Totopotomoy Creek

[1SGDan]

Totopotomoy Creek – Introduction

The late spring of 1864 saw General U.S. Grant's Overland Campaign once again stalled against General R. E. Lee's impressive defense on the North Anna River. After bloody encounters with Lee's Army of Northern Virginia in the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Courthouse Granted opted not to challenge the Confederate works at Ox Ford. Despite a few successes, like Warren's seizure of a crossing at Jericho Mills and especially by his cavalry under new commander General Philip Sheridan at Beaver Dam Station, Yellow Tavern and the breakout from Meadow Bridge, Grant instead opted to once again sidle away from the enemy to avoid the severe losses that he felt a direct confrontation would entail. Consulting with Meade and Engineer Cyrus Comstock they discussed the best way to turn Lee out of his position. Comstock recorded the basic nature of the talks;

"At night Gen. (Grant) decided to attempt performing a crossing at Pamunkey (River) near Hanovertown. I spoke of this to Meade day before yesterday. He thought as I did that it was the decidedly the best flank to turn."[1]

Grant, nevertheless, considered all options and after reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of each and wrote to Major General Henry Halleck in Washington;

"I have determined, therefore, to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near Hanovertown."[2]

The plan was to seize crossings of the Pamunkey River at New Castle Ferry and Dabney Ferry approximately fifteen miles southeast from their position at the North Anna. The move required that Grant recover two separated forces already across the river. A difficult maneuver when the opposing forces were so closely engaged. The intricate maneuver demanded a precise plan — at 10 a.m. on May 26th the following order was issued.

Orders.] Headquarters Army of the Potomac,

The following movements are ordered:

1. The Sixth Corps will be withdrawn at dark by Jericho Bridge, and follow the route of Russell's division, via Chesterfield Station, to Hanovertown, taking the road nearest the Pamunkey River. The train of the corps will join it at Chesterfield Station.

2. The Fifth Corps will be withdrawn at dark by Quarles' Ford Bridge, and pass, via Old Chesterfield, to New Castle Ferry, on the Pamunkey, below Hanovertown, by roads to be examined to-day by the engineers, and respecting which further instructions will be given. The route of the Fifth Corps will be to the northward and eastward of the route of the Sixth Corps. The wooden pontoons forming Jericho Bridge, and as many others as are available, will accompany the Fifth Corps. Should there be any surplus canvas pontoons with the cavalry at Hanovertown crossing, they may be obtained for the use of the Fifth Corps, if required for the bridge at New Castle.

3. Crittenden's division, of the Ninth Corps, will be withdrawn at dark. The Ninth Corps will hold the fords and crossings from Ox Ford to Jericho Mills.

4. The Second Corps and Willcox's division, of the Ninth Corps, will be withdrawn at an hour to be hereafter indicated. The Second Corps will hold the fords and crossings below Ox Ford.

5. When the roads taken by the Fifth and Sixth Corps are clear, the Ninth Corps will follow the Fifth Corps to New Castle Ferry, and the Second Corps will follow the Sixth Corps to Hanovertown. The withdrawal of these two corps from the river and their movements by the route indicated will be simultaneous. The corps commanders will act in concert. As soon as it can be done without interfering with the trains and movements of the Fifth and Sixth Corps, the trains and surplus artillery of the Ninth and Second Corps will be moved to the roads these corps will take. All bridges will be removed when the troops recross to the north bank of the North Anna.

6. The division of cavalry on the right will hold the various fords and bridges as they are successively abandoned from Butler's Ford down and cover the rear of the army.

7. Headquarters will be during the movement on the route of the Sixth and Second Corps.

8. The supply and other main trains of the army will be moved to-night by Bowling Green, along the north or east bank of the Mattapony to Dunkirk or that vicinity, and thence to Hanovertown. A pontoon train will accompany them.

By command of Major-General Meade:

S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant- General. Headquarters Army of the Potomac

Quite naturally such an intricate movement in the face of the enemy could not be reduced to eight simple paragraphs. A long series of messages seeking clarification of several issues began to flow in from the subordinate corps commanders. One by one the issues were resolved, and the movement began after dark.

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[1] The Diary of Cyrus B. Comstock, compiled and edited by Merle E. Sumner, Morningside Press, 1987, Page 269
[2] OR, Volume XXXVI, Part 3, Grant to Halleck, page 206

 

[1SGDan]

Totopotomoy Creek - Sheridan leads the way
With his plan for removing his forces from the dangerous situation across the river matured, Grant now could concentrate on his planned movement in earnest. His newly recovered cavalry, just back from their successful raid toward Richmond was to lead the way. Despite the fatigued troopers and exhausted mounts they departed on two separate missions to kick off the latest effort to turn Lee's right flank. In an effort to confuse Lee about his planned scheme of maneuver Brigadier General James Wilson's two brigade, 3rd division, headed west toward Little River to try and convince Lee that he intended to attack the left flank of his defense at the ford. Other portions of Sheridan's force would travel east towards Littlepage Bridge and Taylor's Ford. The two were located just below the confluence of the North and South Anna rivers and formed the Pamunkey River they represented the closest crossings of the river on Lee's right flank. Both moves were intended to freeze Lee in place while he determined were the actual threat was the greatest.

Wilson's diversionary raid amounted to very little. After crossing the North Anna at Jericho Mills he marched to make his demonstration on the Confederate left. He searched in vain for a crossing point of the Little River but the incessant rains had swollen the stream to make the fords impracticable and all the bridges had been destroyed by the Confederate defenders. Determined to accomplish something of his assigned mission he "made a show of it at Owen's and Cooks Fords"[1] by crossing dismounted troopers over the stream on a fallen tree and creating the appearance of following infantry by setting fires to indicate their presence. It came to naught and after some light skirmishing he returned to the other side of the North Anna by 11:30 p.m.
By this time in the campaign the dependence on the bridging assets was so complete that some commanders began to miss important details. General Wilson, of the cavalry, called for a bridge to be sent to Butler's Mill on the North Anna for passage of his troops after their diversionary raid. Captain Personius moved his train to the appointed location only to find that a good permanent bridge already existed and his train was not needed. He dispatched a messenger to guide Wilson to the bridge.


Sheridan's remaining forces, the 1st division, under Brigadier General Alfred Torbert and 2nd division commanded by Brigadier General David Gregg, assembled for a march southeast from Chesterfield Station down Ridge Road heading directly for Littlepage Bridge. At 5:30 a.m. on the 26th Lieutenant Colonel Ira Spaulding, of the 50th New York engineers, received orders to supply two canvas boat trains to unite with Sheridan's column at their departure point. Spaulding selected the two canvas trains of the Reserve Battalion for the task. Second corps commander, Major General Hancock, fearing his soldiers would be trapped on the far side of the river, disagreed with the removal of his bridges without replacement;

Headquarters Second Army Corps, May 26, 1864—7.50 a. in.

General Williams: I found accidentally this morning that my canvas bridge train was being taken up by order of Major Duane. I telegraphed to the major last night that I would spare these bridges as fast as the pontoons came to replace them. I do not think it prudent to take these bridges up until the others are on the ground, and have therefore ordered them to remain.

WINFD S. HANCOCK[2]

Understanding Hancock's concern the for immediate removal of both bridges the order was revised;

Headquarters Army of the Potomac May 26, 1864—8 a. m.

Major-General Hancock: Your dispatch of 7.50 a. m. received. The commanding general directs that one of your bridges be immediately taken up. It is expected that it will soon be replaced by another pontoon bridge, but meanwhile the general desires you to proceed to make a wooden bridge.

