Seeley's Battery K, 4th U.S.

[jameswoods]

Seeley's Battery K, 4th U.S. Artillery: July 2, 1863

Having initially gone into position to the right (north) of Daniel Klingel's small log house an hour and a half earlier, at around 4:30 p.m. First Lieutenant Francis Seeley's Battery K, 4th​ U.S. shifted its position to the left of the apple orchard on the building's southern exposure. This move enabled the battery to counter the Confederate batteries that were raining down fire on the Federal guns in the Peach Orchard. According to Lieutenant Robert James, the Regulars soon silenced one of the Rebel batteries causing it to retire, a claim often made but rarely substantiated by the reports filed by the opposing contestants. However, Confederate Colonel Alexander reported that Rhett's 4 gun battery had 2 dismounted with 40 men killed and wounded out of less than the 75 men in action that afternoon.

Of course, this artillery assault was but the prelude to an all-out Confederate infantry attack. Finally unleashed by the methodical Major General James Longstreet, a little after 6:30 p. m., Barksdale's Mississippi brigade crossed the Emmitsburg road and drove the Peach Orchard defenders back in confusion from the crest, exposing General Humphreys' line along that road to a flank attack. Receiving orders to throw his left back in order to respond to this imminent threat, Humphreys attempted to comply but no sooner had the 11th​ New Jersey folded its left companies back when the 10th​ Alabama, Wilcox's brigade, (which had advanced with Barksdale, in echelon), closed on it and Battery K.

Seeley had taken a superficial wound to his left thigh by a piece of shell earlier when the battery had first gone into position but just as he received the order to change the battery's position caused by the sudden appearance of Wilcox's infantry, he was hit by a musket ball to his right thigh that shattered bones. Unable to mount his horse, he was carried to the rear and Lt. James assumed command of Battery K.

James noted the rapid advance of the enemy reporting, "…our own infantry falling back, I had only time to fire a few rounds of canister, which although creating great havoc in their ranks, did not check their advance, and in order to save my guns, I was obliged to retire…." Lieutenant Schoonover, 11th​ New Jersey, reported, "…Battery K, Fourth U.S. Artillery, then stationed a short distance to the left and front of the regiment, limbered their pieces and passed by our left and rear…."

James reported that in doing so he took his guns to a position about 400 yards to the right, "…for the purpose of enfilading their line." This position was just to the right of the 26th​ Pennsylvania, Humphreys' extreme right regiment. Unfortunately, as James recounted, "I had scarcely gotten my guns unlimbered when the enemy appeared on my right flank and in rear, deployed as skirmishers, and not more than 30 yards distant, and, getting into the battery along with our own infantry, I could not fire, and it was with the utmost difficulty I succeeded in moving by the left flank and retiring to the rear…" The enemy soldiers appearing on James' right flank were, most likely, from the 2nd​ Florida, while the skirmishers in his rear may have been from the 22nd​ Georgia, Wrights' brigade. There was a large undefended gap between the right of the 26th​ Pennsylvania and the left of the 82nd​ New York in position at the Codori barn; a gap exploited by 22nd​ Georgia and permitting that regiment to penetrate to the very crest of Cemetery Ridge.

Shaking free of the troublesome Confederates, Lieutenant James managed to bring his guns to safety across the Taneytown road where he assessed the damage sustained. A head count revealed he was short 23 men (2 men killed, 19 wounded, 2 missing). The battery also lost 9 horses killed outright; another 16 were so severely disabled they had to be destroyed. However, the work of the battery was not yet finished; Colonel McGilvery of the Artillery Reserve needed guns for the ad hoc artillery line he had constructed earlier to help stop Barksdale's advance. At this time (approximately 7:30 p.m.), the line consisted of Lieutenant Dow's 6th Maine's 4 guns and Captain Phillips 5th​ Massachusetts' remaining 3 guns.

Sent back by McGilvery to locate a battery to relieve him, Captain Phillips found Battery K, 4th​ U.S. and relayed the order to Lt. James. According to James' report, he had his battery take, "…a position in an open field to the rear and left, and distant about 1200 yards from our original position (not having a sufficient number of men to man my six guns I sent a section of the battery to the rear, and went into this position with only four guns), where I remained during the night…"

Attached is a section of Bachelder's map of the 2nd​ day, depicting the two positions occupied by Seeley's battery (at both extremes of Humphreys' line).

 

[Tom Elmore]

I have a different interpretation of where Seeley/James' battery reformed after falling back from the Emmitsburg road. Rather than taking position to the right rear of the 26th Pennsylvania, a distance of 700 yards to the northeast, I have them falling back about 350 yards (closer to James' estimate) to the east-northeast, where they were in the path of the 14th Alabama.

