The great Lee "IF".

[Frums]

When Gen. R.E. Lee made the statement to Longstreet, 'If the enemy is there tomorrow, we must attack him.', was he really thinking that Gen. Meade and the AoP would/could be gone come July 2nd? After the somewhat famously vague order, 'If practical', I started to wonder why Lee did not seem to be in a hurry or worried that they did not capture Cemetery Hill. Maybe because he felt there was a good chance of Meade ordering a full on retreat from Gettysburg? We do see a few other cases of the AoP retreating after a bad day. We also later see the accusation of Meade wanting to order a retreat. Is this because it was almost expected? Many questions abound and I know the experts out there will correct me on any flaws in thinking. Thanks

 

[5fish]

If the enemy is there tomorrow, we must attack him.',

Lee was an aggressive commander. He may have felt he carried the first day another bloody nose and the union may surrender the field of battle and retire. Lee like Grant was used to their opponents retiring after a fierce day of battle. Lee knew Meade well so the question did Lee misjudge Meade willingness to stand and fight. History says he did...

 

[Jamieva]

Based on the results of July 1, Meade pulling back the parts of the AotP that were at Gettysburg to the rest of his army is certainly not out of the question.

Keep in mind during all of this Lee is flying blind as to how much of the AotP is there and where the rest of it is.

 

[Dom71]

At no time did Meade want to order a retreat. That was a myth propagated by one officer trying to rescue his reputation, and others who had an axe to grind.

Seeing the Union position as very daunting it was decided that attacking Culps hill and taking it would make the position on Cemetery hill untenable.

IMO Lee did not believe Meade would retreat after the first day. However I do believe he felt supremely confident he would push them off the heights.

There is my contribution others more qualified than I may have better info on this.

 

[Jamieva]

The decision to stay by Meade was influenced greatly by Hancock sending back word that it was a good place to fight. Meade made the decision to stay and fight on July 2 before he ever saw the field there.

 

[John Hartwell]

What is the source of the Lee quote? It's in Killer Angels, and the movie. But, did Lee really say it?

 

[Jimklag]

At no time did Meade want to order a retreat. That was a myth propagated by one officer trying to rescue his reputation, and others who had an axe to grind.

Seeing the Union position as very daunting it was decided that attacking Culps hill and taking it would make the position on Cemetery hill untenable.

IMO Lee did not believe Meade would retreat after the first day. However I do believe he felt supremely confident he would push them off the heights.

There is my contribution others more qualified than I may have better info on this.

I think you're onto somethibg there. The great factor on the rebel side was over-confidence. All the way from Lee to the lowest private - they had beaten AoP so often over the previous year, the soldiers of ANV were positive that with Lee in charge, they couldn't lose. Lee agreed.

 

[E_just_E]

When Gen. R.E. Lee made the statement to Longstreet, 'If the enemy is there tomorrow, we must attack him.',

I think that the only place that I have seen that statement was the movie

(*) ok Longstreet mentioned it in 1896 too

 

[E_just_E]

When Gen. R.E. Lee made the statement to Longstreet, 'If the enemy is there tomorrow, we must attack him.', was he really thinking that Gen. Meade and the AoP would/could be gone come July 2nd? After the somewhat famously vague order, 'If practical', I started to wonder why Lee did not seem to be in a hurry or worried that they did not capture Cemetery Hill. Maybe because he felt there was a good chance of Meade ordering a full on retreat from Gettysburg? We do see a few other cases of the AoP retreating after a bad day. We also later see the accusation of Meade wanting to order a retreat. Is this because it was almost expected? Many questions abound and I know the experts out there will correct me on any flaws in thinking. Thanks

The validity of the statement aside, Lee arrived at Gettysburg after 2 PM or so. Longstreet likely around 10 PM (so that painting that pictures the movie scene, as well as the movie scene, is fantasy. It was dark, and if any meeting took place, it happened at Lee's HQs) The Confederates have captured prisoners from the 1st and 11th Corps. Only. Lee does not know where the rest of the AoP is. Meade arrived around midnight and the AoP kept arriving through the night.

