Sumter Provocation

Which is it not passed on or that Lamon didn't see a shortage your changing your story...

Lammon mission we do not know because it remains a secret one, the other we do because Lincoln tells us it wa sto determine secesh sentiment in Charleston, neither men were sent to inquire as to supply issues, everything to do with that had already been descided from info already given.
 
Jan 27 :
38 barrels pork:38*240*16=145920.
37 barrels flour:37*240*16=132080
13 barrels hard bread:13*240*16=48920.


March 21:
Six barrels of flour;6*240*16=23040
six barrels of hard bread6* 240*16=23040
twenty-six barrels of pork;26*240*16=99640.


25 days consumption has reduced the Jan to March levels.

You keep talking about an increase in inventory levels during the seige yet show no proof...Anderson sent several reports that he wasn't getting the supplies from Charleston that he was supposed to.. The Mar 21 report is significantly below the Jan one, so how are you claiming an increase in levels? Are you still using Halls April 1 report?

Also, still waiting for something to back up your claim that Anderson didn't want a re-supply fleet sent because he had enough rations.. He certainly had other reasons why he didn't want one sent, but I have never seen anything that says it was because he had enough provisions...
 
Lammon mission we do not know because it remains a secret one, the other we do because Lincoln tells us it wa sto determine secesh sentiment in Charleston, neither men were sent to inquire as to supply issues, everything to do with that had already been descided from info already given.
Whether or not it was a reason he was sent there we have two officers in the fort saying how he was told to make sure Washington knew the status of their food shortage...
 
It is rather a bore to have to copy paste the same things over and over, when you ask the same question over and over despite them being answered already.

Agreed.
Gitmo, DMZ, West Berlin, Sumter.
Everywhere the US soldier is stationed has the potential to be a tripline.
In all four of these cases the opposing force knew the consequences of firing on US soldiers on US posts.
In only one of them did the opposing force just not care.

You're probably getting tired of ignoring this, although to your credit, you are both good and thorough at it.
 
You keep mentioning the report that Anderson gave Lincoln on Mar 4, do you have a source for that...

Lincoln himself.

http://www.fullbooks.com/Abraham-Lincoln-Vol-I-4.html

Such was the
situation on March 4, when Mr. Lincoln came into control and declared a
policy which bound him to "hold, occupy, and possess" Sumter. On the
same day there came a letter from Major Anderson, describing his
position. There were shut up in the fort together a certain number of
men and a certain quantity of biscuit and of pork; when the men should
have eaten the biscuit and the pork, which they would probably do in
about four weeks, they would have to go away. The problem thus became
direct, simple, and urgent.

Lincoln sought an opinion from Scott, and was told that "evacuation
seems almost inevitable." He requested a more thorough investigation,
and a reply to specific questions: "To what point of time can Anderson
maintain his position in Sumter? Can you, with present means, relieve
him in that time? What additional means would enable you to do so?" The
general answered that four months would be necessary to prepare the
naval force, and an even longer time to get together the 5000 regular
troops and 20,000 volunteers that would be needed, to say nothing of
obtaining proper legislation from Congress. Equally discouraging were
the opinions of the cabinet officers. On March 15 Lincoln put to them
the question: "Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumter,
under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it?" Only Chase and
Blair replied that it would be wise; Seward, Cameron, Wells, Smith, and
Bates were against it.


Some more on this topic.

Intresting, we know when Lincoln asked the question. We know Scott opinion of the situation.
http://wbts-calendar.blogspot.com/2011/03/gen-scott-to-lincoln-surrender-sumter.html
"I now see no alternative but a surrender, in some weeks," Scott argued. "Evacuation seems almost inevitable . . . if, indeed, the worn out garrison be not assaulted & carried in the present week."

http://www.scribd.com/doc/50153125/Lincoln-Request-and-Cabinet-Opinions-on-Sumter-March-1861
attacking force could leave Northern ports. The harbor would be closed; a landing must beeffected at some distance from our guns, which could give no aid. Charleston harbor would be aSebastopol in such a conflict, and unlimited means would probably be required to ensure success,before which time the garrison of Fort Sumter would be starved out."
2
General Scott, in his reply to the question, addressed to him by the President, on the 12th instant,what amount of means and of what description, in addition to those already at command, itwould require to supply and reinforce the fort, says, "I should need a fleet of war vessels andtransports, which, in the scattered disposition of the Navy (as understood) could not be collectedin less than four months; 5000 additional regular troops, and 20,000 volunteers -- that is, a forcesufficient to take all the batteries, both in the harbor (including Fort Moultrie) as well as in theapproach or outer bay. To raise, organize and discipline such an army (not to speak of necessarylegislation by Congress not now in session) would require from six to eight months. As apractical military question, the time for succoring Fort Sumter, with any means at hand hadpassed away nearly a month ago. Since then, a surrender under assault, or from starvation, hasbeen merely a question of tim


Fort Sumter.
The President has done me the honor to address to me certain professional questions, to which he desires answers. I proceed with them categorically.

