Union Army Branch Precedence?

[Story]

For years, the US Navy has had a succession or precedence list by branch (line, engineering, medical, JAG, , chaplain, etc.)

Was the same true for the Union Army?

 

[johan_steele]

Yes, but I don't know the precedence. For the Combat Arms it went: Engineers, Arty, Cav then Infantry at the time of the ACW for the non combat arms I don't know.

 

[Story]

Odd, one would think Infantry would be the senior service.

 

[prroh]

Warren was an Engineer at Gettysburg but could not issue orders to infantry officers junior in rank such as Vincent and O'Rourke. He even could not tell artillery Capt Hazlett what to do. He could only suggest.

 

[Republican Blues]

The precedence was basically set by the Academy. The top graduates went into the Topographical Engineers, then the Engineers, then the Artillery, Cavalry, and the rocks went into the Infantry. Pretty much like today..........ok ok, I apologize to any 11Bulletstoppers out there, just a little Engineer/Field Artillery ribbing ( I was a Reserve Engineer and Field Artillery in the Reserves, picking on Grunts comes natural, but it dont mean nothing.........one team one fight)

 

[prroh]

Thought you were talking about line vs staff precedence. You are correct insofar as the top of the class would be assigned in the Engineers with the "goat " in the infantry or, if he were lucky in the cavalry.

 

[Story]

That's just it - there's many forms of 'precedence'.

On the Battlefield; where a 'line' officer (infantry or cavalry) would general have command authority over an equivalent rank attached officer (artillery, engineers).

Academics, as stated above.

Line vs. Staff, as stated above.

Another would be 'Status', where pay for specialists would elevate them over equivalent 'grunt' ranks.

 

[Story]

Warren was an Engineer at Gettysburg but could not issue orders to infantry officers junior in rank such as Vincent and O'Rourke. He even could not tell artillery Capt Hazlett what to do. He could only suggest.

Right - since he was attached and not directly in the Chain Of Command.

 

[rhp6033]

Right - since he was attached and not directly in the Chain Of Command.

As mentioned previously, the preference/priority seemed to be established between the different branches within the Army as set forth in the assignments after graduation from the U.S. Military Acadamy. Sometimes the lines are very well-defined, especially when the branch is designated as a "corps", such as the Engineers, Quartermaster, etc.. (I'm not sure if they had a Judge Advocate Corps back then).

Promotions were confined strictly within the corps, and this became a serious problem for talented individuals like Robert E. Lee. With no standard retirement age (and no defined pension policy), the Engineer Corps became well known as a place where majors, colonels, and generals resided until their death created an opening for promotions all along the line. I don't have the dates of rank, but it seems that Lee was a captain during most of his career in the engineers, and with little hope of promotion for many more years. That's why he eventually asked for, and received, a transferr to the "line" when the size of the U.S. Army was essentially doubled, being assigned to the cavalry in Texas (2nd U.S. Cavalry???), first as second-in-command, and later as a full colonel in full command of a regiment of cavalry. So it appears that within "the line", cavalry and infantry, and perhaps artillary, the distinctions were less well-defined.

As for control on the battlefield, you get to the sticky question of exactly who was in command of what. Depending upon how the army was organized at that time, artillary could be under the command of an artillary officer, but under the effective control of the brigade, division, corps, or army to which it was assigned. Someone outside of that chain of command could make suggestions and requests, but not orders - regardless of which branch he belonged to.

Moving upwards in the chain of command, you see officers from all sorts of backgrounds becoming corps or army commanders (during Chickamauga Thomas amused himself with personally aiming a section of guns for a while - he was essentially an artillary officer and that's where he felt most comfortable). Sheridan became famous for his last command, as a cavalry commander in the East, but for most of the war he was an infantry officer in the West.

 

[ole]

Lee was made a bird colonel by Lincoln shortly before he resigned his commission. He was a Light Colonel when he was in Texas.

As RHP has noted, someone of rank had to die before underlings could move up and, as there was no pension, few resigned except by passing on.

When a general assumed room temperature, the highest ranking colonel was promoted. The highest-ranking Lt. Colonel took his place and a Major got that spot. And so on.

Promotion was very slow. It took the war to advance most.

 

[prroh]

It has been my understanding that a line officer has command precedence in the field as a staff officer would simply not be in the chain of command of a line officer. There were cases like Henry Hunt, a staff officer in the AoP, who also had line authority as commander of the artillery reserve. Thus , at Gettysburg, he could give direct orders to the Reserve and make suggestions to organic Corps artillery. This chain of command caused a bit of a tiff with Hancock during the battle when he ordered a Reserve battery to fire but the battery commander refused , saying he had orders from General Hunt NOT to fire. A wise move, as incurring Hunt's wrath was a fearsome prospect.

At Chancellorsville, Hooker had reorganized his artillery so as to be totally assigned to the Corps. Hunt was strictly a staff officer so could issue no orders. Hooker saw the impracticality of this organization and restored hunt to command of the Reserve. The Reserve had the flexibility of being placed where needed on the battlefield with no concern about Corps boundaries.

 

[prroh]

Even within the same unit, staff officers such as chaplains, quartermasters, paymasters, surgeons had no authority over line officers and men, unless detailed to them.

