Chickamauga Snodgrass Hill

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From the Chickamauga and Chattanooga Military Park FB Page:

Humanity has a morbid curiosity, and this is not something new. It seems to be ingrained in our DNA. For example, here is a description by a southern reporter of the area around Snodgrass Cabin. "The enemy used the house as hospital - Around it are the marks of war's destruction. Death in his most horrible, mangling and disfiguring shape, was there on Sunday, and wagon loads of buried arms and legs and dead attest the fury and carnage of the demon of destruction."

Image: Sketch of the Snodgrass Cabin. Smithsonian Institute.

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I have been there and will attend a miliary history conference there next spring. I assume Snodgrass Hill will be part of our bus tour.

Does being there twice before detract from a third visit? I am not completely sure who our tour guide will be, but what ever ranger or author is our guide, it will worth seeing it again.
 
From the Chickamauga and Chattanooga Military Park FB Page:

Humanity has a morbid curiosity, and this is not something new. It seems to be ingrained in our DNA. For example, here is a description by a southern reporter of the area around Snodgrass Cabin. "The enemy used the house as hospital - Around it are the marks of war's destruction. Death in his most horrible, mangling and disfiguring shape, was there on Sunday, and wagon loads of buried arms and legs and dead attest the fury and carnage of the demon of destruction."

Image: Sketch of the Snodgrass Cabin. Smithsonian Institute.

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Thanks for posting !
One of my favorite places at Chickamauga. Beautiful old cabin, even if not the original.
 
My first road trip as a Stones River living history volunteer was to a battery program at Snodgrass Hill. The coda to Chickamauga was fired by a six gun battery from there.

In an event eerily familiar to CSA red legs, at the order, "By piece from the left… FIRE!" Was followed by: Fiit…fiit…fiit…fiit…fiit…fitt… "Do not advance, THE PRIMER HAS FAILED!" Echoed down the gun line. There followed the misfire drill, fire from the left… same comical result. An entire shipment of friction primers. Ordered in for that weekend, the primers were faulty.

Historically, Union ammunition boxes were packed with 1.5 X the friction primers X the (+/-) 50 rounds. CSA armories packed 5 X the number of rounds. Inadvertently, my baptism of fire was unusually accurate.

You might say that I slept that night with the Snodgrass family. Flat-ish ground is at a premium atop the hill. The ranger told us that in the 1950's the grounds crew got tired of mowing around those n*##%rs & pushed the stones off into the trees.

Exactly why they had concluded that the cemetery was ethnically one way or the other eludes me this morning. It is, however, an example of how the beautifully manicured parks do not reflect the dark truth of what happened there.

Gotta admit that waking in a foggy false dawn covered in heavy dew, the sour smell of the smoldering camp fire & surrounded by perking calls of wild turkeys & foraging deer is probably about as authentic an experience there is. Learning to drink a welcome tin cup of coffee for the first time is on up there, too. Still don't understand how the lip of the cup is twice as hot as the coffee. I suppose there are some things we're are not meant to understand.
 
We were coming back from Florida so I convinced the wife and kids to see Chickamaugua, had no clue where to go but had a GG Grandpa in the 7th Florida Infantry. My other one in Longstreets Corps didn't get there in time for the battle.
At least took a picture of the Florida monument.
 
Thanks for posting. I was there in 2003 and it is time for a return trip. That is a lovely site, it is a cute little cabin. It is no wonder that the description of the cabins use as a hospital is so horrific when you think of the fighting that went on there. George Thomas' last stand there allowed the Union army to retreat to Chattanooga. We often hear about the 20th Maine's stand at Gettysburg's Little Roundtop, but few remember the last stand of the 21st Ohio on Snodgrass Hill. Having the 1855 Colt revolving rifles certainly helped, but they essentially held off large portions of three Brigades of Confederates for over three hours.
 
We were coming back from Florida so I convinced the wife and kids to see Chickamaugua, had no clue where to go but had a GG Grandpa in the 7th Florida Infantry. My other one in Longstreets Corps didn't get there in time for the battle.
At least took a picture of the Florida monument.

The 7th Florida regiment was involved with the conclusion of the battle, charging up the hill just to the west of the Snodgrass house with Trigg's brigade.

Sergeant Watson of Company K, 7th Florida:

"We went in at double quick and got to the foot of the hill at dark. The enemy seeing us sent a man towards us to see whether we were their own men or not with directions to fire if we were enemies, but we took him before he could fire his gun, therefor the Yankees took it for granted that we were their own men. We then proceeded to the top of the hill within 50 yards of them and halted and took 30 prisoners… They tried to escape by running but they ran into the 6th Florida and were all captured."

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The 7th Florida regiment was involved with the conclusion of the battle, charging up the hill just to the west of the Snodgrass house with Trigg's brigade.

Sergeant Watson of Company K, 7th Florida:

"We went in at double quick and got to the foot of the hill at dark. The enemy seeing us sent a man towards us to see whether we were their own men or not with directions to fire if we were enemies, but we took him before he could fire his gun, therefor the Yankees took it for granted that we were their own men. We then proceeded to the top of the hill within 50 yards of them and halted and took 30 prisoners… They tried to escape by running but they ran into the 6th Florida and were all captured."

