Sumner and Franklin


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MikeyB

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Hi guys,
Had a few questions on their encounter.
1) Is it surprising to you that Mac sided with Sumner? I always thought Franklin was a die-hard McClellan loyalist and a very trusted member of the inner circle.
2) Is it possible that when Mac rode up to evaluate the situation, he witnessed the worst carnage of his career? (My understanding is he was in the rear for a lot of the Seven Days). And that this pure shock caused him to order the stop? Did he witness any large carnage in the Crimean?
3) Hooker, Mansfield and Sumner must have had 30-40k men. This has got to be close to the size of Lee's army on the field in the morning. Were these three corps really that beaten up? I know Hooker's slugged it out in the cornfield, but it surprised me to hear that one wing of the ANV could have mauled three federal corps this badly. Was it really poor Federal maneuvering and strong Confederate flanking that won out? Or were their elements of II and XII that weren't that beat up?
4) Not wanting to turn it into a what if. But, if Franklin advanced, was there anything in the way of stopping him?

Mike
 

Andy Cardinal

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Thanks for posting the question. This is of the most interesting scenarios of the battle in my opinion. I'll be interested in seeing what others have to say about it.

1) I think McClellan was predisposed to not make the attack to begin with. More surprising to me is Franklin's desire to make an attack (normally the cautious type) and Sumner's refusal (also opposite his headstrong, attacking caricature). Summer's believe that the 1st, 12th, and Sedgwick's commands were badly beaten up was the deciding factor for Sumner, who seems to have been stunned by the carnage. It also played into McClellan's belief that Lee might have massive reinforcements hiding somewhere. And in fact Lee & Jackson were also considering making an attack at the time and concluded it could not be successful.

2) Yes, I think so -- and it holds true for everyone else there that day as well. It was,c certainly the worst carnage anyone there had ever seen up to that time, and many would continue to say it was worse than anything they saw afterwards as well.

3) I believe you can deduct your number by half. The three corps went into action possibly with that number of men (Hooker 9,000, Mansfield 7,200, Sedgwick 5,500 = 21,700. 2nd Corps total strength was 18,800, so including the entire corps approaches your number, but I do not count French's & Richardson's divisions here). Then add in the massive casualties suffered especially by the 1st Corps & Sedgwick's division, not to mention the inevitable stragglers and others that left the firing line during the fighting. I think those forces were what would be today called combat ineffective by that time -- I believe you can reduce that amount by 1/3 minimum (=14,000 at most available). On the other hand, the Confederates were in a similar position). However, Franklin's corps (8,300) was fresh -- although they had marched to the field that morning.

4) Obviously there was Confederate infantry and, more importantly, artillery. It was also Union artillery that made any Confederate attack impossible at this time. I believe Franklin wanted to take Nicodemus Heights. McClellan stated there would be an attack on the heights the next morning, which of course never took place.
 

MikeyB

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Thanks for posting the question. This is of the most interesting scenarios of the battle in my opinion. I'll be interested in seeing what others have to say about it.

1) I think McClellan was predisposed to not make the attack to begin with. More surprising to me is Franklin's desire to make an attack (normally the cautious type) and Sumner's refusal (also opposite his headstrong, attacking caricature). Summer's believe that the 1st, 12th, and Sedgwick's commands were badly beaten up was the deciding factor for Sumner, who seems to have been stunned by the carnage. It also played into McClellan's belief that Lee might have massive reinforcements hiding somewhere. And in fact Lee & Jackson were also considering making an attack at the time and concluded it could not be successful.

2) Yes, I think so -- and it holds true for everyone else there that day as well. It was,c certainly the worst carnage anyone there had ever seen up to that time, and many would continue to say it was worse than anything they saw afterwards as well.

3) I believe you can deduct your number by half. The three corps went into action possibly with that number of men (Hooker 9,000, Mansfield 7,200, Sedgwick 5,500 = 21,700. 2nd Corps total strength was 18,800, so including the entire corps approaches your number, but I do not count French's & Richardson's divisions here). Then add in the massive casualties suffered especially by the 1st Corps & Sedgwick's division, not to mention the inevitable stragglers and others that left the firing line during the fighting. I think those forces were what would be today called combat ineffective by that time -- I believe you can reduce that amount by 1/3 minimum (=14,000 at most available). On the other hand, the Confederates were in a similar position). However, Franklin's corps (8,300) was fresh -- although they had marched to the field that morning.