 

[M E Wolf]

O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXX/3 [S# 52]
CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN KENTUCKY, SOUTHWEST VIRGINIA, TENNESSEE, MISSISSIPPI, NORTH ALABAMA, AND NORTH GEORGIA, FROM AUGUST 11, 1863, TO OCTOBER 19, 1863.--UNION CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.(*)--#16

HEADQUARTERS, ETC.,
Poe's Tavern, September 6, 1863.
Lieut. Col. C. GODDARD,
Assistant Adjutant-General:
In my communication of yesterday setting forth reasons why the grounds that General Wagner sets up for claiming seniority of rank, viz, seniority of rank as colonel, are not those upon which the rank of general officers whose appointments bear the same date are regulated, but are regulated by the order of appointment, I might have added as follows, which is a case of precisely similar character:

Of the brigadier-generals appointed to rank from May 17, 1861, are the following, in the order of rank as below: Don Carlos Buell, Thomas W. Sherman, John Pope. Then comes among others of the same date: Montgomery, Kearny, Phelps, Grant, Couch, Hurlbut, Sigel, Prentiss, Kelley, McClernand, and others, all of whom were colonels of volunteers while Buell and Sherman were lieutenant-colonels, and Pope was a captain, perhaps a Missouri colonel of junior date; I think, however, he was a captain. The cases are habitual that general officers whose commissions bear the same date rank as arranged by the orders of appointments, or as fixed by the appointing power, which may or may not be according to previous rank.
I am, very respectfully,
W. B. HAZEN,
Brigadier-General.
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O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXVIII/5 [S# 76]
UNION CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN, FROM JULY 1, 1864, TO SEPTEMBER 8, 1864.(*)--#32
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
Near Lovejoy's Station, Ga., September 4, 1864.
Maj. Gen. W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi:
GENERAL: In compliance with your request, I have the honor to submit my views upon the questions of rank arising under the act of Congress approved April 4,1862. These questions may be thus stated:

First. When a corps is temporarily detached from the army to which it belongs to operate with another army, whose commander is assigned by the President, under the act of April 4, 1862, but who is junior by commission to the corps commander, is this corps commander entitled by law to command the combined force?

Second. Is there any provision of law for such command?

The first question can probably best be answered, and the difficulty of the second illustrated by considering a case which has occurred and which is likely to be a very common one. General A commands an army consisting of two corps, whose commanders, Generals B and C, are senior by commission to General A. General D commands a corps of another army and is senior to General A but junior to Generals B and C. General D's corps is detached and ordered to operate with General A's army. The sixty-second Article of War directs that in such case the officer highest in rank by commission there on duty shall command the combined force, "unless otherwise specially directed by the President of the United States." But the officer highest in rank is General B or C, who must therefore command (according to the sixty-second Article of War), unless otherwise specially directed by the President. But neither General B nor C can take the command, for the President has otherwise directed by making them subordinate-to General A, under the act of April 4. And there is no provision of law whatever that would give the command to General D, notwithstanding the fact that he is senior to General A, for he is junior to both General B and General C, hence the combined force can have no commander unless it be General A. I think, therefore, it is clear that the law of April 4, 1862, in giving through the President's order an officer command over his seniors by commission, abrogates the sixty-second Article of War so far as it relates to himself and other officers of the same grade who are not commanding under the law of April 4.

The second question is not so clear. There is an apparent conflict between the sixty-second Article of War and the act of April 4, 1862, which seems to leave a combined force such as I have supposed without a commander provided for it by law. But in my opinion this conflict is not real. The Article of War itself gives the President the power to direct otherwise than according to the general rule, which I understand to mean simply that he may direct the senior not to assume command of all the forces but, leave each under its own commander, and the act of April 4 gives him the additional power to assign a junior officer to the command whenever military operations may require the presence of two or more officers of the same grade in the same field. The President, in pursuance of this law, has assigned a commander to each of three armies or departments (the armies consisting simply of the troops serving in those departments and determined not by the President but by the General-in-Chief of all the armies, or other superior officer having direction of military operations in the three departments), and has assigned a general to command the three departments, combined under the name of a military division, and to direct the operations of the combined armies as general-in-chief. Under the authority conferred by the act of Congress, and the discretion given him in the Article of War, he has provided in advance for the very case in point by naming three army commanders to be next in authority and responsibility to the general-in-chief in the order of their rank, and superior in both authority and responsibility to all other officers; and has given to the general-in-chief authority to combine or separate, detach or unite, his three armies, or any part of them, on any field, as in his judgment "military operations may require." The President has assigned in advance the commanders of the forces which military operations may require to be united on any field, and has left it to his generals-in-chief to judge when, whose, and what forces shall be united. The evident object of the law of April 4, 1862, was to give the President the power to select from all the major-generals of the army those in his judgment most competent to direct the operations of the separate armies, and the power thus given has been habitually exercised. If, when the exigencies of the service require a temporary increase of one of these armies, which is likely to occur only at the most critical periods of a campaign, the army commander selected by the President can be superseded by an officer who has never been intrusted with more than a subordinate command, the object of the law is defeated and the President's selection is of no avail at the most critical moment. It must be observed that, if the sixty-second Article of War was alone taken as the law, a major-general commanding a division in one army might assume command of another army whenever the accidents of a battle should separate him from his own army and throw him in contact with another.

Finally, it is my opinion that the act of April 4, 1862, must be construed as creating, in effect, an additional grade in the army, viz, that of department or army commander superior to that determined by commission alone.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Major-General, Commanding.
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