Vicksburg and Yorktown

Saphroneth

Lt. Colonel
Joined
Feb 18, 2017
An idea sparked from noticing something about Vicksburg.



There is an inspection report of the Vicksburg garrison just after the siege started, which shows only ca. 17,000 muskets and rifles defending the place. This means that the upper bound for the number of troops which could be used to defend Vicksburg at any one time is about 17,000 (effective infantry).

Grant, after the battle of Big Black River, had about 46,000 PFD with his army when he reached Vicksburg proper, and got over 25,000 (PFD) reinforcements during the siege. He was never able to break in successfully and ultimately took Vicksburg by siege.


The 30 April 1862 reports on strength at the Yorktown position in Virginia give effective strength by regiment, and adding up the regiments present on the 5th-6th of April (when McClellan contacted the line) gives:

(Infantry effectives only)

5th:

McLaws 1,977
Cobb (some of which arrived on the 6th) 3,748
Colston 1,750
Wilcox 2,552
Pryor 2,250
Ward 890
Rains 1,830

6th
Rodes 2,960
(most of) Early 2,300
Rest of Cobb

For about 20,250 infantry effectives in position on the 6th of April, not counting Gloucester Point or the (significant) artillery. This number also assumes no sickness took place over the whole month of April, when contemporary reports suggest the 30 April figures were after 10%-20% of the army took sick in the trenches.

(Note that on the 7th Kershaw's brigade arrives with another 2,490 infantry effectives, and on the 9th Featherston and Griffith's brigades arrive with a total of over 4,600 further infantry effectives. So within days it's more like 27,000 infantry effectives.)


McClellan's PFD when making contact with Yorktown is five divisions and one brigade. We don't have exact returns for them, but even with the much larger size of Federal divisions in 1862 it seems unlikely there'd be more than 60,000 PFD involved.

So, here's the point I was leading up to...


What about Vicksburg makes it so that Grant can't break in in two months with more than three times the PFD that his opponent has effectives, when McClellan is criticized at Yorktown for not taking it in much less than a month with less of an advantage?
 
Vicksburg fortifications were laid out by military engineers. Yorktown's was not. Joe Johnston recognized how weak the Yorktown fortifications were, which is why he was so quick to evacuate.

And the Warwick line, which is the real criticism against McClellan, was very thinly manned. When McClellan arrived on the peninsula with his 60,000, there were maybe only 5 or 6 thousand confederates manning the Warwick line. If McClellan had taken that line by assault, Yorktown would have been instantly abandoned.

Grant never had a shortcut like that presented to him at Vicksburg.
 
Here is a description of the Warwick line from someone who was there:

"From Yorktown to its right, as far as the source of Warwick Creek, the line was everywhere weak, and for about five hundred yards there was no parapet whatever. The ground before and behind this line was rolling, open, and well seen from ground occupied by us. The line was defended by three heavy pieces in position and a few field- pieces. To silence these would have been no great affair for our artillery. An attack against this line would not have come within two-thirds of a mile of Yorktown, from the fire of which the undulations of the ground would have afforded much cover. These were circumstances which might have been quickly recognized and established on the ground. In these, an attack by a force six times more numerous than the defenders ought not to have been doubtful.

Lower down, at Winn's Mills, Garrow's and Lee's Mills, were practicable passages across the river on dams, all fortified, but not desperate. The weakest defence was at Garrow's, which was defended by three guns and slight intreuchments. In spite of the reports to the contrary, the stream here was fordable, — a fact, one would think, which should have been discovered the first night. More over, the stream might have been reduced from fifty yards wide to its natural width of fifteen feet, by breaking away the temporary dams, which action Lieut. Comstock of the Engineers recommended under date of April 12. At the same time he intimates his opinion that men could cross at Garrow's by wading. Here, then, were a favorable piece of open country, three separate roads and bridges, and a ford, all feasible for attack. These positions occupied a line more than five miles long from one end to the other, and were too far separated to mutually support each other. They were defended by five thousand men, exclusive of the force in Yorktown. The average force for the defence of each, therefore, reserves included, was one thousand men. Against these at each point Gen. McClellan might easily have put ten times that number."

The Peninsular Campaign of General McClellan in 1862– Military Historical Society of Massachusetts
 
Vicksburg fortifications were laid out by military engineers. Yorktown's was not. Joe Johnston recognized how weak the Yorktown fortifications were, which is why he was so quick to evacuate.
Er, that in and of itself doesn't prove much - Johnston's annoyance was that there were no reverses or bombproofs.
Johnston evacuated the positions in May when McClellan had set up his siege guns and was about to begin bombardment, not because the position was weak per se (as his entire army was in it by that point.)