4) Obviously there was Confederate infantry and, more importantly, artillery. It was also Union artillery that made any Confederate attack impossible at this time. I believe Franklin wanted to take Nicodemus Heights. McClellan stated there would be an attack on the heights the next morning, which of course never took place.
Thank you for your post. I'm grateful for your thoughts and numbers. I didn't realize (or forgot) only Sedgwick's division was present. Was the rest of the II corps coming up or were they held in permanent reserve?
 

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MikeyB

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Thanks for posting the question. This is of the most interesting scenarios of the battle in my opinion. I'll be interested in seeing what others have to say about it.

1) I think McClellan was predisposed to not make the attack to begin with. More surprising to me is Franklin's desire to make an attack (normally the cautious type) and Sumner's refusal (also opposite his headstrong, attacking caricature). Summer's believe that the 1st, 12th, and Sedgwick's commands were badly beaten up was the deciding factor for Sumner, who seems to have been stunned by the carnage. It also played into McClellan's belief that Lee might have massive reinforcements hiding somewhere. And in fact Lee & Jackson were also considering making an attack at the time and concluded it could not be successful.

Foote writes "presently a courier arrived from McClellan, bringing a suggestion that the attack be pressed by both commands if possible." This also seemed somewhat uncharacteristic to me. I guess we won't know how much backbone Mac was feeling at exactly this moment and you could be right that his heart wasn't in it, and he got the confirmation he was looking for from "Bull" Sumner.
 

Andy Cardinal

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Thank you for your post. I'm grateful for your thoughts and numbers. I didn't realize (or forgot) only Sedgwick's division was present. Was the rest of the II corps coming up or were they held in permanent reserve?
They attacked the Sunken Road/Bloody Lane & would not have been available for any attack further to the north.
 

67th Tigers

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1) Is it surprising to you that Mac sided with Sumner? I always thought Franklin was a die-hard McClellan loyalist and a very trusted member of the inner circle.
McClellan's primary interest was effectiveness. He promoted those openly critical of him if they could pull good combat performances.

Franklin's judgement was likely being questioned. Whilst he had a very strong reputation, during the Seven Days he made some terrible blunders. Most notably in quitting his position on the White Oak Swamp, opening up the entire Federal position and causing an additional movement to Malvern and hence Harrison's that McClellan did not want to make.

Then again in pushing forward to reinforce Pope, Franklin acted timidly, and McClellan had to protect him by taking the blame himself.

Finally, at Crampton's Gap, Franklin failed to push forward ad relieve Harper's Ferry.

There are strong ground for thinking McClellan had lost faith in Franklin, and in he deleted Franklin's "wing" immediately after Antietam to make Franklin a corps commander again.

2) Is it possible that when Mac rode up to evaluate the situation, he witnessed the worst carnage of his career? (My understanding is he was in the rear for a lot of the Seven Days). And that this pure shock caused him to order the stop? Did he witness any large carnage in the Crimean?
McClellan was closer than is usually supposed to the fighting, and when he rode up to Sumner's HQ he was no further from the combat than he had been at Williamsburg, 2nd Day of Seven Pines, Oak Grove, Mechanicsville or Malvern Hill.

He certainly did witness Sedgwick's veterans in a state of complete psychological collapse.

McClellan did not approve of Franklin's plan to throw 2 brigades at the Dunker Church, but appears to still be considering attacking. He sent for the last reserve, 2 brigades of Morell's division, to come to the sector.

3) Hooker, Mansfield and Sumner must have had 30-40k men. This has got to be close to the size of Lee's army on the field in the morning. Were these three corps really that beaten up? I know Hooker's slugged it out in the cornfield, but it surprised me to hear that one wing of the ANV could have mauled three federal corps this badly. Was it really poor Federal maneuvering and strong Confederate flanking that won out? Or were their elements of II and XII that weren't that beat up?
The 1st Corps went into action with 8,600 effective infantry, and could could less than 3,000 with the Colors at the end of the day.