"1. To what point of time can Major Anderson maintain his position, at Fort Sumter, without fresh supplies or reinforcements?"

Answer. In respect to subsistence, for the garrison, he has hard bread, flour & rice for about 26 days, & salt meat (pork) for about 48 days; but how long he could hold out against the whole means of attack which the South Carolinians have in, & about the city of Charleston & its Harbour, is a question that cannot be answered with absolute accuracy. Reckoning the batteries troops at 3,500 (now somewhat disciplined) & the batteries at 4 powerful land, & at least one floating -- all mounting guns & mortars of large calibre, & of the best patterns; -- & supposing those means to be skillfully & vigorously employed -- Fort Sumter with its less than 100 men -- including common laborers & musicians -- ought to be taken by a single assault, & easily; if harrassed perseveringly for several previous days & nights by threats & false attacks, with the ability -- from the force of overwhelming numbers -- of converting one out of every three or four of those, into a real attack.

"2. Can you with all the means now in your control, supply or reinforce Fort Sumter within that time?"

Answer. No: Not within many months. See answer to No. 3.

"3. If not, what amount of means, & of what description, in addition to that already at your control, would enable you to supply & reinforce that fortress within the time?"

Answer. A fleet of war vessels & transports, 5,000 additional regular troops & 20,000 volunteers, in order to take all the batteries in the Harbor of Charleston (including Ft. Moultrie) after the capture of all the batteries in the approach or outer Bay. And to raise, organize & discipline such an army, would require new acts of Congress & from six to eight months.

Respectfully submitted.

Winfield Scott.

Head Qrs. of the Army,

Washington, Mar. 11, 1861.
http://hd.housedivided.dickinson.edu/?q=node/25261



When Lincoln asked the questions Scott replied:
Lieutenant General Scott: Executive Mansion, March 9, 1861.

My dear Sir: On the 5th inst. I received from the Hon. Joseph Holt, the then faithful and vigilant Secretary of War, a letter of that date, inclosing a letter and accompanying documents received by him on the 4th inst. from Major Robert Anderson commanding at Fort Sumpter [Sumter] South Carolina; and copies of all which I now transmit. Immediately on the receipt of them by me, I transmitted the whole to you for your consideration; and the same day you returned the package to me with your opinion endorsed upon it, a copy of which opinion I now also transmit to you. Learning from you verbally that since then you have given the subject a more full and thorough consideration, you will much oblige me by giving answers, in writing, to the following interrogatories:

1st To what point of time can Major Anderson maintain his position at Fort Sumpter [Sumter], without fresh supplies or reinforcement?

2d. Can you, with all the means now in your control, supply or re-inforce Fort Sumpter [Sumter] within that time?

3d If not, what amount of means and of what description, in addition to that already at your control, would enable you to supply and reinforce that fortress within the time?

Please answer these, adding such statements, information, and counsel as your great skill and experience may suggest. Your obedient Servant A. LINCOLN.
http://hd.housedivided.dickinson.edu/node/25262
 
In what fantasy land does this seem to be a reasonable cause for war?
If the territory was disputed (and that's the most charitable description available) the presence of (new) CS cannon facing a pre-existing US fort is clearly provocative.
CLEARLY.
PROVOCATIVE.

If the whole defense of southern aggression in the spring of 1861 rests on this aspect, it is a shoddy, hollow argument.
 
You keep talking about an increase in inventory levels during the seige yet show no proof...Anderson sent several reports that he wasn't getting the supplies from Charleston that he was supposed to.. The Mar 21 report is significantly below the Jan one, so how are you claiming an increase in levels? Are you still using Halls April 1 report?

I used maths to show your claim on what it would show to be wrong by 2 months, and texts of primary documentets to show that Anderson resolved the issue of lack of supply and increased his intake by 184 pounds of beef and aquired fresh veg on a regular basis plus other requirements.

Also, still waiting for something to back up your claim that Anderson didn't want a re-supply fleet sent because he had enough rations.. He certainly had other reasons why he didn't want one sent, but I have never seen anything that says it was because he had enough provisions...

Asked and answered too many times already.
 
Whether or not it was a reason he was sent there we have two officers in the fort saying how he was told to make sure Washington knew the status of their food shortage...

And he did not, how important does that make the refernce?, clearly to Lamon it had no relavence due to his understanding the post was to be evacuated in days.
 
Hall was the Posts QM. It refers to the post 120 men, and shows a increase in stores.