And the Warwick line, which is the real criticism against McClellan, was very thinly manned. When McClellan arrived on the peninsula with his 60,000, there were maybe only 5 or 6 thousand confederates manning the Warwick line. If McClellan had taken that line by assault, Yorktown would have been instantly abandoned.


As I've noted above, the number of effective infantry (not present for duty) at the Warwick line - plus Yorktown but exclusive of Gloucester Point) was about 15,000 on the 5th, and it became over 20,000 on the 6th. For there to be "only 5 or 6 thousand Confederates manning the Warwick line" there'd have to be 10,000 or more in Yorktown itself, which there were not.



Assuming you endorse the description, let's have a look at it. Here's Sneden's map:

default.jpg

From Yorktown to its right, as far as the source of Warwick Creek, the line was everywhere weak, and for about five hundred yards there was no parapet whatever. The ground before and behind this line was rolling, open, and well seen from ground occupied by us. The line was defended by three heavy pieces in position and a few field- pieces. To silence these would have been no great affair for our artillery. An attack against this line would not have come within two-thirds of a mile of Yorktown, from the fire of which the undulations of the ground would have afforded much cover. These were circumstances which might have been quickly recognized and established on the ground.

So the target being identified here is the Red and White Redoubts. This is part of the Left Of Position, which mid-month contained:

Rodes, Early, Featherstone, Rains and Ward (demi-bde)

On the 5th this contained Ward and Rains, for about 3,000 infantry effectives - plus a lot of artillery, Rains' brigade has about 1,200 artillery effectives which equates to about 60 guns (probably mostly in Yorktown). Now, this might be vulnerable to an assault on the 5th, and McClellan ordered an assault immediately on reaching the position - but his corps commander decided not to. On the 6th, another 2,000 or so effecttives arrive and so the Left Of Position contains over 5,000 infantry effectives. In addition to this, it's still the case that the approach march involves taking flanking fire from dozens of pieces in Yorktown - "two thirds of a mile" is within bombardment range.

Note that when Grant reached Vicksburg he threw a corps at one of the forts - the Stockade Redan - and was stopped fairly easily (largely by 27th Louisiana AIUI). Here there's at least a full brigade present, and if there's a day's wait like Grant did (he attacked the day after arriving) there's two full brigades present.
This doesn't seem to be an especially weak position.

It notes that an attack would "not have been doubtful" with six times the force of the defenders, but it looks like to manage that on the 5th would require the attack of an entire column (or at least 4-5 brigades out of the six in a column). To get there would also mean marching around the head of the Warwick, which is to say it would mean a not insignificant amount of marching with the flank of the column pointed right at Yorktown. Doing that on the 6th would mean half of McClellan's entire force (it'd take 24,000 effectives).


Lower down, at Winn's Mills, Garrow's and Lee's Mills, were practicable passages across the river on dams, all fortified, but not desperate. The weakest defence was at Garrow's, which was defended by three guns and slight intreuchments. In spite of the reports to the contrary, the stream here was fordable, — a fact, one would think, which should have been discovered the first night. More over, the stream might have been reduced from fifty yards wide to its natural width of fifteen feet, by breaking away the temporary dams, which action Lieut. Comstock of the Engineers recommended under date of April 12.

Yes, these are the positions it's possible to cross the river.
Garrow's is a position which wasn't immediately identified (not until at least afternoon on the 6th), and it's not like McClellan should have been personally investigating the river depth himself. It is the single weakest position because the river is indeed fordable (if only slightly, it's neck deep) and there's a ridge which has some "command" over the battery immediately on the far side. However, this wasn't easy to discover, and indeed as the description notes it's not positively identified until the 12th. This is the Right of Position.
It's actually where Rodes' brigade was sent on the 6th rather than adding it to the "left of position", which added to the troops already there (McLaws and much of Cobb's brigade) and so it's defended on the 6th by about 7,000 infantry. (Rodes would later be sent back to the left of position when Semmes replaced him.)

So it's not possible to put "ten times that number" against Garrow's. Where else is there?

. Here, then, were a favorable piece of open country, three separate roads and bridges, and a ford, all feasible for attack.