The 12th Corps had about 4,650 effective infantry in the old regiments, and 3 new Pennsylvania regiments which had about 2,000 aggregate, and 1,200 to 1,600 actual effectives. Taking the upper bound that's about 6,250.

Only Sedgwick of 2nd Corps fought against the Dunker Church plateau. They had at most 5,100 effective (which is basically what was reported as present).

These equal 19,950 infantry. Say 20,000 with rounding. By the time of the meeting the 1st Corps and Sedgwick's division had basically ceased to exist as organised units. The 12th Corps was split, and Greene's division was overrun, whilst the old regiments of Williams had suffered heavily earlier. Only the three fat new Pennsylvania Regiments were still largely intact.

Of course, since then Franklin had arrive with ca. 8,000 effectives and these constituted the main force available. However, Sumner had spread the first division to arrive (Smith's) across the frontage to stabilise it against a rebel counterattack. Hence the only formed force available for a renewed assault was Slocum's division.

4) Not wanting to turn it into a what if. But, if Franklin advanced, was there anything in the way of stopping him?
Yes. He'd selected the strongest part of the enemy line to attack, where they had three continuous lines in good terrain. On the ridge were McLaws's and Walker's divisions, Early's brigade, and Armistead's brigade. These were almost completely "fresh". Behind the ridge was the residue of the Stonewall Division and Ewell's division (minus Early) rallying. In fact Franklin would have been heavily outnumbered.
 

MikeyB

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McClellan's primary interest was effectiveness. He promoted those openly critical of him if they could pull good combat performances.

Franklin's judgement was likely being questioned. Whilst he had a very strong reputation, during the Seven Days he made some terrible blunders. Most notably in quitting his position on the White Oak Swamp, opening up the entire Federal position and causing an additional movement to Malvern and hence Harrison's that McClellan did not want to make.

Then again in pushing forward to reinforce Pope, Franklin acted timidly, and McClellan had to protect him by taking the blame himself.

Finally, at Crampton's Gap, Franklin failed to push forward ad relieve Harper's Ferry.

There are strong ground for thinking McClellan had lost faith in Franklin, and in he deleted Franklin's "wing" immediately after Antietam to make Franklin a corps commander again.



McClellan was closer than is usually supposed to the fighting, and when he rode up to Sumner's HQ he was no further from the combat than he had been at Williamsburg, 2nd Day of Seven Pines, Oak Grove, Mechanicsville or Malvern Hill.

He certainly did witness Sedgwick's veterans in a state of complete psychological collapse.

McClellan did not approve of Franklin's plan to throw 2 brigades at the Dunker Church, but appears to still be considering attacking. He sent for the last reserve, 2 brigades of Morell's division, to come to the sector.



The 1st Corps went into action with 8,600 effective infantry, and could could less than 3,000 with the Colors at the end of the day.

The 12th Corps had about 4,650 effective infantry in the old regiments, and 3 new Pennsylvania regiments which had about 2,000 aggregate, and 1,200 to 1,600 actual effectives. Taking the upper bound that's about 6,250.

Only Sedgwick of 2nd Corps fought against the Dunker Church plateau. They had at most 5,100 effective (which is basically what was reported as present).

These equal 19,950 infantry. Say 20,000 with rounding. By the time of the meeting the 1st Corps and Sedgwick's division had basically ceased to exist as organised units. The 12th Corps was split, and Greene's division was overrun, whilst the old regiments of Williams had suffered heavily earlier. Only the three fat new Pennsylvania Regiments were still largely intact.

Of course, since then Franklin had arrive with ca. 8,000 effectives and these constituted the main force available. However, Sumner had spread the first division to arrive (Smith's) across the frontage to stabilise it against a rebel counterattack. Hence the only formed force available for a renewed assault was Slocum's division.