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I applaud them for charging up Snodgrass Hill. It was there after a sprinkle of rain that I first learned about how close to skies that Jefferson Davis brogans are.
 
I applaud them for charging up Snodgrass Hill. It was there after a sprinkle of rain that I first learned about how close to skies that Jefferson Davis brogans are.
From the descriptions by the Union soldiers captured in the close of the action, these rebs advancing up the hill were not moving very fast; though evidently giving it their all. The 7th Florida, for example, had just double-quicked across the battlefield, a three miles overland, etc., in one-half hour, occasionally exposed to shell fire, to get into the close of the action. Charged up the hill after a short rest. The fact that they were mostly quiet also caused a little confusion to the union soldiers they came up against, who thought in the smoke and trees, etc. they might be friendlies.

Sgt. Watson says the 7th's men were "nearly dead" for lack of food, rest or water after the action.

Sort of like General Ferraro's aide Lt. Hudson tempered the imagination of the fighting about Burnside Bridge at Antietam, when he posited, "tired soldiers don't run very fast."
 
Here is a brief narrative of what happened after dark. 3 Federal Regiments were left behind. Granger left the ridge, he was in charge. Thomas had gone to Kelly's field to orchestrate the withdrawal of the Federals there. About half a mile east of Horseshoe Ridge. These guys were detached from other units. Command issues, they were not sacrificed. Out of ammo. Victims of circumstances.

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Here is a brief narrative of what happened after dark. 3 Federal Regiments were left behind. Granger left the ridge, he was in charge. Thomas had gone to Kelly's field to orchestrate the withdrawal of the Federals there. About half a mile east of Horseshoe Ridge. These guys were detached from other units. Command issues, they were not sacrificed. Out of ammo. Victims of circumstances.

Certainly, but it is evident they were not only purposely halted in their tracks from continuing with the general retreat, and in spite of their lack of ammo ordered to advance and retake their former positions on the hill... ergo sacrificed in a manner to slow the Confederate pursuit over the ridge.

Lt. W.B. Hamilton of the 22nd MI recorded in his diary their withdrawal...

"Our right flank was truly in the air. The movement of Confederate troops northward on our right no doubt convinced Colonel Le Favour that it was time for us to be getting out of there, so without orders the movement toward the rear was begun, and we were faced about and marched down the hill." [Gracie, Truth About Chickamauga, 1911, 429-430.]

Their movement to join the retreating forces was arrested by Major John C. Smith of Gen. Steedman's staff, found who ordered Col. LeFavour to turn around and go back up the hill and hold at all hazards, even though his command (the 22nd Michigan and 89th Ohio) had almost no ammo left. Smith's account:

"I remember as though but yesterday, that, as I was riding along the line encouraging the men, Col. LeFavor rode up to me, saying: "Major, the enemy is pressing my line, and I am out of ammunition. What are your orders?" I answered: "Fix bayonets, Colonel, and give them cold steel." Looking me earnestly in the face, he replied: "Are those your orders, sir?" I answered: "They are." This as I have said, was about sundown I saw LeFavor fix his bayonets and charge with the Twenty-second Michigan and Eighty-ninth, drive the enemy until enveloped by them, when he was captured. The charge was a gallant one and saved us from any more serious attack that evening. I thought the order a right one; Gen. Steedman thought so, when informed of it, and subsequent events prove that it was…" [Turchin, Chickamauga, 1888, 208.]

About the same time the exhausted 21st Ohio was reorganizing on the north side of the ridge, when an unknown officer ordered Major McMahon, commanding, to move his regiment to cease withdrawing and attack back uphill as well, with the bayonet. Captain Canfield of the 21st recalled:

"The major started to take the regiment to the rear to get ammunition, when he was ordered to retake our position, by this time occupied by the enemy, by a staff officer; brave and obedient to orders, as he was, and typical soldier that he was, Major McMahon protested against taking the regiment back on the front line without ammunition, but the orders being imperative, he looked at the staff officer in his inimitable way and said, "G—d---n it, you rank me; boys we will have to go back," ordered fix bayonets, forward, charge, and the line was retaken at the point of the bayonet...[Canfield, History 21st OH, 144.]

Shortly the three regiments, were collected together on the hill, the 21st Ohio on the right. Capt. Canfield recalls of their capture...

.... The enemy now moved toward us, ordering the regiment to surrender. The regiment did not surrender in the full sense of that term. As they charged towards us, ordering us to surrender, a large number of the regiment was captured, and those that escaped did so by charging through their line." [Canfield, History 21st OH, 144.]
 
Certainly, but it is evident they were not only purposely halted in their tracks from continuing with the general retreat, and in spite of their lack of ammo ordered to advance and retake their former positions on the hill... ergo sacrificed in a manner to slow the Confederate pursuit over the ridge.

Lt. W.B. Hamilton of the 22nd MI recorded in his diary their withdrawal...

