savannah

[MikeyB]

How important was Savannah to the Confederacy? Did it have a lot of manufacturing capacity? Did it have much value as a port?

From a strategic standpoint, why did the Union not use its Naval assets and capture Savannah earlier in the war? If they opened a front here, couldn't they threaten Atlanta and if successful, take major industrial capacity off the map? Or at least siphon off troops from the West and further spread out Confederate resources?

Mike

 

[redbob]

While Savannah had some industrial capacity, it was far from being an Atlanta or Richmond. While commerce could use the waterway backdoors into Savannah, I believe that the Union was content just to block off the river at Fort Pulaski which prevented widespread waterborne commerce from entering Savannah. If the Union had decided to invade the Southern interior early in the War (ala Sherman's march in reverse), until 1864 when the South's interior was as Sherman described it a hollow shell they would have faced, the South's ability to bring troops in from all over the deep South to oppose any Union actions. And depending upon a supply lifeline from Savannah would have been tenuous to say the least. I believe that the Union was content to let the sleeping dogs lie until 1864 at which time Savannah's value to the South was negligible to say the least.

 

[MikeyB]

While Savannah had some industrial capacity, it was far from being an Atlanta or Richmond. While commerce could use the waterway backdoors into Savannah, I believe that the Union was content just to block off the river at Fort Pulaski which prevented widespread waterborne commerce from entering Savannah. If the Union had decided to invade the Southern interior early in the War (ala Sherman's march in reverse), until 1864 when the South's interior was as Sherman described it a hollow shell they would have faced, the South's ability to bring troops in from all over the deep South to oppose any Union actions. And depending upon a supply lifeline from Savannah would have been tenuous to say the least. I believe that the Union was content to let the sleeping dogs lie until 1864 at which time Savannah's value to the South was negligible to say the least.

Thanks for the reply.

When you say, pre-1864, the South had the ability to bring troops from all over the deep south to repeal an invasion.
Would these have been mostly home guard and "auxiliary" troops? In other words, even if the South could accumulate a large force, could a veteran Union column not disperse them fairly quickly? Particularly with naval support?
If your comment was around sending troops East from Bragg or elsewhere, would this not be a worthwhile goal in and of itself?

 

[redbob]

Had the threat been seen as being serious enough, troops that could have been spared may have come from the Army of Tennessee, the Army of Northern Virginia or from any other units across the South. Had the North started enough other campaigns/feints across the South however these troops may not have been available and it would have been catch as catch can for troops.

 

[jepridgen]

After the fall of Pulaski, I see Savannah as more of a garrison town and transportation hub. The fortifications kept the Savannah River clear for Confederate use and protected Augusta which wasn't too terribly far upriver. There were also key railroads that connected there carrying vital supplies north. As far as why it wasn't captured, the Union focused on higher priority ports that had actual ocean access which Savannah didn't after Pulaski was captured. That area would have been a tough nut to crack because of the terrain and strength of other fortifications. There was a reason the city fell from the land side and not the ocean side.

Prior to the spring of 64, the CSA had roughly 2 brigades in the Savannah area plus additional forces in South Carolina. Even the Union Army couldn't attack everywhere at once. Logistics and the requirement to occupy captured areas prevented that. See Olustee for what likely would've happened.

 

[MikeyB]

After the fall of Pulaski, I see Savannah as more of a garrison town and transportation hub. The fortifications kept the Savannah River clear for Confederate use and protected Augusta which wasn't too terribly far upriver. There were also key railroads that connected there carrying vital supplies north. As far as why it wasn't captured, the Union focused on higher priority ports that had actual ocean access which Savannah didn't after Pulaski was captured. That area would have been a tough nut to crack because of the terrain and strength of other fortifications. There was a reason the city fell from the land side and not the ocean side.

Prior to the spring of 64, the CSA had roughly 2 brigades in the Savannah area plus additional forces in South Carolina. Even the Union Army couldn't attack everywhere at once. Logistics and the requirement to occupy captured areas prevented that. See Olustee for what likely would've happened.

This all makes sense. What I thought would have been an interesting angle was if you were able to overcome all of the above and take the city in 1862/1863, if that gives you a nice springboard to threaten Atlanta, which would be the real prize?

But it sounds like the city was near impregnable from the sea, throwing this out.

 

[jepridgen]

I wouldn't say impregnable. It would've just taken a lot, and the Union army was focused on Charleston, then Florida, and later Wilmington. It would've taken more troops than were really available to the department. Also, you'd likely have to use the Savannah River as an axis of advance which leads you through Augusta. That would be a bit north of the actual March. Most generals wouldn't be as willing to risk cutting loose from their supply as Sherman was. Even he almost ran out of food in the barrens west of and surrounding the Savannah area.

If you are talking a major shift of say two corps from other theaters, it is an interesting what if. It would be a race to get troops from a less threatened area to reinforce Beauregard on the coast much like Longstreet to Bragg in 63.

 

[USS ALASKA]

Sirs, some good source material on Savannah...