Yes. He'd selected the strongest part of the enemy line to attack, where they had three continuous lines in good terrain. On the ridge were McLaws's and Walker's divisions, Early's brigade, and Armistead's brigade. These were almost completely "fresh". Behind the ridge was the residue of the Stonewall Division and Ewell's division (minus Early) rallying. In fact Franklin would have been heavily outnumbered.
Interesting on Franklin. Wonder how much of his pushing to attack was motivated by redemption versus solely on sound tactical generaliship.
 

MikeyB

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McClellan's primary interest was effectiveness. He promoted those openly critical of him if they could pull good combat performances.

Franklin's judgement was likely being questioned. Whilst he had a very strong reputation, during the Seven Days he made some terrible blunders. Most notably in quitting his position on the White Oak Swamp, opening up the entire Federal position and causing an additional movement to Malvern and hence Harrison's that McClellan did not want to make.

Then again in pushing forward to reinforce Pope, Franklin acted timidly, and McClellan had to protect him by taking the blame himself.

Finally, at Crampton's Gap, Franklin failed to push forward ad relieve Harper's Ferry.

There are strong ground for thinking McClellan had lost faith in Franklin, and in he deleted Franklin's "wing" immediately after Antietam to make Franklin a corps commander again.



McClellan was closer than is usually supposed to the fighting, and when he rode up to Sumner's HQ he was no further from the combat than he had been at Williamsburg, 2nd Day of Seven Pines, Oak Grove, Mechanicsville or Malvern Hill.

He certainly did witness Sedgwick's veterans in a state of complete psychological collapse.

McClellan did not approve of Franklin's plan to throw 2 brigades at the Dunker Church, but appears to still be considering attacking. He sent for the last reserve, 2 brigades of Morell's division, to come to the sector.



The 1st Corps went into action with 8,600 effective infantry, and could could less than 3,000 with the Colors at the end of the day.

The 12th Corps had about 4,650 effective infantry in the old regiments, and 3 new Pennsylvania regiments which had about 2,000 aggregate, and 1,200 to 1,600 actual effectives. Taking the upper bound that's about 6,250.

Only Sedgwick of 2nd Corps fought against the Dunker Church plateau. They had at most 5,100 effective (which is basically what was reported as present).

These equal 19,950 infantry. Say 20,000 with rounding. By the time of the meeting the 1st Corps and Sedgwick's division had basically ceased to exist as organised units. The 12th Corps was split, and Greene's division was overrun, whilst the old regiments of Williams had suffered heavily earlier. Only the three fat new Pennsylvania Regiments were still largely intact.

Of course, since then Franklin had arrive with ca. 8,000 effectives and these constituted the main force available. However, Sumner had spread the first division to arrive (Smith's) across the frontage to stabilise it against a rebel counterattack. Hence the only formed force available for a renewed assault was Slocum's division.



Yes. He'd selected the strongest part of the enemy line to attack, where they had three continuous lines in good terrain. On the ridge were McLaws's and Walker's divisions, Early's brigade, and Armistead's brigade. These were almost completely "fresh". Behind the ridge was the residue of the Stonewall Division and Ewell's division (minus Early) rallying. In fact Franklin would have been heavily outnumbered.
When I read the passage in Foote, it seemed like another wasted opportunity for the Union. But after this thread, now it seems to me like halting Franklin was the right thing to do. If Mac was unwilling to put his reserves into his fight, it does seem like all that could be done by the Union, had been done.
 

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Then again in pushing forward to reinforce Pope, Franklin acted timidly, and McClellan had to protect him by taking the blame himself.
This is interesting; I have not read it this way before. Can you cite where McClellan took the blame for Franklin?

That certainly fits the m.o. I have for Franklin. The wonder to me is, for whatever reason, Grant seems to have thought highly of Franklin.
 

67th Tigers

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This is interesting; I have not read it this way before. Can you cite where McClellan took the blame for Franklin?
In 1864 Grant inquired about making Franklin commander of Washington. Halleck's response was:

"Genl. Franklin would not give satisfaction. The President ordered him to be tried for negligence & disobedience of orders when here before, but Genl McClellan assumed the responsibility of his repeated delays in obeying orders."

