Tail-to-tooth Ratio for Union Regiments

[tony_gunter]

This source claims 20%, does that sound reasonable?

That would include all the support roles in the field: farrier, blacksmith, wagoner, teamster, pioneer, hospital attendant, musician … am I missing any?

 

[Sheltowee]

"Number of muskets in the line of battle".

So artillery crewmen were also discounted?

 

[tony_gunter]

"Number of muskets in the line of battle".

So artillery crewmen were also discounted?

I think he means that metaphorically. Not sure that his point about officers is correct, didn't Confederate returns list officers and enlisted effectives separately?

The more interesting point is the tail-to-tooth ratio. Federal returns included all support personnel, but those roles in the Confederate army were generally filled by slave labor.

As the war progressed, of course, some of those roles in the Federal army would be offloaded to hired former slaves: cook, personal servants, … ?

Has anyone ever done an estimate on the tail-to-tooth ratio for the Federal armies in the field?

 

[67th Tigers]

Deduct 20% is roughly correct. However, by 1864 the AoP had removed the personnel on extra duty from the PFD column already, and strengths are roughly directly comparable.

 

[tony_gunter]

Deduct 20% is roughly correct. However, by 1864 the AoP had removed the personnel on extra duty from the PFD column already, and strengths are roughly directly comparable.

Is there a source that discusses that?

 

[Saphroneth]

So essentially what you start with is a body of men physically with the army. For the Union early-war this is Aggregate Present, all men present with the army; for the Confederates, it also includes non-soldiers (e.g. slaves or black freedmen) who would also be drawing rations or otherwise eating but who would not be carried on the rolls. The moving body of men physically with the army is the largest category of strength.

There's a way that things were supposed to be done, the pre-war regulations that defined how to fill out the forms, and if done according to those rules you end up with the "Present for Duty" category including everyone who isn't actually sick or under arrest (which we can call "regulation PFD").

The category of Extra Duty is the people who are long-term detached from their regiment. These are the teamsters, cooks etc., who are typically controlled by QMs and get extra pay for the task. That means it's sometimes broken out separately in at least lower level returns.

Special Duty is people on similar tasks who are not eligible for extra money.

Daily Duty is camp guards, etc. which were done on a rotating roster - hence "daily".

What's left is the men who actually go into battle. This is generally somewhere around 80% of the "regulation PFD".

Then if the army is straggling the numbers can drop further.


Over time, and at different times in different armies, commanders changed how the calculations were done. One of the common changes was moving men in the extra, special and daily duty categories out of PFD. Johnston did this in the East for the Army of Northern Virginia, and it wasn't done in the Army of the Potomac until at least October 1862. So as of Antietam (September 1862) you'd see about a 20% difference or so between the numbers - if not more, as sometimes in the Confederate army what they actually report is their strength that they brought to a battle. After straggling.




I like to compare this with Hood's December 10 1864 state, where he gives effectives, PFD and AP explicitly.


Hood gives:
Effectives 23,000
PFD 26,850
AP 36,400

This indicates that about 2/3 of Hood's Aggregate Present was being reported as Effectives, and the other third was not. This would give Hood a tooth:tail ratio of about 2:1, and the numbers here suggest that PFD probably doesn't include at least extra duty men.

 

[Kurtlg]

My question is how do we come up with army strengths at Gettysburg? I assume historians have gone through the regimental strengths and have come up with combatant strength. Generally the numbers are around 70,000 Confederate and 95,000 Union. Do these numbers include cavalry and artillery. I don't believe these numbers would be reported from the size each army reported if the Confederates reported muskets available and the Union reported support troops.

 

[Saphroneth]

My question is how do we come up with army strengths at Gettysburg? I assume historians have gone through the regimental strengths and have come up with combatant strength. Generally the numbers are around 70,000 Confederate and 95,000 Union. Do these numbers include cavalry and artillery. I don't believe these numbers would be reported from the size each army reported if the Confederates reported muskets available and the Union reported support troops.

I would tend to assume that if they've gone through regimental strengths, they would do so with a consistent set of rules to apply to the paperwork of both sides. If they have actual regimental reports that give the number of men on special, extra and daily duty, then they can define for themselves which categories they count as being strengths at Gettysburg and which they do not.