"Our right flank was truly in the air. The movement of Confederate troops northward on our right no doubt convinced Colonel Le Favour that it was time for us to be getting out of there, so without orders the movement toward the rear was begun, and we were faced about and marched down the hill." [Gracie, Truth About Chickamauga, 1911, 429-430.]

Their movement to join the retreating forces was arrested by Major John C. Smith of Gen. Steedman's staff, found who ordered Col. LeFavour to turn around and go back up the hill and hold at all hazards, even though his command (the 22nd Michigan and 89th Ohio) had almost no ammo left. Smith's account:

"I remember as though but yesterday, that, as I was riding along the line encouraging the men, Col. LeFavor rode up to me, saying: "Major, the enemy is pressing my line, and I am out of ammunition. What are your orders?" I answered: "Fix bayonets, Colonel, and give them cold steel." Looking me earnestly in the face, he replied: "Are those your orders, sir?" I answered: "They are." This as I have said, was about sundown I saw LeFavor fix his bayonets and charge with the Twenty-second Michigan and Eighty-ninth, drive the enemy until enveloped by them, when he was captured. The charge was a gallant one and saved us from any more serious attack that evening. I thought the order a right one; Gen. Steedman thought so, when informed of it, and subsequent events prove that it was…" [Turchin, Chickamauga, 1888, 208.]

About the same time the exhausted 21st Ohio was reorganizing on the north side of the ridge, when an unknown officer ordered Major McMahon, commanding, to move his regiment to cease withdrawing and attack back uphill as well, with the bayonet. Captain Canfield of the 21st recalled:

"The major started to take the regiment to the rear to get ammunition, when he was ordered to retake our position, by this time occupied by the enemy, by a staff officer; brave and obedient to orders, as he was, and typical soldier that he was, Major McMahon protested against taking the regiment back on the front line without ammunition, but the orders being imperative, he looked at the staff officer in his inimitable way and said, "G—d---n it, you rank me; boys we will have to go back," ordered fix bayonets, forward, charge, and the line was retaken at the point of the bayonet...[Canfield, History 21st OH, 144.]

Shortly the three regiments, were collected together on the hill, the 21st Ohio on the right. Capt. Canfield recalls of their capture...

.... The enemy now moved toward us, ordering the regiment to surrender. The regiment did not surrender in the full sense of that term. As they charged towards us, ordering us to surrender, a large number of the regiment was captured, and those that escaped did so by charging through their line." [Canfield, History 21st OH, 144.]
If you were left, might have a little different perspective. 21st Ohio was left by Negley. Negley left about 11:30 with part of 3 brigades and 20 tubes, Thomas's reserve ammo. So, there was no one looking out for those guys. Narrative 21st was ordered to use their bayonets while trying to fall back and resupply probably a little earlier. Situation changed abruptly, some didn't get orders. End result don't think Powell and others think they were sacrificed. Got dark about 4 or so. Smoke on the battlefield field from fires. Smoke from all of the gun fire. Wasn't naturally dark. Grangers responsibility take command in Thomas's absence. Might imagine how chaotic it was.
 
If you were left, might have a little different perspective. 21st Ohio was left by Negley. Negley left about 11:30 with part of 3 brigades and 20 tubes, Thomas's reserve ammo. So, there was no one looking out for those guys. Narrative 21st was ordered to use their bayonets while trying to fall back and resupply probably a little earlier. Situation changed abruptly, some didn't get orders. End result don't think Powell and others think they were sacrificed. Got dark about 4 or so. Smoke on the battlefield field from fires. Smoke from all of the gun fire. Wasn't naturally dark. Grangers responsibility take command in Thomas's absence. Might imagine how chaotic it was.


The veterans of the were pretty sure they were sacrificed...If they had no other orders they would have retreated with the troops around them in the general withdrawal. But Given positive orders to stop retreating with the balance of troops around them as the Confederates overran the Snodgrass ridge, turn, attack back uphill and hold their ground... So they did until overwhelmed. Captain Canfield of the 21st Ohio.


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Same with Col. Lefavor with the 22nd Michigan and 89th Ohio.
Lt. Col. Glenn of the 89th Ohio was pretty sure they were sacrificed... after regaining their position they received no support or even ammo, while the bulk of the troops behind them withdrew...

"On the evening when we surrendered, we were out of ammunition. An orderly was sent for supplies. The answer received was, "ammunition will be sent if possible; but hold your position at the point of the bayonet," thus showing that the 89th was taken in, not for want of orders to fall back, but in obedience to positive orders to hold our position, sacrificed as we believed at the time, and still believe, for the good of the army: thus preventing the pursuit of our forces that night."

Captain David M. Barrett of the 89th Ohio was quite sure he and his command were indeed sacrificed...

"Soon after dark the rebels knowing we were there, so disposed their forces as to open fire upon and charge us from three sides, having a brigade on the fourth or front, to renew the attack while the others closed in and surrounded us, and thus we were sacrificed to save the other part of the army and prevent a complete route of our whole line, and the rebel occupation of Chattanooga."