It is implied that McClellan took responsibility for Franklin, who was taking orders directly from Halleck via the wire when moving to Pope.

McClellan certainly started to loose faith in Franklin (and Smith):

“Franklin ought to have been off nearly by this time,” McClellan wrote to his wife at 10:00 a.m. on August 22, “but he & Smith have so
little energy that I fear they will be very slow about it. They have disappointed me terribly—I do not at all doubt Franklin’s loyalty now, but his efficiency is very little—I am very sorry it has turned out so.” Then, after reflecting on the matter, the Young Napoleon concluded, “[t]he main, perhaps the only cause is that he has been & still is sick—& one ought not to judge harshly of a person in that condition. I ought also to make a great deal of allowance for Smith also on the same account—so will try to be as charitable as we can under all these circumstances.”50

- Mark Snell's PhD thesis on Franklin, pg 246 (also published, but I have the thesis)

Franklin arrived in Washington on the 24th August (1600 hrs). He went to Halleck's office to report but he wasn't there. He then went to Halleck's house where he found him:

Franklin recalled that Halleck told him “that he felt no apprehension about Pope’s position,” and doubted whether Franklin’s corps
would even have to go to the front, at least not until the Sixth Corps’ artillery and horses arrived from Newport News. “He directed me to go into camp in front of Alexandria,” Franklin remembered, “and reorganize the corps as the artillery and transportation reached
the camp. The infantry arrived on Monday and Tuesday, the 25th and 26th, but no artillery horses, except sixteen, had arrived on Wednesday night.”56 - Snell, 249

Halleck ordered Franklin forward on the 26th, and immediately countermanded the order. The next few days Halleck keeps changing his mind and on the 30th, after Franklin halted an Annandale wrote to McClellan:

"I am by no means satisfied with General Franklin’s march of yesterday. Considering the circumstances of the case, he was very wrong in stopping at Annandale. Moreover, I learned last night that the Quartermaster’s Department could have given him plenty of transportation, if he had applied for it, any time since his arrival at Alexandria. He knew the importance of opening communication with General Pope’s army, and should have acted more promptly."

McClellan defended Franklin:

"Ever since General Franklin received notice that he was to march from Alexandria he has been using every effort to get transportation for his extra ammunition, but he was uniformly told by the quartermasters here that none was disposable, and his command marched without wagons.

After the departure of his corps, at 6 a.m. yesterday, he procured 20 wagons, to carry a portion of his ammunition, by unloading some of General Banks’ supply train for that purpose."

In the evening Franklin wired Halleck direct that he had halted at the Cub Run, and that Pope's army had broken. As Snell points out, Franklin altered his story in his Century article - at the time he reported he couldn't find Pope and acted as he thought best in halting at the Cub Run. Two decades later he said he found Pope, and Pope gave the order.

A few days later Pope handed in his report and demanded the heads of McClellan, Franklin, Porter, Ricketts, Griffin and others unspecified. As we know, Franklin escaped charges, and the only one charged was Porter. Porter was charged after some of his messages were found to be defeatist, after he predicted Pope's failure.

However, Halleck's 1864 comment makes it appear Lincoln wanted Franklin charged as well. There was nothing so ****ing on Franklin, and McClellan took the responsibility, despite Franklin actually taking his orders direct from Halleck at the time. Hence his escape.
 

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In 1864 Grant inquired about making Franklin commander of Washington. Halleck's response was:

"Genl. Franklin would not give satisfaction. The President ordered him to be tried for negligence & disobedience of orders when here before, but Genl McClellan assumed the responsibility of his repeated delays in obeying orders."

It is implied that McClellan took responsibility for Franklin, who was taking orders directly from Halleck via the wire when moving to Pope.