S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General.[3]

Accordingly Captain Martin Van Brocklin's canvas train No. 5 was immediately released and he began the march to Chesterfield Station His bridge was later replaced by the wooden pontoon train of Major Edmund Beers. The departure of Captain William Folwell's canvas train No.4 was delayed as he waited for Captain James McDonald's wooden train (No. 3) to be called forward from Wright's Tavern to replace his canvas bridge. McDonald arrived at the river at 11 a.m. and by noon Folwell had dismantled his bridge and was on the move to join Sheridan. Arriving at Chesterfield Station Folwell fell in behind Van Brocklin's wagons.

Sheridan needing mounts for his dash to the crossing near Hanovertown ordered Brigadier General Gregg to dismount the newly arrived 13th Pennsylvania Cavalry "and its horses turned over to the dismounted veterans of your command."[4] With all the necessary pieces in place Sheridan's march departed Chesterfield Station at dusk. The first order of business were demonstrations at Littlepage Bridge and Taylor's Ford. Major General David Gregg's 2nd Division troopers were assigned the effort at Littlepage Bridge. At the bridge site Gregg's men met a small group of Confederate troopers from the 2nd Virginia Cavalry on the other bank. With the bridge long since destroyed and the river raging from the incessant rains there was little hope of either side making any cross river venture. Gregg posted a guard with instructions to dig in and keep watch to prevent the Confederates from attempting to cross and interdict Grant's movements. Across the river the Virginians did the same. Realizing that no action was possible under the conditions that existed the remainder of Gregg's division left the guard and hustled on to catch the main column.

The second diversion was the responsibility of Major General Alfred Torbert's 1st Division. At the intersection of Ridge Road and the road leading to the ford Torbert detached Colonel James Anderson's 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry to make the demonstration there. The Pennsylvanians arrived at the ford as darkness was beginning to settle in. Peering across the swollen river in the fading light they spied troopers from the 5th Virginia Cavalry. The Virginians staring back mistakenly took the Union riders for friendly troops and called over to them. The resulting back and forth shouting match was the full extent of the showdown there. Understanding the small opposing force and the condition of the river made a cross river foray unlikely Anderson detached a squadron to watch over the crossing and rode off to catch Sheridan with the remainder of his regiment.

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[1] Report of Brigadier James H. Wilson, OR, Vol. 36, Part 1 Page 880
[2] OR, Vol. 36, Part 3, Hancock to Williams, Page 212
[3] Ibid.
[4] OR, Vol. 36, Part 3, Kingsbury to Gregg, Page 230. The dismounted men of the 13th and all others without mounts were assigned to report to a dismounted battalion at Wright's Tavern with orders to escort the supply trains to and from Port Royal.

 

[1SGDan]

Infantry movements begin

Behind the cavalry screen Brigadier General David Russell's 1st Division of infantry, of Major General Horatio Wright's 6th Corps, was ordered to evacuate their positions to lead the infantry vanguard to the real object of Grant's plan. A member of the 49th Pennsylvania Infantry, Brigadier General Henry Eustis' 3rd Brigade, recalled the preparations "…orders at 9 o'clock (A.M.) to pack up at 10 o'clock, it has been raining very hard for an hour, we recrossed the North Anna and marched to Chesterfield Station."[1]

The division was scheduled to follow the same route as the cavalry advance. They were accompanied by two batteries of artillery (1st Rhode Island Light Battery E and 1st Ohio Light Battery H) and prepared to depart. At 9 p.m. Russell's men started their march for the lower Pamunkey crossings by destroying the station. The march was a rapid one in the forlorn hope of keeping pace with the leading cavalry. The pace was well remembered by the artillerymen. "After firing the buildings at the station we started at nine o'clock and marched all night, sometimes mounting the cannoneers and moving at a trot."[2] Nearly every soldier involved in the forced march that night remembered it. The rapid pace of the march made a very distinct impression on the newly arrived 2nd Connecticut Heavy Artillery, of Brigadier Emory Upton's 2nd Brigade. Unaccustomed to heavy field duty the march down the left bank of the Pamunkey was a horrid experience. The regimental history recorded their feelings in 1868;

"…if all the regiment were summoned – the living and the dead – and notified that all their marches except one must be performed over again and they might choose which one should be omitted the almost unanimous cry would be 'Deliver us from the accursed night march along the Pamunkey!'[3]

Before the main movement could begin the drenching rains continued. The pontoon bridges over the North Anna became subject to intense concern. The raging current and debris swept into the river could cause serious damage to the structures. Accordingly, engineer details at the bridges were strengthened and as a general rule under these circumstances men were posted upstream from the spans to watch for and intercept any threatening debris. At Quarle's Mill Captain Hine replaced eighty feet of pontoon bridge with a corduroy span to strengthen the structure, which totaled over 350 feet of crib and corduroy works. The necessary access roads to the crossings were improved or others constructed, including a "side hill road leading from the bridge at Jericho Mills (a heavy piece of work)"[4] but the violent rains made maintenance of the existing roads and bridges "a matter of extreme labor and anxiety."[5]

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[1] History of the 49th Pennsylvania Volunteers, Robert Westbrook, 1898, Page 203
[2] The History of Battery E, First Regiment of Rhode Island Light Artillery, George Lewis, 1892. Page 305.
[3] History of the Second Connecticut Heavy Artillery, Theodore F. Vaill, 1868, Page 54
[4] OR, Vol. 36, Part 1, Report of Lieutenant Colonel Ira Spaulding, Page 311
[5] Ibid.

 

[1SGDan]

Lee Senses Trouble

The first indication of something happening came as a result of an order for all Union trains and excess artillery to be moved north of the river. While the wagons and guns using the bridges at Jericho Mills and Quarles Mill were safe from Confederate scrutiny those of Hancock'c Corps were not. The unusually heavy traffic quickly caught the attention of Ewell's and Anderson's pickets. This information was forwarded up the chain to Lee's headquarters. Although seriously ill Lee intuitively knew that the increased activity indicated something, but was not sure what. He determined that what was desperately needed was further information. Lee ordered Ewell and Anderson to step up picket activity in an effort to discover what Hancock might be up to. He also ordered his cavalry to remain active and scout along the Pamunkey as far south as Hanovertown. In a remarkably clairvoyant move he directed his chief engineer Martin Smith, to have a footbridge constructed over the South Anna River in the eventuality that he should have to move in that direction.

In obedience to Lee's order Anderson directed Kershaw's division to advance skirmishers to see if Hancock's line had been diminished. The confederate skirmishers moved into some advanced rifle pits but were soon challenged by the Union pickets. The 6th New Hampshire Infantry recorded;

"The enemy disposed to be troublesome, General Potter, our division commander, decided to advance his line and give the 'Johnnies' something to do. The advance was made in the afternoon under a hot fire, the rebels falling back to their heavy works."[1]

The Granite Staters were joined in their advance by the 7th Rhode Island Infantry who later wrote of the event:

"…505 men were sent out and moved forward. As they cleared the edge of the wood to cross a narrow opening the enemy's pickets in the border of the opposite grove opened a heavy fire , but our men pressed forward so close they discovered the enemy was strongly entrenched. Their position was thus shown to be untenable consequently they retired."[2]

The brief show of uncharacteristic aggressiveness indicated to Lee that an assault on his line in that area was being planned. He urged Anderson to remain alert, but no attack followed. Co into convinced that the activity in this sector indicated a prelude to assault Lee ordered another probe along Ewell's portion of the line. At 6 p.m. Ewell's skirmishers were repelled and a second attempt an hour later was also dismissed. Shortly after Ewell's failed efforts Kershaw's renewed attempt at Potter's line was also repelled. Hancock seeking to gain some space for the impending move ordered Colonel Thomas A. Symth to advance with the 69th Pennsylvania. 170th New York, and two companies of the 14th Connecticut and drive the Confederates back. The 14th Connecticut remembered the push;

"... the left wing of the regiment made a charge on the enemy's works to dislodge some Confederates who had establish(ed) a post of observation directly in front."[3]

Nearby the 12th New Jersey and 1st Delaware cleared enemy skirmishers from the Doswell fields and gave the Federals clear control of the Doswell farm. While a seemingly unimportant series of actions they played greatly in the grand scheme of things. It allowed room for Hancock to execute his march away from the North Anna unbothered and most of all clouded Lee's mind about what was actually going on. As a precaution he ordered his cavalry to picket the Pamunkey as far down stream as Hanovertown.

