Sunrise Attack at Chickamauga

[OldReliable1862]

On the night of 19-20 September, Braxton Bragg planned an attack at dawn on the Union left. He had restructured his army at this time, dividing into two wings under James Longstreet and Leonidas Polk.

The attack was to be made by D. H. Hill's corps, which had been placed in Polk's wing. Polk was summoned to Bragg's headquarters and informed of the plan, but through a series of misadventures, Polk failed to make Hill aware of the plans. In the end, the attack went ahead five hours late. The Union troops had spent the early morning constructing and improving their earthworks, adding obstructions with tree branches. The attack on the Union left would be a failure, with Longstreet achieving success on the Union center and right.

Bragg would later claim that it was this five hour delay which cost the Confederacy its independence. While I would not go so far as Bragg did, I believe this attack may well have had a shot at success had Hill been given his orders in a timely manner.

That said, David Powell did not seem optimistic about the attack from what I remember, but I can't quite ascertain why. There is also the matter that an attack on the Union left was exactly what Rosecrans and his subordinates were expecting, and they sent Thomas reinforcements accordingly.

 

[Rhea Cole]

There is always the fog of war. Preposterous things occur that have profound, unanticipated consequences. Chickamauga is a textbook manifestation of that principle. Bragg did not communicate with his commanders, so Hill did not attack. Rosecrans over communicated & opened a hole in his line. Longstreet, who received no orders or communications from Bragg attacks on his own initiative. In short, there was no plan & yet Bragg's army achieved a major tactical victory.

The "P" word, as my greats & grands refer to my plans for family outings, & the words Braxton Bragg hardly belong in the same sentence. The whole point of doing battle at Chickamauga was retaking Chattanooga. Any outcome that did not conclude with that result was a tactical success without strategic benefit. I don't much care for sports analogies, but in this case a successful opening drive in a football game followed by defeat in the 4th quarter is apt.

To directly address the premise of your question, there is no reason to assume that an attack by Hill would have achieved any significant success. Events would prove that Thomas' men were quite capable of beating off anything that the CSA could throw at them, even if there had been a plan.

Since you mentioned David Powell, I am reading his new book about Grant at Chattanooga. The staff work, planing & communications with subordinates on Grant's part is a world apart. Bragg's entire record shows that apart from an opening attack, he never had a plan of any kind. Anybody who has so much as played a game of checkers knows that is a formula defeat.

 

[OldReliable1862]

To directly address the premise of your question, there is no reason to assume that an attack by Hill would have achieved any significant success. Events would prove that Thomas' men were quite capable of beating off anything that the CSA could throw at them, even if there had been a plan.

Do you think the lack of any real breastworks or obstructions would have had any influence on matters? Also, I seem to remember (but I'll check later) that the troops in that sector had fought on the 19th, while Breckinridge's men were relatively fresh.

While Hill's actual attack did fail, I certainly wouldn't consider it a disaster.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

The biggest problem with the attack on the Union left seems to me not to be the timing or breastworks, but rather the nature of the attack itself. A dawn attack certainly goes better for the Confederates but is likely still unsuccessful.

Thomas' line was a crescent with the left on the LaFayette Road without any real topography to provide a firm anchor. The Confederate attack was pretty much across the line, with some units taking flanking fire due to erroneously moving obliquely relative to the Union left or because attacking the right side of the crescent exposed the unit's flank to the straight center of the Union line. The only success was a brief accidental movement around the Union flank.

For the attack to succeed, the Confederates need to do one of the following:

1. Find and turn the Union left flank, which would collapse the entire salient and possibly trap part of it. The best chance for victory, but the hardest to pull off because it requires knowing where the flank is in terrain with low visibility.

2. Concentrate against the left/north side of the crescent. Try to drive in the Union flank, cutting off or collapsing the salient.

3. Concentrate against the eastern tip of the salient with an attack similar to the Spotsylvania Mule Shoe. The goal is to break through the center, which is the weakest point of a convex line, then widen the breach. This gives Thomas the best chance to counterattack or at least stabilize by sealing off the base of the salient. However, it's probably the easiest of the three to execute correctly as #1 requires knowing where the Union flank is and #2 doesn't attack a point of weakness.

 

[OldReliable1862]

Concentrate against the eastern tip of the salient with an attack similar to the Spotsylvania Mule Shoe. The goal is to break through the center, which is the weakest point of a convex line, then widen the breach. This gives Thomas the best chance to counterattack or at least stabilize by sealing off the base of the salient. However, it's probably the easiest of the three to execute correctly as #1 requires knowing where the Union flank is and #2 doesn't attack a point of weakness.

This is interesting, but looking at this map:

Thomas has two brigades (Willich's and Scribner's) stashed close inside the salient. While a breach could perhaps be made, it seems plugging it would be a relatively simple matter.

 

[jackt62]

Let me see if I understand this situation. Bragg's planned assault on the Union left was properly conceived in order to cut the federal connection with the roads leading north to Chattanooga and to get around the Union flank and rear and derange the AotC. As a tactical matter, Bragg seemed to be going by the same playbook he used at Stones River (albeit the attack being made on the Union right), a powerful wheeling movement that benefited from McCook's weak dispositions at that place. In contrast, at Chickamauga on the Union left, Bragg was facing Thomas, a formidable opponent. To make matters worse, as noted, the assault was commenced 5 hours too late against the federal left that had been extended further than anticipated. So would the attack have succeeded otherwise? Not helpful, Bragg's relationships with his subordinate officers were probably at their lowest point by September 1863, and Rosecrans' (despite the botched mixup that doomed the Union position on Day 2), was highly capable in conducting a defense by moving forces from the right to reinforce Thomas's left. Had Longstreet's fortuitous breakthrough not occurred, the betting money should have been on Rosecrans' and the AotC holding its position at day's end.

 

[Norman Dasinger Jr]

The attack was effective - at first. Where the question arises is following Longstreets breakthru. What did Hills Div do in the afternoon? As Longstreet was driving the Yankee cneter west and north, Hill's men sat. What if they had also attacked the Union left soon after longstreet had wrecked the center? What if Hill had gotten troops behind the Union left as longstreet's men attacked the Snodgress Hills? As the Yankess withdrew toward Chattanooga this Union left flank excavated north between Longstreets men and Hill's Div. What if Hill had even waited until this late hour to move and move against these retreating Yankees?