McClellan certainly started to loose faith in Franklin (and Smith):

“Franklin ought to have been off nearly by this time,” McClellan wrote to his wife at 10:00 a.m. on August 22, “but he & Smith have so
little energy that I fear they will be very slow about it. They have disappointed me terribly—I do not at all doubt Franklin’s loyalty now, but his efficiency is very little—I am very sorry it has turned out so.” Then, after reflecting on the matter, the Young Napoleon concluded, “[t]he main, perhaps the only cause is that he has been & still is sick—& one ought not to judge harshly of a person in that condition. I ought also to make a great deal of allowance for Smith also on the same account—so will try to be as charitable as we can under all these circumstances.”50

- Mark Snell's PhD thesis on Franklin, pg 246 (also published, but I have the thesis)

Franklin arrived in Washington on the 24th August (1600 hrs). He went to Halleck's office to report but he wasn't there. He then went to Halleck's house where he found him:

Franklin recalled that Halleck told him “that he felt no apprehension about Pope’s position,” and doubted whether Franklin’s corps
would even have to go to the front, at least not until the Sixth Corps’ artillery and horses arrived from Newport News. “He directed me to go into camp in front of Alexandria,” Franklin remembered, “and reorganize the corps as the artillery and transportation reached
the camp. The infantry arrived on Monday and Tuesday, the 25th and 26th, but no artillery horses, except sixteen, had arrived on Wednesday night.”56 - Snell, 249

Halleck ordered Franklin forward on the 26th, and immediately countermanded the order. The next few days Halleck keeps changing his mind and on the 30th, after Franklin halted an Annandale wrote to McClellan:

"I am by no means satisfied with General Franklin’s march of yesterday. Considering the circumstances of the case, he was very wrong in stopping at Annandale. Moreover, I learned last night that the Quartermaster’s Department could have given him plenty of transportation, if he had applied for it, any time since his arrival at Alexandria. He knew the importance of opening communication with General Pope’s army, and should have acted more promptly."

McClellan defended Franklin:

"Ever since General Franklin received notice that he was to march from Alexandria he has been using every effort to get transportation for his extra ammunition, but he was uniformly told by the quartermasters here that none was disposable, and his command marched without wagons.

After the departure of his corps, at 6 a.m. yesterday, he procured 20 wagons, to carry a portion of his ammunition, by unloading some of General Banks’ supply train for that purpose."

In the evening Franklin wired Halleck direct that he had halted at the Cub Run, and that Pope's army had broken. As Snell points out, Franklin altered his story in his Century article - at the time he reported he couldn't find Pope and acted as he thought best in halting at the Cub Run. Two decades later he said he found Pope, and Pope gave the order.

A few days later Pope handed in his report and demanded the heads of McClellan, Franklin, Porter, Ricketts, Griffin and others unspecified. As we know, Franklin escaped charges, and the only one charged was Porter. Porter was charged after some of his messages were found to be defeatist, after he predicted Pope's failure.

However, Halleck's 1864 comment makes it appear Lincoln wanted Franklin charged as well. There was nothing so ****ing on Franklin, and McClellan took the responsibility, despite Franklin actually taking his orders direct from Halleck at the time. Hence his escape.
Interesting. I had not put 2 and 2 together before regarding the Franklin episode in August 1862. I assume McClellan was not necessarily happy about Franklin's performance June 28-30 either.

Is the biography of Franklin the same as the thesis. I have not read the book but it is one i have thought about getting it from time to time.
 
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When I read the passage in Foote, it seemed like another wasted opportunity for the Union. But after this thread, now it seems to me like halting Franklin was the right thing to do.
That’s because you’re being given incorrect information. McLaws’ and Walker’s divisions were not “almost completely fresh”. They were almost completely wrecked. The Stonewall Division and Ewell’s division were also wrecked. Here is a breakdown of their brigades’ respective casualties and strength, according to Ezra Carman:

McLaws’ Division*: 1,119 / 2,934 = 38.1%
Semmes - 314 / 709 = 44.3%
Cobb - 156 / 398 = 39.2%
Kershaw - 355 / 936 = 37.9%
Barksdale - 294 / 891 = 33.0%


Walker’s Division: 1,120 / 3,994 = 28.0%
Manning 917 / 2,164 42.4%
Ransom 186 / 1,600 11.6%
Artillery 17 / 230 7.4%


Stonewall Division: 648 / 2,095 = 30.9%
Starke 287 / 725 39.6%
Jones 71 / 223 31.8%
Winder 88 / 279 31.5%
Taliaferro 168 / 558 30.1%
Artillery 34 / 310 11.0%


Ewell’s Division: 1,336 / 4,127 = 32.4%
Hays 336 / 613 54.8%
Lawton 567 / 1,283 44.2%
Trimble 237 / 781 30.3%
Early 194 / 1,227 15.8%
Artillery 2 / 223 0.9%


*Artillery included in McLaws’ brigade numbers
 
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Andy Cardinal

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I believe that the artillery line each side established by mid-morning was the main factor on preventing either side from attacking.