Pondering the situation Lee figured that since Hancock was still in his front and acting aggressively there was no movement happening there, but no activity on the northern side of his defensive wedge meant something different. He assumed since the bulk of the Union forces he faced were there it could only mean a movement was in the works. Reports of Wilson's Cavalry activity at the Little River seemed to indicate a move in that direction. He wrote to James Seddon, Confederate Secretary of War;

"…from the present indications he seems to contemplate a movement on our left flank." [4]

But Wright and Warren were not moving so Lee had to wait until Grant's intent became clear before he could decide on his next move.

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[1] History of the Sixth New Hampshire Regiment in the War for the Union, Lyman Jackman, Republican Press Association, 1891, page 268.
[2] The Seventh Regiment Rhode Island Volunteers in the Civil War, Williams P. Hopkins, The Providence Prees, 1903, Page 179
[3] History of the Fourteenth Regiment Connecticut Infantry, Charles D. Page, The Horizon Printing Company, 1906, Page 261.
[4] OR, Vol 36, Part 3, Lee to Secretary of War, Page 834.

 

[1SGDan]

In the way of explanation this series of posts is in answer to question asked some time ago now, Is the North Anna Operation interesting? While I had no doubt about it, I began to reread the operations there. This may not be the highlight of the Overland Campaign but it certainly drew my interest.

 

[1SGDan]

The Army of the Potomac Leaves Ox Ford

The heavy rains continued to create the possibility of the troops on the southern side of Lee's defense being trapped on the far side of the river. Accordingly Major-General Burnside requested from Major-General Hancock that a portion of Major Brainerd's battalion be lent to him for the construction of a crib bridge to provide an escape route for his forward deployed men. With the permission of Hancock, Brainerd released two companies of his command to go to the assistance of Burnside. The proposed bridge location made the construction of a pontoon bridge impractical, so a crib bridge was necessary. Construction was begun late on the evening of the 25th when:

"Trees were chopped down, cut to the proper length and notched, some cutting, some rolling them to the water, while others in the water placed them in position and others found stone and filled the cribs to sink and hold them in their places. The cribs were 6 ft. wide by 10 ft. long placed lengthwise with the stream and 14 ft. apart. On and across these cribs were placed heavy logs and they in turn covered crosswise with smaller ones thus forming a corduroy road, high and dry above the water." [1]

The work was continued through the night and completed in a driving thunderstorm. "Occasional flashes of lightning revealed the men hard at work in the rolling torrent"[2] of water. Construction continued through the storm and darkness and by morning the crossing was complete much to the delight of Burnside who invited the soaking wet Brainerd to breakfast to express his gratitude with a cup of coffee and some whiskey from his flask. By mid-morning the exhausted engineers were returned to their bridges as promised in the deal between the two Corps commanders. Burnside acknowledged Hancock's assistance in his report stating "I am indebted to Major General Hancock, of the Second Corps, for the loan of a portion of his engineer corps, who assisted in building the bridge across the river during the night."[3]

Final preparations for the move away from Ox Ford continued with yet another mission for the engineers. "General Hancock desired me to build a floating bridge sufficient to cross the last picket line"[4]after the remainder of his troops had departed and the wooden bridge removed. Once the last man was over the new bridge could then be cut away to be destroyed by the raging water. Major Brainerd assigned the construction of this bridge to Captain Michael McGrath and left basic instructions before leaving to get a few hours of rest. The episode almost spelled disaster for Hancock's 2nd Corps. When Brainerd returned about two hours later he found that an extremely dangerous situation was developing. Captain McGrath had constructed a raft long enough to cross the stream on squared timbers about for feet wide and was about to launch it across the stream with several men holding the downstream end while others were about to push the other end to allow the current to push the span across. Brainerd realized to his horror that no effort had been made to tether it against the possibility of it being torn away the force of the current. As the structure was upstream from the pontoon bridge it posed a serious threat. The strength of the current would surely push the loose raft through the pontoons destroying the bridge and stranding Hancock's men on the far side. Brainerd leapt into action;

"Fortunately there happened to be a piece of rope lying on the bank. Seizing one end of this I ran out on the raft and secured it and then ran back and took a turn around a tree. By this time the farther end of the raft was swinging across the stream at a fearful rate. The rope straightened as the other end struck the shore. Then the force of the current, which was very great, bent down the middle of the raft, completely submerging it and drawing the rope out as taunt as a violin string. Smaller and smaller it grew until I expected every moment to see it snap. That was an anxious minute."[5]

Fortunately the rope held fast and disaster was avoided. Brainerd then had the raft more tightly secured and the far end released to swing downstream to the near shore. The project was abandoned and Hancock told that the current and the remaining time available made further efforts of this nature impractical. Hancock adopted a revised plan. Artillery was placed to cover the pontoon bridge while the last of the pickets were recovered from the far side.

That night under the cover of a pouring rain the movement began. Union forces on the north side of Lee's wedge shaped defense were removed by crossing the pontoon bridges at Jericho Mills and Quarles Mills. The pontoons at Quarles Mills were removed and replaced by Captain Hine, of the 50th New York Engineers, with a corduroy structure, to be destroyed upon departure of the last pickets. Access roads to the crossings had been improved or constructed, including a "side hill road leading from the bridge at Jericho Mills (a heavy piece of work)" [6] built by Major Ford's detachment of engineers. Rains in the afternoon swelled the river and made maintenance of the installed bridges and roads "a matter of extreme labor and anxiety."[7]

Despite the foul weather the operation began shortly after darkness fell. Wright's 6th Corps marched undetected to Jericho Mills under the protection of a picket screen held by the 110th Ohio and 4th Vermont. The movement went smoothly and Lieutenant Colonel Otho Binkley, commanding the picket force reported simply "about 11 o'clock at night I withdrew the pickets, (and) recrossed the North Anna."[8] The movement was off to a good start. After a brief delay waiting for the 6th Corps to clear the roads Warren's 5th Corps began their withdrawal. As the trenches emptied a picket force under the command of Lieutenant Colonel William Throop stretched out to cover nearly two miles of entrenchments. The Confederates made no action to indicate that they were suspicious of the movement so Throop slowly began removing the pickets until only a small group was left. These dashed across the river at dawn and the engineers quickly dismantled the bridges. Remarkably two corps had slipped away without apparent notice by the enemy.

Removal of the lower portion of the Union position created a bigger problem. The close proximity of the opposing forces and open terrain left any movement in clear sight of the Confederates. Hancock's 2nd corps had four divisions[9] to remove and it had to be done quickly before any attack by the nearby Confederates could be organized. Each division was assigned a specific route to one of the four available bridges[10]. Hancock's move began shortly after 9 p.m. At 10 p.m. Brigadier General John Gibbon's 2nd division with two batteries began crossing the lowest pontoon bridge. Brigadier General Francis Barlow's 1st division, also with two batteries of artillery moved to the pontoon bridge above Gibbon. Potter's 9th Corps division with two batteries used a pontoon bridge and the Chesterfield Bridge to cross the North Anna. As each of these divisions moved Major General David Birney's 3rd division troops extended to occupy the abandoned trenches. Near dawn the last of Birney's pickets and the final Union troops crossed the Chesterfield Bridge and set it ablaze. Another bout of rain quickly killed the flames but members of the 7th New York Heavy artillery managed to pullup the wet decking and set the substructure on fire. Unfortunately the fire spread too quickly spelling disaster for the picket troops of the 32nd Maine.

