Brownsville Road when Pemberton realized he could not withdraw the rest of his force.

He certainly wasted those men by letting them hang out to merely listen to the fighting instead of giving needed aid!
 
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Decades ago while reading "Decision In Mississippi" (1962) I made a mental note of Bearss' assertion that Higgins could hold Vicksburg. But I've not found any real analysis of Pemberton's troop dispositions. I'm interested to know the collective wisdom of the group on that point. Is Bearss correct?



screenshot-2026-03-13-at-6-07-29%E2%80%AFpm-webp.576606
One thing I've never seen opined upon that would be interesting to see:

Was Pemberton even capable of bringing up his entire army for extended service in the field? Did he have the wagons and mules necessary for supplying such a force?

The way he spent so much energy trying to protect his wagon train while attempting to join up with Johnston really makes me question how much transportation he had available for operations in the field.
 
One thing I've never seen opined upon that would be interesting to see:

Was Pemberton even capable of bringing up his entire army for extended service in the field? Did he have the wagons and mules necessary for supplying such a force?

The way he spent so much energy trying to protect his wagon train while attempting to join up with Johnston really makes me question how much transportation he had available for operations in the field.

I think he answered that question in explaining his reluctance to operate in areas south of Big Black River. Whereas operating in areas east of the Big Black River —though still reluctant—he was able to stay in proximity to the railroad and its all important bridge. So the answer is likely no, and it partly explains why he agreed initially to the move on Dillon's rather than to the move toward Clinton as ordered by Johnston.
 
Was Pemberton even capable of bringing up his entire army for extended service in the field? Did he have the wagons and mules necessary for supplying such a force?
The evidence would support no. By remaining in place at Edward's Depot Pemberton wanted to rely on trains to supply the army. He therefore detailed most of the wagons to Snyder's Bluff to bring in supplies from the Delta. But he had only two trains operating west of Big Black River. On the 14th-15th Pemberton sent (I think) six requisitions for trains for ambulance duty, rations, artillery ordnance, and small arms ammunition. Once he committed to a move, he made moves to get wagons to Edwards, including taking some of Vaughn's (20 I think) to fill out a 50 wagon (30 from Forney) train of ammo. IIRC he told Forney to send the 30 unloaded to Bovina The train would off load at Bovina and the 50 wagons would move it to Edwards. Then in the middle of that it took 24 hours to get Tilghman from south of Bovina to Edward's Depot. I think Tilghman started shipping at about 7pm on the 14th and finished around daylight on the 15th. Pemberton ordered troops moved on train until complete so that backed up the resupply. Plus a large portion of the wagons of the department were in Jackson and used to evacuate from the 7th to the 14th.

Bowen reported 140 wagons with him when he arrived at Bovina on 05/05. Gates used 75 of Bowen's wagons to evacuate commissary stores from the depot at Edward's Depot. I'm not sure Buford or Featherston had wagons organic to them. Buford having hustled back from Tennessee and Featherston's still in route from Grenada. Stevenson's were used to move the resupply to Grand Gulf. He sent one on the 29th, another on the 3rd, and possibly one more on the 5th. Apparently they all came back as Stevenson reported the "immense" wagon train back across Big Black River. Just adding this for context, not sure if it fits in the narrative or not.
 

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