Thoughts on Braggs performance at Shiloh?

[Creighton1930]

How would you say that Braxton Bragg preformed at Shiloh?

 

[uaskme]

He was on the Battlefield. That would change over time.

 

[16thAL]

Typical Bragg

 

[Nathan Stuart]

At Shiloh, Bragg led the Second Corps (14,868 men) – the largest of the four Corps in the Army of Mississippi. Most of the soldiers in this Confederate Army at the time, had little or no combat experience.

The attack plan was for Bragg's large Corps to form a second battle line (behind Hardee's Corps) for the advance towards Pittsburgh Landing. During continuous heavy rain, both Hardee and especially Bragg had difficulty forming their Divisions for the original proposed attack on April 4. One of Bragg's Divisions even got lost along the way to this deployment. It took Johnston's intervention to get this Division back into the formation. It was the combination of inclement weather and failure of both these Corps to get into position that caused Johnston to delay his attack until the morning of April 6.

When the attack got underway on April 6, Bragg's units formed the center of the forward movement. The center of the Confederate attack focused on a Union held defensive line called the 'Hornets Nest' (a 600 yard long stretch of road). In the mid-morning, Bragg took command of most of the assaults on this position. He ordered multiple frontal assaults (estimated to be between 8 and 14 separate assaults) with the bayonet against Union infantry armed with muzzleloading rifles. These assaults resulted in heavy casualties for Bragg's units.

Bragg's attacks failed because he launched a series of piecemeal and uncoordinated assaults with not enough men each time, rather than a single mass attack. He stubbornly persisted with these assaults against the consistent contrary advice of his subordinate commanders. In short, Bragg rigidly applied the same tactics against the Hornets Nest, costing his men heavily, and for no gain of ground.

Bragg's preoccupation with the Hornets Nest in the center of the line delayed the Confederate advance for about 5 hours, drawing in manpower and incurring large casualties in the process, and this took the momentum out of the sweeping Confederate attack on April 6. The delay also allowed Grant to build a strong defensive line near the Landing later during that day, saving the Federal Army from destruction on the first day at Shiloh. Bragg's failure to take the Hornets Nest earlier was largely due to his improper direction of the assault on it. When Beauregard took over command of the Confederate Army (after Johnston's death) around mid-afternoon, he immediately moved Ruggles artillery (more than 50 cannons) and Bragg's infantry to surround the position and ordered them to reduce the Hornets Nest. About two hours later, the 2,200 Union defenders that remained in the Hornets Nest finally surrendered around 5.30 pm, after holding out for seven hours. By the evening of April 6, the Confederate opportunity for victory the next day was lost, with the arrival of large Union reinforcements thoughout the night.

Bragg's tactical failings at the Hornets Nest on the first day of the battle, were among his worst single combat command performances during the war. Bragg's poor handling of these assaults on the Hornets Nest caused extended delays and unwanted distractions in the Confederate advance on April 6. This command failure was significant in causing the Confederacy to lose any advantage on day one, and thereby substantially reduced any realistic hope of victory.

 

[Creighton1930]

At Shiloh, Bragg led the Second Corps (14,868 men) – the largest of the four Corps in the Army of Mississippi. Most of the soldiers in this Confederate Army at the time, had little or no combat experience.

The attack plan was for Bragg's large Corps to form a second battle line (behind Hardee's Corps) for the advance towards Pittsburgh Landing. During continuous heavy rain, both Hardee and especially Bragg had difficulty forming their Divisions for the original proposed attack on April 4. One of Bragg's Divisions even got lost along the way to this deployment. It took Johnston's intervention to get this Division back into the formation. It was the combination of inclement weather and failure of both these Corps to get into position that caused Johnston to delay his attack until the morning of April 6.

When the attack got underway on April 6, Bragg's units formed the center of the forward movement. The center of the Confederate attack focused on a Union held defensive line called the 'Hornets Nest' (a 600 yard long stretch of road). In the mid-morning, Bragg took command of most of the assaults on this position. He ordered multiple frontal assaults (estimated to be between 8 and 14 separate assaults) with the bayonet against Union infantry armed with muzzleloading rifles. These assaults resulted in heavy casualties for Bragg's units.

