Sherman's march

MikeyB

Sergeant
Joined
Sep 13, 2018
Sherman's men had to live off the land, not having enough time to build a robust supply line.

What if the Confederate authorities were heartless to their populace with a rugged determination to win and confiscated or destroyed every piece of foodstuff in Sherman's path? Would this delay him a few months while he built a supply line, take away a few last minute Union wins and perhaps enough to tilt the election to Mac?
 
Sherman's men had to live off the land, not having enough time to build a robust supply line.

What if the Confederate authorities were heartless to their populace with a rugged determination to win and confiscated or destroyed every piece of foodstuff in Sherman's path? Would this delay him a few months while he built a supply line, take away a few last minute Union wins and perhaps enough to tilt the election to Mac?
What if the CSA had begun the war with a campaign like Shermans towards DC or Maryland. What would the results have been? Just curious about CWT thoughts.
 
Sherman's men had to live off the land, not having enough time to build a robust supply line.

What if the Confederate authorities were heartless to their populace with a rugged determination to win and confiscated or destroyed every piece of foodstuff in Sherman's path? Would this delay him a few months while he built a supply line, take away a few last minute Union wins and perhaps enough to tilt the election to Mac?

They did that, IIRC. A lot of the destruction along Sherman's path wasn't by Sherman's men.

I suspect the efforts were sub-optimal since they didn't know his path or even his final destination.
 
What if the CSA had begun the war with a campaign like Shermans towards DC or Maryland. What would the results have been? Just curious about CWT thoughts.

You mean like right after the Confederate victory at Bull Run (First Manassas) on 21 Jul 1861? The first real large conventional battle of the Civil War, where the infantries and artilleries of both armies opposed each other in full scale warfare for the first time? I have often said that this was the best opportunity that the Confederacy had of winning the war, as they had momentum and were only with-in 25 miles of Washington; D.C. This was the only time during the war that the numbers of both armies were about even. From the beginning of 1862 until May of 1865 the Confederacy was severely out-manned, out-numbered and out-gunned. Instead, they went on to fight and gain another Confederate victory at Leesburg, Va. on 20-24 Oct 1861 and then the Confederate States Army decided to go into Winter Camp. Huge mistake....
 
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Sherman's men had to live off the land, not having enough time to build a robust supply line.

What if the Confederate authorities were heartless to their populace with a rugged determination to win and confiscated or destroyed every piece of foodstuff in Sherman's path? Would this delay him a few months while he built a supply line, take away a few last minute Union wins and perhaps enough to tilt the election to Mac?

Actually, throughout the war, Confederate authorities impressed food and forage from its local population, which did not endear many civilians to their own government. As far as Sherman's March is concerned, which Confederate authorities would have the wherewithal to carry out such a "scorched earth" campaign? The Georgia Militia and Wheeler's Cavalry were unable to even put a dent in Sherman's advance.
 
Sherman's men had to live off the land, not having enough time to build a robust supply line.

What if the Confederate authorities were heartless to their populace with a rugged determination to win and confiscated or destroyed every piece of foodstuff in Sherman's path? Would this delay him a few months while he built a supply line, take away a few last minute Union wins and perhaps enough to tilt the election to Mac?

