Scouting Cemetery Ridge

[Billy Yank]

It's the morning of the 2nd. day and you are preparing to attack Cemetery Ridge. What is the weakest point in the Federal line? What part of the Federal line is the most difficult to reinforce and use its advantage of interior lines? Which opposing general is the weakest commander and has the weakest corps? Which topographical features favor the ANV?

It's a do-over. You can stick with the original plan or try something different. I favor attacking the tip of the fish hook with Longstreet & Hood around the left of Culp's Hill supported by Dick Ewell.

 

[Hussar Yeomanry]

As something I have been looking into there is something that needs to be addressed first.

In hindsight maybe you are correct though the ground around the left of Culp's Hill isn't ideal for an attack. However in the chaos of the moment and without Stuart's cavalry (and perhaps more importantly Stuart and his staff to colate intelligence reports) Lee has been given misleading (incorrect) intelligence. Initially he believes the Union line doesn't extend as far south as either of the Round Tops and probably stops somewhere around what is later to be known as the copse of trees. Even then initially that is a vague 'best guess' from some of his people. At first light it becomes clear this is wrong and the line runs beyond that.

Where?

As far as the Round Tops? Some of his people claim to have (at least partly) climbed Little Round Top and found it empty! (as per Sears amongst others). Does this therefore mean Meade has made a critical mistake and has his left flank unprotected? To Lee this seems to become like a red flag to a bull. Even when evidence starts to come in that this isnt the case he seems to have fixated on this idea.

Now as I say this is in hindsight. Personally I think a better plan is the Longstreet plan of moving round the flank. After all this is what Meade himself seems to become worried about...

 

[WJC]

It's the morning of the 2nd. day and you are preparing to attack Cemetery Ridge. What is the weakest point in the Federal line? What part of the Federal line is the most difficult to reinforce and use its advantage of interior lines? Which opposing general is the weakest commander and has the weakest corps? Which topographical features favor the ANV?

It's a do-over. You can stick with the original plan or try something different. I favor attacking the tip of the fish hook with Longstreet & Hood around the left of Culp's Hill supported by Dick Ewell.

Years later, when Alexander finally was able to see the entire battlefield and consider the troop placements, that is the point where he wrote the attack should have been centered.... <Gary W. Gallagher, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander.(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), p. 252.>

 

[Billy Yank]

If Lee wanted to get the AOP out in the open, I believe the backside of Culp's Hill around the left does not provide sufficient cover for Meade (like the round tops,) and Longstreet's infantry should be able to handle opposing cavalry. If developed quickly and with force, I believe it has a better chance of success than what actually transpired that day.

 

[WJC]

As something I have been looking into there is something that needs to be addressed first.

In hindsight maybe you are correct though the ground around the left of Culp's Hill isn't ideal for an attack. However in the chaos of the moment and without Stuart's cavalry (and perhaps more importantly Stuart and his staff to colate intelligence reports) Lee has been given misleading (incorrect) intelligence. Initially he believes the Union line doesn't extend as far south as either of the Round Tops and probably stops somewhere around what is later to be known as the copse of trees. Even then initially that is a vague 'best guess' from some of his people. At first light it becomes clear this is wrong and the line runs beyond that.

Where?

As far as the Round Tops? Some of his people claim to have (at least partly) climbed Little Round Top and found it empty! (as per Sears amongst others). Does this therefore mean Meade has made a critical mistake and has his left flank unprotected? To Lee this seems to become like a red flag to a bull. Even when evidence starts to come in that this isnt the case he seems to have fixated on this idea.

Now as I say this is in hindsight. Personally I think a better plan is the Longstreet plan of moving round the flank. After all this is what Meade himself seems to become worried about...

The US lines did not, in fact, extend as far south as the Round Tops. No one seems to have attached much importance to them initially. It was only as Engineers noted the potential for the position as it was about to be threatened that troops and artillery were rushed there.
Taken in isolation, Longstreets- or Hood's- plan to flank the US lines, capture or destroy Meade's supply trains parked there and cut off his likely path of retreat looks very favorable.
One downside is that it would have put the rebels in jeopardy should a large US force arrive from the south along that same supply route. After all, Lee did not know whether sizeable reinforcements were coming. He simply chose what he believed was a safer plan.
That choice has been questioned often over the years. I don't have the source at hand just now, but during a post-WW2 tour of the battlefield, Eisenhower and Montgomery agreed that Lee should have followed Longstreet's plan.