An interesting case study here is to look at 1st Minnesota. One of their companies was detached on divisional provost (C company) and when "262 men" is given as their strength making their charge on the 2nd of July that's the morning muster strength of A, B, D, E, G, H, I & K companies - note that C company (as well as F company) are not on the list. If the per-regiment lists 1st Minnesota strength as 262 at Gettysburg, it is only counting the morning strength of men engaged, and so it's not counting men detached to other duties.

Whether it includes daily duty men is a separate question.

 

[tony_gunter]

I would tend to assume that if they've gone through regimental strengths, they would do so with a consistent set of rules to apply to the paperwork of both sides. If they have actual regimental reports that give the number of men on special, extra and daily duty, then they can define for themselves which categories they count as being strengths at Gettysburg and which they do not.

An interesting case study here is to look at 1st Minnesota. One of their companies was detached on divisional provost (C company) and when "262 men" is given as their strength making their charge on the 2nd of July that's the morning muster strength of A, B, D, E, G, H, I & K companies - note that C company (as well as F company) are not on the list. If the per-regiment lists 1st Minnesota strength as 262 at Gettysburg, it is only counting the morning strength of men engaged, and so it's not counting men detached to other duties.

Whether it includes daily duty men is a separate question.

Where were C and F?

 

[RedRover]

McClellan's report shows, as noted by Col. Palfrey,

and Palfrey's point was that no matter the number on the rolls present for duty on a given morning report, simple realities prevented every man so accounted for from being actually in the line of battle, on the battlefield, over the next twelve or more hours.


The First Corps is credited with 14,856 present with the army at the battle. The day after the Battle General Meade, commanding, noted a large number of personnel were yet in the rear, many having straggled, etc., and others bailed or dispersed during the action...

Meade makes this statement as the Corps reported a total of 2,590 casualties on September 17, out of the 14,856 "present." Which should have left on hand 12,266 men on the 18th. But roll call found only half that many left besides the casualties. McClellan noted:

The point of "separation" mentioned would have been between the morning roll-calls/reports, and marching to and engaging in the battle. And as Meade mentions, some of the men in that number were dispersed during the battle.

General McClellan was aware of the issue of straggling, dispersion, etc., and noted:

Colonel Palfrey's claim was that no matter what was reported from the morning reports on the day of battle, even the best and mot efficient commands could not have gotten more than 4/5ths of the men present for duty into action... meaning in his view the average was somewhat less...

Palfrey's point being that he was satisfied that at best, and probably significantly less than, 70,000 Union troops were actually physically engaged in the battle to any extent.

Lee's accounting at Antietam, after deducting stragglers, details etc. was that he had not more than 30,000 physically engaged.

 

[Saphroneth]

Lee's accounting at Antietam, after deducting stragglers, details etc. was that he had not more than 30,000 physically engaged.

It's my understanding that going through the accounts of the Confederate commanders you get a larger total engaged - but that larger total is only about 47,000 all told, out of what "should" be about 65-75,000 regulation PFD based on post-battle reports and add-back of casualties.

The real issue here is that McClellan reported regulation strength (i.e. proper PFD) and Confederate reports are of effectives, after a particularly intense period of hard marching and lots of straggling. So it's by no means apples to apples. Both sides seem to have been deploying more like 60% than 80% of their theoretical regulation PFD in actual effectives.

Where were C and F?

C were on divisional provost, I'm not sure what F were doing.

 

[RedRover]

Three days after the battle of Antietam, the Army of the Potomac included 293,798 men aggregate present and absent, with 164,359 present for duty, excluding those casualties resulting from the battle of the 17th.

There were 24,315 aggregate on special duty, sick, or under arrest, and
another 105,124 absent for various reasons.

Looking at the numbers, compared to McClellan's report, it appears that only half of the troops present for duty within a few days of the battle were actually present on the day of battle.

Three days previous to this return, the Army brought 87,164 to the battlefield, of whom a majority were engaged in the battle, of whatever proportion, and about 12,400 were casualties.