Bragg's attacks failed because he launched a series of piecemeal and uncoordinated assaults with not enough men each time, rather than a single mass attack. He stubbornly persisted with these assaults against the consistent contrary advice of his subordinate commanders. In short, Bragg rigidly applied the same tactics against the Hornets Nest, costing his men heavily, and for no gain of ground.

Bragg's preoccupation with the Hornets Nest in the center of the line delayed the Confederate advance for about 5 hours, drawing in manpower and incurring large casualties in the process, and this took the momentum out of the sweeping Confederate attack on April 6. The delay also allowed Grant to build a strong defensive line near the Landing later during that day, saving the Federal Army from destruction on the first day at Shiloh. Bragg's failure to take the Hornets Nest earlier was largely due to his improper direction of the assault on it. When Beauregard took over command of the Confederate Army (after Johnston's death) around mid-afternoon, he immediately moved Ruggles artillery (more than 50 cannons) and Bragg's infantry to surround the position and ordered them to reduce the Hornets Nest. About two hours later, the 2,200 Union defenders that remained in the Hornets Nest finally surrendered around 5.30 pm, after holding out for seven hours. By the evening of April 6, the Confederate opportunity for victory the next day was lost, with the arrival of large Union reinforcements thoughout the night.

Bragg's tactical failings at the Hornets Nest on the first day of the battle, were among his worst single combat command performances during the war. Bragg's poor handling of these assaults on the Hornets Nest caused extended delays and unwanted distractions in the Confederate advance on April 6. This command failure was significant in causing the Confederacy to lose any advantage on day one, and thereby substantially reduced any realistic hope of victory.

From the way you write this, you make it seem like Bragg is to blame for the failure of victory at Shiloh.

Bragg was not alone, in the war, when it came to ordering frontal assaults that were costly, especially at this early stage of the war. The majority of the generals at Shiloh, and I would say the whole war, had not had the experience of leading large formations of troops. This would change mid-way during the conflict, but I think to criticize Bragg for it is redundant, because there are examples of others who did similar costly assaults. I am not saying Bragg is entirely innocent, but some of your argument seems to make it look like Bragg is entirely to blame.

As for infantry armed with muzzleloading rifles criticism; didn't civil war officers prefer to order their soldiers to engage in short-range fire, because they were still thinking in terms of the smoothbore muskets? What about the parabolic trajectory of a civil war bullet? doesn't that diminish it's accuracy at longer ranges? and what about the wooded and rolling terrain, in which it was difficult to see further targets?

As I like to say in any debate, you may be right, and I might be wrong, so I am willing to hear your side of the argument, and I respect it.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Thanks for your response. Appreciate your views.

To begin, I believe that Bragg's improper direction of the day one assaults on the Hornets Nest was a significant (but not the only) factor in the Confederate failure at Shiloh.

Johnston's original plan was to attack Grant's Army situated near Pittsburgh Landing, push it into the waterways beyond, then destroy it on April 4, before it could be reinforced. I understand that the center of the Federal line was not the primary focus for the attack. Johnston intended to drive the attacks on the flanks, in an effort to roll up the Union positions. It was thought that the attack required immediate and swift action, as well as surprise, to be successful. However, continuing heavy rains combined with disorganization in attack formations delayed this attack commencing until the morning of April 6.

Bragg, an experienced and West Point trained professional military officer was certainly well suited to lead the largest Corps of raw and inexperienced troops in the Confederate Army at Shiloh. He possessed sound organizational skills and was also a stern disciplinarian. It was Bragg's Corps that formed the center of the advancing line on April 6.