"The picket-line was long, and before the officers were able to convey the order to retire, along its whole extent, and the men could struggle through the darkness back to the bridge, the fires had been already lighted. And when they emerged from the forest, upon the river bank, the flames were already curling around brace and stringer, and blazing above plank and piling, and their retreat was cut off. The lurid light of the burning timbers fell upon the turbid and swollen waters with a sullen glare, as if to show them how hopeless was any effort to escape. There was death in the swirling and angry river at their feet, and behind them was a less merciful and slower death in the hells of Andersonville and Salisbury prisons."[11]

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[1] Brainerd, Page 226
[2] Ibid.
[3] OR, Vol XXXVI, Part 1, Report of Major General Ambrose Burnside, Page 913
[4] Brainerd, Page 227
[5] Ibid. Page 228
[6] OR, Vol XXXVI, Part 1, Report of Lieutenant Colonel Ira Spaulding, Page 311
[7] Ibid.
[8] OR, Vol XXXVI, Part 1, Report of Lieutenant Colonel Otho Binkley, Page 743
[9] Brigadier General Robert Potter's 2nd Division of 9th Corps was temporarily assigned to Hancock. The remainder of 9th Corps was stationed north of the river.
[10] Three pontoon bridges and Chesterfield Bridge which had been seized intact earlier in the campaign, but was easily targeted by enemy batteries.
[11] The Thirty-Second Maine Regiment of Volunteers, Henry Houston, Press of the Southworth Brothers 1903, page 228. Indeed George W. Wilson and James K. P. Whitten, both being privates in Company C perished at Andersonville.

 

[1SGDan]

Breaching the Pamunkey

Dawn of the 27th saw Sheridan's cavalry vanguard at Dabney Ferry across the Pamunkey from Hanovertown. After a failed attempt by Custer to swim his horse across the river the cavalry commanders gathered to discuss the way to proceed. At that moment Confederate cavalry from Colonel John Baker's brigade of North Carolina Cavalry were patrolling the opposite side of the river. The 5th North Carolina Regiment deployed to challenge a crossing. They exchanged shots across the river with Company C, 1st Michigan cavalry. The rapid fire of the Wolverines fire proved too much for the Confederates and they backed away from the river. At the rear of the Union column Captain Van Brockin assembled two of his canvas boats and his engineers carry them to the river. Troopers from the 1st Michigan boarded the boats and headed across the river to establish a bridgehead. Surging from the boats on the far shore the area was swept clean of Confederate troopers. Van Brocklin dashed his train to the bank of the river and, under harassing long range fire had a 180 foot span complete in an hour. One engineer soldier was shot during the construction of the bridge.[1]

The rapidly assembled bridge allowed the cavalry to charge across the river. Colonel Peter Stagg's 1st Michigan Cavalry troopers led the way, followed quickly by the remainder of Custer's brigade. The rest of Torbert's division also crossed and set about to secure the bridgehead. By 9 a.m. Sheridan was able to "report that I now occupy Hanovertown. The crossing was taken with but little opposition. A small picket of cavalry being the only force found at this point."[2] Torbert immediately began the expansion of the bridgehead as his troops became available. A portion of Custer's Brigade was ordered west down the Hanover River Road to a series of small hills that rose up at the border of the river's flood plain. They easily drove the North Carolina troopers back and set up at "Westwood" the home of the Brockenborough family.

Given the slight opposition Torbert also saw an opportunity to seize another crossing at Nelson's Bridge. The additional crossing sight would shorten the march of the main body by several miles. He took the initiative to send two of Custer's Michigan regiments (1st and 6th) northwest up the Hanover River Road in an effort to uncover the site. The Union troopers had little trouble pushing the Confederate cavalry of Colonel John Baker's North Carolina Regiment Matthew Butler back. Torbert's push to Nelson's Bridge ran into a brief stalemate when Baker's troopers formed a line just short of the confluence of Crump's Creek to the Pamunkey. Major General Fitshugh Lee had dispatched reinforcements from Hanover Court House in the shape of the 1st Maryland Cavalry to Baker's assistance. Instead of bolstering their existing line with Colonel Bradley Johnson's 250 Troopers the two commanders struck up a plan to strike the Union rear. Unfortunately, unknown to them, the 5th and 7th Michigan heading to assist their brigade mates had entered on exactly the same plan using the same road. No sooner had Johnson departed on his flank march than the 17th Pennsylvania arrived to reinforce the Union cavalry in front of Baker. The situation became even worse for the Confederates when Johnson's column ran headlong into Custer's regiments on the narrow farm road they shared. Overmatched and with little room to maneuver Johnson had his men tear out a section of fence and made a brief stand in the fields of the Pollard farm. A violent saber wielding charge by the Wolverines routed them and they retreated in a melee north of Crump's Creek. Unaware of Johnson's defeat Baker "held on tenaciously so long as it was subjected to a front attack only."[3] The sudden disappearance of the 1st Maryland left Baker threatened not only in the front but also on his right. "As soon as Custer made his appearance on the flank"[4] Baker had no option but to leave his works and retreat behind forty-one prisoners. A short pursuit of the fleeing Confederates was called back by Torbert to consolidate their position on the south side of the creek and the crossing was theirs. Behind them Captain William Folwell's train laid a second bridge of 164 feet just upstream to Van Brocklin's span and later, using parts and pieces left over from the two bridges at Dabney Ferry assembled a "seemingly frail"[5] but usable bridge at the newly gained crossing site. Gregg's 2nd Division began crossing shortly thereafter but Russell's infantry division had not yet arrived on the scene. Sheridan's men had accomplished their mission but news of their arrival had already arrived at Confederate headquarters.

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[1] Rhea's work on the effort claims that a sergeant of the engineers was killed here but a review of the New York Adjutant General's roster of the 50th Engineers show the only possible casualty in this time frame was Private Israel Bishop Co. B wounded, date not stated; died of such wounds, June 3, 1864 Cold Harbor. Engineer reports of the operation also do not mention any casualties. I certainly do not want to dispute Rhea but could not find evidence of this.
[2] OR, Vol. 36, Part 1, Sheridan to Humphries, page 782
[3] Personal Recollections of a cavalryman in Custer's Michigan Brigade, J. H. Kidd, Sentinel Printing company, 1908, Page 320
[4] Ibid.
[5] OR, Vol. 36, Part 1, Report of Lieutenant Colonel Ira Spaulding. Page 313

 

[1SGDan]

Lee Reacts

General Lee spent the night of May 26/27 still wondering what Grant was up to. With little information to go on he could not make any definitive moves to counter what he expected was a major movement by the Union forces. Desperate for information he issued the following order to General Anderson. "Headquarters, May 27, 1864—4.20 a. m. General: General Lee wishes you to ascertain what is in your front, and if you discover that the enemy is leaving you to be prepared to move your command promptly to the south side of the South Anna River.

W. H. TAYLOR Assistant Adjutant- General."[1]

While awaiting for Anderson's report cavalry messengers arrived with the news that Union cavalry had arrived at Hanovertown. Coupled with reports from the front that large masses of infantry could be seen marching in that direction across the North Anna the Union intent became clear. At 6:45 a.m. Lee was confident enough about the Federal movements to send this message to Secretary of War Seddon.

"Taylorsville, May 27, 1864—6.45 a. m. Hon. James A. Seddon:

The enemy retired to the north side of the North Anna last night. A portion of his force is still visible on the north bank, but cavalry and infantry have crossed at Hanovertown. I have sent the cavalry in that direction to check the movement, and will move the army to Ashland.