Major McMahon of the 21st Ohio opined that the only confusion was among the rest of the troops around them working to get out of the bag, viz. which had not been given positive orders to hold their ground and not withdraw (unlike his own regiment and LeFavour's).
Some of General Brannan's division (Van Derveer's brigade) were nearby as they were surrounded... and fired into what they thought were the Confederates in their front in the woods, but Major McMahon of the 21st Ohio complained later that Brannan's last shots were into his men's backs on the hill...

"I do not know if he is aware even now, that the last firing done by Van Derveers brigade and the other regiments which had come to the support of Brannan's right, was delivered right into these same three regiments, which he supposed to be captured and removed from the field. Of course the rebels were coming from up at the time and were also fired upon."
 
The veterans of the were pretty sure they were sacrificed...If they had no other orders they would have retreated with the troops around them in the general withdrawal. But Given positive orders to stop retreating with the balance of troops around them as the Confederates overran the Snodgrass ridge, turn, attack back uphill and hold their ground... So they did until overwhelmed. Captain Canfield of the 21st Ohio.


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Same with Col. Lefavor with the 22nd Michigan and 89th Ohio.
Lt. Col. Glenn of the 89th Ohio was pretty sure they were sacrificed... after regaining their position they received no support or even ammo, while the bulk of the troops behind them withdrew...

"On the evening when we surrendered, we were out of ammunition. An orderly was sent for supplies. The answer received was, "ammunition will be sent if possible; but hold your position at the point of the bayonet," thus showing that the 89th was taken in, not for want of orders to fall back, but in obedience to positive orders to hold our position, sacrificed as we believed at the time, and still believe, for the good of the army: thus preventing the pursuit of our forces that night."

Captain David M. Barrett of the 89th Ohio was quite sure he and his command were indeed sacrificed...

"Soon after dark the rebels knowing we were there, so disposed their forces as to open fire upon and charge us from three sides, having a brigade on the fourth or front, to renew the attack while the others closed in and surrounded us, and thus we were sacrificed to save the other part of the army and prevent a complete route of our whole line, and the rebel occupation of Chattanooga."


Major McMahon of the 21st Ohio opined that the only confusion was among the rest of the troops around them working to get out of the bag, viz. which had not been given positive orders to hold their ground and not withdraw (unlike his own regiment and LeFavour's).
Some of General Brannan's division (Van Derveer's brigade) were nearby as they were surrounded... and fired into what they thought were the Confederates in their front in the woods, but Major McMahon of the 21st Ohio complained later that Brannan's last shots were into his men's backs on the hill...

"I do not know if he is aware even now, that the last firing done by Van Derveers brigade and the other regiments which had come to the support of Brannan's right, was delivered right into these same three regiments, which he supposed to be captured and removed from the field. Of course the rebels were coming from up at the time and were also fired upon."
Never said these guys didn't think they were intentionally left.

If you are interested you can read David Powell's analysis in his works. Says in depth what I summarized. Plus the other side of what you have posted. Always more to it. Lefavor says above "they received no support". 21st Ohio complaining they got no direction from Brannan. Brannan requested Negley give him a regiment. He did and subsequently left without telling anyone. He gets cashiered over this. A lot of stuff went on here that afternoon. Federals had a lot of different pieces here. Steedman brought up 2 Brigades. Lot of Brannnan's guys stopped here after the Brakethrough. Harker's Brigade was intact. Part of another of Wood's brigades. Others just few guys from other regiments. If you were on 1 hill, due to the terrain and smoke, you couldn't see what was happening on the other hills. They were not writing out orders and passing them out. These guys got part of an order that by the time they got it had changed.
 
Never said these guys didn't think they were intentionally left.

If you are interested you can read David Powell's analysis in his works. Says in depth what I summarized. Plus the other side of what you have posted. Always more to it. Lefavor says above "they received no support". 21st Ohio complaining they got no direction from Brannan. Brannan requested Negley give him a regiment. He did and subsequently left without telling anyone. He gets cashiered over this. A lot of stuff went on here that afternoon. Federals had a lot of different pieces here. Steedman brought up 2 Brigades. Lot of Brannnan's guys stopped here after the Brakethrough. Harker's Brigade was intact. Part of another of Wood's brigades. Others just few guys from other regiments. If you were on 1 hill, due to the terrain and smoke, you couldn't see what was happening on the other hills. They were not writing out orders and passing them out. These guys got part of an order that by the time they got it had changed.

I've read Mr. Powell's description, among others. But I prefer the statements of the veterans relative to the conclusion of the fighting. They were all withdrawing from the hill when their regiments particularly received positive orders to cease withdrawing with the balance, and retake their positions on the hill, and hold at all costs. They were'nt partial or confusing orders, but rather very upsetting positive orders. Col. Lefavour received them from a staff officer of his division commander, acting in his seniors' name, and Gen. Steedman never contradicted them, or threw the staff officer under the bus. He was later promoted. It might have been necessary to sacrifice these regiments, as claimed.