 

[Hussar Yeomanry]

The US lines did not, in fact, extend as far south as the Round Tops. No one seems to have attached much importance to them initially. It was only as Engineers noted the potential for the position as it was about to be threatened that troops and artillery were rushed there.
Taken in isolation, Longstreets- or Hood's- plan to flank the US lines, capture or destroy Meade's supply trains parked there and cut off his likely path of retreat looks very favorable.
One downside is that it would have put the rebels in jeopardy should a large US force arrive from the south along that same supply route. After all, Lee did not know whether sizeable reinforcements were coming. He simply chose what he believed was a safer plan.
That choice has been questioned often over the years. I don't have the source at hand just now, but during a post-WW2 tour of the battlefield, Eisenhower and Montgomery agreed that Lee should have followed Longstreet's plan.

Yes and No.

At around first light at the time of the so called scouting mission they were indeed unoccupied though significant divisional size elements of Hancock's 2nd Corps were encamped around them and would have been unmissable.

So too the signals detachment climbing Little Round Top to establish the Signals Station there.

Later while the line Sickles was supposed to hold ends at the northern end of LRT they were hardly left undefended for 5th Corps as it arrives goes into reserve immediately behind them and then there is the signals station on top.

Also there are supposed to be 2 slightly depleted Cavalry Brigades (Buford) screening them. However they were removed (insert mild controversy over who did this here!) and (by mistake?) no replacements provided, with Meade supposedly not informed about this. So while I accept that no one seems initially to have noted how critical they might be they werent exactly ignored. It should also be said that Meade's initial attention is entirely on the other flank so them getting even this much attention is slightly against the standard view that they werent given any consideration.

Finally there were indeed a few admittedly neglible skirmishers deployed around their base even after the Cavalry withdrew.

So, were they ignored? I don't think so. Were they adequately defended? In hindsight... Yes... but it becomes an unnecessarily near run thing...

 

[Hussar Yeomanry]

WJC

I should also add, as to the rest of your post... yes. Lee just doesn't have good intelligence so going round the flank (as per Longstreet) is a risk for exactly the reason you say. However, is it as bad as continuing with an attack that is based off intelligence that you know to be at least partly faulty by the time you finally launch the attack? Which is what Lee does...

(and I didnt know about the Eisenhower, Montgomery information. Very interesting)

 

[jackt62]

I have a different viewpoint about this. For the second day, I would have Lee leave the ANV posted in a defensive stance along Seminary Ridge, with time to construct entrenchments and adequately position his supply trains. This action might have befuddled Meade and placed upon the AOTP the burden of assuming the offensive, a difficult maneuver for the AOTP at that time given its prior history. Alternatively, if Meade chose not to attack within a day or two at most, Lee could have withdrawn the ANV back across the Potomac to Virginia in a controlled movement, preserved his resources, and declared victory by stating the Pennsylvania gambit as having met most of its aims.

 

[E_just_E]

It's the morning of the 2nd. day and you are preparing to attack Cemetery Ridge. What is the weakest point in the Federal line? What part of the Federal line is the most difficult to reinforce and use its advantage of interior lines? Which opposing general is the weakest commander and has the weakest corps? Which topographical features favor the ANV?

It's a do-over. You can stick with the original plan or try something different. I favor attacking the tip of the fish hook with Longstreet & Hood around the left of Culp's Hill supported by Dick Ewell.

Few issues with this. In the morning of the 2nd day there was no fish hook. It was an upside down U with what became the tip of the fish hook where it was and the other side ending at about the NY monument. The biggest issue was that not all of the Union troops were there, and Baltimore Pike (right the tip of the fish hook) along with Tarneytown Rd, were their major routes up North. So, if there were any Confederate troops between Culps Hill and the forthcoming Union army, they would have have the fate of OO Howard's troops up North on Day 1 when Ewell's Corps came over...

 

[Hussar Yeomanry]

Few issues with this. In the morning of the 2nd day there was no fish hook. It was an upside down U with what became the tip of the fish hook where it was and the other side ending at about the NY monument. The biggest issue was that not all of the Union troops were there, and Baltimore Pike (right the tip of the fish hook) along with Tarneytown Rd, were their major routes up North. So, if there were any Confederate troops between Culps Hill and the forthcoming Union army, they would have have the fate of OO Howard's troops up North on Day 1 when Ewell's Corps came over...

A very good point.

It also potentially brings the 'Big 6th' in to play because to get Longstreet etc over to that front would have taken a minimum of a few hours (and given his mood that day possibly much longer). Therefore the attack won't start til mid morning at the very earliest and the lead elements of 6th Corps (by far the largest in the Union army) arrive around Powers Hill at about 2:00PM I seem to recall...