Second Day Please Explain This -- Why Couldn't Ewell's Attacks Be Synch'd With Longstreet's?

[johncla]

I understand Gen. Ewell was supposed to attack at the same time as Longstreet, true? Apparently he actually attacked THREE HOURS LATER. I guess there was something else going on with that, but Edwin Coddington in 'The Gettysburg Campaign' commenting on the coordination failures on the 2nd day, said we shouldn't expect that level of coordination in a Civil War-era battle.

Why not? They had railroad-style timepieces. Synchronize your timepieces in the morning!
Or, use couriers. Riding time from Lee's HQ to Longstreet or Ewell's HQ was what, about 15 minutes?
Didn't the Ottomans, in the 16th century, use drums (BIG ones) to coordinate on the battlefield?

I have no military training. I expect there's some hidden gotcha there. Educate me.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Didn't the Ottomans, in the 16th century, use drums (BIG ones) to coordinate on the battlefield?

I suspect a 1500s battlefield was much less noisy and smoky than one in the American Civil War.

Longstreet was repeatedly delayed in his attack so setting a time would have been futile.

Communication via mounted courier is you best bet, which has to go from one end on the Confederate line to the other. Possible accidents or delays. There's no guarantee Ewell will be at his HQ when the message arrives or that Longstreet will be at his HQ when the reply arrives. If the attacks are to be coordinated Longstreet needs to make sure Ewell's reply isn't a request to delay the attack because of some problem on his end of the line.

Communication issues aside, Ewell attacking simultaneously with Longstreet would have been disastrous for Ewell. He failed to take Culp's Hill even after most of its defenders had been rushed to Cemetery Ridge. If Ewell is quickly repulsed then somevdefenders might still be sent to contain Longstreet.

Whether Ewell could have been an effective sacrificial lamb by delaying or preventing any Union troops from leaving Culp's Hill to reinforce Cemetery Ridge I'm not sure about as I'm not familiar with which units arrived when and what impact they had. Hopefully someone else who does van chime in.

 

[rpkennedy]

Part of the problem were delays in getting the troops into position to attack Culp's Hill (including detailing off the Stonewall Brigade to watch the army's left flank in the absence of the cavalry) plus, it's a long ride from one end of the line to the other. Coordinating over those distances and out of sight of one another is a very difficult proposition.

Besides, if Ewell attacks earlier, his attack is shot apart by an extra 8000 Twelfth Corps troops who were sent south, unnecessarily.

Ryan

 

[121st PA Vols]

Part of the problem were delays in getting the troops into position to attack Culp's Hill (including detailing off the Stonewall Brigade to watch the army's left flank in the absence of the cavalry) plus, it's a long ride from one end of the line to the other. Coordinating over those distances and out of sight of one another is a very difficult proposition.

Besides, if Ewell attacks earlier, his attack is shot apart by an extra 8000 Twelfth Corps troops who were sent south, unnecessarily.

Ryan

What I've found over the years is the hesitancy to be critical of the South, Lee in particular. Perhaps because of the Lost Cause nonsense. But I think today there is the opposite inclination with some calling decisions, dumb, stupid and any number of somewhat extreme and simplistic statements. One thing in my understanding of the overall as a life-long student of the battle is that Southern generalship was poor. And I won't say I know why but will say the following.

* The impact of Stuart's absence is profound (unending egs), whoever you want to blame. But....someone needs to take the blame.
* All 3 corps commander's behavior if not questionable was mysterious. In defense of Lee, he never needed them more with Stuart lost somewhere off to the East and Stonewall dead.
xx Longstreet's behavior is odd on the flank march in not following Alexander's tracks and using every excuse (reason?) to delay the attack.
xx Ewell arguing to keep his forces in town and to the East are unusual knowing Lee asked about swinging him around to the right flank/center twice. EVERYONE knew it was bad ground for any offensive. Imagine Ewell reinforcing the Sem Rdg Line, center or right, allowing others to slide right, ie south.
xx Hill: Was Hill at Gettysburg? Good of him to ride towards the sound of battle with Lee's appearance in camp and the sound of artillery off to the East. I've read he was sick. I think of the 1st and 11th corps running into battle and to their deaths after hard marches. And this man was sick.

Sometimes you have to call a spade a spade, as respectfully as possible.

 

[rpkennedy]

What I've found over the years is the hesitancy to be critical of the South, Lee in particular. Perhaps because of the Lost Cause nonsense. But I think today there is the opposite inclination with some calling decisions, dumb, stupid and any number of somewhat extreme and simplistic statements. One thing in my understanding of the overall as a life-long student of the battle is that Southern generalship was poor. And I won't say I know why but will say the following.