The 21st Ohio particularly was upset about their nearby receipt of the same orders to attack and hold, because they had received no particular orders all afternoon, but acted in concert with the units near them... Until they wanted to get out the bag and were withdrawing from the hill with the rest, and when they finally received an order, it was to halt, turn, counterattack and hold with the bayonet, etc. No senior officers subsequently admitted to giving those orders, but Maj. McMahon, and dozens of his officers and men testified that a senior officer gave them. They would never forget getting a practical death sentence.

McMahon could not prove it, but he was under the impression the orders he received came from an officer of Brannan's division.

They also didn't like that Brannan's men behind them fired into their rear either, as they were being surrounded by the Confederates, rather than coming up to help them.

Lt. E.S. Scott of the 89th Ohio recalled of it: "for some reason or another, fired a volley into us, rebels and all. The rebels scattered like sheep at this volley, hiding behind trees, logs. I piled with the rest behind a big tree in the middle of the hollow; the mass were piled three or four deep. I was a fool for not trying to get away. Quite a number did take advantage of this and escaped…"

Part of the confusion you mention is that some of the federals on the hill, like Scott above, presumed this firing into them and the rebs surrounding them was from another body of rebs in their rear (even some of the Confederates thought so). But it was from Brannan's men behind them, who thought the 21st Ohio etc. in their front had already surrendered, though they were not firing because they had no ammo.
 
I've read Mr. Powell's description, among others. But I prefer the statements of the veterans relative to the conclusion of the fighting. They were all withdrawing from the hill when their regiments particularly received positive orders to cease withdrawing with the balance, and retake their positions on the hill, and hold at all costs. They were'nt partial or confusing orders, but rather very upsetting positive orders. Col. Lefavour received them from a staff officer of his division commander, acting in his seniors' name, and Gen. Steedman never contradicted them, or threw the staff officer under the bus. He was later promoted. It might have been necessary to sacrifice these regiments, as claimed.

The 21st Ohio particularly was upset about their nearby receipt of the same orders to attack and hold, because they had received no particular orders all afternoon, but acted in concert with the units near them... Until they wanted to get out the bag and were withdrawing from the hill with the rest, and when they finally received an order, it was to halt, turn, counterattack and hold with the bayonet, etc. No senior officers subsequently admitted to giving those orders, but Maj. McMahon, and dozens of his officers and men testified that a senior officer gave them. They would never forget getting a practical death sentence.

McMahon could not prove it, but he was under the impression the orders he received came from an officer of Brannan's division.

They also didn't like that Brannan's men behind them fired into their rear either, as they were being surrounded by the Confederates, rather than coming up to help them.

Lt. E.S. Scott of the 89th Ohio recalled of it: "for some reason or another, fired a volley into us, rebels and all. The rebels scattered like sheep at this volley, hiding behind trees, logs. I piled with the rest behind a big tree in the middle of the hollow; the mass were piled three or four deep. I was a fool for not trying to get away. Quite a number did take advantage of this and escaped…"

Part of the confusion you mention is that some of the federals on the hill, like Scott above, presumed this firing into them and the rebs surrounding them was from another body of rebs in their rear (even some of the Confederates thought so). But it was from Brannan's men behind them, who thought the 21st Ohio etc. in their front had already surrendered, though they were not firing because they had no ammo.

Thanks for these particularly vivid citations. Fighting to the last bullet & more under these conditions showed extraordinary grit & determination. The Ohio regiments in the 14th Corps have an exceptionalcombat record.
 
I've read Mr. Powell's description, among others. But I prefer the statements of the veterans relative to the conclusion of the fighting. They were all withdrawing from the hill when their regiments particularly received positive orders to cease withdrawing with the balance, and retake their positions on the hill, and hold at all costs. They were'nt partial or confusing orders, but rather very upsetting positive orders. Col. Lefavour received them from a staff officer of his division commander, acting in his seniors' name, and Gen. Steedman never contradicted them, or threw the staff officer under the bus. He was later promoted. It might have been necessary to sacrifice these regiments, as claimed.

The 21st Ohio particularly was upset about their nearby receipt of the same orders to attack and hold, because they had received no particular orders all afternoon, but acted in concert with the units near them... Until they wanted to get out the bag and were withdrawing from the hill with the rest, and when they finally received an order, it was to halt, turn, counterattack and hold with the bayonet, etc. No senior officers subsequently admitted to giving those orders, but Maj. McMahon, and dozens of his officers and men testified that a senior officer gave them. They would never forget getting a practical death sentence.

McMahon could not prove it, but he was under the impression the orders he received came from an officer of Brannan's division.

They also didn't like that Brannan's men behind them fired into their rear either, as they were being surrounded by the Confederates, rather than coming up to help them.

Lt. E.S. Scott of the 89th Ohio recalled of it: "for some reason or another, fired a volley into us, rebels and all. The rebels scattered like sheep at this volley, hiding behind trees, logs. I piled with the rest behind a big tree in the middle of the hollow; the mass were piled three or four deep. I was a fool for not trying to get away. Quite a number did take advantage of this and escaped…"

Part of the confusion you mention is that some of the federals on the hill, like Scott above, presumed this firing into them and the rebs surrounding them was from another body of rebs in their rear (even some of the Confederates thought so). But it was from Brannan's men behind them, who thought the 21st Ohio etc. in their front had already surrendered, though they were not firing because they had no ammo.
Ever been to Horseshoe Ridge? It is actually a spur of Missionary Ridge. A series of hills probably a quarter of a mile long.