As I've said, I believe Bragg's command performance at the Hornets Nest (in the center of battlefield) on day one was unsatisfactory and a material factor in the final result. He became fixated on, and preoccupied with, the Hornets Nest, to the detriment of the entire Confederate line surging forward. During mid-morning, Bragg took control of the assaults on this enemy foothold. He ordered repeated piecemeal frontal attacks by bayonet to carry this position held by a relatively smaller number of the enemy, rather than direct a larger mass attack to overwhelm the defenders there. In 'Shiloh – in Hell Before Night', James Lee McDonough wrote at page 126, that Union Major D. W. Reed, who fought in the Hornets Nest, counted twelve separate charges made, while the author adds that at least ten can definitely be identified from the official reports of officers in the battle. These successive piecemeal attacks that Bragg ordered resulted in heavy losses each time, and were launched against the consistent advice of his subordinates.

The criticism is that Bragg applied outdated tactics (repeated frontal bayonet attacks), against soldiers armed with rifled muzzleloaders, not smoothbores. Unlike smoothbores used in earlier period conflicts, trained soldiers firing rifled muskets had the benefit of much higher firing rates and longer accurate killing distances, and this made understrength frontal assaults by bayonet virtually unviable. Moreso, Bragg kept repeating his mistakes, after seeing the same results each time, by ordering successive piecemeal assaults with insufficient numbers to overwhelm the enemy position. This calamity continued for well over five hours. Either Bragg was stubborn in his thinking or unaware of the realities of the situation. (I don't think it was the latter here). Eventually, it was Beauregard who finally ordered Ruggles artillery and the infantry to surround the Union position and reduce it (the defenders surrendered about 5.30 pm) to break this stalemate in the center.

The futility of Bragg's repeated frontal bayonet assaults reminds me of what happened at Fredericksburg. It was like a scaled-down version of Burnside's ordered multiple frontal assaults on Marye's Heights, at Fredericksburg, that resulted in a continuous slaughter.

I believe Bragg's inept handling of the assaults on the Hornets Nest materially disrupted the momentum of the entire Confederate attack (already faltering in parts) by drawing troops into the sector and providing distractions for other commanders. Bragg's holdup at, and inability to secure, the Hornet's Nest, undermined the whole advance. The Confederate attack lost its critical mass in the drive forward. When the flank attacks were stalled, the long delays in the center, allowed Grant to strengthen his defensive line near the Landing by late afternoon, which was bolstered shortly afterwards by substantial reinforcements arriving through the night.

Bragg's inability for most of the day to carry the Hornets Nest through poor command decisions (as well as Johnston's death around mid-afternoon) were key factors that weakened the thrust of the Confederate attack on April 6. Any real chance of destroying Grant's Army was gone by the evening.

Perhaps McDonough (ibid., page 137) sums up Bragg's performance in this episode of the battle best when he says, …"Bragg has been referred to as 'a man who could snatch defeat from the jaws of victory'."…

 

[Saruman]

Thanks for your response. Appreciate your views.

To begin, I believe that Bragg's improper direction of the day one assaults on the Hornets Nest was a significant (but not the only) factor in the Confederate failure at Shiloh.

Johnston's original plan was to attack Grant's Army situated near Pittsburgh Landing, push it into the waterways beyond, then destroy it on April 4, before it could be reinforced. I understand that the center of the Federal line was not the primary focus for the attack. Johnston intended to drive the attacks on the flanks, in an effort to roll up the Union positions. It was thought that the attack required immediate and swift action, as well as surprise, to be successful. However, continuing heavy rains combined with disorganization in attack formations delayed this attack commencing until the morning of April 6.

Bragg, an experienced and West Point trained professional military officer was certainly well suited to lead the largest Corps of raw and inexperienced troops in the Confederate Army at Shiloh. He possessed sound organizational skills and was also a stern disciplinarian. It was Bragg's Corps that formed the center of the advancing line on April 6.

As I've said, I believe Bragg's command performance at the Hornets Nest (in the center of battlefield) on day one was unsatisfactory and a material factor in the final result. He became fixated on, and preoccupied with, the Hornets Nest, to the detriment of the entire Confederate line surging forward. During mid-morning, Bragg took control of the assaults on this enemy foothold. He ordered repeated piecemeal frontal attacks by bayonet to carry this position held by a relatively smaller number of the enemy, rather than direct a larger mass attack to overwhelm the defenders there. In 'Shiloh – in Hell Before Night', James Lee McDonough wrote at page 126, that Union Major D. W. Reed, who fought in the Hornets Nest, counted twelve separate charges made, while the author adds that at least ten can definitely be identified from the official reports of officers in the battle. These successive piecemeal attacks that Bragg ordered resulted in heavy losses each time, and were launched against the consistent advice of his subordinates.

