The Do something theory

atlantis

2nd Lieutenant
Joined
Nov 12, 2016
Johnston chose to attack Grant before Buell arrived. Given that the junction of Grant/Buell would not produce the 3 to 1 ration desired for assault, was a defensive posture considered by Johnston on any of his subordinate commanders.
Was Johnston feeling pressure either from Richmond or from himself to Do something after the withdrawal from Kentucky followed by the abandonment of Nashville.
Was Johnston concerned about being relieved of command if he didn't strike.
We see what happened to the union commander of the army of the Potomac in the peninsula campaign when he was deemed to be too passive that same year.
 
Johnston knew the importance of the city he was defending and the need to keep the invader away from Corinth . There was desperation because he knew we needed that railway running to keep our country.
"We" and "our country"? Are you not a US citizen?

I do think there was pressure on ASJ to do something- he'd given up a lot of ground. He thought he had an opportunity and launched an assault. The rest is history.
 
"We" and "our country"? Are you not a US citizen?

I do think there was pressure on ASJ to do something- he'd given up a lot of ground. He thought he had an opportunity and launched an assault. The rest is history.
He was trying to save Corinth from the invasion and pillaging that ensued from the invaders .
 
He was trying to defend enslaved labor farms and make safe that deplorable institution.
By that logic Grant had advanced in Tennessee in 1862 to protect the US enslaved labor farms and protect the United States deplorable institution from possible Confederate threat....................he certainly successfully defended Kentucky slavery by doing so..........As well Tennessee slavery in areas he occupied, as they would be exempt from EP later.....................

Personally I don't think everything, including military operations were motivated by slavery. But if one did as you seem to suggest, that would been a major effect of Grants move.
 
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The southern press had taken Johnston to task for the loss at Forts Henry and Donelson and Nashville. After having originally been exalted by Davis as the savior of the western Confederacy, the breakdown of the cordon line extending across Kentucky and Tennessee was a bitter pill to swallow, and of course, Johnston as commander got the blame. So the concentration at Corinth and the surprise assault at Pittsburg Landing was conceived by Johnston as a means to regain the initiative and halt federal momentum. Johnston no doubt would feel additional pressure to accomplish such an undertaking successfully but the plan itself was a good one which any effective commander would carry out.
 
In this post I am thinking specific to Johnston.
I see. The idea that a decision maker can be put under pressure to "just do something" seems familiar to me -- not just in the Civil War but in other contexts as well.

In the case of Johnston at Pittsburg Landing, do you think that he was pressured to enter an engagement against his better judgment? Is that what you're getting at?

ARB
 
In the case of Johnston at Pittsburg Landing, do you think that he was pressured to enter an engagement against his better judgment?
The idea behind the Confederate concentration and attack at Pittsburg Landing was a good one, and Johnston deserves credit for that. For sure, he was under pressure by the press and public at that point after having overseen the fall of the riverine forts and the entire defense line across Kentucky and Tennessee. But I would not consider his going forward with the engagement against his better judgment. What I would consider flawed and for which Johnston must bear some responsibility were problems with the preparation and execution of the battle plan including allowing Beauregard to meddle, and not ensuring that effective troop discipline was maintained. And perhaps Johnston's heroic but foolhardy stance in the battle line that led to his mortal wound was against his better judgement but prompted in part by his need to regain his own fallen stature.
 
I see. The idea that a decision maker can be put under pressure to "just do something" seems familiar to me -- not just in the Civil War but in other contexts as well.

In the case of Johnston at Pittsburg Landing, do you think that he was pressured to enter an engagement against his better judgment? Is that what you're getting at?

ARB
I think the pressure from the press and public was something he had never experienced before in his military career. I do not disrespect him. To have been in his shoes as a career officer must have been crushing after the reverses his command had suffered and then he gets word of another union advance headed his way. I agree just do something is familiar in other conflicts with awful results for the soldiers that have to carry it out.
 
The idea behind the Confederate concentration and attack at Pittsburg Landing was a good one, and Johnston deserves credit for that. For sure, he was under pressure by the press and public at that point after having overseen the fall of the riverine forts and the entire defense line across Kentucky and Tennessee. But I would not consider his going forward with the engagement against his better judgment. What I would consider flawed and for which Johnston must bear some responsibility were problems with the preparation and execution of the battle plan including allowing Beauregard to meddle, and not ensuring that effective troop discipline was maintained. And perhaps Johnston's heroic but foolhardy stance in the battle line that led to his mortal wound was against his better judgement but prompted in part by his need to regain his own fallen stature.
I respectfully disagree it was a good plan given how skillfully the union used rivers to their advantage. The farther away from the river the better for the confederates. He had no realistic chance of destroying either union army.
 
I respectfully disagree it was a good plan given how skillfully the union used rivers to their advantage. The farther away from the river the better for the confederates. He had no realistic chance of destroying either union army.
But that is exactly why the southern concentration was necessary to block any further Union advance along the river systems. Using rivers to their advantage, federal armies had advanced and broken through the Confederate defense line in Kentucky and Tennessee and were making inroads towards Mississippi. Johnston needed to seize the opportunity to deal a blow to this advance by attacking Grant's force at Pittsburg Landing before Buell could come up.
 
He was trying to save Corinth from the invasion and pillaging that ensued from the invaders .
That's weird . The thought that WE are invading our own country. 0f course the that's from the Norths perspective
 
That's weird . The thought that WE are invading our own country. 0f course the that's from the Norths perspective
Corinth Mississippi was part of the Confederate States of America.
 
ASJ was under pressure from the press, government and the white population. However he was a soldier and knew the Confederacy could not lose Kentucky and Tennessee and survive! The crops and livestock produced by these states were vital to the survival of the young nation.

Grant was after control of the rivers on the way to his ultimate goal of taking Vicksburg and severing the CSA.

So yes Johnston had "To Do Something" at Shiloh
Regards
David
 

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