I've studied it with Powell, Historian Jim Ogden, Lee White and others. On the ground.

"a senior Officer"? Prove to us that someone who had Command authority such as Steedman, Brannan, Granger or Thomas had the intent to sacrifice these three regiments to save the others. Due to the circumstances and terrain it was impossible for them to do this to begin with. Just don't think you understand the circumstances. I wouldn't just by reading it.
 
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Ever been to Horseshoe Ridge? It is actually a spur of Missionary Ridge. A series of hills probably a quarter of a mile long.
I've studied it with Powell, Historian Jim Ogden, Lee White and others. On the ground.

Yes, a time or two.

"a senior Officer"? Prove to us that someone who had Command authority such as Steedman, Brannan, Granger or Thomas had the intent to sacrifice these three regiments to save the others. Due to the circumstances and terrain it was impossible for them to do this to begin with. Just don't think you understand the circumstances. I wouldn't just by reading it.

I have the impression that the evidence for an order, verbally given, is first an obedience to it. And second a lack of rebuke for acting upon it.

Relative to the orders received by Col. LeFavour which consigned his 22nd MI and the 89th OH regiments to a continued defense of the ridge until their capture, their orders originated from a staff officer of Gen. Steedman's division, acting quickly in the name of his general.

After Smith of Steedman's staff instructed Col. LeFavour to use the bayonet, and return to the ridge while the balance of Steedman's division was withdrawing, General Steedman was informed of the orders given to Col. LeFavour with the 22nd Michigan and 89th Ohio; and evidently that general subsequently sent orders for them to withdraw and join the rest, but it was too late, the Confederate forces intervening. This is what the officers of the 22nd MI who escaped capture were informed evidently. From Capt. Atkinson, 22nd Michigan in a Sept. 29 letter to Col. LeFavour's family to explain what happened:

"Gen. Steedman sent an order to fall back, but too late. Before it arrived the regiment was closed in upon by rebel hordes on both flanks and cut off. This brave charge, Gen. Steedman says, saved that portion of the army…"

Consequently these regiments, and the 21st Ohio by the end formed with them remained in position until captured, without ammunition, and with the bayonet alone.

Relative to the 21st, as mentioned, they stated that they fought on their own hook most of the afternoon, and as they were withdrawing with the balance at the close down the northern slopes, a mounted officer, a colonel in full view of the regiment, stated to Major McMahan to attack the ridge and hold with the bayonet if necessary. They believed or understood that officer was associated with Brannan's division, and invoked the authority of at least Col. Van Derveer of that division.

Capt. Vantine's official report of the battle for the 21st (the senior officer that escaped capture) states:

"Our ammunition was exhausted, and we could not procure any more. At about half past 5 p.m. the enemy sent up messengers to Brannan's men stating that some of them were waiting for them (our men) to cease fire in order to give themselves (i.e., the enemy) up. The firing ceased and the enemy came up, but instead of giving themselves up they fired a volley and charged up the hill, gaining possession of it entirely. The commanding officer of Brannan's troops asked that the 21st Ohio should charge up and retake the hill."

While he says they were "asked" to do this, his commander Major McMahan, among those who were taken prisoner on the ridge, reported they were not "asked" but commanded by a direct order to yet contend against the enemy on the ridge etc.

Captain Cusac, and others, backed up Major McMahan that they were positively ordered to attack by a superior officer, hold, etc. Cusac:

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McMahan officially reported his understanding it was Col. Van Derveer of Brannan's Division who ordered him to remain on the ridge though Van Derveer later positively and absolutely denied having been the officer in question, or having originated or approved any such orders. McMahan:

1729347191605.png


McMahan later explained the circumstances to Mr. George Dolton, (a veteran of Battery M, 1st Illinois which was also involved in the fighting on the ridge), as to why he identified Van Derveer. Dolton recorded his statement:

"That while looking around, he discovered a small tree in his rear, standing in a very peculiar, slanting position; that looking up on the ridge to his left front, he saw two large trees, behind which were two officers on horseback; that shortly after he had formed his men, one of these officers came to him and ordered him to move his regiment to the right of the troops then on the crest of the ridge at his right front [Le Favor's 22nd MI and 89th OH]; that he refused to do so, saying that his men were not in condition to go into battle again, they having no ammunition, and being very much disorganized on account of the many attacks they had withstood; that the officer returned to the other one and consulted with him, and immediately came back and again ordered him to move to the right. He asked by whose authority the order was given, and was informed that it was by the order of Gen. Van Derveer, the other officer by the trees. The officer who gave him the order was a tall, slim man, wearing large glasses or goggles. He then ordered his bugler to sound the "advance,"

Irrespective of who the officers on horseback were, which was never proven, veterans of the 21st later pointed out where they received the order in question, and in later years they found the two trees and the leaning tree, marked around point 8 below: (north is down)

1729348865722.png


It has been suggested that McMahan, Captain Cusac and others were mistaken in these things. As you mention, nobody took credit for giving the orders, and nobody can prove who did so, or on what authority. Their obedience to orders to the end of the battle was their only evidence.



