Rosecran's Problems Were Mainly Logistical

[uaskme]

27th Sept the RR Bridge at Bridgeport is nearly Completed. RR bridge at Running Water Creek is reday to put up. Rosecrans comes into the City on Sept 10. Immediately starts rebuilding the bridge at Running Water Creek.

Orders 2 Trestle Bridges build across the TN at Chattanooga and two pontoon bridges. There was 2 sawmills left by the Confederates. They hid a few key parts, but assumed they would retake Chattanooga. 27th is when Meigs reports . . when the troops understood to be on their way here arrive, General Rosecrans expects to recover command of the river to Bridgeport. Supplies can then be accumulated by water. Pp 372 Lamers The Edge of Glory. So, this is Rosecrans plan to open the Cracker Line. There was never over 4 Regiments of Confederates across Lookout Creek. On the Battle of Browns Ferry, there were only 2.

Rosecrans opens the Supply route to Jasper. Ordered 5 steamboats built and the Dunbar converted into a transport.

Oct 2 Wheeler attacks Rosecrans supply train at Anderson's Crossroads. Repeated requests to Halleck and Burnside brought no help.

XI Corps gets to Bridgeport on October 2, Hooker a few days latter. Since Hooker didn't bring his Wagons or Animals with him, Rosecrans orders him to picket his supply line. The RR. So, Hooker isn't ready to move to Chattanooga until late in October. So this is why Rosecrans Plans weren't complete. In the mean time Baldy Smith comes up with the Browns Ferry maneuver. So, Rosecrans added that as part of securing the Cracker Line.

 

[wausaubob]

Its hard to take a photo of a page from Mr. Moore's book seriously.

 

[uaskme]

Its hard to take a photo of a page from Mr. Moore's book seriously.

Actually that is Lamers. Another source. I should do like some and just forget studying a subject and just pontificate the order of events. Pretty easy to just rely on one Witness, Grant, who had a Axe to grind. He has proved not to be a reliable Witness on some events. Any event which included Rosecrans. I also posted Meigs Letter.

You seem Frustrated. Maybe you need a good book about the subject. Seriousl!

 

[wausaubob]

Lamers is entitled to his view, but I am not obligated to take it seriously.
The railroads got Hooker's divisions to Tennessee, and then the railroad south of Louisville had to support about 60,000 soldiers and their livestock, not just 40,000. Sherman's force could have moved to Bridgeport, but that would have only made matters worse. The railroad eastward from Memphis was never adequately maintained by the US because no. Mississippi was fully of insurgents.
When the operation to open a shorter line was first proposed, Hooker objected because he had few or no artillery teams in which the horses could move the guns.
10 days after the operation was successful Thomas persuaded Grant not to undertake further offensive plans, because in Thomas' opinion the artillery horses were not ready and would not be ready for weeks.
Sorry to disappoint you, but by December of 1863 none of the observers doubted that the logistical problem was real. People like Montgomery Meigs were impressed that the situation had completely changed in 1 month after Grant had arrived and he wrote enthusiastically about the battle of Chattanooga.

 

[wausaubob]

But Lamers writing in 1932 would be re-writing things just about the time the Civil War generation was dying, and just about the time that the Democratic party was able to shed the stain of rebellion from its reputation.

 

[wausaubob]

see pp. 403-404. https://books.google.com/books?id=U...hur Edwards" Quartermaster Bridgeport&f=false
The entire logistical framework in the Kentucky/Tennessee theater was being redesigned. Eventually all that Don Carlos Buell had constructed was done away with. McClallum took over management of the railroad by February 1864. Moving Rosecrans away from Chattanooga and into St. Louis was just a minor change.

 

[uaskme]

Lamers is entitled to his view, but I am not obligated to take it seriously.
The railroads got Hooker's divisions to Tennessee, and then the railroad south of Louisville had to support about 60,000 soldiers and their livestock, not just 40,000. Sherman's force could have moved to Bridgeport, but that would have only made matters worse. The railroad eastward from Memphis was never adequately maintained by the US because no. Mississippi was fully of insurgents.
When the operation to open a shorter line was first proposed, Hooker objected because he had few or no artillery teams in which the horses could move the guns.
10 days after the operation was successful Thomas persuaded Grant not to undertake further offensive plans, because in Thomas' opinion the artillery horses were not ready and would not be ready for weeks.
Sorry to disappoint you, but by December of 1863 none of the observers doubted that the logistical problem was real. People like Montgomery Meigs were impressed that the situation had completely changed in 1 month after Grant had arrived and he wrote enthusiastically about the battle of Chattanooga.