 

[Belfoured]

Seeley's Battery K, 4th U.S. Artillery: July 2, 1863

Having initially gone into position to the right (north) of Daniel Klingel's small log house an hour and a half earlier, at around 4:30 p.m. First Lieutenant Francis Seeley's Battery K, 4th​ U.S. shifted its position to the left of the apple orchard on the building's southern exposure. This move enabled the battery to counter the Confederate batteries that were raining down fire on the Federal guns in the Peach Orchard. According to Lieutenant Robert James, the Regulars soon silenced one of the Rebel batteries causing it to retire, a claim often made but rarely substantiated by the reports filed by the opposing contestants. However, Confederate Colonel Alexander reported that Rhett's 4 gun battery had 2 dismounted with 40 men killed and wounded out of less than the 75 men in action that afternoon.

Of course, this artillery assault was but the prelude to an all-out Confederate infantry attack. Finally unleashed by the methodical Major General James Longstreet, a little after 6:30 p. m., Barksdale's Mississippi brigade crossed the Emmitsburg road and drove the Peach Orchard defenders back in confusion from the crest, exposing General Humphreys' line along that road to a flank attack. Receiving orders to throw his left back in order to respond to this imminent threat, Humphreys attempted to comply but no sooner had the 11th​ New Jersey folded its left companies back when the 10th​ Alabama, Wilcox's brigade, (which had advanced with Barksdale, in echelon), closed on it and Battery K.

Seeley had taken a superficial wound to his left thigh by a piece of shell earlier when the battery had first gone into position but just as he received the order to change the battery's position caused by the sudden appearance of Wilcox's infantry, he was hit by a musket ball to his right thigh that shattered bones. Unable to mount his horse, he was carried to the rear and Lt. James assumed command of Battery K.

James noted the rapid advance of the enemy reporting, "…our own infantry falling back, I had only time to fire a few rounds of canister, which although creating great havoc in their ranks, did not check their advance, and in order to save my guns, I was obliged to retire…." Lieutenant Schoonover, 11th​ New Jersey, reported, "…Battery K, Fourth U.S. Artillery, then stationed a short distance to the left and front of the regiment, limbered their pieces and passed by our left and rear…."

James reported that in doing so he took his guns to a position about 400 yards to the right, "…for the purpose of enfilading their line." This position was just to the right of the 26th​ Pennsylvania, Humphreys' extreme right regiment. Unfortunately, as James recounted, "I had scarcely gotten my guns unlimbered when the enemy appeared on my right flank and in rear, deployed as skirmishers, and not more than 30 yards distant, and, getting into the battery along with our own infantry, I could not fire, and it was with the utmost difficulty I succeeded in moving by the left flank and retiring to the rear…" The enemy soldiers appearing on James' right flank were, most likely, from the 2nd​ Florida, while the skirmishers in his rear may have been from the 22nd​ Georgia, Wrights' brigade. There was a large undefended gap between the right of the 26th​ Pennsylvania and the left of the 82nd​ New York in position at the Codori barn; a gap exploited by 22nd​ Georgia and permitting that regiment to penetrate to the very crest of Cemetery Ridge.

Shaking free of the troublesome Confederates, Lieutenant James managed to bring his guns to safety across the Taneytown road where he assessed the damage sustained. A head count revealed he was short 23 men (2 men killed, 19 wounded, 2 missing). The battery also lost 9 horses killed outright; another 16 were so severely disabled they had to be destroyed. However, the work of the battery was not yet finished; Colonel McGilvery of the Artillery Reserve needed guns for the ad hoc artillery line he had constructed earlier to help stop Barksdale's advance. At this time (approximately 7:30 p.m.), the line consisted of Lieutenant Dow's 6th Maine's 4 guns and Captain Phillips 5th​ Massachusetts' remaining 3 guns.

Sent back by McGilvery to locate a battery to relieve him, Captain Phillips found Battery K, 4th​ U.S. and relayed the order to Lt. James. According to James' report, he had his battery take, "…a position in an open field to the rear and left, and distant about 1200 yards from our original position (not having a sufficient number of men to man my six guns I sent a section of the battery to the rear, and went into this position with only four guns), where I remained during the night…"

Attached is a section of Bachelder's map of the 2nd​ day, depicting the two positions occupied by Seeley's battery (at both extremes of Humphreys' line).



View attachment 343661

Another good example of the stupidity of Sickles' decision-making from an artillery perspective.