* The impact of Stuart's absence is profound (unending egs), whoever you want to blame. But....someone needs to take the blame.
* All 3 corps commander's behavior if not questionable was mysterious. In defense of Lee, he never needed them more with Stuart lost somewhere off to the East and Stonewall dead.
xx Longstreet's behavior is odd on the flank march in not following Alexander's tracks and using every excuse (reason?) to delay the attack.
xx Ewell arguing to keep his forces in town and to the East are unusual knowing Lee asked about swinging him around to the right flank/center twice. EVERYONE knew it was bad ground for any offensive. Imagine Ewell reinforcing the Sem Rdg Line, center or right, allowing others to slide right, ie south.
xx Hill: Was Hill at Gettysburg? Good of him to ride towards the sound of battle with Lee's appearance in camp and the sound of artillery off to the East. I've read he was sick. I think of the 1st and 11th corps running into battle and to their deaths after hard marches. And this man was sick.

Sometimes you have to call a spade a spade, as respectfully as possible.

I agree with you on most of your points.

The issue with Stuart has a number of people's fingerprints all over it. Lee, Longstreet, and Stuart, all share some of the blame. Plus, Lee has to get some of the blame for not utilizing what cavalry was available (Jenkins) and Robertson has to be criticized for remaining behind when he should have been following up the army's movement north.

Hill was basically an empty suit at Gettysburg due to his persistent illness. He did better later in July and was pretty active in later campaigns (although his illness did come and go and did affect his ability to command). Ewell, IMO, overall did well during the campaign but showed a bit of resolve on July 2 and 3, some of which can be attributed to Early's influence and Rodes being ill. Longstreet did about as well as can be expected and had some ups and downs.

And Lee has to bear a good deal of the responsibility for these failures. Some of the issues with the AoNV at Gettysburg could have been alleviated by a larger staff who could have kept on top of things a little more closely. But ultimately, the buck stops at the top.

Ryan

 

[7thWisconsin]

The Confederate line at Gettysburg was around 9 miles long end to end. Any aide carrying orders from Lee to Ewell or Longstreet is going to have to travel quite a distance just to deliver them. Furthermore, the flanks are not really visible from Lee´s location, so trying to communicate vai semaphore, etc was basically pointless (not to mention it would be done in full view of the enemy). When physically away from the commander, those 2 corps commanders are completely out of communication, and may as well be in Harrisburg as Gettysburg in terms of coordinating their movements. Once the operation began, Longstreet was forced to double back on his flank march, repeating almost the entire distance, which put his command hours behind curtain time. They´re also well out of earshot, so you can´t even instruct Ewell to launch his attack when he hears Longstreet commence his. Lee´s army is thrown out in an extended line with inferior numbers - that makes command and control difficult right from the get-go.

 

[JerryD]

Wasn't Ewell told to commence his attack when he heard the guns from Longstreet's attack?

 

[7thWisconsin]

I think he was, but that´s just not a practical trigger. You can´t see the Round Tops, or the Emmittsburg Road, for that matter, from Ewell´s area of responsibility. It´s wishful thinking that such a combined action could really be coordinated.

 

[JerryD]

I think he was, but that´s just not a practical trigger. You can´t see the Round Tops, or the Emmittsburg Road, for that matter, from Ewell´s area of responsibility. It´s wishful thinking that such a combined action could really be coordinated.

Not sure I agree. I know there have been acoustic shadows on other battlefields that prevented the sound from traveling rather short distances, but using sound had been used successfully on innumerable battlefields. It wasnt ffoolproof, granted, but it was used to give good effect many times. I am not aware that anyone has ever claimed an acoustic shadow existed at Gettysburg.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Wasn't Ewell told to commence his attack when he heard the guns from Longstreet's attack?

That would be based on Ewell being able to clearly distinguish the sound of Longstreet's attack at the opposite end of the line, with intervening topography (hills and trees) and probably other intermittent firing occurring in between.

 

[jackt62]

Any aide carrying orders from Lee to Ewell or Longstreet is going to have to travel quite a distance just to deliver them. Furthermore, the flanks are not really visible from Lee´s location, so trying to communicate vai semaphore, etc was basically pointless (not to mention it would be done in full view of the enemy). When physically away from the commander, those 22 corps commanders are completely out of communication, and may as well be in Harrisburg as Gettysburg in terms of coordinating their movements

A very important point that is often not emphasized enough. Communication and coordination problems were widespread on both sides during the war and as you point out, a particular problem at Gettysburg given the length of the ANV's exterior lines, existing topography, and Lee's short-handed staff.