- Joined
- Jan 16, 2015
As of summer 1863, the organization and duties of the ordnance departments in the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia and Federal Army of the Potomac were similar. It appears that each Confederate infantry regiment had one assigned ordnance wagon, usually pulled by six mules owing to the weight, but it traveled separately in an ordnance (wagon) train grouped together by brigade. Unlike baggage trains, ordnance trains were permitted to approach the battlefield, being kept at a safe distance just beyond the range of enemy artillery, but close enough to readily resupply the troops, often after the day's fighting was over. Accounts by Confederate ordnance officers are scarce, but the diary of Lt. William Beavans, who served on the staff of BGen. Daniels' NC brigade is one excellent source. Federal ordnance was similarly organized, but at the division level for infantry. Andrew Boies of the 33rd Massachusetts reported in April 1863 that his division ordnance train consisted of one lieutenant, two sergeants, and 36 men, who were detailed from the various regiments in the division. From three extant examples, it appears that about three ordnance wagons were assigned to every Federal regiment. If accurate, it suggests the Confederate system was considerably more efficient; despite making due with far fewer ordnance wagons, their infantry was nearly always adequately supplied with small-arms ammunition.
A six mule team could theoretically haul a 30,000 pound load over good roads - the equivalent of 30 ammunition boxes, but in practice a load of 15-20 boxes was more the norm. The boxes carried the different types of ammunition used by the subordinate regiments: smoothbore caliber .69 buck and ball, rifled muskets caliber .54, Springfield muskets caliber .58, etc. Excess capacity in the wagons would be used to carry spare muskets, including weapons and ammunition gathered after a battle. Staff ordnance officers interfaced with an ordnance sergeant from each regiment, who was charged with inspection and repair of small-arms, and the monitoring of ammunition expenditures. Periodic ordnance reports required of unit commanders indicated current status. Confederate Colonel William Allan, Chief of Ordnance of MGen. Richard Ewell's Second Corps, said that as of early 1863, ordnance reports were required every two weeks, accounting for every round of ammunition, which helped significantly reduce losses. Ammunition was of course a top priority item in both armies. Surgeon T. F. Wood of the 3rd NC said no wagons or men were allowed to recross the Potomac during the retreat from Gettysburg until the ordnance wagons were safely over.
One humorous incident involved Michael S. Schroyer of the 147th Pennsylvania. After the regiment made camp in late June 1863, Mike was detailed to go to the ammunition train and bring up a box of ammunition. Since the train was back fully three-quarters of a mile, and owing to the weight of the box, 100 pounds, Mike found it a very severe task, but upon arrival in camp he was allowed an extra supper.
Artillery ammunition in the batteries and reserve trains was handled separately. BGen. Henry Hunt in the Federal army and Col. E. P. Alexander in the Confederate army have both written extensively on this topic for their respective commands. As an interesting aside, one of BGen. Pendleton's aides was sent back to the reserve trains to report on the status of Confederate artillery ammunition during the third day at Gettysburg, and found some wagons held ammunition for large siege guns that had obviously been mistakenly loaded for the journey into Pennsylvania, since they did not fit any gun in the army. So far as is known, this fact has remained hidden for 150 years.
A six mule team could theoretically haul a 30,000 pound load over good roads - the equivalent of 30 ammunition boxes, but in practice a load of 15-20 boxes was more the norm. The boxes carried the different types of ammunition used by the subordinate regiments: smoothbore caliber .69 buck and ball, rifled muskets caliber .54, Springfield muskets caliber .58, etc. Excess capacity in the wagons would be used to carry spare muskets, including weapons and ammunition gathered after a battle. Staff ordnance officers interfaced with an ordnance sergeant from each regiment, who was charged with inspection and repair of small-arms, and the monitoring of ammunition expenditures. Periodic ordnance reports required of unit commanders indicated current status. Confederate Colonel William Allan, Chief of Ordnance of MGen. Richard Ewell's Second Corps, said that as of early 1863, ordnance reports were required every two weeks, accounting for every round of ammunition, which helped significantly reduce losses. Ammunition was of course a top priority item in both armies. Surgeon T. F. Wood of the 3rd NC said no wagons or men were allowed to recross the Potomac during the retreat from Gettysburg until the ordnance wagons were safely over.
One humorous incident involved Michael S. Schroyer of the 147th Pennsylvania. After the regiment made camp in late June 1863, Mike was detailed to go to the ammunition train and bring up a box of ammunition. Since the train was back fully three-quarters of a mile, and owing to the weight of the box, 100 pounds, Mike found it a very severe task, but upon arrival in camp he was allowed an extra supper.
Artillery ammunition in the batteries and reserve trains was handled separately. BGen. Henry Hunt in the Federal army and Col. E. P. Alexander in the Confederate army have both written extensively on this topic for their respective commands. As an interesting aside, one of BGen. Pendleton's aides was sent back to the reserve trains to report on the status of Confederate artillery ammunition during the third day at Gettysburg, and found some wagons held ammunition for large siege guns that had obviously been mistakenly loaded for the journey into Pennsylvania, since they did not fit any gun in the army. So far as is known, this fact has remained hidden for 150 years.
Bringing the