Sherman by historians?

I have read a number of books on Sherman over the years, but can make no claim to having read enough of them to be anything resembling an authority on them. However, I can tell you that the criteria you outlined in your question are very subjective, and difficult to quantify. Thus, it should be no surprise if people, including historians, have different opinions on such things. In addition to that, I have a hard time thinking of anyone from that period that has spawned a greater diversity of opinions over the years.

That said, I believe that if there is anything remotely resembling a consensus on Sherman, it would be that he was strategically brilliant and tactically proficient. However, even saying that much involves endless caveats that I won't spend the time going into and, obviously, the methods he chose to employ remain controversial to this day. None of this should be construed as my personal endorsement of any particular opinion regarding Sherman, I'm just trying to convey what I consider to be the consensus regarding a fascinating man. If there is any one thing I would suggest, it would be to read a number of books on him and form your own opinion. He is worth the time.
 
Is there a general consensus by professional Civil War historians on Sherman? Is he generally considered a "great" general, or simply a famous (or perhaps infamous) one?

Think there could be multiple dimensions to such a question raised. That is, defining a 'great General 'according to what criteria applied.

That's a relevant distinction made above by rob63 for here: i.e. 'strategist' vs. 'tactician'.

Overall, from my limited knowledge of Sherman, thought his strategic thinking clearly exceeded his tactical proficiency, but am uncertain by what extent.
 
Sherman was one of the most important and influential commanders during the Civil War, second possibly only to Grant. ¨Blood, Tears and Glory,¨ a study of Ohioans in the Civil War gives a very good appraisal of his contribution. Agree totally that he was a more able strategist than tactician. Still, sidestepping around the flanks of Joe Johnston was tactical brilliance (Wasting it at Kenesaw wasn´t). Furthermore, Sherman had a long and distinguished post-war career, reaching the absolute height of his profession, command of the Army of the United States. Although the military campaigns of the post-war army were brutal, even genocidal, they were conducted in a fashion that ended in victory for the United States. I don´t think W.T. Sherman and I would have gotten along personally, and I do not admire the man but as a commander he was adored by his men and one of the best of his generation.
 
I can't speak for historians but of those I've read, a general consensus is that Sherman is credited with advocating and carrying out the Union's raiding strategy whose main goal was to degrade the enemy's civilian and military infrastructure. By 1864, this strategy (most famously implemented by Sherman at Meridian and Georgia) had been adopted as doctrine by the Lincoln administration, and in no small part led to the final Union victory.
 
I would think he is generally considered famous to great, but his star has probably fell in some circles in recent years, but so has Grant and Lincolns, or most any white male of the period in some circles.
 
I would be curious to see a poll of historians about the greatest Union general, other than Grant, who I'm certain takes the top spot.

Aside from a few Rosecrans or McClellan diehards, I think Thomas is the only real contender.

Opinion of McPherson and Sheridan have fallen in recent decades, so they're definitely out of contention with historians (maybe not with buffs).

Meade is probably in the conversation, but I can't see him beating out Thomas and Sherman, even if his stock is probably at an all-time high.

Besides an awareness of how to fight the war most effectively, Sherman's work in 1864 was incredibly methodical. His (mostly) patient turning Johnston out of positions. Then encircling Atlanta. Then demolishing Atlanta. Then the careful planning of the March to the Sea. Not to mention effective use of an army group that entire time, when nobody was experienced with such vast forces. Yes, it was a great advantage, but it was also more than lesser generals of the era could have handled.
 
Think there could be multiple dimensions to such a question raised. That is, defining a 'great General 'according to what criteria applied.

That's a relevant distinction made above by rob63 for here: i.e. 'strategist' vs. 'tactician'.

Overall, from my limited knowledge of Sherman, thought his strategic thinking clearly exceeded his tactical proficiency, but am uncertain by what extent.
I tend to class Sherman with Jackson - generally mediocre tacticians but proficient at operational/strategic maneuver (beating the opponent to a destination and affecting high-level decisions by the opponent). Sherman's mediocre tactical record was similar to Jackson's - Chickasaw, Chattanooga, most of the battles during the Atlanta Campaign.
 
I would be curious to see a poll of historians about the greatest Union general, other than Grant, who I'm certain takes the top spot.

Aside from a few Rosecrans or McClellan diehards, I think Thomas is the only real contender.

Opinion of McPherson and Sheridan have fallen in recent decades, so they're definitely out of contention with historians (maybe not with buffs).

Meade is probably in the conversation, but I can't see him beating out Thomas and Sherman, even if his stock is probably at an all-time high.

Besides an awareness of how to fight the war most effectively, Sherman's work in 1864 was incredibly methodical. His (mostly) patient turning Johnston out of positions. Then encircling Atlanta. Then demolishing Atlanta. Then the careful planning of the March to the Sea. Not to mention effective use of an army group that entire time, when nobody was experienced with such vast forces. Yes, it was a great advantage, but it was also more than lesser generals of the era could have handled.
Your points about both Georgia campaigns are good ones. That is what I meant above by the "operational/strategic" level. Like Jackson, I think he would have been better served by listening to others when it came to battlefield tactics.
 
sidestepping around the flanks of Joe Johnston was tactical brilliance (Wasting it at Kenesaw wasn´t).
Sherman was also fortunate to face Joe Johnston as his willing opponent. It would be interesting to speculate how Sherman's flanking strategy would have played out had he been facing Lee in Georgia. As we all know, Grant tried a similar flanking strategy in his Overland Campaign but wily and aggressive Lee was able to put up a formidable defense. But of course, Grant did end up crossing the James River and besieging Petersburg as Sherman did in crossing the Chattahoochie River and besieging Atlanta.

