Russian Naval Help?

[neyankee61]

In December, 1863, war fever swept through Europe with rumors of war between GB, FR, and Russia. Amid this, two Russian fleets arrived in the United States. One sailed up the Potomac and the other arrived in SF. It is not too difficult to see why the Russians decided to send the ships to American waters. Indeed, they did not want the fleets locked in ice-bound ports. There were no ports in Europe from which they would be free to operate against British and French shipping. This made for an unusual bit of diplomatic history. It can be said that Russia did not send its squadrons to our ports for our benefit. By doing so, however, it must be recognized that the czar rendered a distinct service of showing "support" of the Union cause. It may also be said that the United States saved Russia from humiliating situations and even a war.
Recently, I was sent an article concerning this visit and Alaska's purchase. It was claimed that the purchase was tied to the visit of the Russian fleet. There were rumors that part of the purchase price of about $7 million was, in reality, a repayment by the United States Government for expenses incurred during the visit of the Russian fleets to this country. An investigation of these charges was ordered but could find no conclusive evidence.
Now here comes the kicker...the article claimed that the Russian Fleet was actively employed off of Charleston Harbor to help maintain the blockade. The $7 million was money to offset the expenses of the Russian Navy. I must say this is new to me! Any thoughts?
(I apologize for not being able to cite my source. The article was sent to me by a friend)

 

[USS ALASKA]

I read elsewhere that Alaska cost much less than the posted price the US paid. The large differential was to repay secret loans by the Czar to the US.

"It has recently been disclosed that only $1,400,000 of the amount paid to Russia was for the acquisition of Alaska. The remaining $5,800,000 was to reimburse Russia for the expense to which she was put in sending a fleet to New York during the Civil War as a demonstration of friendship for the North." This coming from Muzzey, Vol. II p47, note. "A Congressional investigation later disclosed the fact that Robert J. Walker, former Secretary of the Treasury, had received $26,000 from the Russian embassy to aid in the adoption of the treaty, and that $5,000 of this sum had been paid to a brother of a Washington of a Washington newspaper editor whose paper 'had rendered valuable service' in supporting the treaty."

As far as "...the Russian Fleet was actively employed off of Charleston Harbor..." - never heard of it.

HTHs,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

The Bilateral Effect of the Visit of the Russian Fleet in 1863
Tom Delahaye

The Bilateral Effect of the Visit of the Russian Fleet in 1863

U.S. Civil War: The US-Russian Alliance that Saved the Union
Webster G. Tarpley

U.S. Civil War: The US-Russian Alliance that Saved the Union, by Webster G. Tarpley

April 2011 marks the 150th anniversary of the U.S. Civil War, which began when Confederate forces opened fire upon Fort Sumter in Charleston, South Carolina. The following essay by Webster Tarpley, tells about the largely untold alliance between President Abraham Lincoln and Russian Tsar...

www.voltairenet.org

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[RedRover]

Some Russian sailors in New York...

 

[neyankee61]

"As far as "...the Russian Fleet was actively employed off of Charleston Harbor..." - never heard of it."
Me either.

 

[Belfoured]

"As far as "...the Russian Fleet was actively employed off of Charleston Harbor..." - never heard of it."
Me either.

I would find that astonishing, to be honest. The directive to the Russian Navy was to hole up in US ports - particularly NY but others if necessary - and wait to see if war broke out between Russia and Britain/France. It was not to become actively engaged in the US war. The fleet was also small and its ships were hardly first-class. Last, just having them near Charleston would increase the possibility of an inadvertent "incident" with blockade-runners.

 

[Story]

Now here comes the kicker...the article claimed that the Russian Fleet was actively employed off of Charleston Harbor to help maintain the blockade. The $7 million was money to offset the expenses of the Russian Navy. I must say this is new to me! Any thoughts?

You may find this thread of interest

NF - Weirdest ACW Author Ever...? | Civil War Books, Stories, & Media

Trust me, I wasn't looking for this. I was on Amazon and was looking at the "Customers also bought items by" for Howard Ray White, and saw this guy: https://www.amazon.com/stores/author/B0BPS2BGGW/about?tag=civilwartalkc-20 What the actual heck? He wrote this...

civilwartalk.com

(I apologize for not being able to cite my source. The article was sent to me by a friend)

Was it emailed or snail-mailed to you? Folks here can walk you through how to post it on CWT

 

[JeffBrooks]

It would have been politically foolish of Lincoln to accept any genuine Russian military assistance. The Democrats would have made a lot of political hay over it ("Look! Our president is so incompetent he needs the Czar's help to blockade a single Southern port! Vote him out!"), causing him much more trouble than the Russian help would have been worth.