 

[Saphroneth]

Three days after the battle of Antietam, the Army of the Potomac included 293,798 men aggregate present and absent, with 164,359 present for duty, excluding those casualties resulting from the battle of the 17th.

Sorry, you're misreading the return - though it is easy to misread in this case. The return here includes a line for "General Banks, defences of Washington, incluing 3rd and 11th Corps". That formation (71,000 PFD, about 45% of the army's PFD strength) is the defenders of Washington, and they're all 50+ miles away. Functionally speaking they're only part of the Army of the Potomac in a purely administrative sense, and in fact McClellan has to go through Halleck if he wants any of Banks' defenders moved into his field army so they're not really under his command.


In addition to that formation, one division of Porter's 5th Corps had not yet arrived on the 17th, and nor had Couch's division of 4th Corps. There were also some regiments which joined post-Antietam.

 

[RedRover]

Sorry, you're misreading the return - though it is easy to misread in this case. The return here includes a line for "General Banks, defences of Washington, incluing 3rd and 11th Corps". That formation (71,000 PFD, about 45% of the army's PFD strength) is the defenders of Washington, and they're all 50+ miles away. Functionally speaking they're only part of the Army of the Potomac in a purely administrative sense, and in fact McClellan has to go through Halleck if he wants any of Banks' defenders moved into his field army so they're not really under his command.


In addition to that formation, one division of Porter's 5th Corps had not yet arrived on the 17th, and nor had Couch's division of 4th Corps. There were also some regiments which joined post-Antietam.

The defense of Washington, being a principal duty of the Army of the Potomac, is certainly a principal reason those troops weren't present on the battlefield.

 

[Saphroneth]

The defense of Washington, being a principal duty of the Army of the Potomac, is certainly a principal reason those troops weren't present on the battlefield.

True enough, though it means you need to cut them out of the estimate. Roughly speaking I believe the post-battle PFD of the formations that "should" have been at the battle is about 75,000 PFD, depending on how many reinforcement regiments you count.

Personally I suspect that McClellan's reported strengths PFD are literally this very report (the September 20 one) plus adding back casualties, or at least the data that fed this September 20 report as he would have the September 20 divisional returns for 5th Corps for example.

 

[Steven Rockwell]

Where do the ill, hospitalized, walking wounded, and those soldiers under arrest or otherwise under the custody of the Provost Martial and MPs fall? Are they counted as part of the support numbers or not counted at all because they aren't able-bodied troops who are able to do something in the rear?

 

[Saphroneth]

Where do the ill, hospitalized, walking wounded, and those soldiers under arrest or otherwise under the custody of the Provost Martial and MPs fall? Are they counted as part of the support numbers or not counted at all because they aren't able-bodied troops who are able to do something in the rear?

Someone who is with the army is part of the Aggregate Present. Some returns actually break out "sick and in arrest" as a separate category.

I believe that anyone able to do a duty might be counted as PFD depending on reporting techniques, but anyone in hospital or under arrest (who is still with the army) would be under Aggregate Present only. Anyone not with the army would be absent.

 

[Saphroneth]

A good way to think about it is that the high level reports are usually aggregated up from low level ones, which amount to a list of what each soldier is doing at the time. If they're on duty, then they're listed as such, but if they're not then they're categorized according to why. (Sick and can't do duty, or under arrest, or absent.)

This is actually one reason why the Antietam numbers are a bit vague for Lee - he hadn't taken proper rolls in months.

 

[rpkennedy]

C were on divisional provost, I'm not sure what F were doing.

Company F was the skirmish company on July 2.

Ryan

 

[Rhea Cole]

The Army of the Cumberland was (+/-) 70-80,000 men. The enormous Department of the Cumberland had (+/-) 240,000 men that supported the army.

That includes RR operators, RR engineering units, riverine transports, quartermaster depots in Cincinnati, Louisville, Nashville, Murfreesboro, Clarksville & garrisons to protect them. The medical support even included specially designed & built hospital trains that were painted red. The civilian employees numbered in the thousands.

The logistical network that armed, fed, clothed, nursed, & shipped remounts to the A of the C & then Sherman's army group was a massive undertaking.