MikeyB, they did attempt this early in the war at Pensacola in the spring of 1862, long before Sherman in fact began to implement his scorched earth policy and hard war strategy. General Braxton Bragg voluntarily withdrew his eight thousand troops from Pensacola in March 1862, sending them to Corinth, MS where they could be used to support General`s Albert Sidney Johnston and P.G.T. Beauregard in the upcoming battle against General U.S. Grant at Shiloh, TN. So the Confederates made the hard decision and chose to abandon Pensacola, knowing that they would have to destroy much of it and its local industries as they did. As Bragg pulled out of Pensacola he destroyed much of the Florida Panhandle (Beards Raid) to include the local industries and much private property, primarily up the Blackwater River at Bagdad, Arcadia and Milton, swearing to leave nothing behind with which the Federals could use against the Confederacy when they would soon fully occupy the area. The Confederates completed their withdrawal and evacuation from Pensacola on the night of 9 May 1862, and as they did the Confederate Cavalry destroyed all of the remaining public and military buildings at Pensacola, as well as putting the Confederate army barracks, the Warrington Navy Yard, Woolsey, Fort Barrancas and Fort McRee (Foster`s Island) under the torch, which resulted in the vast majority of it all burning. Then the Confederate cavalry began ripping up the rails to tear up the Florida & Alabama Railroad and pulled down the telegraph cables from Pensacola towards Pollard, AL.

This resulted in a festering of hatred to begin to grow from many of the citizens in the Florida Panhandle towards Bragg and the Confederate army, who many accused of the same atrocities later committed by Sherman during his march to the sea. The result was many defections from the Florida Panhandle turning against the Confederate cause, with many of those deserters and defectors joining with the union cause.

Follow the link below to read an OP which I wrote here on CWT regarding those events.


North-western Mississippi also had defectors of the Confederate cause for similar reasons. Many just below Memphis in the Mississippi Delta were growing tired of the Confederate army confiscating animals and foraging food stores from the local populace and only issuing pay vouchers (promise to later pay / essentially an I.O.U.) from the Confederate government which was either never repaid or slow to be paid.
 
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Just thought I might add that Sherman's march left the chain of supply and logistics between Chattanooga, through NW Georgia and Atlanta. The idea was to resume supply from the navy once the coast was reached. That late in the war, the navy and army had improved inter-service cooperation somewhat--at least to some degree...

Any large body of callow youths is going to cause a lot of trouble when not moving... The attempts by the CSA to try to move into the border states and Union reflect that realization, I'd think.
 
What if the CSA had begun the war with a campaign like Shermans towards DC or Maryland. What would the results have been? Just curious about CWT thoughts.

That could be a good topic, maybe as its own thread. DC is right across the river from Virginia, so they wouldn't be marching deep into enemy territory. Also unlike Sherman they would be fighting a major battle against most of the Union army of the time, though as @2nd Alabama Cavalry notes they had a fair chance. If successful, they might advance further into Maryland, but they would hope to get Maryland to join the cause, which would not be helped by plundering the locals for food and forage. On the other hand, there was considerable secessionist sympathy in eastern Maryland; the Confederate army might not be unwelcome.
 
Just thought I might add that Sherman's march left the chain of supply and logistics between Chattanooga, through NW Georgia and Atlanta. The idea was to resume supply from the navy once the coast was reached. That late in the war, the navy and army had improved inter-service cooperation somewhat--at least to some degree...

Good point. Advancing into enemy territory, Sherman was actually moving towards his source of resupply.
 
Sherman's men had to live off the land, not having enough time to build a robust supply line.

What if the Confederate authorities were heartless to their populace with a rugged determination to win and confiscated or destroyed every piece of foodstuff in Sherman's path? Would this delay him a few months while he built a supply line, take away a few last minute Union wins and perhaps enough to tilt the election to Mac?

Assuming you're referring to the March to the Sea, that started after the presidential election, so that would not be impacted.

Several hundred thousand people lived in the path of Sherman's march and ate 365 days a year, so it would take near-total destruction to not leave enough food for 60,000 men passing through. "Heartless" would indeed be the word. They would probably have to evacuate the civilian population, and house and support them somewhere. They would also be cutting off whatever foodstuffs the region supplied to the Confederate armies.

At what point would the Confederates start this earth-scorching? They wouldn't know what Sherman was up to until the march was underway, and even then they wouldn't know his path or objectives. How much of their countryside would they devastate on the chance that the Yankees might come that way? And of course Sherman could vary his route depending on the degree of destruction in various areas.
 