Meigs was here in Sept. He is a reliable witness. I posted his letter to Stanton.

Grant arrives on Oct 23. Oct 24 Grant makes his tour of Browns Ferry and agrees to Rosecrans and Brady Smith's plan. As I posted above, Hooker took weeks to assemble horses and wagons from Nashville. All of the horses were worn out. He was little help to Rosecrans other than picketing the RR. By late Oct he was ready to move. Rosecrans was building pontoons for the assault. If not for being relieved of command on Oct 19th. Rosecrans would of made the assault and opened the shorter, amphibious Cracker Line. Rosecrans lost 600 to 800 wagons at Anderson's Crossroads. He lost estimated 10k transporting wagons on the route to Jasper. The Army was on 2/3 rations but the animals had little. When Sherman came up they were feeding 6 mules 2 mules rations. It took 6 to do what 1 or 2 would usually do. This is after the Cracker Line is opened.

So, in a months time and certainly after Sherman comes up and the Battles for Chattanooga and Missionary Ridge happen, things have vastly improved. You can't convince us it was because of what Grant did during the time he was here, other than carry out Rosecrans plans and bring Sherman up, which he was ordered to relieve Rosecrans on Sept 15 by the War Department. Which took him 2 months. Hurlbut was in Memphis. So Grant had at least a Division there.

Another source who probably won't like. Daniels, Days of Glory. Notice even the Spy Dana thinks advancing before Sherman comes up is a bad idea. Dana isn't a fortune teller and can't predict what a Failure Sherman will be.

So, by your analysis we would have to believe that Rosecrans was oblivious to River and RR Transport. We would have to believe that Rosecrans did nothing after he consolidated in Chattanooga. And we would have to forget that he fought one of the bloodiest battles of the Civil War with a numerical disadvantage. His supply line was 30 to 40 miles away.

 

[uaskme]

But Lamers writing in 1932 would be re-writing things just about the time the Civil War generation was dying, and just about the time that the Democratic party was able to shed the stain of rebellion from its reputation.

I've read your post on Chattanooga and Chickamauga. Most people haven't studied these battles in depth. I don't think you are an exception. Ramble on.

 

[wausaubob]

I've read your post on Chattanooga and Chickamauga. Most people haven't studied these battles in depth. I don't think you are an exception. Ramble on.

So a little ad hominen rhetoric for Tuesday? Hardly unusual.

 

[wausaubob]

Stanton, Meigs and Grant removed Rosecrans. He was never invited back to Washington or Nashville. The army he had once commanded did not decline in effectiveness. And like Rosecrans, Burnside and Hooker also lost their commands by July of 1864. For the sake of consistency there should be a campaign to revive their reputations and claim they were wronged. Why not do the same for William Smith? It has been done for George Thomas, even though Thomas continued in command and was part of Reconstruction until he became tired of the southern problem.

 

[wausaubob]

Rosecrans was stuck in Chattanooga, but the action was in Louisville, Nashville and Bridgeport. The change from Rosecrans to Grant was incidental to those changes. It also resulted in Thomas taking command of the Cumberland Army, which is what the administration had wanted for quite some time.

 

[David Moore]

So much bad information by some on
this site.
Lamers' book came out in 1961 not 1932 as someone wrote.
I invite everyone posting or observing here to join several Facebook pages on Chattanooga and the Western Theater.
On them one may engage in discussion with NPS people and published authors. However one must know their stuff or risk being ignored. (People are never insulted.) Mere opinion impresses no one. There is value of course in learning and not posting.
It is sad that this site is dominated by people who know so little and even sadder have no interest in learning more.