The criticism is that Bragg applied outdated tactics (repeated frontal bayonet attacks), against soldiers armed with rifled muzzleloaders, not smoothbores. Unlike smoothbores used in earlier period conflicts, trained soldiers firing rifled muskets had the benefit of much higher firing rates and longer accurate killing distances, and this made understrength frontal assaults by bayonet virtually unviable. Moreso, Bragg kept repeating his mistakes, after seeing the same results each time, by ordering successive piecemeal assaults with insufficient numbers to overwhelm the enemy position. This calamity continued for well over five hours. Either Bragg was stubborn in his thinking or unaware of the realities of the situation. (I don't think it was the latter here). Eventually, it was Beauregard who finally ordered Ruggles artillery and the infantry to surround the Union position and reduce it (the defenders surrendered about 5.30 pm) to break this stalemate in the center.

The futility of Bragg's repeated frontal bayonet assaults reminds me of what happened at Fredericksburg. It was like a scaled-down version of Burnside's ordered multiple frontal assaults on Marye's Heights, at Fredericksburg, that resulted in a continuous slaughter.

I believe Bragg's inept handling of the assaults on the Hornets Nest materially disrupted the momentum of the entire Confederate attack (already faltering in parts) by drawing troops into the sector and providing distractions for other commanders. Bragg's holdup at, and inability to secure, the Hornet's Nest, undermined the whole advance. The Confederate attack lost its critical mass in the drive forward. When the flank attacks were stalled, the long delays in the center, allowed Grant to strengthen his defensive line near the Landing by late afternoon, which was bolstered shortly afterwards by substantial reinforcements arriving through the night.

Bragg's inability for most of the day to carry the Hornets Nest through poor command decisions (as well as Johnston's death around mid-afternoon) were key factors that weakened the thrust of the Confederate attack on April 6. Any real chance of destroying Grant's Army was gone by the evening.

Perhaps McDonough (ibid., page 137) sums up Bragg's performance in this episode of the battle best when he says, …"Bragg has been referred to as 'a man who could snatch defeat from the jaws of victory'."…

Bragg also demonstrated his gift of demoralizing and making enemies of his subordinates by calling Randall L. Gibson an "arrant coward" without any justification.

 

[Irishtom29]

Typical Bragg

Which is what? Elaborate.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Beauregard not Johnston wrote the attack plan for the Shiloh attack. Johnston had ceded command of the army to Beauregard while it concentrated at Corinth. Bragg & Hardee were placed in an impossible tactical position.

Beauregard placed two corps in two parallel lines. It was physically impossible for either commander to control their strung out commands. The announced goal of the attack was to unhinge Grant from the river, turning his left flank & driving the disordered Yankees into the interior. In one of many inexplicable command failures, the extreme right of the CSA line did not receive orders to attack. When NB Forrest & others took things into their own hands it was too late to have a decisive impact on the battle.

Given the incompetent nature off the army leadership, Bragg's corps was placed into an all but impossible tactical position. Bragg did what he always did, attack head on. It was the responsibility of Johnston & Beauregard to control Bragg's attack. The fact that he hammered away at a position that did not threaten Grant's grip on the landing was not Bragg's responsibility.

 

[James N.]

... Bragg's preoccupation with the Hornets Nest in the center of the line delayed the Confederate advance for about 5 hours, drawing in manpower and incurring large casualties in the process, and this took the momentum out of the sweeping Confederate attack on April 6. The delay also allowed Grant to build a strong defensive line near the Landing later during that day, saving the Federal Army from destruction on the first day at Shiloh. Bragg's failure to take the Hornets Nest earlier was largely due to his improper direction of the assault on it. When Beauregard took over command of the Confederate Army (after Johnston's death) around mid-afternoon, he immediately moved Ruggles artillery (more than 50 cannons) and Bragg's infantry to surround the position and ordered them to reduce the Hornets Nest. About two hours later, the 2,200 Union defenders that remained in the Hornets Nest finally surrendered around 5.30 pm, after holding out for seven hours. By the evening of April 6, the Confederate opportunity for victory the next day was lost, with the arrival of large Union reinforcements thoughout the night...