Oh, okay, so Garrows is being counted as a bridge and a ford? I think? The "ford" is clearly Garrows, which is also one of the dams, so that's only one point of attack; the other two (Lee's Mill and Wynn's Mill) are just dams, and are defended by the centre of position (which on the 5th means Colston, Wilcox and Pryor - 6,500, or about 3,000 per position).


Thus the possible positions are (from west to east)

Garrows (ford etc.) - not located on the 5th or overnight 5th-6th as it was a mile west of the line of march of the west flank column. Defenders on the 6th: about 7,000 infantry effectives.
Lees Mill (dam) - McClellan ordered this position attacked immediately upon arriving at it ("if only with the bayonet!"), but his corps commander decided not to attack that day. Defended on the 5th by about 3,000 infantry.
Wynns Mill (dam) - not located on the 5th as it's between the two columns of march. Defended on the 5th by about 3,000 infantry.
Red and White Redoubts (open ground with forts at the far end) - McClellan ordered this position attacked immediately upon arriving at it ("Attack with all your forces as soon as you arrive"), but his corps commander declined to attack. Defended on the 5th by about 2,000 infantry and the 6th by about 4,000 infantry, plus large amounts of flanking artillery from Yorktown.



These positions occupied a line more than five miles long from one end to the other, and were too far separated to mutually support each other. They were defended by five thousand men, exclusive of the force in Yorktown. The average force for the defence of each, therefore, reserves included, was one thousand men. Against these at each point Gen. McClellan might easily have put ten times that number."


Quite apart from the rather startling fact that the compiler of this report has double counted Garrows, based on the number of effectives present then in order for McClellan to "easily put ten times that number" he needs to employ:

40,000 at Garrows (if attacked on the 5th - 70,000 on the 6th)
30,000 at Lees
30,000 at Wynns
20,000 at the Redoubts (if attacked on the 5th - 40,000 on the 6th).

Now, I don't think McClellan had 120,000 troops on the 5th, and he certainly didn't have 170,000 troops on the 6th. He had 60,000 PFD (not effectives, so perhaps 48-50,000 Effectives) and if he spreads his troops to attack all along the line as the report you quote seems to suggest he'd be putting one division each at four separate points and with enough concentration of force to overwhelm none of them.

Want to contest this? Which of the units I've identified as being present were not present?
 
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The thing I think is interesting here is that I put the strength at Yorktown on the 5th and 6th in the OP, but you seem to have ignored it. The argument that a five mile line is too long for mutual support is also interesting, as the Vicksburg defences form a line 6.5 miles long!
 
The thing I think is interesting here is that I put the strength at Yorktown on the 5th and 6th in the OP, but you seem to have ignored it. The argument that a five mile line is too long for mutual support is also interesting, as the Vicksburg defences form a line 6.5 miles long!
Because I have no confidence in the accuracy of those numbers. And because McClellan never made a decent effort to take the Warwick line. There are opinions in the record from those present, both Union and Confederate, that the Warwick line could have been taken.
 
What about Vicksburg makes it so that Grant can't break in in two months with more than three times the PFD that his opponent has effectives, when McClellan is criticized at Yorktown for not taking it in much less than a month with less of an advantage?

Can I make one correction. The Mississippi regiment attached to Cobb was one of Kershaws' and didn't arrive until the 7th.

The general point stands though. Vicksburg and Yorktown (6th) were defended by roughly equal forces.

The artillery along the Vicksburg line is 102 pieces. Most field guns (40 are 6 pdrs for example). I don't have solid numbers for Yorktown, but 15 field batteries of 4-6 guns were available on the 6th (say 70-ish), and the fort mounted 15 batteries, including the river batteries. Since the Vicksburg figure does not include the river batteries (manned by the 1st Louisiana Artillery) we need to disambiguate. I counted about 60 heavy guns facing towards the direction of the Federal advance, plus more shot "across" the line and could engage troops attacking at "The Divide".

Yorktown is stronger in artillery.

The terrain is far more favourable at Vicksburg. Vicksburg was really an entrenched camp rather than a fortification. It's strength lay in it's elevation - the improvised lines followed the contours of the heights. They built strong points along the line where the terrain allowed or required, however the work was very incomplete, and the entrenchments were weak:

“In spite of the previously vaunted report that Vicksburg had been surrounded by fortifications that were impregnable, we found a very feeble line,” [Hebert] later wrote, “and very weakly thrown up with little redoubts here and there.” -Ballard, Michael B.. Vicksburg: The Campaign That Opened the Mississippi (Civil War America) (pp. 319-320). The University of North Carolina Press. Kindle Edition.