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Assuming you're referring to the March to the Sea, that started after the presidential election, so that would not be impacted.

I consider Sherman`s "March to the Sea" as beginning soon after Chickamauga in the Fall of 1863, when Sherman, from Memphis, first moved on Chattanooga (October 1863) to better position his forces for a more successful march on Atlanta in the near future. Then the "Great Mississippi Expedition" (Meridian Campaign) was Sherman`s first attempt of sustaining his army off of the land by confiscation and foraging, with the dual purpose of feeding, provisioning and supplying his army, while at the same time, denying the Confederates from using those same resources. The "Meridian Campaign", which took him 300 miles round trip across central Mississippi, from 3 Feb - 3 Mar 1864, was Sherman`s Blue Print for his March from Atlanta to Savannah just 8 months later (15 Nov - 10 Dec 1864) and his first attempt of implementing his scorched earth and hard war policies and strategies. By the time that he marched through Georgia from Atlanta to Savannah he had already perfected those strategies, mostly because of the lessons learned during the "Meridian Campaign". In addition to his primary objectives for the "Meridian Campaign", being to destroy the roads, railroad, supply lines and to completely rid himself of Nathan Bedford Forrest (by killing him), he also wanted to chase the entire Confederate army out of Mississippi, so that it would free up between 20,000 to 30,000 Federal troops in Mississippi, to soon be used during the fighting at Atlanta, of whom many did go on to fight there during that Campaign.
 
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Assuming you're referring to the March to the Sea, that started after the presidential election, so that would not be impacted.

Several hundred thousand people lived in the path of Sherman's march and ate 365 days a year, so it would take near-total destruction to not leave enough food for 60,000 men passing through. "Heartless" would indeed be the word. They would probably have to evacuate the civilian population, and house and support them somewhere. They would also be cutting off whatever foodstuffs the region supplied to the Confederate armies.

At what point would the Confederates start this earth-scorching? They wouldn't know what Sherman was up to until the march was underway, and even then they wouldn't know his path or objectives. How much of their countryside would they devastate on the chance that the Yankees might come that way? And of course Sherman could vary his route depending on the degree of destruction in various areas.

Thanks for the post. So, Sherman's army was still being supplied by traditional Union supply lines and logistics through the capture of Atlanta versus living off the land?
 
There is a misunderstanding of what Sherman's campaign was designed to do.

IMG_5194.JPG

Plate LVIII The Official Military Atlas of the Civil War

We are all familiar with the highly detailed maps of the Atlanta Campaign & The March to the Sea. Every river, creek, railroad, town & house is shown in exacting detail. Sherman's personal map that he used on the March to the Sea is in the Library of Congress. What is not generally known is the existence of the map that made the March to the Sea possible.

20disunion1-tmagArticle.jpg


Grant's order to Sherman was to penetrate the interior of Georgia in order to inflict maximum damage to the food source that fed the rebellion. Almost from the first step, Southern newspaper headlines screamed in outrage. Sherman was accused of engaging in random acts of barbaric, pointless vandalism. Nothing could have been further from the truth. There was nothing random about what Sherman set out to do.

It is hard to see on this format, but the map above was a work of singular genius. Joseph Kennedy, superintendent of the census, combined the world class Coastal Survey maps with census data. Every county in Georgia was depicted with its slave population, mule production, hogs, corn etc.

20disunion4-blog480-v2.jpg


Using this detailed map, Sherman wrote his marching orders targeting the most productive counties along his route.

20disunion3-blog480.jpg


As you can see, the information included was very comprehensive. The route the March took was designed to inflict maximum damage while providing his army with ample rations. By making feints at Macon & Augusta, Sherman was able to completely befuddle the Confederate high command. His vulnerable flank swept past the forces guarding those points, leaving them in his wake impotent.