'Civil War Savannah' by Derek Smith

'Vital Rails: The Charleston & Savannah Railroad and the Civil War in Coastal South Carolina' by H David Stone Jr.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

Journal Article
Forgotten Battles: Engagements at Monteith Swamp and Shaw's Bridge During the Savannah Campaign in 1864
Barry Sheehy
The Georgia Historical Quarterly
Vol. 89, No. 2 (SUMMER 2005), pp. 135-156
Georgia Historical Society

https://www.jstor.org/stable/40584822

Full article at above link on JSTOR with Google sign-in (In the upper right-hand corner of the linked page, there is a 'Log in' button. If you have a Gmail account, you have a Google sign-in and this will allow for free reading of 100 articles a month).

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Thanks for the reply.

When you say, pre-1864, the South had the ability to bring troops from all over the deep south to repeal an invasion.
Would these have been mostly home guard and "auxiliary" troops? In other words, even if the South could accumulate a large force, could a veteran Union column not disperse them fairly quickly? Particularly with naval support?
If your comment was around sending troops East from Bragg or elsewhere, would this not be a worthwhile goal in and of itself?

The Confederacy was building a major armory and a major arsenal at Macon, GA (both were actually partially functional). The CSA would have dedicated as many resources as possible to defend Savannah.

 

[rebelatsea]

There were two large shipbuilding yards in Savannah: Krenson & Hawkes and Henry F Willink. Both of constructed ironclads, gunboats, and at least one spar torpedo boat.
Henry Willink was also a Naval Constructor who designed vessels.

 

[USS ALASKA]

Journal Article
Hardee's Defense of Savannah
N. C. Hughes, Jr.
The Georgia Historical Quarterly
Vol. 47, No. 1 (March, 1963), pp. 43-67
Georgia Historical Society

Hardee's Defense of Savannah on JSTOR

N. C. Hughes, Jr., Hardee's Defense of Savannah, The Georgia Historical Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 1 (March, 1963), pp. 43-67

www.jstor.org

Full article at above link on JSTOR with Google sign-in (In the upper right-hand corner of the linked page, there is a 'Log in' button. If you have a Gmail account, you have a Google sign-in and this will allow for free reading of 100 articles a month).

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Taking Pulaski effectively shut down Savannah as a blockade-running port.

Taking Savannah itself would have been difficult as the city was mostly surrounded by wetlands. Sherman circumvented the problem by crossing the Savannah River, which forced Hardee to evacuate the city to avoid encirclement. The manpower necessary to do that simply wasn't available until Sherman's army got there.

The fortifications kept the Savannah River clear for Confederate use and protected Augusta which wasn't too terribly far upriver.

Augusta was over 100 miles upriver from Savannah as the crow flies, and much farther as the river bends.

 

[jepridgen]

Taking Pulaski effectively shut down Savannah as a blockade-running port.

Taking Savannah itself would have been difficult as the city was mostly surrounded by wetlands. Sherman circumvented the problem by crossing the Savannah River, which forced Hardee to evacuate the city to avoid encirclement. The manpower necessary to do that simply wasn't available until Sherman's army got there.



Augusta was over 100 miles upriver from Savannah as the crow flies, and much farther as the river bends.

100 plus isn't really that bad on a steamship. It wasn't a day trip by any means, but the point about Savannah's defenses still stands. A Union force based in Savannah early on would've prevented Augusta from becoming a major CS arsenal and powder works.

Point of clarification, Sherman never actually crossed the Savannah prior to Hardee evacuating the city. He was too busy linking up with the Union Navy on the Ogeechee River to get resupply since he was short on rations and needed his siege artillery to invest the city. He was sure enough he had the city where he wanted it that he wasn't risking a river crossing that would divide his army.

 

[Stryker65]

Journal Article
Hardee's Defense of Savannah
N. C. Hughes, Jr.
The Georgia Historical Quarterly
Vol. 47, No. 1 (March, 1963), pp. 43-67
Georgia Historical Society

View attachment 554280

Hardee's Defense of Savannah on JSTOR

N. C. Hughes, Jr., Hardee's Defense of Savannah, The Georgia Historical Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 1 (March, 1963), pp. 43-67

www.jstor.org

Full article at above link on JSTOR with Google sign-in (In the upper right-hand corner of the linked page, there is a 'Log in' button. If you have a Gmail account, you have a Google sign-in and this will allow for free reading of 100 articles a month).

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

An accessible version of Colonel Jones's article can be found here, as well:

https://docsouth.unc.edu/fpn/jonescharles/jones.html

 

[USS ALASKA]

Journal Article
The Civil War Comes to Savannah
Earl W. Fornell
The Georgia Historical Quarterly
Vol. 43, No. 3 (September, 1959), pp. 248-260
Georgia Historical Society

https://www.jstor.org/stable/40577982

Full article at above link on JSTOR with Google sign-in (In the upper right-hand corner of the linked page, there is a 'Log in' button. If you have a Gmail account, you have a Google sign-in and this will allow for free reading of 100 articles a month).

Cheers,
USS ALASKA