Hebert in his comments is correct. The Vicksburg lines had been designed by Lockett, but only a little work was done and since the lines had not been occupied in months the rains had collapsed many of the trenches that had been dug. However, starting with McClernand's turning movement the rebels had started to work again. Thus rather than a position that had been prepared for defence for a year (Yorktown), in reality what Vicksburg was was a couple of weeks of digging. Hence the walls that existed were thin, and in places not even reveted.

If you look at the terrain you can see the ridgeline the rebels occupied.

Grant, of course, left Warrenton road open until the 22nd, apparently deliberately. Pemberton could have marched his troops out of Vicksburg and to safety beyond the Big Black south of Vicksburg. It is speculated that, like at Fort Donelson, seeing the threat the rebels would take the "Golden Bridge" he was offering.

Yorktown's fortifications were generally better built, and generally behind a river and on dominating ground except at one point (near Dam No. 1 where the Garrow Ridge dominates the crossing from the eastern side). Of course, the defenders there also complained.

The thing I think is interesting here is that I put the strength at Yorktown on the 5th and 6th in the OP, but you seem to have ignored it. The argument that a five mile line is too long for mutual support is also interesting, as the Vicksburg defences form a line 6.5 miles long!

>8 miles, surely? Although the southern sector was essentially left alone.

The rebel dispositions, ca. 22nd left to right were:

Smith Division - 1.6 miles frontage from Fort Hill to the Stockade Redan
Vaughn (Fort Hill and environs)
Baldwin (divide between Fort Hill and the Stockade Redan)
Shoup (to the road, with his right being the 27th La Redan)

= 3,709/ 1.6 miles = 2,300 muskets/ mile

Forney's Division* - 2.7 miles frontage from the Stockade Redan to the railroad gap
Hebert (Stockade Redan etc.)
Green (Green Redan etc.)
Moore (Great Redout to 2nd Tx Redan)
- Cockerill's brigade as reserve.

= 6,957 muskets/ 2.7 miles = 2,600 muskets/ mile (inc. reserve)

* Bowen was sick and his division was operationally under Forney

Stevenson's Division - 6.5 mile frontage from the railroad gap to South Fort on the river, and then back across towards Vicksburg
SD Lee
Cummings
Reynolds
(Barton along segment facing west)

= 6,573 /6.5 = ca. 1,000 muskets/ mile
 
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Because I have no confidence in the accuracy of those numbers. And because McClellan never made a decent effort to take the Warwick line. There are opinions in the record from those present, both Union and Confederate, that the Warwick line could have been taken.

Then you need to research and provide better numbers, surely. Your feeling that the provided numbers are wrong, when if anything they're underestimates, does not constitute evidence.
 
And the defenders at Yorktown were - assuming the five miles figure there is correct - at about 4,000 muskets/mile.
 
Okay, I went through regiment by regiment, and I'm pretty sure I've got all the arrival times.

I'm going to show the overall strength of the defences (including the Gloucester Point outwork and the artillery at the Williamsburg fallback position, as the former is part of the defences and the latter is available for relatively quick reinforcement if they felt they really needed it) on three dates - the 5th, 6th and 12th.

Note that in all cases the individual numbers are effective strength on the 30th April. Effective strength on the 5th and 6th is going to be much higher, effective strength on the 12th somewhat higher (as effective strength is reduced by casualties including sickness, and there were thousands of sick.)


5th:

1: Inf 14627
2: Art 3037
3: Cav 1748

Regiment Type Effectives
1: 5th LA Inf 744
2: 10th LA Inf 595
3: 15th VA Inf 476
4: Noland Battalion Inf 162
5: Garrett Art 50
6: Young Art 57
7: 16th GA Inf 488
8: 24th GA Inf 660
9: 2nd LA Inf 782
10: 10th GA Inf 582
11: 32nd VA (1 coy) Inf 29
12: 52nd Va Mil Inf 30
13: 68th Va Mil Inf 20
14: 115th Va Mil Inf 40
15: Old Dom Rifles Inf 60
16: Allen's battalion Art 500
17: Companies Art Art 121
18: 3rd VA Inf 550
19: 13th NC Inf 575
20: 14th NC Inf 625
21: 9th AL Inf 550
22: 10th AL Inf 550
23: 11th AL Inf 656
24: 19th MS Inf 800
25: 8th AL Inf 800
26: 14th AL Inf 700
27: 14th LA Inf 750
28: Macon Art 60
29: 2nd FL Inf 530
30: 2nd MS Battalion Inf 360
31: 13th AL Inf 474
32: 26th AL Inf 283
33: 6th GA Inf 703
34: 23rd GA Inf 370
35: 19 batteries, Yorktown Art 1151
36: 46th VA Inf 356
37: 9th VA Mill Inf 29
38: 21st VA Mill Inf 39
39: 61st Va Mill Inf 201
40: Det Cav Cav 18
41: Det East Shore Inf 58
42: Matthews Lt Dr Cav 40
43: Armistead Art 46
44: Heavy Art Art 332
45: Pendleton Art 720
46: Magruder's cav Cav 990
47: Wise and Hampton cavalry Cav 700