R. E. LEE."[2]

The necessary movements of his army were now clear and Lee wasted no time issuing the orders to put his army in motion.

Hanover Junction, May 27, 1864—8.30 a. m. "Headquarters

General R. S. Ewell: General: General Lomax states that Colonel Baker, commanding Gordon's brigade of cavalry, reports the enemy's infantry and cavalry as having crossed at Hanovertown, on the Pamunkey. The general commanding desires you to begin to withdraw your troops quietly and so as not to be seen, and to move back to the south side of the South Anna. Please direct General Breckinridge to put his column in motion at once.

Respectfully, W. H. TAYLOR, Assistant Adjutant-General."[3]

The race to get the primary combat forces in place was on. Lee's troops had some advantages from the start. Their inside track to the Pamunkey was about half the marching distance than that of the Union forces and he had access to two excellent routes and the crossings of Little River and the South Anna River and were already in place. To avoid the confusion that was plaguing Grant's troops on overcrowded roads a detailed assignment of these routes and order of march was issued. An additional advantage was had by the fact that several key leaders were thoroughly familiar with the area[4] and could easily guide the troops along without worry about losing time trying to determine the best possible path to their final objective, Atlee's Station on the Virginia Central railroad. The station was conveniently located on the south side of Totopotomoy Creek where Lee intended to develop his new defensive line.

By 10 a.m. the Army of Northern Virginia was on the road. Ewell's Corps crossed the South Anna and turned east at Taylorsville and marched to the Virginia Central railroad and then followed a route south roughly parallel to the rail line. Breckinridge's small command marched due south along the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad followed by Anderson's 1st Corps. Hill's troops and Major General George Pickett's division of 1st Corps remained in place as a rear guard until the roads cleared and then followed the same route as Anderson and Breckinridge. Like their Union counterparts the Confederate soldiers, exhausted by nearly a month of constant combat and maneuver and short rations found the march very trying. The bulk of the Confederate cavalry was already massing in the area near Atlee's Station in response to Sheridan's announced arrival over the Pamunkey. Only Brigadier General Lunsford Lomax's brigade of Virginian troopers remained behind at Hanover Court House to cover the Hanover River Road. The march continued throughout the day with only short rests. As night was beginning to fall Lee, understanding the fatigue at hand, issued orders for an overnight halt.

Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, Jenkins' House, near Hughes' Shop, May 27, 1864—7.30 p. in.

General Anderson: General: General Lee directs me to inform you that he will stop for the night at the above place. He wishes you to have your troops made as comfortable as possible for the night, and to move at 3 o'clock in the morning for Atlee's Station. General Ewell's corps is now near Hughes' Shop and will move at the same hour in the same direction. The object of the general is to get possession of the ridge between Totopotomoy and Beaver Dam Creek, upon which stands Pole Green Church. You will give General Pickett all necessary instructions to join you in the morning. General Ewell's corps is just east of you and General Hill west of Pickett.

W. H. TAYLOR, Assistant Adjutant-General.[5]

The grueling 15 mile march left the Confederate troops exhausted but close to their objective. Ewell's corps had only three miles left to go to reach Atlee's Station. General Ewell, however, became a casualty to dysentery and was forced to relinquish command of his corps to Major General Jubal Early. The march resumed early on the morning of the 28th and by 6 p.m. Lee could write to Secretary of War Seddon from his headquarters at Atlee's Station that "The army is in front of this position extending toward Totopotomoy Creek."[6]

---

[1] OR, Vol. 36, Part III, Taylor to Anderson, page 837
[2] Ibid., Page 836
[3] Major General John Breckinridge's division was an independent command nominally under the direction of 2nd Corps Commander Lieutenant General Richard Ewell.
[4] Captain Henry Wingfield, guiding Ewell's Corps had a home along the intended route and managed to stop by for a meal as they passed.
[5] Or Vol. 36, Part III, Taylor to Anderson, Page 838
[6] Ibid., Lee to Seddon Page 843

 

[1SGDan]

Haw's Shop – Setting the stage

The morning of May 28th found the commanders of both armies establishing their new positions. Lee was busy placing his troops along a defensive line on the south bank of Totopotomoy Creek and seeking information about what exactly what was in front of him. Grant was rushing the remaining pieces of his army to the crossing points of the Pamunkey River. The profusion of troops arriving on the far bank demanded that the bridgehead be expanded. To accomplish these goals both men turned to their cavalry. On the Union side Sheridan was to push out to the west and seize the small hamlet of Haw's Shop. The village contained an important intersection that would allow Grant several avenues of approach for a march southward toward Richmond. Lee needing intelligence on the Federal troop dispositions ordered Major General Wade Hampton[1] to conduct a cavalry reconnaissance eastward toward Haw's Shop in an effort to develop Grant's position. These decisions placed the two mounted arms on a direct collision course that made battle almost certain.

At 8 a.m. two of Major General Gregg's 2nd division regiments began their ride. The 10th New York Cavalry arrived at Haw's Shop around 10 a.m. There the brigade commander Brigadier General Henry Davies halted to establish a command post and waited for the trailing 1st Pennsylvania Cavalry to arrive. As a security precaution a squadron of the 10th New York was sent out to man picket lines further to the west on the Atlee's Station Road. Unaware of the Federal presence a squadron of the 2nd Virginia cavalry was scouting forward of the main Confederate column mounting nearly 4500 men.[2] The advanced squadron numbered only 20 troopers, under Lieutenant Robert Wilson, but boldly moved forward at a trot.

Sergeant Alfred Edson's small picket detail were the first to catch a glimpse of the approaching Confederates. His men unleashed a volley at the Virginians and then rejoined the rest of the advanced squadron, under Lieutenant Truman White. When Wilson's men came into range "White formed his few men across the road and gave them a warm reception, checking their advance by well-directed and rapid volleys," [3], but the Confederates were undeterred. With a rebel yell they charged the new line. . Lieutenant Truman White, fearing the worst ordered a retreat to a line near Enon Church. Following up the Federal retreat Wilson's tiny band was joined by the rest of the 2nd Virginia and managed to push the Yankee troopers back into the headquarters just established by Davies at Haw's Shop just as the 1st Pennsylvania was coming on line. Davies ordered the Pennsylvania commander, Colonel John Taylor, to charge the Virginians. With a battalion posted on each side of the road Taylor ordered "Draw Saber" and "Charge"! The unexpected ferocity of the assaulted stunned the Confederates who were jammed together on the road, hemmed in on both sides by sturdy rail fences. The rebel troopers did the best they could to get away but were caught in a violent hand to hand melee. The Virginians finally broke and the survivors retreated west. They formed a line west of Enon Church and waited for the rest of Wickham's brigade to arrive. After a short rest Wickham with Hampton riding along arrived followed closely by Rosser's brigade and two batteries of horse artillery. The Confederate line now boasted seven Virginia regiments and the 35th Virginia Battalion, easily overlapping the two regiment Union Line. Fortunately federal reinforcements arrived in the form of the 4th and 13th Pennsylvania Cavalry arrived to lengthen Davies line but they were still badly outnumbered. A second line consisting of the 1st Maine Cavalry, 2nd Massachusetts Cavalry and two batteries close to the Haw farm. In less than two hours a slight picket skirmish had evolved into a major showdown of the mounted forces.