Compare both the strategic blow the destruction of the breadbasket of the South & shattering blow to morale of Sherman's March to Bragg's invasion of Kentucky. Nobody had mentioned to Bragg that 1862 was an El Niño year. Crops in Kentucky had died knee high. Pastures were nothing but brown stubble sticking out of dust. After two days battle at Perryville, Bragg had no option but to retreat because he only had a couple of day's rations. Every step his army took in Kentucky brought them to one drought ridden county after another. His horses were literally dropping dead & there were no remounts to be had, even in Kentucky.

A suggestion has been made that Jefferson Davis should have followed the Tsar's lead & engaged in a scorched earth counter move. A couple of things made that impractical. One, Davis did not have Kennedy's brilliant map. Second, Nobody knew where Sherman intended to go, not even his own army group commanders. Three, Even if Davis had known Sherman's intended path to the sea, ordering every house, barn & footsore destroyed on a sixty mile wide swath would have done Sherman's work for him. He would have just turned northward & joined Thomas or Grant.

Nothing about Sherman's planning for the March was left to chance. He had very specific goals that he pursued with single minded determination. Sherman stated that he would not have attempted the Atlanta Campaign or the March to the Sea without the brilliance of his map makers.
 
Thanks for the post. So, Sherman's army was still being supplied by traditional Union supply lines and logistics through the capture of Atlanta versus living off the land?

Yes, they used the railroad from Chattanooga. It was sometimes attacked by Confederate raiders, but the damage was repaired quickly and service restored. Supposedly one Confederate suggested blowing up a tunnel, and another replied that Sherman probably carried a spare tunnel with him :wink: And of course there was not much potential for living off the land in the hills and woods.

For the March to the Sea, the situation was reversed: ever-lengthening supply lines would become progressively more vulnerable and require more Union troops to keep them open, and the countryside could support his army. He could deal a massive blow to Confederate logistics and morale, and the excess troops were sent back to Tennessee where they ultimately helped defeat Hood's incursion.
 
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Didn't Sherman warn the populace in front of him that if they were zealous in hiding and destroying supplies, he would be zealous in burning homes and mills and businesses?
 
There is a misunderstanding of what Sherman's campaign was designed to do.

View attachment 342461
Plate LVIII The Official Military Atlas of the Civil War

We are all familiar with the highly detailed maps of the Atlanta Campaign & The March to the Sea. Every river, creek, railroad, town & house is shown in exacting detail. Sherman's personal map that he used on the March to the Sea is in the Library of Congress. What is not generally known is the existence of the map that made the March to the Sea possible.

View attachment 342444

Grant's order to Sherman was to penetrate the interior of Georgia in order to inflict maximum damage to the food source that fed the rebellion. Almost from the first step, Southern newspaper headlines screamed in outrage. Sherman was accused of engaging in random acts of barbaric, pointless vandalism. Nothing could have been further from the truth. There was nothing random about what Sherman set out to do.

It is hard to see on this format, but the map above was a work of singular genius. Joseph Kennedy, superintendent of the census, combined the world class Coastal Survey maps with census data. Every county in Georgia was depicted with its slave population, mule production, hogs, corn etc.

View attachment 342446

Using this detailed map, Sherman wrote his marching orders targeting the most productive counties along his route.

View attachment 342445

As you can see, the information included was very comprehensive. The route the March took was designed to inflict maximum damage while providing his army with ample rations. By making feints at Macon & Augusta, Sherman was able to completely befuddle the Confederate high command. His vulnerable flank swept past the forces guarding those points, leaving them in his wake impotent.

Compare both the strategic blow the destruction of the breadbasket of the South & shattering blow to morale of Sherman's March to Bragg's invasion of Kentucky. Nobody had mentioned to Bragg that 1862 was an El Niño year. Crops in Kentucky had died knee high. Pastures were nothing but brown stubble sticking out of dust. After two days battle at Perryville, Bragg had no option but to retreat because he only had a couple of day's rations. Every step his army took in Kentucky brought them to one drought ridden county after another. His horses were literally dropping dead & there were no remounts to be had, even in Kentucky.