It strikes me the more controversial point is the suggestion that the last firing by the Union line in the battle, by the right of Van Derveer's brigade, namely the 35th Ohio, was delivered into these three regiments, along with the Confederates surrounding them on the ridge.

Some since claim that could not be, by placing the 35th Ohio, etc. on Van Derveer's right, on top of the high hill or second hill at the last shots of the fighting, or about point 7 in the map above, and holding the hill and repelling the last Confederates attack upon it with their last volley.

As you mention, there was much confusion etc., and the various parties receiving it (US and CS) didn't know from whom this last firing came. Some of the captured regiments presuming it was from some rebs, and some rebs like Lt. Col. Wade of the 54th VA of Trigg's brigade surrounding these regiments, initially presumed the same, he even ordering the 6th Florida, which fired back to cease, etc. (though he subsequently discerned and reported it was Union firing). After this last firing Triggs' and Kelly's brigades moved quickly gathered up the three regiments as prisoners and moved them off without opposition.

Supporting the claims of Maj. McMahan, that this last firing was into the three captured regiments as well as the rebs around them, was the 9th Indiana; who state just prior to it they were present near the top of the high or second hill (their skirmishers about point 7 in above map), where it has since been claimed for the 35th Ohio was positioned at that time of the capture of the three regiments. The 9th had evidently just relieved the 35th from their position on the hill, and shortly barely escaped capture themselves as Trigg's Confederate brigade overwhelmed LeFavour and the 21st Ohio just to their right. Col. Suman of the 9th Indiana:

"My regiment was then ordered still farther to the right, on a high hill. It was while in this position that my attention was drawn to my right by an unnecessary amount of talking. I went over to see what it meant, and, to my surprise, I found the enemy demanding our troops [Le Favour and the 21st Ohio] to surrender. At that moment a rebel officer pointed a pistol at my head and demanded my surrender. I informed him that I had surrendered some time ago. He appeared satisfied with my explanation. At that moment something drew his attention, and I slipped away from him....

Suman and others later explained that he rejoined his regiment, and quickly left that spot...

1729458920891.png


Regardless, something like 34 or so of Col. Suman's men didnt' withdraw as they were at this time surrounded and captured as with LeFavour and the 21st Ohio to their right. Suman's report continued:

....brought two of my right companies to bear [Companies A and F, 9th IN], and opened fire on them and scattered the party. Our men ran one way and the rebels ran another. The officer with whom I talked reported himself as colonel of the thirty-fifth [Fifty-fourth] Virginia Regiment, and said he was attached to Buckner's corps. He said he was only off of the cars seven hours. One of my lieutenants went over to see what was going on, and the same officer took his sword from him. One of his men fired on the rebel colonel and killed him, retook the lieutenant's sword, and took the rebel's sword and pistol. At this moment the officer came up that I had reported to at that point. He appeared to think it impossible that the enemy had gained that point. I informed him that he had but 30 steps to walk to convince himself, but he seemed not inclined to convince himself by going to see. Immediately afterward I was ordered to retire with my command, which I did in good order."

The 9th Indiana veterans thought it was ungentlemanly in later years to so positively deny their regiment had barely escaped capture on top of the high hill as occurred to the balance of the troops nearby. Their controversy of position is given in Conley, Laurence D., "The Truth about Chickamauga: A Ninth Indiana Regiment's Perspective," Indiana Magazine of History, Volume 98, Issue 2 (2002).


But wherever they were, Lt. Col. Boynton's own 1863 official report itself places his regiment off of the hill, but in the last fire of the battle shooting at men yet on it...particularly confederates who had "occupied" it. Per Col. Suman (9th IN) and Maj. McMahan (21st OH), etc., the three captured regiments were in his front among the hill's "occupiers." Boynton:

1729347449846.png


Captain McConnell of the 9th Indiana notes that when both Companies A and F of the 9th Indiana and the 35th Ohio fired upon the mounted reb of Trigg's brigade who rode up to them, the fire of the 35th, which they claimed simultaneous, passed over and through the 9th Indiana too, before striking at the hill's "occupants"...

"What that they fired on him, and by the light of the guns he [the mounted Confederate who approached the 9th IN and 35th OH] and his horse were both seen to fall. The rebels then opened fire on us from their line and the regiment returned the fire. The bullets from the enemy passing through us reached the 34th Ohio [sic.] behind us and they opened fire, putting us between two fires."

McConnell and others of the 9th Indiana explained the "occupiers" of the hill, rapidly moved to cover.

"This regiment was asked to surrender by the captors, but it answered by musketry, in which some troops on higher ground behind it, joined, quickly causing the enemy with his prisoners [the 22nd MI, 89th OH, and 21st OH] to disappear."