If the statement was made, it was simple: If they are there, because we know that just 2 Corps of them are there, and maybe Hancock's that was not engaged.

 

[Frums]

I think you're onto somethibg there. The great factor on the rebel side was over-confidence. All the way from Lee to the lowest private - they had beaten AoP so often over the previous year, the soldiers of ANV were positive that with Lee in charge, they couldn't lose. Lee agreed.

It would also explain the reason Lee never seems in a hurry, excited, or bothered that Ewell did not take the hill. It seems to be more of a "ehh... we got this" or "they won't even be there" sort of response.

 

[E_just_E]

It would also explain the reason Lee never seems in a hurry, excited, or bothered that Ewell did not take the hill. It seems to be more of a "ehh... we got this" or "they won't even be there" sort of response.

Everything that has to do with Lee in Gettysburg has to seen with the light of his physical situation: he had acute diarrhea throughout the battle and was oft occupied with dealing with that.

For example: Lee took off from Cashtown on horseback at noon on July 1st and arrived to Gettysburg around 2 PM. This sounds like a simple innocuous sentence, unless one realizes that Cashtown from Lee's HQs is 7 miles. A two beat trot (there is a mention that Lee went towards Gettysburg slower than AP Hill 'who left of a gallop') is about 10 mph. He made the distance in 3.5 miles per hour pace. That's just a little faster than regular infantry march pace (2.5 mph).

This is a really big thing, has to be taken into account, and really people do not bother mentioning much, esp. sources close to the time of the battle, because it is not something that they would like to talk about, because it is undignifying. The guy was practically disabled during the battle.

 

[Hoseman]

I think you're onto somethibg there. The great factor on the rebel side was over-confidence. All the way from Lee to the lowest private - they had beaten AoP so often over the previous year, the soldiers of ANV were positive that with Lee in charge, they couldn't lose. Lee agreed.

I agree and have thought that Lee and his army almost thought they were unbeatable by the time they arrived at Gettysburg. They had won nearly every time they had met and it came on the heels of the great victory at Chancellorsville. I believe that Lee thought his men could do just about anything he ordered them to do on July 2nd, 1863. I think over-confidence was the single most important factor that led Lee to make the error in ordering the frontal assault on July 3rd. He felt like he was on such a roll that he and his army were unstoppable. He soon learned otherwise.

 

[FZ11]

When Gen. R.E. Lee made the statement to Longstreet, 'If the enemy is there tomorrow, we must attack him.', was he really thinking that Gen. Meade and the AoP would/could be gone come July 2nd? After the somewhat famously vague order, 'If practical', I started to wonder why Lee did not seem to be in a hurry or worried that they did not capture Cemetery Hill. Maybe because he felt there was a good chance of Meade ordering a full on retreat from Gettysburg? We do see a few other cases of the AoP retreating after a bad day. We also later see the accusation of Meade wanting to order a retreat. Is this because it was almost expected? Many questions abound and I know the experts out there will correct me on any flaws in thinking. Thanks

I think Lee is simply stating or reiterating to Longstreet what Lee is thinking at the moment.

 

[Carronade]

I wonder if he might have meant it another way: "The only reason we would not attack tomorrow is if the enemy is no longer there." That is, a determination to attack unless the federals precluded it by retiring.

July 1 had been an unplanned meeting engagement. Neither side had intended to fight a major battle at Gettysburg. Union troops rushing to the sound of the guns had retreated almost as quickly as additional Confederate forces joined the action. Lee did not know how near or far the bulk of the AofP might be, whether they were in supporting distance, or whether the federals in front of him might prefer to disengage.

 

[Jamieva]

It's not a meeting engagement. Good watch Eric's talk about Buford's defense

 

[FZ11]

P.S. I believe this conversation happened after Longstreet proposed that the Confederates move around the Federal left.

 

[chucksr]

Why wouldn't Lee attack given the success of the 1st day attacks? His forces had walloped two Union corps on that initial day and given that performance he must of thought the 2nd day would be successful as well.