Spring Hill Question

[rgtaylor61]

I'm reading Eric Jacobson's For Cause and For Country and had a question/thought on Spring Hill. Does anyone think that there is a chance that many Confederate soldiers heard the Federal Army moving up the pike and out of concern for their own safety just let them go. These were veteran fighters who'd seen a ton of battle and I'd imagine were in no hurry for a fight (especially at night) . Perhaps those sentries etc. thought if they aren't attacking ill just stand here quiet. Just a thought. There are so many reports of the men there saying they heard things, saw things and even had federal soldiers wander in their camps but nobody sounded the alarm... Seems odd unless that indifference was self preservation induced.

 

[hughes]

Interesting idea. It would be similar to the instances of soldiers from each side filling canteens simultaneously but not engaging.

 

[gjpratt]

At the risk of oversimplifying, I would say it is more plausible that fatigue was a bigger factor. If you have not toured the battlefield and the Confederate route of march it is difficult to understand how difficult the terrain is. There are occasional references to undulating hills. That description is too mild. In reality the geography from Duck River to the outskirts of Spring Hill consists of a series of long steep climbs and descents. This was a long day's march over unimproved roads that were quite muddy. They were exhausted by nightfall.

Good question

 

[DixieRifles]

This was a long day's march over unimproved roads that were quite muddy. They were exhausted by nightfall.

That was my opinion, too. Besides the long hard march, they (or many of them) had been maneuvering and engaging the enemy or under threat of attack.
The first Confederate cavalry and infantry brigade cleared our the Federal troops and the more units were arriving. Since Hood held a staff meeting there the next day, I assume aides were making preparations. Everything seemed to be under control and the roads and fields were secure. So they thought.

 

[RedRover]

From Confederate Veteran, 1893:

Post-war Gov. Harris of Tennessee, who was present and carried orders for Gen. Hood that day, explained that one of Hood's staff who had been given Hood's positive orders to Cheatham to attack and secure the road, etc., had not delivered the orders.

 

[uaskme]

Hood was strapped to a horse. God's wonder how he made the trip. He was physically drained. They had dropped their trains. Artillery didn't catch up until after Franklin. NBF had retired because he was out of ammo. Poor communication, vague orders. Usual problems the AOT were plagued with. Poor planning to begin with down the road.

Lee White historian at Chickamauga calls the AOT the Charlie Brown Army. Every time they get an advantage, something happens. Like when Charlie Brown gets ready to kick the football, somebody moves it before he is able to. No surprises here.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Does anyone think that there is a chance that many Confederate soldiers heard the Federal Army moving up the pike and out of concern for their own safety just let them go.

Interesting possibility, but don't think that's a major consideration here. Even though there are accounts by Confederate soldiers nearby of hearing the sounds of Schofield's force retreating along the Columbia Pike throughout the night, believe any failures to move on the Pike must be wholly attributed to breakdowns (including lack of follow-through) in command communications among the chain of high command in the AoT. At Spring Hill, the three commanders responsible were Hood (army commander), Cheatham (corps commander) and Brown (division commander). As to who of these three commanders was most at fault, depends on whose postwar conflicting version of the communications that occurred one is more willing to believe.

Also thought any suggestion that Confederate soldiers on the night of Nov. 29/30 were reluctant to engage does not seem to be supported by their actions on the next day/evening.

 

[rgtaylor61]

Interesting possibility, but don't think that's a major consideration here. Even though there are accounts by Confederate soldiers nearby of hearing the sounds of Schofield's force retreating along the Columbia Pike throughout the night, believe any failures to move on the Pike must be wholly attributed to breakdowns (including lack of follow-through) in command communications among the chain of high command in the AoT. At Spring Hill, the three commanders responsible were Hood (army commander), Cheatham (corps commander) and Brown (division commander). As to who of these three commanders was most at fault, depends on whose postwar conflicting version of the communications that occurred one is more willing to believe.

Also thought any suggestion that Confederate soldiers on the night of Nov. 29/30 were reluctant to engage does not seem to be supported by their actions on the next day/evening.

I think there's A difference between

Interesting possibility, but don't think that's a major consideration here. Even though there are accounts by Confederate soldiers nearby of hearing the sounds of Schofield's force retreating along the Columbia Pike throughout the night, believe any failures to move on the Pike must be wholly attributed to breakdowns (including lack of follow-through) in command communications among the chain of high command in the AoT. At Spring Hill, the three commanders responsible were Hood (army commander), Cheatham (corps commander) and Brown (division commander). As to who of these three commanders was most at fault, depends on whose postwar conflicting version of the communications that occurred one is more willing to believe.