Here are some of his reports.
FORT SUMTER, S. C., March 21, 1861.
Maj. R. ANDERSON, First Artillery, Commanding:
MAJOR: I have examined the commissary supplies on hand, and find them to be in kind and amount as follows, viz:
Six barrels of flour; six barrels of hard bread; three barrels of sugar; one barrel of coffee; two barrels of vinegar; twenty-six barrels of pork; one-fourth barrel of salt; one and a half barrels of rice; three boxes of candles.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
NORMAN J. HALL,


FORT SUMTER, S. C., April 1, 1861.
Maj. ROBERT ANDERSON, First Artillery, Commanding:
MAJOR: In compliance with your request, I have the honor to submit the following list of provisions sold to Capt. J. G. Foster, Corps of Engineers, for the subsistence of the employés in his department at this post, and have expressed the quantities in numbers of rations, viz:
Five and one-half barrels of pork-one thousand four hundred and sixty-seven rations.
Twenty barrels of flour-three thousand four hundred and eighty-five rations.
One hundred and eighty pounds hard bread-one hundred and eighty rations.
Two and one-half bushels of beans-one thousand rations.
One hundred and seventy-four pounds coffee-one thousand seven hundred and forty rations.
Seven, hundred and seventy-four pounds sugar-five thousand one hundred and sixty rations.
{p.231}
These provisions, which have necessarily been consumed by others, would have added to the time we have already been at this post subsistence for the following number of days, respectively:
Pork-Sixteen and twenty-seven-ninetieths days.
Flour and hard bread-Forty and sixty-five-ninetieths days.
Beans-Eleven and one-ninth days.
Coffee-Nineteen and one-third days.
Sugar-Fifty-seven and one-third days.
Or, with what is now on hand, at least thirty-five days of comfortable subsistence for the command, including the laundresses, who were sent away about two months ago.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
NORMAN J. HALL,

As i already explained his stores increased during the siege, not decreased.

You looked at these two inventories wrong, Hall is saying that with what the others consumed plus whats on hand would have been 35 days of comfortable subsistence...

If you take the inventory out between the two sentences its clear what hes saying

These provisions, which have necessarily been consumed by others, would have added to the time we have already been at this post subsistence for the following number of days, respectively. Or, with what is now on hand, at least thirty-five days of comfortable subsistence for the command, including the laundresses, who were sent away about two months ago..
With the current inventory level plus what the others ate that the Corps of Eng. purchased would have added up to 35 days..Hall isn't saying that they can eat comfortably for 35 days; but that they could have if there weren't these "employees" that ate the food..
 
And he did not, how important does that make the refernce?, clearly to Lamon it had no relavence due to his understanding the post was to be evacuated in days.

How important were the officers of the fort telling him to tell Washington that they were running short on food? I would say pretty important since they not only said it in dispatches but to anyone from Washington who showed up at Sumter.
 
I used maths to show your claim on what it would show to be wrong by 2 months, and texts of primary documentets to show that Anderson resolved the issue of lack of supply and increased his intake by 184 pounds of beef and aquired fresh veg on a regular basis plus other requirements.



Asked and answered too many times already.

You haven't showed any evidence that Anderson didn't want to be re-supplied.. Give me a post number.

No Anderson had an agreement with Gov. Pickens that he could receive beef and veg, but we also have reports of him complaining that this was not being done, so to count these supplies is just guessing on what he did receive...
 
001-X3.jpg


Inventory of Ft. Sumter March 1... So we have food ( bread and hard tack) for 85 men for at least 28 days. The problem is that were 55 more men that had to be fed from these stores.


Now compare that inventory to the one of Mar 21...

Six barrels of flour; six barrels of hard bread; three barrels of sugar; one barrel of coffee; two barrels of vinegar; twenty-six barrels of pork; one-fourth barrel of salt; one and a half barrels of rice; three boxes of candles
 
The inventory and supply levels are absolutely irrelevant.

The only relevant question regards the right of a nation to access its military posts.
If the posts are in dispute (such as Gitmo or the DMZ, for example), then the EXPECTED approach is to resolve it diplomatically.
NB: "Diplomatically" does not mean sending two guys to attempt an ad hoc meeting with the executive. It means actually putting some effort into it.

Clearly this was not accomplished and the whole basis of the argument is essentially a troll. A whine. A collection of weasel words. It's that creepy neighborhood kid who always had excuses for everything.
 
The inventory and supply levels are absolutely irrelevant.

The only relevant question regards the right of a nation to access its military posts.
If the posts are in dispute (such as Gitmo or the DMZ, for example), then the EXPECTED approach is to resolve it diplomatically.
NB: "Diplomatically" does not mean sending two guys to attempt an ad hoc meeting with the executive. It means actually putting some effort into it.

Clearly this was not accomplished and the whole basis of the argument is essentially a troll. A whine. A collection of weasel words. It's that creepy neighborhood kid who always had excuses for everything.

Absolutely spot on.
 
You looked at these two inventories wrong, Hall is saying that with what the others consumed plus whats on hand would have been 35 days of comfortable subsistence...

If you take the inventory out between the two sentences its clear what hes saying


With the current inventory level plus what the others ate that the Corps of Eng. purchased would have added up to 35 days..Hall isn't saying that they can eat comfortably for 35 days; but that they could have if there weren't these "employees" that ate the food..

We covered that already.
 

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