As far as Kennesaw goes, there are also similarities to Grant's ill-fated frontal assaults at Cold Harbor. In both cases, the Union commanders had just about run out of space to maneuver, and deemed the time had come for more assertive actions that could deal devastating blows to the enemy. But to give Sherman a little more of a pass on his decision to attack at Kennesaw, it should be noted that Johnston, over the preceding days, had prepared and had fallen back along strongly entrenched lines in the rugged terrain of Lost, Pine, Brush, and Kennesaw Mountains, thereby further suffocating Sherman's efforts to carry out effective flanking movements.
 
Sherman was also fortunate to face Joe Johnston as his willing opponent. It would be interesting to speculate how Sherman's flanking strategy would have played out had he been facing Lee in Georgia. As we all know, Grant tried a similar flanking strategy in his Overland Campaign but wily and aggressive Lee was able to put up a formidable defense. But of course, Grant did end up crossing the James River and besieging Petersburg as Sherman did in crossing the Chattahoochie River and besieging Atlanta.

As far as Kennesaw goes, there are also similarities to Grant's ill-fated frontal assaults at Cold Harbor. In both cases, the Union commanders had just about run out of space to maneuver, and deemed the time had come for more assertive actions that could deal devastating blows to the enemy. But to give Sherman a little more of a pass on his decision to attack at Kennesaw, it should be noted that Johnston, over the preceding days, had prepared and had fallen back along strongly entrenched lines in the rugged terrain of Lost, Pine, Brush, and Kennesaw Mountains, thereby further suffocating Sherman's efforts to carry out effective flanking movements.
That´s a good point. Eventually you run out of maneuver room and push comes to shove.
Brilliance really is relative, isn´t it? A similar observation has been made about Napoleon´s career. He posted many of his most stunning victories over Austrian commanders who were 60 and 70 years old, and were clearly past their prime.
 
Sherman is interesting.

Sherman is generally not considered a "fighting" general. But he performed very well on the first day at Shiloh (after getting over the notion that there was no chance of a confederate attack).

Sherman is often seen as a guy who favored maneuver over attack especially in the Atlanta campaign.

Sherman was a very active general. He did not sit around and need to have someone build a fire under him to get him moving and he also came up with his own ideas and implemented them without having to be flogged.

Sherman seems to have played well with others. He was quite good in cooperating with Grant even when Grant was in Virginia. If facts, some have argued that the Grant-Sherman partnership won the war. It is also my impression that Sherman got along pretty well with subordinates. He cut McPherson some slack when McPherson hesitated at the beginning of the Atlanta campaign and did not trap the Confederate army. He seems to have understood Judson Kilpatrick's strengths and weaknesses and used him reasonably well. He did get rid of Joe Hooker but Joe Hooker did not seem to play well with others.

Sherman was cranky with reporters (at least far more so than Grant who was reasonably tolerant).

Sherman was one of the few generals on either side who could command an "army group". Grant, Lee, Meade were others and maybe Halleck and McClellan (if you are OK with being slow moving). So he is one of say 7 at most and maybe just 4 if you want to see some action.

Sherman oddly enough was always good for an over the top quote and there are many of those.

Sherman tended to be somewhat boneheaded on his handling of politics. He tended to make policy decisions that were not in the military sphere and had to be overruled. The forty acres and a mule and the surrender terms with Joe Johnson come to mind. Grant, in contrast, seemed to know where the military sphere ended and politics began. Sherman did not.

Also, Sherman seemed to do better with someone to back him up. He had the solid support of Grant and flourished under it. I wonder if he would have done as well without it. Sherman seemed to over think things and get anxious. He did better with some back up.

Also, Grant had sympathy and appreciation of the plight of black contrabands (are there any other kind?), free blacks and USCT. Sherman does not seem to have had that sympathy and could not seem to grasp the contributions of blacks.

However, after the war, Sherman visited Casa Redondo (sp?) which was the horrible reservation where the Navajo were shut up in. The suffering and death rates were high there. Sherman was appalled and I believe he was instrumental in returning the Navajo to the "Big Reservation" where they did far better.

Now ranking Sherman among civil war generals or generals of all time is tricky. Each person operates in different circumstances so ranking is in the final situation a judgement call and not objective.

I would say that Sherman ranks no lower than 3 as an army commander in the ACW and maybe number 1 depending on your ranking system.

Now if you are talking about pure fighting, at the army level, maybe Thomas ranks highest. At the corps level maybe Longstreet, Forrest, Sheridan or so on. But that is a whole other matter.
 
Sherman tended to be somewhat boneheaded on his handling of politics. He tended to make policy decisions that were not in the military sphere and had to be overruled. The forty acres and a mule and the surrender terms with Joe Johnson come to mind. Grant, in contrast, seemed to know where the military sphere ended and politics began. Sherman did not.
Excellent point! It probably also relates to his intense dislike (hatred even?) of the press that was exacerbated by the negative treatment he received for his fraught Kentucky command. So, Sherman is naturally wary of the press and by extension, politicians. (Sherman was not impressed with Lincoln, upon his first meeting with the President.) On the other hand, one would think that Sherman would have been more quick-witted about politics, given that his adopted family had political connections and brother John was a prominent senator. But to your point about Sherman's blunder when treating with Johnston at war's end; Sherman was also influenced by his fond pre-war associations with southerners and his superintendency of the Louisiana Military Academy, which might have clouded his judgement about not engaging in political matters.
 

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