... Beauregard placed two corps in two parallel lines. It was physically impossible for either commander to control their strung out commands. The announced goal of the attack was to unhinge Grant from the river, turning his left flank & driving the disordered Yankees into the interior. In one of many inexplicable command failures, the extreme right of the CSA line did not receive orders to attack. When NB Forrest & others took things into their own hands it was too late to have a decisive impact on the battle.

Given the incompetent nature off the army leadership, Bragg's corps was placed into an all but impossible tactical position. Bragg did what he always did, attack head on. It was the responsibility of Johnston & Beauregard to control Bragg's attack. The fact that he hammered away at a position that did not threaten Grant's grip on the landing was not Bragg's responsibility.

No fan of Bragg here, but my understanding is that due to the confusion and intermixing of units that a flexible approach was attempted by Johnston (or possibly it was Beauregard) by dividing the front into sectors, giving Polk the left where he faced Sherman-McClernand around Shiloh Church/Crossroads; Bragg the center opposite Prentiss-Wallace in the Hornet's Nest; and Breckinridge assisted by Hardee the right facing Hurlbut at the Peach Orchard. If this was in fact the agreed-upon "arrangement" then Bragg was left with no other option than to conduct the battle as he did, making repeated frontal assaults, although I seem to recall in at least one of the books I most recently read (likely Larry Daniel's Shiloh or O. E. Cunningham's Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862) that the number of attacks made there usually cited, especially those across Fraley Field, has been called into question. Calling @Ole Miss

 

[jackt62]

Seems to me that the reasons for Confederate defeat at Shiloh must be attributed to multiple factors, including as posters have already mentioned, a 2-day delay in commencing the attack (giving time for Buell to reach the field), Beauregard's faulty attack alignment, and lack of leadership (including Johnston's death) that sidelined the emphasis on striking the Union left flank. So the Confederate plan was probably already deranged regardless of Bragg's assaults on the Hornet's Nest. Bragg had a fairly capable reputation commanding in the Gulf before Shiloh, and promptly carried out his portion of concentrating his army at Corinth in accordance with Johnston's strategy. Just wonder whether there is a tendency to be unduly harsh on Bragg at Shiloh given his later history.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Seems to me that the reasons for Confederate defeat at Shiloh must be attributed to multiple factors, including as posters have already mentioned, a 2-day delay in commencing the attack (giving time for Buell to reach the field), Beauregard's faulty attack alignment, and lack of leadership (including Johnston's death) that sidelined the emphasis on striking the Union left flank. So the Confederate plan was probably already deranged regardless of Bragg's assaults on the Hornet's Nest. Bragg had a fairly capable reputation commanding in the Gulf before Shiloh, and promptly carried out his portion of concentrating his army at Corinth in accordance with Johnston's strategy. Just wonder whether there is a tendency to be unduly harsh on Bragg at Shiloh given his later history.

As the ghoul map shows so graphically, Beauregard's attack was profoundly misdirected. Johnston rode around leading random regiments, Beauregard was isolated behind the lines. It would have taken a miracle for Bragg to ignore his orders & move to his right leading an attack on Pittsburg Landing.

 

[Ole Miss]

James N. I agree with your post above regarding the chaos late in the afternoon after Johnston's death. I would mention a few points if I may.

1) Beauregard believed himself to a modern age Bonaparte and that an opponent who was knocked out would stay out and he was more concerned in composing his congratulatory telegram to President Davis telling of his splendid victory. Grant and Sherman understood war but Beauregard did not.

2) Bragg, Beauregard, Polk and many others were fighting individual battles against Grant and Buell the next day. The relationship between Bragg and anyone was toxic and he never found his equal who could match his skill!