Per this last, and from Maj. McMahan's 21st Ohio and Le Favor's regiments say this combined fire struck them just as the 9th understood. Lt. Scott of the 89th OH again:

"for some reason or another, fired a volley into us, rebels and all. The rebels scattered like sheep at this volley, hiding behind trees,
logs. I piled with the rest behind a big tree in the middle of the hollow; the mass were piled three or four deep. I was a fool for not trying to get away. Quite a number did take advantage of this and escaped…"


Scott presumed the firing was from rebs. Just as some of the rebs of the 54th VA near him thought so to, and didn't return it (though the 6th Florida did). But in any case, the result was a downhill slide as the 54th VA and the three Union regiments moved downhill fast.

Lt. Sam Dunstan of the 9th Indiana confirmed the crowd of men flying downhill after the firing of the 9th IN/35th OH, was a mix of Confederates and Union soldiers of the three captured regiments.. He marks the point of the mounted reb as an X in front of the right companies of the 9th Indiana:

1729353502568.png


Lt. Col. Wade of the 54th Virginia, who who initially thought like many this last volley came from fellow rebs (when he ordered the 6th Florida to cease fire) also confirms that this last federal fire struck into both his command, and the federals...

1729461741386.png


Major McMahan of the 21st Ohio, being overwhelmed at that point concurred this last firing had little effect on the Confederates surrounding, though he claims some of his men were felled by it... as he noted in a letter mocking claims his regiment had quietly surrendered previous to the this last firing of the battle:

"Trigg's brigade had [got] clear round in our rear. It was the left of that brigade which Boynton [and 35th OH] fired upon killing the mounted orderly of Col. Trigg whom he supposed to be a rebel officer, the only rebel injured by the fire, tho there were some of our men knocked down by the same fire which came right into us, toward the end I had only 200 men and not a shot. Such was our quiet capture."

The above is in reference to the northern slopes of the ridge/hill. After these last shots, the battle was over. The 5th Kentucky of Kelly's Confederate brigade quickly advanced and secured many of the Union prisoners of the three regiments piled downhill in the hollow, or lower ground, just Southwest of the Snodgrass house, per Captain Gaines of the 5th Kentucky:

"It was after we had advanced, I think about two hundred yards [600 ft.] further, that we made the recapture before spoken of. This recapture took place in the clearing at the foot of the northern slope of the ridge in the bowl-shaped hollow southwest of the Snodgrass house. It was then after sundown. Here occurred Colonel Kelly's greeting with Colonel Carlton, of the 89th Ohio. I remember well, forming on each side of them and our marching back with them."

That hollow would appear to be here: (north is up),

1729379225175.png


The division commander of Trigg's and Kelly's brigades, Gen. Preston, referred to this as a "a crowded dell in front of Kelly and Trigg" at the conclusion of the firing, where they found many federal troops, including wounded, etc. and quickly gathered up their prisoners before moving them southward off the field.

In the meantime, the 68th and 101st Indiana, which had some ammo, was sent to the 35th Ohio under Lt. Col. Boynton, to relieve his 35th OH and 9th IN, which then withdrew. These Indiana regiments crept up to the point where the 9th IN/35th OH had just fired, and spoke to the mortally wounded horseman of Trigg's brigade shot down by their last fire. The firing was over however:
Major Steele of the 101st Indiana:

"The 68th and 101st Indiana were ordered to the relief of Brannan's division, or that portion of it left on Snodgrass hill, which we proceeded to do. we took our position in front of the troops as far as we could, and were ordered to hold that position until Brannan's troops had cleared the field at least ten minutes. We obeyed [as] ordered... We did not fire a gun on Snodgrass Hill."

But they could see the Confederates yet in front, gathering the prisoners of the three regiments. Veterans of the 68th Indiana recalled:
1729465955067.png


It was evidently too dark by this time for the rebs and the prisoners to be clearly visible. Maj. Steele of the 101st is mentioned before they left, seeing torches flickering among them. And among the prisoners Norbert Generoux of the 22nd Michigan of LeFavour's command, among the prisoners now in Confederate custody, confirms the rebs lit torches before marching them off...

"Then the enemy recharged with infantry, and the Union troops continued to repulse their charges until night, when they were surrounded. The Confederates marched the Union prisoners three or four rods, and carried torch-lights in order that the surrendered soldiery would not step on the wounded and dead."

So within several minutes these last Union regiments joined in the general retreat, while the 22nd MI, 89th and 21st Ohio were largely carried off to prison in the other direction. Thus shortly after Major McMahan among these prisoners reported that his command was sacrificed by orders...


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Not surprisingly, all of this got rehashed when it came time to mark the battlefield during the creation of the Chickamauga-Chattanooga National Military Park in the 1890s. The 21st Ohio veterans originally composed a description of their role on Snodgrass Hill based on the accounts above, placing blame for their capture on officers from Van Derveer on down. That version never made it on the marker because the 35th Ohio's Henry Boynton was a mover and shaker in the park's construction and quashed an account that implied (or stated outright) that either he, his regiment, or his brigade superiors could have made such a mistake. The 21st's marker is slightly down the slope in about the right spot, but it avoids accusing anyone of making the mistakes that got it overrun.
 

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