Union Naval techniques against nighttime blockaders?

[leftyhunter]

Has we know most if not close to all blockaders used nighttime to conceal their entry into Southern ports. The only night vision technology that I am aware of that existed during the Civil War was flare guns. Even flare guns could sometimes be defeated as they were on at least one occasion if a blockade runner fired his own to create confusion.
Sea mine technology didn't exist yet? So knowing that the blockade runners ran at night how could USN officers counter them?
Thanks
Leftyhunter

 

[AndyHall]

In the case of Confederate ports that were large enough to have several blockading vessels stationed offshore, it was common for each vessel to be assigned a day station and a night station. The night stations were generally much closer inshore and near the channels, to give the blockaders a better chance of catching a runner going in or out.

In between these positions, the blockaders would send individual launches or boats to wait as pickets and sound the alarm if they spotted a runner. These boats typically had a half-dozen seamen and a petty officer, along with various rockets or flares to shoot off as a signal. This could be very dangerous work for the Union sailors, because (obviously) they could not show a light themselves, and stood a not-insignificant chance of being run down by a blockade runner dashing by. Tom Taylor, an Englishman who served as a sort of business manager for a fleet of runners, witnessed a close call in the early morning hours of February 24, 1865, while running into Galveston aboard Banshee (II):

We had been under weigh some time, when suddenly we discovered a launch close to us on the port bow filled with Northern blue-jackets and marines. "Full speed ahead," shouted [Captain Jonathan W.] Steele, and we were within an ace of running her down as we almost grazed her with our port paddle-wheel. [Frank] Hurst and I looked straight down into the boat, waving them a parting salute. The crew seemed only too thankful at their narrow escape to open fire, but they soon regained their senses and threw up rocket after rocket in our wake as a warning to the blockading fleet to be on the alert.

A Federal guard boat on blockade duty, 1864. Harper's Weekly.​

As an example, here are the approximate positions of blockaders off Galveston on the evening of April 30, 1864, when Lavinia (ex-Harriet Lane) got away:

 

[leftyhunter]

In the case of Confederate ports that were large enough to have several blockading vessels stationed offshore, it was common for each vessel to be assigned a day station and a night station. The night stations were generally much closer inshore and near the channels, to give the blockaders a better chance of catching a runner going in or out.

In between these positions, the blockaders would send individual launches or boats to wait as pickets and sound the alarm if they spotted a runner. These boats typically had a half-dozen seamen and a petty officer, along with various rockets or flares to shoot off as a signal. This could be very dangerous work for the Union sailors, because (obviously) they could not show a light themselves, and stood a not-insignificant chance of being run down by a blockade runner dashing by. Tom Taylor, an Englishman who served as a sort of business manager for a fleet of runners, witnessed a close call in the early morning hours of February 24, 1865, while running into Galveston aboard Banshee (II):

We had been under weigh some time, when suddenly we discovered a launch close to us on the port bow filled with Northern blue-jackets and marines. "Full speed ahead," shouted [Captain Jonathan W.] Steele, and we were within an ace of running her down as we almost grazed her with our port paddle-wheel. [Frank] Hurst and I looked straight down into the boat, waving them a parting salute. The crew seemed only too thankful at their narrow escape to open fire, but they soon regained their senses and threw up rocket after rocket in our wake as a warning to the blockading fleet to be on the alert.

A Federal guard boat on blockade duty, 1864. Harper's Weekly.​

As an example, here are the approximate positions of blockaders off Galveston on the evening of April 30, 1864, when Lavinia (ex-Harriet Lane) got away:

View attachment 128480

That does look dangerous if the weather turns rough which could happen rather quickly. One hypothetical technique is to run two ships together towing a chain to snag a blockade runner. When the blockade runner hits the chain both ships would fire flares at where they think the blockade runner is. A third ship at a more or less 90 degree angle would then fire on the blockade runner so has not to cause a cross fire. Again this a hypothetical technique not to say it was used.
Off hand one would think in daylight since the USN crew would take captured blockade runners to a prize commission that many USN commanders would have a creative definition of how to interpret a "20 mile limit".
Leftyhuunter

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

The blockade was more than just the close-in screen, though. There were patrolling offshore cruisers that veteran blockade runners actually feared more than the inshore vessels, and they made a substantial portion of the captures.