 

[Kearny The Magnificent]

I am aware of Russian sailors who sacrificed during the war. 6 Russian sailors, part of their Pacific Squadron and in SF to assist the US Navy, died fighting the San Francisco Fire of 1863. They are buried at Mare Island Naval Cemetery.

I've never heard of their Navy operating in Charleston. The furthest south I've heard of their Atlantic Squadron going is Alexandria, Virginia in late 1863.

 

[Zack]

General-Adjutant Krabbe issued the following orders for the Russian fleet on July 26, 1863:

Your fleet is to consist of three frigates, three clippers, and two corvettes. In case of war destroy the enemy's commerce and attack his weakly defended possessions. Although you are primarily expected to operate in the Atlantic, yet you are at liberty to shift your activities to another part of the globe and divide your forces as you think best. After leaving the Gulf of Finland proceed directly to New York. It would be preferable to keep all the ships in that port, but if such an arrangement is inconvenient for the American government you may, with the advice of our representative in Washington, dispose of the vessels among the various Atlantic ports of the United States. When you learn that war has been declared it is left to you how to proceed, where to rendezvous, etc. Our minister will help you in matters of supplies; he will have on hand a specially chartered boat to keep you informed of what is going on. Should you find out on the way that war has broken out begin operations at once. If soon after reaching New York you deem it wise to go to sea to keep your fleet together until war is actually declared, but avoid the enemy, even commercial ships, so as to cover your tracks. If through our minister or some other reliable source you are told of the opening of hostilities dispose of your ships and plan your campaign as may seem best. Captain Kroun is preceding you to America to prepare for your coming. Study the Treaty of Paris so as to be well informed on matters of neutrality. Should you meet with Rear-Admiral Popov consult with him as to the course to be pursued. Communicate in cipher. Hand in person your secret instructions to the officers. Whether there is war or not make a study of the commercial routes, of the strength and weakness of the European colonies, of desirable coaling stations for our fleet, and of the economic and military importance of our own possessions. These instructions are made purposely general in order to give you a free hand to act according to your judgement and discretion.

Only 5 Russian ships ultimately made the journey to New York City, the first of which, the Alexander Nevski, arriving on September 24, 1863. The fleet moved to Alexandria in December 1863. They remained there until receiving orders to return to Russia on April 26, 1864.

In other words, they arrived shortly after the capture of Battery Wagner (September 7, 1863) and the failed Union assault on Fort Sumter (September 8-9, 1863). The failed attack of the CSS David on the USS New Ironsides came October 5 and the bombardment of Charleston, which had largely stopped, was resumed with a vengeance in November 1863. The Hunley attacked on February 17, 1864 and, shortly after the Russians left, ground operations resumed in July 1864.

My point is, Charleston was a very active war zone during the time when the Russians were anchored along the Eastern Seaboard. Joining the blockade of Charleston would not have meant some passive sitting around off the coast. There is no way the Russians would send ships there, both to avoid actively entering the war and preventing their few ships from being damaged when war with England and/or France seemed possible. The whole point was to protect their ships.

Sources

The Russian Navy Visits the United States

PDF Version [19.2MB]

www.history.navy.mil

An Illustrated, Non-Comprehensive Timeline of the Campaign to Take Charleston, South Carolina | Fort Sumter

April 1863 - April 1865 BACKGROUND As the North planned the blockade of Southern ports at the outbreak of the war, one major issue was how best to fuel and resupply the coal-fired steamships of the Union navy. Relying on Northern ports presented a tremendous strain on logistics, so in the...

civilwartalk.com

 

[Belfoured]

It would have been politically foolish of Lincoln to accept any genuine Russian military assistance. The Democrats would have made a lot of political hay over it ("Look! Our president is so incompetent he needs the Czar's help to blockade a single Southern port! Vote him out!"), causing him much more trouble than the Russian help would have been worth.

A bigger issue might have been the Czar's ongoing persecution of the Poles (in which he was supported by Prussia). Lincoln and the Administration had to dance between not getting involved in a cause supported by Britain/France and not alienating those in the North who sympathized with the Poles - including an odd combination of Brahmins like Sumner and Catholic immigrants. As I pointed out, how much meaningful "assistance" could be rendered by five mediocre ships in any event is another, separate question.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