The defences here are weak enough that an attack could work, but not one off the line of march - the divisions need to be closed up. McClellan ordered an attack off the line of march, but it fell flat because both column commanders considered themselves too weak to simply push through. Given the amount of sickness we're functionally talking about 16,000 effective infantry defenders - basically the same strength as Vicksburg.


6th April

1: Inf 19427
2: Art 3257
3: Legion 594
4: Cav 1748

Regiment Type Effectives
1: 5th LA Inf 744
2: 10th LA Inf 595
3: 15th VA Inf 476
4: Noland Battalion Inf 162
5: Garrett Art 50
6: Young Art 57
7: 16th GA Inf 488
8: 24th GA Inf 660
9: Cobb's Legion 594
10: 2nd LA Inf 782
11: 10th GA Inf 582
12: 32nd VA (1 coy) Inf 29
13: 52nd Va Mil Inf 30
14: 68th Va Mil Inf 20
15: 115th Va Mil Inf 40
16: Old Dom Rifles Inf 60
17: Allen's battalion Art 500
18: Companies Art Art 121
19: 3rd VA Inf 550
20: 13th NC Inf 575
21: 14th NC Inf 625
22: 9th AL Inf 550
23: 10th AL Inf 550
24: 11th AL Inf 656
25: 19th MS Inf 800
26: Stanard Art 60
27: 8th AL Inf 800
28: 14th AL Inf 700
29: 14th LA Inf 750
30: Macon Art 60
31: 20th GA Inf 560
32: 23rd NC Inf 540
33: 24th VA Inf 740
34: Jeff Davis Art 80
35: 5th AL Inf 660
36: 6th AL Inf 1100
37: 12th AL Inf 550
38: 12th MS Inf 650
39: King William Art 80
40: 2nd FL Inf 530
41: 2nd MS Battalion Inf 360
42: 13th AL Inf 474
43: 26th AL Inf 283
44: 6th GA Inf 703
45: 23rd GA Inf 370
46: 19 batteries, Yorktown Art 1151
47: 46th VA Inf 356
48: 9th VA Mill Inf 29
49: 21st VA Mill Inf 39
50: 61st Va Mill Inf 201
51: Det Cav Cav 18
52: Det East Shore Inf 58
53: Matthews Lt Dr Cav 40
54: Armistead Art 46
55: Heavy Art Art 332
56: Pendleton Art 720
57: Magruder's cav Cav 990
58: Wise and Hampton cavalry Cav 700

Essentially, nearly 6,000 more reinforcements have arrived and the position is now stronger than Vicksburg by a substantial margin.



12th (when McClellan can land his other divisions and bring them up to the line)



