Is there a general consensus by professional Civil War historians on Sherman? Is he generally considered a "great" general, or simply a famous (or perhaps infamous) one?
I tend to class Sherman with Jackson - generally mediocre tacticians but proficient at operational/strategic maneuver (beating the opponent to a destination and affecting high-level decisions by the opponent). Sherman's mediocre tactical record was similar to Jackson's - Chickasaw, Chattanooga, most of the battles during the Atlanta Campaign.Think there could be multiple dimensions to such a question raised. That is, defining a 'great General 'according to what criteria applied.
That's a relevant distinction made above by rob63 for here: i.e. 'strategist' vs. 'tactician'.
Overall, from my limited knowledge of Sherman, thought his strategic thinking clearly exceeded his tactical proficiency, but am uncertain by what extent.
Your points about both Georgia campaigns are good ones. That is what I meant above by the "operational/strategic" level. Like Jackson, I think he would have been better served by listening to others when it came to battlefield tactics.I would be curious to see a poll of historians about the greatest Union general, other than Grant, who I'm certain takes the top spot.
Aside from a few Rosecrans or McClellan diehards, I think Thomas is the only real contender.
Opinion of McPherson and Sheridan have fallen in recent decades, so they're definitely out of contention with historians (maybe not with buffs).
Meade is probably in the conversation, but I can't see him beating out Thomas and Sherman, even if his stock is probably at an all-time high.
Besides an awareness of how to fight the war most effectively, Sherman's work in 1864 was incredibly methodical. His (mostly) patient turning Johnston out of positions. Then encircling Atlanta. Then demolishing Atlanta. Then the careful planning of the March to the Sea. Not to mention effective use of an army group that entire time, when nobody was experienced with such vast forces. Yes, it was a great advantage, but it was also more than lesser generals of the era could have handled.
Sherman was also fortunate to face Joe Johnston as his willing opponent. It would be interesting to speculate how Sherman's flanking strategy would have played out had he been facing Lee in Georgia. As we all know, Grant tried a similar flanking strategy in his Overland Campaign but wily and aggressive Lee was able to put up a formidable defense. But of course, Grant did end up crossing the James River and besieging Petersburg as Sherman did in crossing the Chattahoochie River and besieging Atlanta.sidestepping around the flanks of Joe Johnston was tactical brilliance (Wasting it at Kenesaw wasn´t).
That´s a good point. Eventually you run out of maneuver room and push comes to shove.Sherman was also fortunate to face Joe Johnston as his willing opponent. It would be interesting to speculate how Sherman's flanking strategy would have played out had he been facing Lee in Georgia. As we all know, Grant tried a similar flanking strategy in his Overland Campaign but wily and aggressive Lee was able to put up a formidable defense. But of course, Grant did end up crossing the James River and besieging Petersburg as Sherman did in crossing the Chattahoochie River and besieging Atlanta.
As far as Kennesaw goes, there are also similarities to Grant's ill-fated frontal assaults at Cold Harbor. In both cases, the Union commanders had just about run out of space to maneuver, and deemed the time had come for more assertive actions that could deal devastating blows to the enemy. But to give Sherman a little more of a pass on his decision to attack at Kennesaw, it should be noted that Johnston, over the preceding days, had prepared and had fallen back along strongly entrenched lines in the rugged terrain of Lost, Pine, Brush, and Kennesaw Mountains, thereby further suffocating Sherman's efforts to carry out effective flanking movements.
Bosque RedondoCasa Redondo (sp?)
Excellent point! It probably also relates to his intense dislike (hatred even?) of the press that was exacerbated by the negative treatment he received for his fraught Kentucky command. So, Sherman is naturally wary of the press and by extension, politicians. (Sherman was not impressed with Lincoln, upon his first meeting with the President.) On the other hand, one would think that Sherman would have been more quick-witted about politics, given that his adopted family had political connections and brother John was a prominent senator. But to your point about Sherman's blunder when treating with Johnston at war's end; Sherman was also influenced by his fond pre-war associations with southerners and his superintendency of the Louisiana Military Academy, which might have clouded his judgement about not engaging in political matters.Sherman tended to be somewhat boneheaded on his handling of politics. He tended to make policy decisions that were not in the military sphere and had to be overruled. The forty acres and a mule and the surrender terms with Joe Johnson come to mind. Grant, in contrast, seemed to know where the military sphere ended and politics began. Sherman did not.