 

[infomanpa]

I have a different interpretation of where Seeley/James' battery reformed after falling back from the Emmitsburg road. Rather than taking position to the right rear of the 26th Pennsylvania, a distance of 700 yards to the northeast, I have them falling back about 350 yards (closer to James' estimate) to the east-northeast, where they were in the path of the 14th Alabama.
View attachment 343714

Then, my question would be if Battery K was located as in Tom's map, wouldn't the field of fire be a problem? As you can see below, I visited the location and it appears that the ridge along the Emmitsburg Rd blocks the view to the right. The buildings on the ridge are part of the Klingle Farm.

 

[Tom Elmore]

Then, my question would be if Battery K was located as in Tom's map, wouldn't the field of fire be a problem? As you can see below, I visited the location and it appears that the ridge along the Emmitsburg Rd blocks the view to the right. The buildings on the ridge are part of the Klingle Farm.

View attachment 343742

Good point. In the position on my map, in their second position Battery K, 4th U.S. would be firing toward the southwest against the Confederate advance of Barksdale, the left (18th and 13th Mississippi) of which was already east of the Emmitsburg road. In fact it was the pressure from Barksdale that compelled K/4 US to move back from the road, so it makes sense that K/4 US took up its second position to confront that immediate threat. Of course, 10th and 11th Alabama of Wilcox were moving on the Klingle farm from the west, and by the time K/4 US took up their second position, the Federal infantry was already being squeezed out of the Klingle orchard as depicted on the above map. Here's another of my draft maps showing a different perspective, as K/4 US was pulling back from the road:

 

[infomanpa]

Good point. In the position on my map, in their second position Battery K, 4th U.S. would be firing toward the southwest against the Confederate advance of Barksdale, the left (18th and 13th Mississippi) of which was already east of the Emmitsburg road. In fact it was the pressure from Barksdale that compelled K/4 US to move back from the road, so it makes sense that K/4 US took up its second position to confront that immediate threat. Of course, 10th and 11th Alabama of Wilcox were moving on the Klingle farm from the west, and by the time K/4 US took up their second position, the Federal infantry was already being squeezed out of the Klingle orchard as depicted on the above map. Here's another of my draft maps showing a different perspective, as K/4 US was pulling back from the road:

Thanks, Tom. As you can see in my added picture, which is taken more to the left of the field of fire, you have an excellent view. In this image, you can also see the Sherfy farm on the left.

 

[Tom Elmore]

Thanks! The last photograph really bolsters the written explanation regarding the proposed second (and last) position of K/4 US on that part of the field. By the way, my 1850 Peach Orchard map does not show the 74th New York, which had been moved from the right of the 26th Pennsylvania southward and would help its sister regiments (120th and 70th New York) deal with Barksdale until ousted by the arrival of the merged 10th and 11th Alabama. It highlights the powerful one-two punch of Barksdale and Wilcox in crushing Humphrey's salient near the Klingle farm, after Barksdale had alone crushed the salient at the Peach Orchard.

 

[rpkennedy]

Thanks! The last photograph really bolsters the written explanation regarding the proposed second (and last) position of K/4 US on that part of the field. By the way, my 1850 Peach Orchard map does not show the 74th Pennsylvania, which had been moved from on the right of the 26th Pennsylvania southward and would help its sister regiments (120th and 70th New York) deal with Barksdale until ousted by the arrival of the merged 10th and 11th Alabama. It highlights the powerful one-two punch of Barksdale and Wilcox in crushing Humphrey's salient near the Klingle farm, after Barksdale had alone crushed the salient at the Peach Orchard.

I think you meant the 74th New York, not Pennsylvania, @Tom Elmore.

Ryan

 

[jameswoods]

Tom,

You are right in pointing out that Lt. James considerably underestimated the distance from Klingel's apple orchard to a position on the right of the 26th​ Pennsylvania. Nevertheless, that position makes the most sense if the intent was, as he reported, to enfilade the advancing enemy's line.

Moving ENE back as you suggest would not offer any opportunity to do so; Union troops falling back from the Peach Orchard and Emmitsburg Road as well as those forming the doomed line Humphreys was trying to put in place would have blocked such an attempt.

Seeley was wounded and carried to the rear as the battery was leaving and so he did not see it take its 2nd​ position. Interestingly though, Seeley's correspondence with Bachelder (see following extracts) notes that as he was being carried back, he was able to observe Humphreys, unattended, trying to rally his Division. As the ground to the rear is pretty open, one wonders why Seeley didn't also see his battery unlimbered there. Of course, he had to be in considerable pain and a modern photograph of the landscape as it is now cannot capture what it was like then, still it is something to be considered.

