Unified Command vs Interservice Rivalry

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

One of the major problems the Union had during the American Civil War was interservice rivalry between the Army and Navy. The two could collaborate successfully (ex: Grant & Foote), but frequently refused to do so and the regional commanders often held animosity for one another. They wanted the glory for their service and felt other service was trying to use them.

While interservice rivalry never went away at least during WW2 the US assigned theater commanders who had authority over all branches in their area. A single Defense Department wasn't created until 1947.

1. Why were the Army/War and Navy departments created separate in the first place in 1789? Interservice rivalry from the beginning? Copying the British or French organizational model?

2. I know some nations with advanced militaries were still behind the US in terms of interservice cooperation. Japan's Army-Navy rivalry was especially severe during WW2, with no unified command whatsoever. But what about other major powers like the British, French, Russians, and Prussians/Germans? Did they have separate Army and Navy departments in the 19th century? Did any of them use the equivalent of unified commands, either theater-wide or operation-specific? The British conducted some pretty effective combined operations in the War of 1812.

 

[Carronade]

As you mention, most countries had separate armies and navies. "Everybody does it that way" isn't always the best reasoning, but there was little reason for the new nation not to follow the example they were familiar with. And of course much of the work of armies or navies was/is not that closely connected with the other.

 

[Belfoured]

One of the major problems the Union had during the American Civil War was interservice rivalry between the Army and Navy. The two could collaborate successfully (ex: Grant & Foote), but frequently refused to do so and the regional commanders often held animosity for one another. They wanted the glory for their service and felt other service was trying to use them.

While interservice rivalry never went away at least during WW2 the US assigned theater commanders who had authority over all branches in their area. A single Defense Department wasn't created until 1947.

1. Why were the Army/War and Navy departments created separate in the first place in 1789? Interservice rivalry from the beginning? Copying the British or French organizational model?

2. I know some nations with advanced militaries were still behind the US in terms of interservice cooperation. Japan's Army-Navy rivalry was especially severe during WW2, with no unified command whatsoever. But what about other major powers like the British, French, Russians, and Prussians/Germans? Did they have separate Army and Navy departments in the 19th century? Did any of them use the equivalent of unified commands, either theater-wide or operation-specific? The British conducted some pretty effective combined operations in the War of 1812.

Technical point: At the time Foote was subject to army control, not the USN. That didn't change for the "Brown Water Navy" until late Summer/early Fall 1862. Porter and Grant at Vicksburg would fit.

 

[Carronade]

One of my favorite military aphorisms is from Napoleon; he was speaking of armies, but it would apply even more to multi-service operations. He said he would rather entrust command of an army to one bad general than two good ones.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

One of my favorite military aphorisms is from Napoleon; he was speaking of armies, but it would apply even more to multi-service operations. He said he would rather entrust command of an army to one bad general than two good ones.

There was an instance in the Civil War where two generals were instructed to "cooperate" in a campaign. One sent back a reply that he would gladly have the other as his subordinate or would gladly report to him as his superior, but damned if he was going to "cooperate" with anyone.

And he was right. No matter how cooperative and respectful two commanders, heck any two people, might be sooner or later they will disagree and one must have the authority to make a decision (and suffer the consequences if they decide wrong).

 

[leftyhunter]

One of the major problems the Union had during the American Civil War was interservice rivalry between the Army and Navy. The two could collaborate successfully (ex: Grant & Foote), but frequently refused to do so and the regional commanders often held animosity for one another. They wanted the glory for their service and felt other service was trying to use them.

While interservice rivalry never went away at least during WW2 the US assigned theater commanders who had authority over all branches in their area. A single Defense Department wasn't created until 1947.

1. Why were the Army/War and Navy departments created separate in the first place in 1789? Interservice rivalry from the beginning? Copying the British or French organizational model?

2. I know some nations with advanced militaries were still behind the US in terms of interservice cooperation. Japan's Army-Navy rivalry was especially severe during WW2, with no unified command whatsoever. But what about other major powers like the British, French, Russians, and Prussians/Germans? Did they have separate Army and Navy departments in the 19th century? Did any of them use the equivalent of unified commands, either theater-wide or operation-specific? The British conducted some pretty effective combined operations in the War of 1812.

Paging @Saphroneth @67th Tigers @thomas aagaard .
Leftyhunter

 

[Saphroneth]

My understanding is that in general the British (for example) did not have institutionalized integrated command, largely because in most situations either the Army or the Navy was overwhelmingly dominant in any given sequence of operations. This is partly because of (as Hearts of Oak boasts) most navies who fought the Royal Navy ended up being run to shore and didn't come out to fight again.

That being said, in some of the operations of the Crimean War and the wars in China (for example) there are signs of interservice cooperation. There doesn't seem to be all that much friction, but this might be because most of the actions are comparatively small-scale (and thus can be a bit informal), though this is conjecture; it seems like in practice they knew who was in command and whoever was in command knew to defer to whoever was the relevant expert.


One interesting thing though is that it's not until the post-Crimea reforms that there's integrated command within the British Army. Wellington had to deal with something like nine separate departments under him, some of them only practically (and not theoretically) under him...



To be honest, I suspect the reason the US Army didn't get this sorted out formally is the same reason the British didn't. Despite the experience of the ACW the US Army for most of its existence is as much a kind of gendarmerie as anything (though in expeditions into the interior and the near-abroad rather than directly handling subjects and protecting interests all around the world) and so most operations have a decidedly small character - for the British it's an ad-hoc army of a few brigades being dropped off at a port to march fifty or so miles inland and sort out some issue or other, for the Americans it's half a regular army regiment marching two hundred miles west from Fort Leavenworth to see what the Indians have done this time (or in one case an ad-hoc army of a few regiments marching several hundred miles west to see what Brigham Young has done this time).

 

[wausaubob]

Its an interesting subject. Grant eventually solved the inter service co-operation issue by assigning commanders with little independent reputation, such as Granger and Terry to assist the navy in closing the last two blockade ports. Those were essentially naval actions.
However the situation in Virginia, and Georgia, in 1864, seems to have been different.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Its an interesting subject. Grant eventually solved the inter service co-operation issue by assigning commanders with little independent reputation, such as Granger and Terry to assist the navy in closing the last two blockade ports. Those were essentially naval actions.
However the situation in Virginia, and Georgia, in 1864, seems to have been different.

Pretty certain Grant didn't assign Granger.

 

[wausaubob]

Pretty certain Grant didn't assign Granger.

Someone did. Anyway between Farragut and Granger, it was no question who was in charge.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Pretty certain Grant didn't assign Granger.

I thought Granger waa transferred from Cumberland to Gulf because his behavior had displeased Grant at Orchard Knob. Then it was Canby who would have assigned him to the Mobile operation, with only a few thousand men plus siege artillery.

 

[wausaubob]

John Rawlins most likely did not like Granger. But Grant kept Granger on hand, for assignments like this. Granger was known to send a few drunken telegrams, is my recollection. Mobile Bay was a navy operation, and the armies roll was to isolate the forts in the sequence created by the navy.