In December, 1863, war fever swept through Europe with rumors of war between GB, FR, and Russia. Amid this, two Russian fleets arrived in the United States. One sailed up the Potomac and the other arrived in SF. It is not too difficult to see why the Russians decided to send the ships to American waters. Indeed, they did not want the fleets locked in ice-bound ports. There were no ports in Europe from which they would be free to operate against British and French shipping. This made for an unusual bit of diplomatic history. It can be said that Russia did not send its squadrons to our ports for our benefit. By doing so, however, it must be recognized that the czar rendered a distinct service of showing "support" of the Union cause. It may also be said that the United States saved Russia from humiliating situations and even a war.
Recently, I was sent an article concerning this visit and Alaska's purchase. It was claimed that the purchase was tied to the visit of the Russian fleet. There were rumors that part of the purchase price of about $7 million was, in reality, a repayment by the United States Government for expenses incurred during the visit of the Russian fleets to this country. An investigation of these charges was ordered but could find no conclusive evidence.
Now here comes the kicker...the article claimed that the Russian Fleet was actively employed off of Charleston Harbor to help maintain the blockade. The $7 million was money to offset the expenses of the Russian Navy. I must say this is new to me! Any thoughts?
(I apologize for not being able to cite my source. The article was sent to me by a friend)

I hadn't read about this at all. Thanks.

 

[Zack]

A bigger issue might have been the Czar's ongoing persecution of the Poles (in which he was supported by Prussia). Lincoln and the Administration had to dance between not getting involved in a cause supported by Britain/France and not alienating those in the North who sympathized with the Poles - including an odd combination of Brahmins like Sumner and Catholic immigrants. As I pointed out, how much meaningful "assistance" could be rendered by five mediocre ships in any event is another, separate question.

Funny you mention the Poles -

London Punch ran a cartoon of Lincoln and the Tsar that read:
Imperial son of Nicholas the Great,
We air in the same fix, I calculate,
You with your Poles, with Southern rebels I,
Who spurn my rule and my revenge defy.

Some Americans were very sympathetic to the Poles, with aid committees and mass meetings set up across the North. Charles Sumner gave a speech in New York where he belittled the Russians, stood up for the Poles, and declared that Switzerland was America's only true friend in Europe.

France and Great Britain actually requested that the US help mediate the issue but Seward refused.

Horace Greeley supported the Christian Tsar, who had recently freed Russian serfs, prompting the Richmond Examiner to fire back that the Tsar was freeing the serfs while enslaving the Poles and Lincoln was trying to free the slaves and subjugate white Southerners.

While considering where to send the fleet, Admiral Popov of the Pacific Squadron explained on August 3, 1863 that he chose San Francisco because [emphasis mine]

I took such a decision because I do not have here any other information besides my own views, which tell me that our [Far Eastern] ports are unfavorable for the concentration, just as they do not represent any fortunate means either for provisioning the squadron or for the indispensable repairs…The republics of Central and South America do not seem inclined to turn us out of their ports, although they are indeed swamped with Poles. [But] they, too, as in Mexico, do not hinder either the French or the English from spying on our squadron in their roadsteads. There remains, therefore, the United States of America which England and France have worried to the utmost by their recent interference.

Same source:

The Russian Navy Visits the United States

PDF Version [19.2MB]

www.history.navy.mil

While we're on the topic, here is (in my opinion) a really cool image of Russian troops in Warsaw in 1861 enforcing martial law:

And an image of Marian Langiewicz, a Polish leader of the uprising, c. 1863

 

[rebelatsea]

I would find that astonishing, to be honest. The directive to the Russian Navy was to hole up in US ports - particularly NY but others if necessary - and wait to see if war broke out between Russia and Britain/France. It was not to become actively engaged in the US war. The fleet was also small and its ships were hardly first-class. Last, just having them near Charleston would increase the possibility of an inadvertent "incident" with blockade-runners.

Not only with blockade runners, both Britain and France had station ships maintaining contact with the consuls in Charleston. As it was one near miss occurred between HMS Rinaldo and a blockader when both ran out their guns.

 

[wausaubob]

Its more complicated than that. Tensions between Britain and Russia were rising. The British ship builders had evaded British law about building warships for other nations. The United States was capable of doing the same thing. Isherwood's fast cruisers were in the construction docks in 1863. They were designed to have powerful steam engines and to be capable of out steaming any ships in the British fleet. They could easily have been sold, unarmed to Russia. The Russian sailors would have needed training in the operation of the steam engines. But once the Russians were in the United States, that was possible.
Therefore, after the US captured Vicksburg and Port Hudson, British Admiral Milne began extensive talks with the United States officials about patching up relations with the US. Eventually he visited the US and met with US officers and I believe even with Seward. Arrangements were agreed to that put the US blockade at some distance from Nassau and Bermuda. But the blockade was tightened as noted above. That was especially true at Charleston, which was effectively closed for about 6 months.
It was probably about that time, the Summer and Fall of 1863, that the Americans made their complaints about the Alabama and the other British built raiders more known. I doubt all the diplomatic niceties were maintained. Ambassador Adams in London expressed the ambiguous but strident warning that if the Laird rams made into Confederate hands, "This is war." And the means by which the US would make war with the British is by selling cruisers to the Russians who were the enemies of Britain.
From that point on Britain and the US began to recognize their long term interests in re-establishing the rule of international law on the world's oceans. And that recognition worked until submarine warfare began in earnest.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

In December, 1863, war fever swept through Europe with rumors of war between GB, FR, and Russia.