Additionally, Seeley had copies of Bachelder's maps and did not dispute Bachelder's positioning of the battery (temporarily) to the right of the 26th​ Pennsylvania (Seeley states that he had conversations with the officers of the battery after the battle).

I copied the following extracts from Volumes 1 and 3 of The Bachelder Papers, Ladd and Sauers.

Letter of Lt. Francis W. Seeley​

Lake City, Minn'

May 10th. 1878​

"…From my own knowledge of the disposition of the main forces at Gettysburg (especially on the 2d July, when I had command of field Battery "K," 4th​ U.S. Artillery, 3rd​ Army Corps, and was engaged from 4 until 5 P.M. near "Peach Orchard") I am able to bear witness to the correctness of your maps. I value mine very highly and would not part with them for a small fortune…." BP Vol. 1, 563

Letter of Lt. Francis W. Seeley​

Lake City, Minn.

May 23. 1878​

"…pursuant to orders from Genl. A.A. Humphreys commanding 2d Div.: 3rd​ Corps, under whose orders I was temporarily acting –moved the battery into position at, or near, the orchard, and-after a few well directed shots-silenced a battery of Confederate Artillery, which had opened on our lines with considerable effect, from a position in skirt of woods beyond the Emmitsburg Road (while taking that position I was wounded (not seriously) by a piece of shell, in my left thigh.) For proof of the effectiveness of our work while in this position, I respectfully refer you to Genl. Humphreys official report, to which you may have access.

After silencing the enemy's battery we were under a heavy musketry fire from Longstreet's advancing infantry; our opponents also had some batteries in position towards their right the fire from which completely enfiladed our battery front doing much damage. As soon as the retiring infantry (of the 3rd​ Corps) had cleared our path-opened with good effect on the enemy. About this time-while in front superintending the service of my guns, was severely wounded by a rifle musket shot-high up in my right thigh-the bones shattered somewhat; I remained in command-reclining upon the ground-until orders came to change the position of the battery to what point I cannot now recollect-when being very weak and faint from loss of blood, and unable to mount my horse, I was carried to the rear-by two infantry soldiers. While being so carried over the ground-on an open plain & between the orchard and the heights in rear, I observed that the ground was completely scoured by the projectiles from the Confederate Arty.: shells were screaming through the air and bursting in every direction! A short distance from me-in the midst of the tornado-Genl. A. A. Humphreys-I think, bareheaded, and unattended-was endeavoring to rally (with only partial success, I judge) the retreating infantry of the 3rd​ Corps. I believe it to be almost an impossibility to rally the most staid veterans under such a fire of artillery as our troops were then exposed to.

I have been informed by the officers of the battery that it did good service in its second position, and was finally extricated without any assistance from the infantry. On the 3rd​ July-I learn from some officers-the battery was brigaded with McGilverys artillery, and did good service…." BP Vol. 1, 607, 608


Seeley's Bat. K, 4" U.S.

Lieut. Francis W. Seeley, comdg. was in position at the apple orchard with Humphreys division July 2". When it retired it fell back to the right, passed the rear of the infantry and went into position near Codora's house, but did not open fire as the enemy was too near. It at once limbered to the rear. BP, Vol.3, 1972


The last (above) is apparently Bachelder's summary.

 

[Tom Elmore]

E. J. Davis, who carried the colors of Battery K, 4th U.S. Artillery wrote: "At Gettysburg this battery was first stationed in the Peach Orchard [Klingle's orchard], and when the line of the Third Corps was driven in, the battery did not leave its position until Berdan's Sharpshooters were on a line with the guns, at which time canister was fired at the approaching rebels until it had to fall back to save their guns. At this time Lieut. Seeley was twice severely wounded, and although the battery had suffered great losses in men and horses, it fell back to its new position at the Ridge." (Davis, The National Tribune, March 8, 1888, p. 3) It is interesting that Davis never mentions taking a second position other than back on Cemetery Ridge.

It also appears to me from Lt. Robert James' official report that he was in that second position very briefly and may not have even fired a single round from there. He wrote that he had "scarcely gotten my guns unlimbered when the enemy appeared on my right flank and rear, deployed as skirmishers, and not more than 30 yards distant, and, getting into the battery along with our own infantry, I could not fire, and it was with the utmost difficulty that I succeeded in moving by the left flank and retiring to the rear ..." It is hard to reconcile James' account with being to the rear or right rear of the 26th Pennsylvania. For one thing, Lang's and Wright's skirmishers were absorbed into their respective main battle lines well prior to reaching the Emmitsburg road. For another, Wright's brigade lagged behind Lang's brigade in my estimation, but even if Wright was actually in advance of Lang, the entire 22nd Georgia, intact and unopposed by Union infantry, appeared south of the Codori buildings, which does not accord with James' account, and it is unlikely Battery K could have escaped under those circumstances. The reality was that part of the 2nd Florida joined by some members of the 2nd Georgia Battalion, went straight for the guns of Weir's Battery C, 5th U.S. and captured three of them. I see no reason why they would not have made straight for James' battery if it was anywhere in that vicinity.