---

[1] No permanent successor to Stuart had yet been named but Hampton had assumed that role
[2] The column consisted of Wickham's Brigade, Rosser's Brigade and an ad hoc brigade of the 4th and 5th South Carolina Cavalry and 20th Georgia Cavalry Battalion. The newly arrived South Carolina and Georgia troopers had no combat experience.
[3] History of the Tenth Regiment of Cavalry New York State Volunteers, August, 1861, to August, 1865,
N. D. Prestond. Appleton and Company, 1892 page 189

 

[1SGDan]

Haw's Shop – Battle Rages

Hampton studied the scene and, although he was separated from any infantry help by Totopotomoy Creek, decided to act aggressively. Sensing his manpower advantage he announced to Colonel White, of the 35th Virginia Battalion "we've got the Yankees where we want them now."[1] This was to be a new kind of battle for the troopers involved. Hemmed in between Totopotomoy Creek to the south and Crump's Creek to the north maneuver room was limited. The 1st Pennsylvania's bold saber wielding charge was to be the last of the day. The available terrain was broken and heavily wooded calling for a dismounted fight. This naturally reduced the number of combatants available as men on both sides were detailed to manage the rider less horses. The remainder began to dig in or form protective breastworks from whatever material that could be found.

Despite the apparent Confederate advantage in numbers Davies initiated the action by ordering an advance by the four forward deployed regiments. "It was clearly an unequal contest"[2] and the attack was quickly driven back under a deluge of fire. Determined to drive the Confederates, Davies inserted the 6th Ohio between the 10th New York and the 4th Pennsylvania and tried again. Again the rebel troopers of the 7th Virginia held their line. As more Union troopers arrived the battle devolved into a close contact standoff. The Confederate batteries at the northern end of the line swapped counter battery fire with the two Union batteries near Oak Grove, the Haw family residence. The 1st Maine Cavalry waiting in support of the battery considered their charges excellent at "drawing a smart fire from the rebel battery."[3] Feeling somewhat helpless to avoid the fire the regiment was finally allowed to dismount and hold their horses while sitting on the ground. It did little to alleviate the strain for "to remain under that severe fire doing nothing was a greater strain by far than the more active if more dangerous fighting."[4] The artillerymen were also having their own difficulties. Being somewhat blind to the Confederate positions a short fused round fell into the midst of the 10th New York. The gunners admitted the after the fight that the New Yorkers took a dim view of them. While raining shot and shell at a good pace the long arm of both sides could not change the static condition on the battlefield.

To break the stalemate the untried 4th and 5th South Carolinians and the equally untried 20th Georgia Battalion were thrust into battle on the Confederate right. To match their deployment Gregg sent in his last reserve the 1st New Jersey Cavalry. Gregg messaged Sheridan that with reinforcements he felt he could overcome the stalemate, but all available cavalry forces were already on the field or coming to assist. Sheridan apparently did not want readily available infantry to join the battle which he thought his troopers could win on their own. No call for infantry help was made. The 1st New Jersey was split to reinforce both ends of the Union line. The northern portion of the Jersey men, under Captain Walter Robbins, discovered a gap in the line where a portion of the 10th New York had been pushed back away from connection with the 4th Pennsylvania. Robbins gathered scattered elements of the 10th New York and filled the gap with them and his troops causing "…the line which had been slowly swinging back its right for a hundred and fifty yards now steadied itself and stopped the retrograde."[5] Not only had they stopped the retrograde but a rush forward by his troopers pushed the Confederates back to re-establish the Union right. The impasse continued with neither side willing to break off the hour's long fight.

Robbins heroic push led to more bloody stalemate with many of the opposing troopers only 50 yards apart. On the southern end of the fight the Confederates were gaining some advantage over the worn out 1st Pennsylvania. The 1st New Jersey contingent there, under Captain Hugh Janeway, rushed in to reinforce the faltering Pennsylvania line. The 20th Georgia Battalion took the brunt of the new Union onslaught. Tasting their first real battle experience the Georgians held their position and battered the New Jersey troopers and the standoff continued. Brigadier General Alfred Tolbert's 1st Division troopers, finally being relieved of duty on Crump's creek by the 6th Corps, where ordered by Sheridan to ride to Davies assistance. The Confederates also received reinforcements when Rooney Lee arrived with three regiments of Virginia Cavalry. Each side beefed up their artillery support with additional batteries and the fight continued unabated. Rooney Lee's newly arrived troops were sent to strengthen the left of the Confederate line. He entered the battle but the dismounted opposition made him think he faced an overwhelming force of Union infantry. He requested permission to withdraw. It was the beginning of the end for the Confederate defense. Convinced by Rooney Lee that infantry had entered the battle Hampton authorized the removal of Lee's brigade, commanded by Brigadier General John Chambliss. As the Virginians pulled back the 6th and 17th Pennsylvania along with the 1st New York Dragoons poured into the vacated space enfilading Rosser's portion of the line and forcing him to withdraw also. Wickham's line came next and he was forced to withdraw as well. The exodus of Confederate troops to his north inspired Custer to send his 1st and 6th Michigan Wolverines on the attack north of the Atlee Station Road and the 5th and 7th regiment south of it. With the dissolving line to their north the Confederates there were forced to retire and the retreat turned into a rout. By 6 p.m. after nearly seven hours of brutal combat the battle of Haw's Shop was over.

The fight at Haw's Shop was considered the hardest cavalry fight of the war by many that had experienced it. The losses on both side were very heavy, nearly 750 troopers were killed, wounded, or missing. Sheridan claimed victory as his troops had pushed the Confederates back across the Creek. Hampton, however, could also claim something of value for the efforts of his men. Although he did not identify the whereabouts of the Union infantry the fight gave the Confederate infantry badly needed time to solidify their defensive line on the south of Totopotomoy Creek.

---

[1] Rhea footnotes this quote to Joseph R. Haw, "The Battle of Haw's Shop", Confederate veteran 33 (1925), page 374, but I have read this article several times and do not find it. He backs up the footnote with Myers "The Comanches, page 290 a book I am not familiar with. Comanches was the nickname of the 35th Virginia Battalion.
[2] History of the Tenth Regiment of Cavalry New York State Volunteers, August, 1861, to August, 1865,
N. D. Prestond. Appleton and Company, 1892 page 189
[3] History of the 1st Maine Cavalry, 1861-1865, Edward P. Tobie, Press of Emery &Hughes, 1887, Page 276
[4] Ibid
[5] The History of the 1st New Jersey Cavalry, Henry R. Pyne , J.A. Beecher Publisher, 1871 Page 252

 

[1SGDan]

Consolidation at Totopotomoy Creek

As the opposing cavalry troops primed for their show down at Haw's Shop much was going on behind the scenes. The main body of Union infantry troops were moving across the Pamunkey in a non-stop flow. At Nelson's Bridge the frail structure assembled by Captain Folwell and the work of Major Brainerd's battalion on the " roads and approaches to the bridges"[1], allowed the 6th Corps with their artillery to cross the river. At 3 p.m. wooden boats with Major Beers arrived at Nelson's Bridge and immediately threw a 140 foot bridge below Folwell's canvas span. Captain Personius traveling with the trains to the supply depot at Port Royal threw a 180 foot bridge over the Mattapony River at Dunkirk the span was complete by 2:30 p.m. Later he assembled a bridge over ferry boats "for the passage of infantry and Cavalry reinforcements[2] from Port Royal."[3] Major Ford's bridge train was moved to Hanovertown to replace one of the canvas spans in use at Dabney Ferry. Van Brocklin's span was removed, leaving Folwell's canvas bridge still in use, and they went into camp on the south side of the Pamunkey. Easy access across the river gave Grant unfettered movement of the main body into the area. He assembled his line with Wright's 6th Corps anchoring the northern end of the line on Crump's Creek. Hancock's 2nd Corps attached to his left and ran to Haw's Shop where Warren spread his 5th corps troops southward to land at Totopotomoy Creek. Burnside's 9th Corps formed a reserve near Hanovertown. In the aftermath of the fighting at Haw's Shop Sheridan, with Grant's approval took his cavalry east to rest and recover near Old Church. This decision left Grant with no reconnaissance asset to find Lee's army. Instead he planned to use his infantry to search for the Army of Northern Virginia. Meade designed a plan to march large infantry formations along three major roads.

