Chattanooga Was Atlanta important?

[Saint Jude]

Short answer: Yes, it was important.

 

[Specster]

absoltively!!! it was industrial and a transporation hub

 

[rebelatsea]

No one has mentioned the presence of the Schofield & Markham ironworks, rolling and re rolling rail and producing armor plate for the CSN.

 

[Bruce Allardice]

David Surdam's book on the Blockade makes clear that the southern railroad network NEVER could have supplied the wants of a large army in VA. The south had largely relied on ships to move goods from one area to another, with the railroads being feeders to the ports. That worked fine in peacetime, but with the Union blockade, that was no longer an option. The ANV alone was bigger and consumed more supplies than any Confederate city (except New Orleans). There simply was no surplus rail capacity to sustain a major war on the Confederacy's periphery.

 

[wausaubob]

David Surdam's book on the Blockade makes clear that the southern railroad network NEVER could have supplied the wants of a large army in VA. The south had largely relied on ships to move goods from one area to another, with the railroads being feeders to the ports. That worked fine in peacetime, but with the Union blockade, that was no longer an option. The ANV alone was bigger and consumed more supplies than any Confederate city (except New Orleans). There simply was no surplus rail capacity to sustain a major war on the Confederacy's periphery.

And not all miles of railroad track are equal. It would have been too costly for the southern railroads to build to the same standard of the railroads in eastern seaboard states in the north. The southern railroads weren't connecting major cities. I suspect they did not have the revenue sufficient to justify upgrading the lines.

 

[SWS]

No one has mentioned the presence of the Schofield & Markham ironworks, rolling and re rolling rail and producing armor plate for the CSN.

Was Schofield also owner of the works bearing his name in Macon?

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

"[Lee's] transportation had progressively declined as his dependence on it had increased. . . the exhaustion [and disruption by the enemy] of grain in Virginia and North Carolina necessitated the hauling of corn from Georgia to feed the men and horses of [his] army. . . From the winter of 1863‑1864 Lee's army had to draw its supplies from South Carolina and southern Georgia, a distance of from five hundred to a thousand miles, and it rarely had more than two or three days' supply of food ahead. No surplus could be accumulated and as time wore on the supply became scantier [rendering a defensive campaign in the Wilderness inevitable]. . . Indeed it is hard to see how Lee could have maintained his army in [Northside] Virginia for another year, even if Grant had been content to watch him peaceably from a distance. And yet Lee's army was starving not because there was no food in the Confederacy, for it was plentiful in many portions of Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, but because the railroads simply could not carry enough of it. Over and over again Lawton declares that 'transportation is scarcer than provisions'.⁠ Corn brought in Richmond twenty and twenty-five times as much as it sold for in southwest Georgia.⁠ When this region was cut off and the remnant of the feeble roads wrecked by Sherman's destructive march through Georgia and the Carolinas, the stoppage of all supplies followed, and the long struggle was over."

Well stated, @SWS.

 

[SWS]

Well stated, @SWS.

They're quotes from D.S. Freeman (1934 edition of Lee) and Charles Ramsdell (The Confederate Government and the Railroads, 1917).

 

[Pat Answer]

In 1864, the outcome of the war depended entirely on public opinion, both North and South. Whether or not Atlanta was important, what mattered was that people thought it was important. That, by itself, made it important.

Similar to Vicksburg the previous year…

 

[rebelatsea]

Was Schofield also owner of the works bearing his name in Macon?

I believes so, they were all sold to Easons of Charleston in 1863. The Macon Works eventually became Taylors Ironworks in 1930

 

[J C J Barefoot]

On the other hand, Atlanta was still a small city in that era.

You're the expert here on population data. Any notion on the population of the general Atlanta area in 1863-64? Thanks.

 

[wausaubob]

You're the expert here on population data. Any notion on the population of the general Atlanta area in 1863-64? Thanks.

About 10,000. The main cities in the secession states were New Orleans, Memphis, Mobile, Charleston and Richmond.

 

[SWS]

I thought 10,000 was the antebellum figure, while the actual wartime population had doubled to over 20,000 due to refugees and other types.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

You're the expert here on population data. Any notion on the population of the general Atlanta area in 1863-64? Thanks.

A quickie lookup online gives Atlanta's population as about 9,500 in 1860, including 500 slaves, BUT another source gives about 14,000 - so if you want an accurate figure it would be best to look up the census records for 1860.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Atlanta was a key rail hub, with maintenance and repair capabilities for engines and cars. It was also a supply depot, and during the war had developed manufacturing capabilities. It was indeed important.

 

[wausaubob]

I thought 10,000 was the antebellum figure, while the actual wartime population had doubled to over 20,000 due to refugees and other types.

Correct.

 

[SWS]

"I have inquired of the Quartermaster-General in relation to the question of forage, the supply of which you are aware was mainly drawn from Southwestern Georgia, communication with which was interrupted by [Stoneman's 30 July] raid on the [Georgia] Central Railroad. That road is again at work, and the Quartermaster-General expects the first lot of corn from Macon since the road was broken will arrive in four or five days, and if there be no further interruption there will be a steady succession in the arrival from that quarter, and that the amount will be adequate for the supply of your army. He is quite confident that the Danville and Piedmont Railroad can transport all which can be brought to their terminus. One of the difficulties of which he complains is that of getting the corn from the plantations to the depots, and this, he says, is mainly due to the withdrawal of the detailed men, overseers, and farmers from their homes for [militia] service.

I have had serious apprehension that the source of supply might be exhausted by the retreat of the Army of Tennessee and the consequent exposure of the Atlanta and Montgomery Railroad, the possession of which by the enemy would compel the army to draw its supplies from the same quarter which is relied on to furnish corn for the Army of Virginia. West of the Alabama River there is an abundant supply of corn, large quantities of which are stored along the railroads and navigable rivers. The reported amount now at Montgomery is 300,000 bushels, and the receipts are said to be equal to the amount sent forward from there daily. The 600 wagons were put on the break on the West Point railroad, and another train of wagons is running from Montgomery to the railroad at Union Springs. If General Hood is successful against Sherman, and we suffer no serious disaster, so as to deprive us of the supplies in Middle Alabama and East Mississippi, I think we shall be better able to sustain an army here than we were the first year of the war. I directed inquiry to be made for oats in Virginia and North Carolina, but have been disappointed by learning that but a small amount can be obtained. It would seem, therefore, that for the supply of forage we must mainly rely upon the railroad connection with [Southwestern Georgia] by way of Danville and Greensborough. I trust the enemy will not be able to reach that road. . ." - Davis to Lee, 23 August 1864