Type total_effectives
1: Inf 29706
2: Art 3725
3: Legion 594
4: Cav 1748


Regiment Type Effectives
1: 5th LA Inf 744
2: 10th LA Inf 595
3: 15th VA Inf 476
4: Noland Battalion Inf 162
5: Garrett Art 50
6: Young Art 57
7: 1st La Inf 315
8: 13th MS Inf 640
9: 18th MS Inf 684
10: 21st MS Inf 792
11: Cosnahan Art 51
12: Howitzer Art 103
13: Manly Art 37
14: Read Art 72
15: Sands Art 80
16: 2nd SC Inf 616
17: 3rd SC Inf 550
18: 7th SC Inf 581
19: 8th SC Inf 467
20: Gracie's bn Inf 276
21: Kemper Art 77
22: 16th GA Inf 488
23: 24th GA Inf 660
24: Cobb's Legion 594
25: 2nd LA Inf 782
26: 17th MS Inf 692
27: 15th NC Inf 532
28: Page Art 48
29: 10th GA Inf 582
30: 32nd VA (1 coy) Inf 29
31: 52nd Va Mil Inf 30
32: 68th Va Mil Inf 20
33: 115th Va Mil Inf 40
34: Old Dom Rifles Inf 60
35: Allen's battalion Art 500
36: Companies Art Art 121
37: 7th VA Inf 700
38: 11th VA Inf 750
39: 3rd VA Inf 550
40: 13th NC Inf 575
41: 14th NC Inf 625
42: 9th AL Inf 550
43: 10th AL Inf 550
44: 11th AL Inf 656
45: 19th MS Inf 800
46: Stanard Art 60
47: 8th AL Inf 800
48: 14th AL Inf 700
49: 14th LA Inf 750
50: Macon Art 60
51: 20th GA Inf 560
52: 5th NC Inf 460
53: 23rd NC Inf 540
54: 24th VA Inf 740
55: Jeff Davis Art 80
56: 5th AL Inf 660
57: 6th AL Inf 1100
58: 12th AL Inf 550
59: 12th MS Inf 650
60: King William Art 80
61: 2nd FL Inf 530
62: 2nd MS Battalion Inf 360
63: 13th AL Inf 474
64: 26th AL Inf 283
65: 6th GA Inf 703
66: 23rd GA Inf 370
67: 19 batteries, Yorktown Art 1151
68: 27th GA Inf 428
69: 28th GA Inf 518
70: 4th NC Inf 739
71: 49th VA Inf 539
72: 46th VA Inf 356
73: 9th VA Mill Inf 29
74: 21st VA Mill Inf 39
75: 61st Va Mill Inf 201
76: Det Cav Cav 18
77: Det East Shore Inf 58
78: Matthews Lt Dr Cav 40
79: Armistead Art 46
80: Heavy Art Art 332
81: Pendleton Art 720
82: Magruder's cav Cav 990
83: Wise and Hampton cavalry Cav 700



At this point the position is closer to twice the strength of Vicksburg.
(for reference, by the 16th there's over 40,000 effective infantry in the position, so the strength keeps going up.)

I have provided this information to back up my assertions on the effective strength of the defences.
 
Another difference between Vicksburg and Yorktown:

Davis ordered Vicksburg to be held. Period.

Yorktown was only ordered to held until Norfolk was evacuated.
 
Yorktown was only ordered to held until Norfolk was evacuated.
This is the complete opposite of what happened. Norfolk was evacuated because Yorktown was about to become untenable.

This is in the ORs right under the place I got the above information about unit strength - Norfolk had to be abandoned because Yorktown was in trouble.

Incidentally, do you still contest the strength appreciations I gave for the Yorktown line? If so, which units have I misidentified the positions of?
 
For comparative purposes.


The filled area is the strength in the Yorktown line on the given dates, in effectives. The horizontal line is the maximum possible effective infantry strength in Vicksburg (i.e. the number of muskets when the siege began)
Yorktown.jpeg
 
Saphroneth wrote
"What about Vicksburg makes it so that Grant can't break in in two months with more than three times the PFD that his opponent has effectives, when McClellan is criticized at Yorktown for not taking it in much less than a month with less of an advantage?"

Have you ever been to Vicksburg? If not, I would highly recommend it as the topography is hard to visualize by looking at maps and contour lines. Sections of the Confederate lines were accessible only by mountain goats and much more difficult for mere mortals under fire from the defenders. Terrain is always a factor in battles and woe to those who ignore this principle.
Regards
David
 
Have you ever been to Vicksburg? If not, I would highly recommend it as the topography is hard to visualize by looking at maps and contour lines. Sections of the Confederate lines were accessible only by mountain goats and much more difficult for mere mortals under fire from the defenders. Terrain is always a factor in battles and woe to those who ignore this principle.
Glad you mentioned it! Most of the Yorktown line is behind a river, which is fordable in one position only (Garretts Chimney). There's also a gap (which is under the flanking fire of many guns) and two narrow dams to use as bridges, but that's about it for possible points of attack.
 
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If we assume that the number of soldiers who surrendered at Vicksburg was not 29,000 approximately, and that 60,000 small arms were not surrendered, then this discussion has some purpose.
If those assumptions are incorrect, then the discussion is another pointless diatribe.
Since all three United States corps tested the defenses at Vicksburg before laying siege, and were decisively repulsed the probability is that low numbers in the report were inaccurate and probably purposely inaccurate to excuse the potential sudden loss of the garrison.
But sorting through the OR to find pieces of information to impeach the writing of dead guys seems like an internet obsession.
 
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