Wright was again to use Russell's division to move north towards Hanover Court House. Hancock would send Barlow's Division west along Atlee Station Road toward the crossing of Totopotomoy Creek. Warren would send Griffin's Division across the creek to probe west along Shady Grove Road.

These movements had the possibility of each of these divisions to be caught and destroyed before reinforcements could arrive, but without cavalry there was no other way to locate Lee's army. Across the creek Lee had prepared for just such a contingency on the south bank of creek. Hill's corps was anchored west on the Virginia Central Railroad extending east to the Atlee Station Road. Breckinridge connected to his right and spread eastward to the intersection of Atlee Station Road and Shady Grove Road. The Confederate line turned south here with Early's troops stationed at Pole Green Church. Anderson's 1st Corps troops turned the line west again along Shady Grove Road. All major routes were covered with this compact alignment that allowed each portion of the line to be reinforced quickly by the others if they should be threatened. Additionally two brigades of cavalry[4] remained at Hanover Court House to slow any movement coming from the north. As had become standard operating procedure trenches and breastworks were being prepared. Once again Lee had beaten Grant to his objective and now had to wait for his next move.

---

[1] OR, Vol. 36, Part 1, Report of Lieutenant Colonel Ira Spaulding. Page 313
[2] After repeated calls from Grant the 18th Corps of Major General William Smith had been ordered away from Butler's moribund Bermuda Hundred Campaign to reinforce the Army of the Potomac.
[3] OR, Vol. 36, Part 1, Report of Lieutenant Colonel Ira Spaulding. Page 313
[4] Fitzhugh Lee's two brigade division of Lomax's and Wickham's Virginians

 

[1SGDan]

Positions and movements on May 29th

 

[1SGDan]

Seeking Battle – May 30th, 1864

The Union probes of the 29th revealed Lee's defensive positon with little more than skirmishing. Barlow found Breckinridge dug in on the far side of the creek on the Atlee Station Road. Too weak to attack he deployed his men in a parallel line on the far side of the creek. The other divisions also met the rebels in well-constructed defenses and called for reinforcements. Within hours a North Anna style standoff had developed across the right of the line, the opposing forces staring at each other across the water. Only a portion the left wing found unfettered access across the Totopotomoy. Here Burnside and Warren took up positions along the Old Church Road facing Early. Lee knew instinctively that this area posed the greatest threat and laid out a plan to strike the Union forces there a blow to prevent an unobstructed move to the important crossroads at Cold Harbor. Early responded to the request for an attack:

"I will withdraw Rodes from the right and send him out on the Mechanicsville road to Bethesda Church to see what the enemy has, and, if necessary, I will send the other divisions to co-operate with him and attack the enemy, getting Anderson to take the place of my other divisions, and in the event of my meeting the enemy and driving him Anderson can move down on the road to Old Church from this place if you think proper."[1]

At 2 p.m. Lee wrote to General Anderson:

"I inclose you a note from General Early. I approve what is therein suggested, and have authorized General Early to carry out what is proposed, if his judgment approves. I desire you, if circumstances permit, to carry out your part."[2]

Early's plan was for Anderson to come forward and attack down the Shady Grove Road taking Warren head on while he slipped south to move up the Old Church Road and strike him in the flank. Across the Totopotomoy Meade had inspected positions in the front and decided that nothing much could be accomplished there. He determined that only Warren had a reasonable chance for success against the rebel defenses and messaged him "if you think it expedient to attack the enemy you can do so."[3] Warren's actions got off to a bad start when he could find no cavalry picketing his left flank. Before Warren could initiate any action the turbulent command atmosphere rose its ugly head. Meade despised Sheridan who in turn detested Warren for blaming him for cavalry failures at Spotsylvania, and Warren was rapidly wearing out his welcome at headquarters with constant bickering. The situation made cooperation extremely difficult. Warren requested cavalry support but his request was ignored by Sheridan. After back and forth haggling he finally sent Torbert an order to send a brigade down Old Church Road. The message somehow got confused and Devin's brigade headed off in the wrong direction. Lacking the cavalry support he desired Warren sent Colonel Martin Hardin's all Pennsylvania Reserve brigade to the Old Church Road. Hardin established a blocking position at Bethesda Church. Once again the two sides seemed to be on a collision course.

---

[1] OR, Vol. 36, Part 3, Early to Lee, Page 354
[2] OR, Vol. 36, Part 3, Lee to Anderson, Page 351
[3] OR, Vol. 36, Part 3, Meade to Warren, Page 340

 

[1SGDan]

Bethesda Church

On the western end of Shady Grove Road, Colonel Jacob Sweitzer was leading Griffin's division forward with his crack 22nd Massachusetts infantry in the lead. They battled some stubborn enemy pickets at the site of Sydnor's Mill and then continued forward until they struck Early's main line. After close examination they determined it too strong to assault and began digging in. Word was sent to Warren who reported up chain. Warren in turn sent the following to Meade;

"General Griffin reports to me that he has struck the enemy's line with rifled cannon in position."[1]

Griffin consolidated a line with his regiment with Brigadier General Romeyn Ayres' mixed regiment of New York, Pennsylvania, and United States Regulars. Griffin's soldiers were not done providing important information.

"Several times our skirmishers when halting for a few moments in the openings in the woods, could see Early's heavy columns in the distance, moving to our left; and as our regimental line was some distance in advance, word was sent to have our supports hurry up."[2]

Warren took immediate steps to strengthen the Union line along the Shady Grove Road. Behind Ayres and Griffin Brigadier General Lysander Cutler's 4th division and Colonel Joseph Fisher's brigade of Crawford'd division were strung out west to east.

At Bethesda Church half of Hardin's troops built earthworks near the Tinsley farm the 1st and 13th Pennsylvania "Bucktails" were sent out on a scout west on the Old Church Road. While pausing to await the expected arrival of the rest of the brigade they were attacked by Rode's lead element. Brigadier General Bryan Grimes brigade of North Carolinians easily routed the small force and captured several prisoners. The remainder fled back to the works at the Tinsley farm. Grime's driving east in pursuit ran into Hardin's badly constructed defensive works. The line was easily flanked on both sides and a hasty retreat became a rout. Brigadier General Samuel Crawford, commanding Warren's 3rd Division, stationed at the Bowles farm on Shady Grove Road, reacting to the sound of the fight immediately dispatched two brigades to Hardin's assistance. Leading the way Colonel Samuel Kitching's two regiment brigade of New York heavy artillery men reached about the halfway point to Bethesda Church they were swarmed by Hardin's retreating men. Distracted and disorganized the "Heavies" were easy prey for the Tar Heels. A volley ripped through the command group, killing four officers, but leaving Kitching unharmed. He rallied what troops he could and attempted to conduct a delaying action but was pushed back to the Shady Grove Road where Warren was strengthening his line. Seeing the mass of Union soldiers Grimes halted his chase. The Confederates rapid advance now played into Warren's hands. At Bethesda Church Early had stopped Rodes and Ramseur to sort out their commands which had become badly intermixed in the hurried advance.

This delay allowed Warren to piece together an impressive line facing south. Cutler's division was called back and Brigadier General Henry Lockwood's division was called up from their reserve position. Hardin's and Kitching's men were reorganized and placed in line. The natural curvature of the road and intersection layout created a position that arced into a perfect kill zone. Any advance from the Confederate position would be assaulted from the front and both flanks. The position was further strengthened by the addition of several batteries of artillery. To replace Cutler's division on Shady Grove Road, Burnside's 9th Corps was ordered to fill the vacancy from Crittenden's and Potter's divisions.