How did those countries nearly come to shooting again not a decade after the Crimean War?

 

[wausaubob]

How did those countries nearly come to shooting again not a decade after the Crimean War?

Maybe because one of the countries was Russia?

 

[USS ALASKA]

How did those countries nearly come to shooting again not a decade after the Crimean War?

The January Uprising of 1863.

"The British Political Standpoint concerning the January Uprising until April 1863" by Wojciech Jasiakiewicz

https://repozytorium.ukw.edu.pl/bitstream/handle/item/2591/Jasiakiewicz%20The%20British%20political%20standpoint%20concerning%20the%20january%20uprising%20until%20April%201863.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

The Russian government in Poland: with a narrative of the Polish Insurrection of 1863 by William Ansell Day

The Russian government in Poland : with a narrative of the Polish Insurrection of 1863 : Day, William Ansell : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

26

archive.org

Journal Article
Mid-Victorian Public Opinion, Polish Propaganda, and the Uprising of 1863
John F. Kutolowski
Journal of British Studies
Vol. 8, No. 2 (May, 1969), pp. 86-110
Cambridge University Press

https://www.jstor.org/stable/175218

Journal Article
THE MAKINGS OF A NEW POLISH POLICY: N. A. MILYUTIN AND THE POLISH QUESTION, 1861-1863
W. BRUCE LINCOLN
The Polish Review
Vol. 15, No. 1 (Winter, 1970), pp. 54-66
University of Illinois Press

https://www.jstor.org/stable/25776889

Journal Article
THE RUSSO-POLISH CRUCIBLE OF THE 1860's: A REVIEW OF SOME RECENT LITERATURE
STANLEY J. ZYZNIEWSKI
The Polish Review
Vol. 11, No. 2 (Spring, 1966), pp. 23-46
University of Illinois Press

https://www.jstor.org/stable/25776655

Full articles at above links on JSTOR with Google sign-in (In the upper right-hand corner of the linked page, there is a 'Log in' button. If you have a Gmail account, you have a Google sign-in and this will allow for free reading of 100 articles a month).

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

The January Uprising of 1863

Thank you for the links. I had never heard of this before.

Post-Napoleon pre-WW1 Europe gets so little attention in America, other than the Crimean War and Franco-Prussian War.

Reading just a short summary of the subject it sounds like the European powers didn't really care much about the Poles, only whether the success or failure of the uprising would favor their perception of the balance of power in Europe, including how they might gain alliances or block alliances by others to tip the balance in their favor.

 

[Zack]

Its more complicated than that. Tensions between Britain and Russia were rising. The British ship builders had evaded British law about building warships for other nations. The United States was capable of doing the same thing. Isherwood's fast cruisers were in the construction docks in 1863. They were designed to have powerful steam engines and to be capable of out steaming any ships in the British fleet. They could easily have been sold, unarmed to Russia. The Russian sailors would have needed training in the operation of the steam engines. But once the Russians were in the United States, that was possible.
Therefore, after the US captured Vicksburg and Port Hudson, British Admiral Milne began extensive talks with the United States officials about patching up relations with the US. Eventually he visited the US and met with US officers and I believe even with Seward. Arrangements were agreed to that put the US blockade at some distance from Nassau and Bermuda. But the blockade was tightened as noted above. That was especially true at Charleston, which was effectively closed for about 6 months.
It was probably about that time, the Summer and Fall of 1863, that the Americans made their complaints about the Alabama and the other British built raiders more known. I doubt all the diplomatic niceties were maintained. Ambassador Adams in London expressed the ambiguous but strident warning that if the Laird rams made into Confederate hands, "This is war." And the means by which the US would make war with the British is by selling cruisers to the Russians who were the enemies of Britain.
From that point on Britain and the US began to recognize their long term interests in re-establishing the rule of international law on the world's oceans. And that recognition worked until submarine warfare began in earnest.

This is very interesting. Negotiations over the Alabama Claims, which continued until the Treaty of Washington in 1871, also helped laid the groundwork for a rapprochement between the United States and Britain and the eventual "special relationship" the two nations share.

Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations - Office of the Historian

history.state.gov 3.0 shell

history.state.gov