A suggestion has been made that Jefferson Davis should have followed the Tsar's lead & engaged in a scorched earth counter move. A couple of things made that impractical. One, Davis did not have Kennedy's brilliant map. Second, Nobody knew where Sherman intended to go, not even his own army group commanders. Three, Even if Davis had known Sherman's intended path to the sea, ordering every house, barn & footsore destroyed on a sixty mile wide swath would have done Sherman's work for him. He would have just turned northward & joined Thomas or Grant.

Nothing about Sherman's planning for the March was left to chance. He had very specific goals that he pursued with single minded determination. Sherman stated that he would not have attempted the Atlanta Campaign or the March to the Sea without the brilliance of his map makers.
I was never aware of these detailed preparations. Of course I knew of his "dress rehearsal" (the Meridian Campaign), but the map prep is news to me.
Thanks a lot.....now I've got more reading to do!
 
I was never aware of these detailed preparations. Of course I knew of his "dress rehearsal" (the Meridian Campaign), but the map prep is news to me.
Thanks a lot.....now I've got more reading to do!

It must have been a thing with Sherman regarding his preparations, because he did the same thing mapping his route out during the Meridian Campaign. His Chief Engineer, Andrew Hickenlooper, before starting out on the Campaign sent spies to gather information regarding which plantations and farms would be best suited from which to forage and confiscate horses and mules along the march. The map is available and shows where Sherman, McPherson and Hurlbut stayed each night of the Campaign, marked on the Map by the date. That is why Sherman took two different roads during the Campaign, the lower Vicksburg - Montgomery stage route going towards Meridian, passing through Decatur and the upper stage route coming back from Meridian, passing through Union. This allowed him to have plenty of provisions during his march. However, McPherson left along the same route which they took to Meridian, going back to Vicksburg, so that he could collect the trains left at the Wagon Corral on 13 Feb 1864, due to the roads being destroyed from that point to Meridian, so much so that a wagon could not pass.

Follow the link below to view Hickenlooper`s Meridian Campaign Map which was compiled in January 1864:

 
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Didn't Sherman warn the populace in front of him that if they were zealous in hiding and destroying supplies, he would be zealous in burning homes and mills and businesses?
No, he did not. The reason is a simple one, to do that Sherman would have had to announce his intended route of march. His orders, which were followed except where bummers were attacked, were to not destroy houses & to leave the family enough food to get by. The intention was to destroy the industrial & agricultural assets that supported the Confederate army, not terrorize the population.
 
It must have been a thing with Sherman regarding his preparations, because he did the same thing mapping his route out during the Meridian Campaign. His Chief Engineer, Andrew Hickenlooper, before starting out on the Campaign sent spies to gather information regarding which plantations and farms would be best suited from which to forage and confiscate horses and mules along the march. The map is available and shows where Sherman, McPherson and Hurlbut stayed each night of the Campaign, marked on the Map by the date. That is why Sherman took two different roads during the Campaign, the lower Vicksburg - Montgomery stage route going towards Meridian, passing through Decatur and the upper stage route coming back from Meridian, passing through Union. This allowed him to have plenty of provisions during his march. However, McPherson left along the same route which they took to Meridian, going back to Vicksburg, so that he could collect the trains left at the Wagon Corral on 13 Feb 1864, due to the roads being destroyed from that point to Meridian, so much so that a wagon could not pass.

Follow the link below to view Hickenlooper`s Meridian Campaign Map which was compiled in January 1864:

Sherman agreed to put back the start of the Atlanta Campaign for five days to allow maps to be completed. A sergeant named Nathan Finegan scouted & collected information from anybody who had fresh knowledge. William E. Merrill reported to Sherman that the map would be complete when 'Sergeant Finegan & his motley crew' finish their work. You will see Merrill & Finegan's names on Sherman's maps.
 

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