The Confederate line ran along Reel Ridge/Hauser's Ridge/Nicodemus Heights.

The Union artillery line ran roughly from the Dunker Church plateau to the North Woods area.

I think role these batteries played in the lack of offensive action on both sides (both sides considered an attack in the afternoon) is one of the most unappreciated stories of the battle.

As an imperfect comparison, I think of McGilvery's artillery line on July 2 at Gettysburg.
 
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Here are the other three confederate divisions that fought north of Sharpsburg, plus G. T. Anderson’s brigade which was detached from Jones’ division (south of Sharpsburg) and fought in the West Woods.

Hood’s Division: 1,025 / 2,304 = 44.5%
Wofford 548 / 854 64.2%
Law 454 / 1,146 39.6%
Artillery 23 / 304 7.6%

D. H. Hill’s Division: 2,310 / 5,795 = 39.9%
Ripley 776 / 1,349 57.5%
Colquitt 722 / 1,320 54.7%
G. B. Anderson 475 / 1,174 40.5%
Rodes 203 / 850 23.9%
Garland 84 / 756 11.1%
Artillery 50 / 346 14.5%

Anderson’s Division: 1,278 / 4,000 = 32.0%
Infantry, minus Armistead 1,227 / 3,072 39.9%
Armistead 35 / 600 5.8%
Artillery 16 / 328 4.9%

G. T. Anderson’s Brigade: 87 / 749 = 11.6%
 

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Here are the other three confederate divisions that fought north of Sharpsburg, plus G. T. Anderson’s brigade which was detached from Jones’ division (south of Sharpsburg) and fought in the West Woods.

Hood’s Division: 1,025 / 2,304 = 44.5%
Wofford 548 / 854 64.2%
Law 454 / 1,146 39.6%
Artillery 23 / 304 7.6%


D. H. Hill’s Division: 2,310 / 5,795 = 39.9%
Ripley 776 / 1,349 57.5%
Colquitt 722 / 1,320 54.7%
G. B. Anderson 475 / 1,174 40.5%
Rodes 203 / 850 23.9%
Garland 84 / 756 11.1%
Artillery 50 / 346 14.5%


Anderson’s Division: 1,278 / 4,000 = 32.0%
Infantry, minus Armistead 1,227 / 3,072 39.9%
Armistead 35 / 600 5.8%
Artillery 16 / 328 4.9%


G. T. Anderson’s Brigade: 87 / 749 = 11.6%

thanks for the data.
Just as an aside - when casualties are reported, they included missing and captured right? So in theory, if an entire regiment surrendered, would their reported casualty rate be listed at 100%?
 
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Lee’s remaining two divisions, plus Evans’ independent brigade, fought south of Sharpsburg. There were two brigades (Pender and Brockenbrough) from A. P. Hill’s division that were not engaged and, therefore, are not included here in that division’s totals, but they were on the field.

Jones’ Division (minus G. T. Anderson’s brigade): 671 / 2,362 = 28.4%
Toombs 160 / 357 44.8%
Drayton 142 / 465 30.5%
Garnett 78 / 261 29.9%
Jenkins 216 / 755 28.6%
Kemper 69 / 443 15.6%
Artillery 6 / 81 7.4%


A. P. Hill’s Division: 387 / 2,568 = 15.1%
Infantry 374 / 2,231 16.8%
Artillery 13 / 337 3.9%


Evans’ Independent Brigade: 84 / 399 = 21.1%
Infantry 65 / 284 22.9%
Artillery 19 / 115 16.5%
 

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