On the other hand, looking at the Cemetery Ridge map in post #2 (time is 1855 - 6:55 p.m.), I could envision a skirmish line or lead members of the 9th Alabama reaching the Emmitsburg road at the gap opened by the departure of Battery F/K, 3rd U.S. Artillery, and, following closely behind Carr's retreating troops (12th New Hampshire, 11th New Jersey and 16th Massachusetts), it would fit well with Lt. James' account.

Seeley had been wounded previously at the Emmitsburg road and could not personally know where his battery went afterwards. By the time he could observe Humphreys trying to rally his fleeing troops (Humphreys, by the way, reportedly went back through the line of the 19th Maine), his battery would probably have been back on Cemetery Ridge, or else the mass of retreating Federal infantry might have hidden the battery from his view.

 

[Tom Elmore]

Part of an article published in The National Tribune, July 8, 1886, p. 4:

"A gentleman who was cordially welcomed by the veterans of the Third Corps at the Gettysburg Reunion was Col. Francis W. Seeley, who commanded Battery K, 4th U.S. Art., attached to the Third Corps. He fought his battery gallantly in resisting the overwhelming attack of the rebels, and was severely wounded. He was an enlisted man in the Regular Army for some six years before the war, and his intelligence and soldiership were such as to bring him the extraordinary recognition of a Second Lieutenant's commission, which he received in 1860. After the war he resigned and removed to Minnesota, and for several years was Postmaster at Clear Water. Not being in harmony with the present Administration he was not reappointed at the close of his term, and is now engaged in mercantile business."

 

[lelliott19]

Excerpt from a letter from W. Redhead to Editor of the Telegraph, dated Camp at Littletown, PA., July 6, 1863. Although the designation is not provided, Redhead was apparently a member of another Union battery engaged on July 2 and 3. [Perhaps Redhead was a member of Gibbs' battery L 1st Ohio?]

Of Francis W. Seeley and the performance of Seeley's battery, Redhead says:

During this fight [of July 2], Captain Seelye [sic] of the 4th US Battery K, was severely, though I understand not dangerously, wounded. His battery has the reputation of being the best in the service, and I believe it fully maintained its reputation in this conflict. As an officer and a gentleman Capt. Seelye can not be exceeded.​

<Omitted>

<end of excerpt>
Ashtabula Weekly Telegraph. (Ashtabula, OH), July 18, 1863, page 2, column 1.

Redhead goes on to describe the role of his own battery during the fight on July 3. I feel certain someone more knowledgeable than myself could positively identify the battery to which Redhead belonged. Above, I've made the source note a link in case anyone would like to read the entire letter.

 

[Tom Elmore]

Laura, it would appear that W. Redhead is Sergeant/2nd Lieutenant Wadmon Redhead of the 11th New York Battery, which was attached to Battery K, 1st New York, under Captain Robert H. Fitzhugh. It contained some men from Ashtabula, Ohio, which was news to me.

This is a very important account because Redhead places his battery 100 yards south of the point reached by Pickett's men, which was the subject of debate - see: https://civilwartalk.com/threads/lo...ies-of-fitzhugh-and-parsons-on-july-3.149498/

He also references Sergeant (Orlando H.) Cheeney with his battery. Cheeney does not even appear as a casualty in Busey and Busey's Union Casualties at Gettysburg. The battery was in reserve on the Baltimore turnpike on July 2, where evidently Cheeney was struck by a stray shell, and the battery only went into position on the afternoon of July 3 when the charge was in progress.

 

[lelliott19]

This is a very important account because Redhead places his battery 100 yards south of the point reached by Pickett's men, which was the subject of debate

Great! I'm pleased to have located it and happy you were able to identify the writer!

Here's a very brief account describing the position of Battery K 4th US Artillery, provided by Andrew J. Miller of Seeley's Battery. This one was published in The National Tribune., February 05, 1891, page 3.

"It [Battery K/4th US] took a position just on the border of Peach Orchard, there being a small brown house almost in front of the right section, while the Sherfy House was to the left and front. Before reaching this place, they learned that Capt. Clark was already in position a little farther to the left. On that spot Battery K lost many men and horses, and there Capt. Seeley was badly wounded."