Also thought any suggestion that Confederate soldiers on the night of Nov. 29/30 were reluctant to engage does not seem to be supported by their actions on the next day/evening.

I'm struggling to convey my idea but I'll try: I wonder if that night those men who heard noises didnt take the approach that i myself took as a soldier (not comparing my experiences to theirs) which was "Ill do what im told when im told but I was told to guard this camp so whatever is goign on over there is not goign on here". To me thats different then the next day when they were ordered to attack and complied. Soldiers tend to do what they are told but sometimes dont do anything extra unless told to as well. I know its a 160 year old mystery but it jsut seems odd that nobody ran and told someone higher that they were moving, especially when Federal soldiers were wandering into their camp on accident. Perhaps it was a case of "someone else is up the road blockign it" maybe it was a perfect storm of all of these ideas but i do think there was at least some reluctance to engage without being told to. Just an idea and in no way disparaging other opinions especially of thsoe who knwo way more than i do. due to family ties this battle has interested me since i can remember but im jsut recently startign to learn more of the true details of it. I was raised with a bit of a LOST CAUSE slant when it came to earnign about our families ties to the war so it's been quite eye opening to learn the truth.

 

[lupaglupa]

It's hard to believe in any large group of soldiers there weren't some who were happy not to investigate a noise. I think a tired group of men who had not been told to be alert for movement probably discounted what they heard. Were some suspicious and decided not to cause a fuss by getting up and checking? Maybe. But likely they thought what they heard was a small relocation of men. I think if anyone had suspected the whole Federal force was on the move they would have raised the alarm.

 

[RedRover]

I know its a 160 year old mystery but it jsut seems odd that nobody ran and told someone higher that they were moving, especially when Federal soldiers were wandering into their camp on accident. Perhaps it was a case of "someone else is up the road blockign it" maybe it was a perfect storm of all of these ideas but i do think there was at least some reluctance to engage without being told to. Just an idea and in no way disparaging other opinions especially of thsoe who knwo way more than i do. due to family ties this battle has interested me since i can remember but im jsut recently startign to learn more of the true details of it. I was raised with a bit of a LOST CAUSE slant when it came to earnign about our families ties to the war so it's been quite eye opening to learn the truth.

On that score, Capt. John K. Shellenberger of Company B, 64th Ohio, Wagner's Division who was among Schofield's troops which defended Spring Hill in the fighting of Nov. 29, corresponded with some of the Confederate commanders about the Spring Hill incidents of that evening and his conclusions were reproduced in Confederate Veteran in 1928.

Shellenberger concluded that Hood or his headquarters staff did not make a priority of seeing to it that Cheatham's Corps cut the road south of the town, though partly formed within a couple hundred yards of it in places, as Hood had ordered Stewart's Corps to move near sunset to cut the road North of the town...

...

And indeed, General Cheatham later claimed that Hood personally informed him as the fighting died down toward dark, that Stewart's Corps was moving to Cheatham's right to cut the pike and the federal's route of retreat to the northward...

Gen. Cheatham does not believe that General Stewart was remiss in this situation either.

Stewart states that the combination of darkness, the proximity of the enemy, a lack of guides, and the exhaustion of his men combined prevented him from pressing them to the pike to block it...

In a letter to his wife from January, 1865, Col. Gale, the adjutant general of Stewart's Corps, stated that, (while Cheatham understood Stewart was to cut the road to his right), Gen. Stewart understood Cheatham's corps was to cut it to his left...

So here comes the fun part. Evidently, while Stewart's corps was moving after sunset to lay its right across the pike, Stewart received orders from Hood to change his disposition, and instead of blocking the road with his right, and his left extending behind Cheatham's left flank (Brown's Division), he was to form his whole corps in extension of Cheatham's line... orders by which his corps would not reach the pike at all...

So Stewart was apprised that Cheatham was going to block the road under the new orders. However, as Gov. Harris was later apprised, Gen. Cheatham did not receive the new orders to advance his corps across the road... as Col. Mason of Hood's staff, for some unknown reason, did not deliver them to Cheatham personally.

Hood himself opined later that had he brought Gen. S.D. Lee and his corps to Spring Hill instead of Cheatham's he was satisfied Lee would of cut the road, and broken up the federal march, with or without direct orders to do so, or in spite of other orders where he saw the opportunity...

The next day, the angered Hood took his whole army tightly in hand, and gave them simple, direct orders, to attack at Franklin, resulting in what Hood's men called "Hood's Killing."