Early, having straightened out his alignment decided to test the Union position with a brigade reconnaissance. Ramsuer selected the 500 man strong Pegram[3] brigade, currently under the command of Colonel Edward Willis, for the task. As they advanced in good order up the road the opposing artillery batteries began to exchange fire but the Union infantry held their fire. The unfortunate Confederates had no idea that their brigade was marching directly into a trap manned by the bulk of an entire Union corps. Their advance reached the Shady Grove Road at 6 p.m. and continued on into the fields of the Bowle's Farm. At two hundred yards range the Federals opened with canister, case shot, and musketry. The devastation was enormous and after several minutes of unmitigated slaughter the surviving Virginians were called upon to surrender. The fight was over and a review of the field found large heaps of gore. Most of the corpses were unrecognizable. 450 of the original 500 men had been killed or wounded. Early realized that the sacrifice of a single brigade has shown that the Union position he was to attack was unassailable. Early blamed Anderson for failing to conduct his portion of the plan. Major General George Pickett's division had replaced Rodes and Ramseur in front of Griffin and was to assault that end of the line to aid Early's assault. Pickett's effort amounted to little than ineffectual skirmishing and allowed Warren to concentrate his force against Early. The battle was over by 8 p.m. and the opposing lines settled into the usual standoff.

---

[1] OR, Vol. 36, Part 3, Warren to Meade, Page 341
[2] Henry Wilson's Regiment , History of the Twenty-Second Massachusetts Infantry, by Regimental Association, Press of Rand Avery Co., 1887 , Page 454
[3] Brigadier General John Pegram was wounded in earlier fighting and was recovering.

 

[CW3O]

Pretty interesting! Well researched and well written. A pleasure to read.

 

[1SGDan]

Matadequin Creek

While Sheridan had virtually ignored Warren's call for assistance at Bethesda Church his troops did manage to find action of their own. With Torbert's division he had moved his headquarters to Old Church. Below his new camp the road network led to the Bottom's Bridge crossing of the Chickahominy River. Devin's brigade, having received faulty orders, instead of supporting Warren on the Old Church Road rode off on a reconnaissance of the roads to Cold Harbor. Where Bottom's Bridge Road crossed the Matadequin Creek Devin set up a brigade command post while a squadron of the 17th Pennsylvania moved on to scout the area. Where Cold Harbor Road entered Bottom's B Bridge Road they established a line. This placed the Union cavalry in an area of great interest to General Lee.

Lee dispatched Butler's brigade of South Carolina cavalry into the area to see if any Federal forces were concentrating there. Butler left one regiment (6th) at Mechanicsville and took the 4th and 5th and headed up the Cold Harbor Road. They were joined by the newly arrived 7th as they moved. Shortly after 1 p.m. they struck the 17th Pennsylvania outpost and easily pushed back this squadron. Reaching the Matadequin Creek the retreating Pennsylvania troopers were strengthened by two additional squadrons of their own unit. Together they managed to reverse the flow and pushed back Butler's skirmishers. Devin thinking the simple little engagement posed no real threat did nothing more to reinforce his line. A 3 p.m. that poor decision came back to haunt him when much of Butler's force charged out and easily drove the picket lie back across the creek. There they waged an uneven battle to prevent Butler from crossing. Realizing his mistake Devin threw the 6th and 9th New York into the fight. Butler countered by inserting the entire 4th and 5th South Carolina into the fray. At this point Brigadier General Torbert arrived on the scene and immediately ordered the remainder of the division forward. The reinforcements rushed in, the 2nd United States Regulars replaced the 17th who had run out of ammunition. The shifting number of forces now favored the Federals. The 6th New York and the 2nd United States attacked in unison and pushed the 4th South Carolina back and threatened to break through. On the left the 9th New York pushed the rebels back across the creek, but when they attempted to cross they became easy targets and the effort was given up. The 6th Pennsylvania was sent upstream to find a safer crossing point and flank the Confederate position. After crossing the creek they fell into a fierce hand to hand struggle with the 5th South Carolina. At this critical juncture Custer's Michigan brigade arrived to change the balance of power for the last time. Now flanked on both sides the South Carolinians collapsed and began a flow southward. At the crossroads of Bottom's Bridge Road and Cold Harbor Road the 7th South Carolina, Butler's reserve, counterattacked on foot. The rookie unit was no match for Custer's veterans. Using their repeating carbines to great advantage the Wolverines mowed down the advance, knocking out much of the 7th's command. Panic set in and the retreat turned into a rout which became worse when the fleeing troopers realized that the horse holders had already fled the scene taking the mount with them. Terrified men fled into the woods and the Union victory was complete.

This short battle was to have far greater consequences than might be expected from a battle of this size. Lee realizing he could not do much at against the Grant's forces where he was and understanding that door south to the Chickahominy was now open decided to move on.[1] On the night of the 31st/1st movements began. Lee sent Anderson and Early on a march to reinforce Hoke's brigade of North Carolinians who were contending with Sheridan at Cold Harbor. Granted countered by starting Wright's 6th Corps on the long march in the same direction. Movement to Cold Harbor essentially ended action at Totopotomoy Creek. But there was much suffering to be done as the armies would once again meet at the killing fields of Cold Harbor.

---

[1] Sheridan had indeed taken possession of Cold Harbor and the threat was easily understood by Lee.

 

[1SGDan]

Conclusion and assessment

Grant's selection of another turning of Lee's defense by the right cannot reasonably be debated. It was the proper option considering that any effort around the left would remove him further from his supply line and place three additional rivers in their path (Little River, New Found River and the South Anna.).

There were four major reasons why Grant's turning movement from Ox Ford Failed to produce the desired result.

• Weather – The constant rain during the period of this move made such a movement much more difficult. Difficult movement is slower movement. Beating an enemy with the inside track to the objective requires a rapidity that was simply not possible given the conditions.
• As Gordon Rhea suggests in his writing on this time period, the complete removal of the Army of the Potomac from Lee's front left him free to maneuver his entire army without fear of being assaulted as he departed his works. Free movement is more rapid movement. Some force might have been left in place to threaten and possibly delay his departure with his entire force.
• Russell's infantry division vanguard might have been used to temporarily block Lee's access roads into the Totopotomoy Creek area. Of course they could not have stopped them but forcing them to array for battle would have consumed valuable time which would allow more Union troops into the area. Unfortunately the limits of human endurance prevented this. Marching over 30 miles in just over 24 hours on half rations simply exhausted his troops. When they reached the crossing point of the Pamunkey they halted for much needed rest. The real power of the Army of the Potomac slowed by mud, exhaustion, crowded roads, and a much longer route could not reach their objective in time.
• Removing the cavalry for rest after the Battle of Haw's Shop stole Grant's rapid reconnaissance asset from the field. Reconnaissance by infantry is slow by nature and also puts smaller elements out to be defeated by whatever they may discover.
• 
  
• For General Lee this episode is just another example of his ability to anticipate and make decisive decisions. His defense at Totopotomoy Creek was every bit as ingenious as his effort at Ox Ford. Nevertheless, the operations at Totopotomoy Creek highlighted some disconcerting trends for the Army of Northern Virginia.
• The loss of leaders was making management of the army more difficult. Jackson and Stuart were dead, Longstreet sidelined, Ewell part time due to sickness, and dozens of brigade and regimental commanders killed or wounded. Company level officers were suffering enormous casualty rates. Replacements were often under qualified or overwhelmed by their new positions.
• Confederate supremacy in cavalry operations was over.
• Command problems and lessening manpower had stolen the Confederates once feared offensive capabilities. While the Confederates had failed to strike a serious blow at Totopotomoy Creek, the stalemate created here led to drift of both armies toward another and even bloodier encounter at Cold Harbor.