 

[leftyhunter]

The blockade was more than just the close-in screen, though. There were patrolling offshore cruisers that veteran blockade runners actually feared more than the inshore vessels, and they made a substantial portion of the captures.

True enough. It's a whole lot easier to spot a ship in sunlight. I am thinking that USN commanders of said cruisers would creatively interpret how many miles off shore the blockade runners were in order to increase their prize money. I take it in theory a USN ship can only sieze a blockade runner 20 miles of the shore of the U.S. mainland or an U.S. Island. An ambitious USN commander thus may creatively interpret "20 miles". If the blockade runners captain disputes the legality of his ship being seized he has two major legal obstacles to overcome.
1. Blockade Runners look a lot like well Blockade Runners.
2. Their are no GPS of video recordings back then. It's a case of " he said , he said" on just how many actual miles offshore the blockade runner was when it was seized.
Leftyhunter

 

[AndyHall]

The blockaders could seize a runner anywhere they caught it, except in another country's territorial waters. There is no 20-mile rule in that regard. Runners were generally easier to intercept coming in or out of Confederate ports, were they inevitably had to pass. It was probably also easier to prove to a prize court that they actually were running the blockade when they were caught a few miles offshore, rather than in the open expanse of the Gulf of Mexico or Atlantic Ocean.

You wrote:

1. Blockade Runners look a lot like well Blockade Runners.
2. Their are no GPS of video recordings back then. It's a case of " he said , he said" on just how many actual miles offshore the blockade runner was when it was seized.

The U.S. prize courts generally followed the old legal maxim, ratione anatis -- walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, etc. Many runners challenged their seizure in court, often claiming some ludicrous case of navigational error, and some were successful, but generally speaking, the courts weren't fooled very often.

 

[Carronade]

"As an example, here are the approximate positions of blockaders off Galveston on the evening of April 30, 1864, when Lavinia (ex-Harriet Lane) got away:"

Was that a common technique? Sending several blockade runners out at once? It might help the chances of some of them getting through; on the other hand it would increase the chance of someone being spotted or caught. I could see an independent-minded captain preferring to go it alone.

Was there any control over which ships departed, or when?

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

Was there any control over which ships departed, or when?

That varied from time to time and place to place. When Lt. John Wilkinson was placed in charge of regulating and organizing blockade running operations at Wilmington (and really, there were few better men to attempt that), the success rate was seen to improve-- but many of the individual blockade runner commanders hated the rules and preferred to 'make their own game,' regardless of overall results. They were a generally unruly bunch-- "herding cats" is the phrase that springs to mind.


(One of the elements about the 'Blockade Runner' board game that I have-- but haven't actually played yet-- is that the rules set up a tension between individual profits and group success that rings quite true historically. An individual blockade runner captain could make a bigger profit if his peers did *not* make it, because they were in essence his competitors at the same time they were his comrades.)

 

[AndyHall]

Was that a common technique? Sending several blockade runners out at once? It might help the chances of some of them getting through; on the other hand it would increase the chance of someone being spotted or caught. I could see an independent-minded captain preferring to go it alone.

Was there any control over which ships departed, or when?

Local port officials exercised some control over that, because they issued clearances to sail and in many cases coordinated with shore batteries (e.g., at Wilmington). In some cases there were required things that had to be done immediately before sailing, including smoking the holds to drive out any stowaways. But individual masters and owners generally were able to choose their departures, based on weather and tide conditions, moonlight, and the observed positions of blockaders.

The Lavinia case was unusual in that regard, because she was a pet project of General Magruder, whgose forces had captured her (as Harriet Lane) sixteen months before, and she was carrying government cotton. In that case, they definitely coordinated it to have three go out together, one after the other. In fact, they were probably closer together than shown in the map.

 

[AndyHall]

(One of the elements about the 'Blockade Runner' board game that I have-- but haven't actually played yet-- is that the rules set up a tension between individual profits and group success that rings quite true historically. An individual blockade runner captain could make a bigger profit if his peers did *not* make it, because they were in essence his competitors at the same time they were his comrades.)

It captures the "big picture" of blockade running very well. Find a group of gamers near you and have a go -- you'll enjoy it.