3) Not one commander, that I know attempted to redress his lines and secure supplies for his unit(s). Forrest was the only leader who scouted Grant's lines and witnessed Buell's troops crossing the Tennessee River. And as everyone knows he was unable to get word to Beauregard as no one know where his headquarters were!

4) There was so much elaborate, formal and self-congratulatory prose in all of the Official Reports it takes take time to weed out the facts, except of course for Bragg when they were all at fault. This was early in the War and the "just the facts" where hidden in gobbleygook.
Regards
David

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Beauregard not Johnston wrote the attack plan for the Shiloh attack. Johnston had ceded command of the army to Beauregard while it concentrated at Corinth. Bragg & Hardee were placed in an impossible tactical position.

When Beauregard was sent west in early February, 1862, he actively pushed for the concentration of all available forces in the western theater to launch a mass offensive against the Union advance.

Beauregard, as the appointed second-in-command under Johnston, was largely responsible for assembling and organizing the Confederate Army of the West, which became known as the 'Army of Mississippi'. In the weeks preceding Shiloh, Johnston appeared to support the strong-willed Beauregard's actions, giving him full discretion and complying with most of his requests. Beauregard's dominant role under Johnston during this period can perhaps be illustrated by the following opening statement of orders he wrote to soldiers on March 5, …"I assume this day the command of the Army of the Mississippi"…. ('OR': Series 1, Vol. X, Part II, at page 297).

When scouts reported on April 2 that Buell's Army had left Columbia and was moving to join Grant's Army at Pittsburgh Landing, Beauregard firmly believed that he must strike Grant now before both these Union Armies combined. He urged Johnston at Corinth, of the immediate need to attack Grant before his Army was reinforced. Apparently, Johnston was initially hesitant, claiming that he was not ready, but was soon convinced by senior officers present to support Beauregard's strong urging for action.

Apparently, in Johnston's original attack plan proposed for April 4, he intended to focus on the Union left to drive the enemy away from the river. It seems that Johnston's initial plan was changed by Beauregard, who (as second-in-command) was responsible for implementing it. Writers like Thomas Connelly claimed that Beauregard's altered attack plan involved complicated maneuvers unsuited for raw troops and the terrain involved. With the scheduled attack delayed by rain and the disorganization of formations, Beauregard tried to argue in the final hours (on April 5) against the attack because he thought the element of surprise was now lost. However, Johnston remained resolute and decided to commence the assault on the next morning. Even if Beauregard might have chiefly devised the attack plan, Johnston is ultimately responsible for deciding to launch the offensive at Shiloh.

Think that Beauregard must bear a degree of responsibility for the failed attack on day one, because his plan adopted (if it's true) was faulty to begin with. As James Lee McDonough in 'Shiloh – In Hell Before Night' says at page 73, …"Grant's Army was ripe to be smashed, but the Rebel battle plan practically guaranteed confusion in command and inefficient use of manpower"… Similarly, Bragg is also partly responsible, as commander of the largest Corps in the center of the attack, for his involvement in the flawed execution of it.

To summarize. Regarding the failure of the Confederate attack at Shiloh (on the first day), Beauregard bears some responsibility in the planning; Bragg in its execution.

 

[Sbc]

How would you say that Braxton Bragg preformed at Shiloh?

Unremarkable

 

[trice]

I think Bragg's performance was pretty much the same as his performance at Stones River and Chickamauga. Whatever the reason, on the battlefield in the midst of combat he seems to have fixated on single points: the Hornet's Nest, the Round Forest, the attack on Thomas. When the going got tough, Bragg seems to have narrowed his focus down and made everything into a contest of will. Like a wind-up toy, he would bang into a barrier, back up and hit again, repeating this time after time. The good ideas and planning he showed outside the day of battle went away. His tactical flexibility vanished. He would smash his head against the defensive wall time and again, intent on crushing the opposition at any cost, with maneuver a forgotten concept.

All IMHO, of course.

 

[Ole Miss]

Unfortunately, the ones banging their heads into the Federal line were the poor Gray Backs! Bragg was an arrogant man who never hesitated to blame anyone and everyone except himself.
Truly a detestable individual who caused hundreds useless deaths
Regards
David