 

[RLowe]

So much bad information by some on
this site.
Lamers' book came out in 1961 not 1932 as someone wrote.
I invite everyone posting or observing here to join several Facebook pages on Chattanooga and the Western Theater.
On them one may engage in discussion with NPS people and published authors. However one must know their stuff or risk being ignored. (People are never insulted.) Mere opinion impresses no one. There is value of course in learning and not posting.
It is sad that this site is dominated by people who know so little and even sadder have no interest in learning more.

David, Agree. I run the Civil War Round Table in Chickamauga & Chattanooga and I, too, get some comments and perspective that lack...depth and context. Much needed for sure.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Gentlemen, I have read this thread with great interest. As you all know, I have a great interest in Gen. Rosecrans & the Army of the Cumberland. Living where I do, volunteering at Stones River, booking speakers for our CW Roundtable, speaking to Roundtables in three states & lots of historians who have been very generous with their time, gives me a different perspective than most folks on this subject. That said, I would not use any of the sources you all have cited in this thread.

These are the publications that have shaped my views on Rosecrans' logistics & command decisions.

Online References
​

Intelligence Operations of the Army of the Cumberland During the Tullahoma & Chickamauga Campaigns.
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree: Master of Military Arts & Science.
By Doyle D. Broome, Jr., Maj. USA A.A. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1989

This source not only contains a professional analysis of Rosecrans' intelligence operations, it contains the original texts of intelligence reports. You can read the intel that Rosecrans & his officers received in the form they received it. There is no filter.

===​

Thomas T. Eckert Papers, Telegrams from Charles Dana, Huntington Library, Art Museum, & Botanical Gardens Digital Library.

​

Cover, Dana's dispatches from Chattanooga

Page 3

Page 192
Until last fall, nobody knew that Ekert had not destroyed the ledgers from the telegraph office in Washington. As a result, we can read the special ledger that was kept exclusively for Dana's reports from Chattanooga. I encourage you to read these dispatches much as you would emails. Some of the dispatches are only hours apart. Dana, a newspaper man, writes clearly & concisely. My entire understanding of what Dana was doing & what he communicated to Stanton/Lincoln was completely revolutionized by reading these pages.

Also in the Ekert papers there are the logs that contain Grant's dispatches from Chattanooga. What did he know, what did he think, what did he tell Stanton/Lincoln... no ned to speculate, read the messages for yourself.

====​

In all candor, my conclusion is that what is written about Dana's dispatches has way more to do with the writer's preconceptions than anything in the texts. I can understand why Lincoln would read Dana's dispatches out loud.

====​

Chattanooga or Lookout Mountain & Missionary Ridge From Moccasin Point.
By Bradford R. Wood, Jr., Brevet Captain, late U.S.A., Brevet Major U.S.V. Albany, N.Y.
Online Library

The Signal Corps was very spare in regard to rank. As both a Captain & Brevet Major in the Signal Corps, Woods was a more important person than his rank would indicate. The chief signal officer of a corps was a captain, for example. During the Battle of Chattanooga, Wood commanded the signal station at Moccasin Point. This pamphlet contains "contrabands" that show exactly what Bragg's intel was on the eve of Sherman's crossing of the Tennessee. General Thomas ordered indirect fire via the signal net. The text of Hooker's coms with Moccasin Point controlling the fire from that battery. The text of General Granger's report from atop Missionary Ridge is an example of how extraordinarily quick Grant/Thomas received reports & were able to give orders.

====
Opinion
​

(Note: For whatever reason, I can't get this website to turn off the bold & italic commands, so don't conclude anything from the emphatic appearance of my comments.)

My point is that, unlike Connelly, we do not have to drive thousands of pre-interstate miles read the original documents in archives scattered all over the country. Lenette Taylor's book is based on a treasure trove of documents that should have been destroyed. Captain Perkins papers document the actual nuts & bolts of the Army of the Cumberland's supply system. Knowing that Rosecrans ordered the RR be used exclusively for fodder & the return of disabled horses & mules during the Tullahoma Campaign is an eye opener. You don't have to depend on somebody's speculation how horses & mules were supplied, you can read nuts & bolts level examples of how it was done.

When Grant became commander of the Western theater, he had about 1/2 million men. Instead of the herky-jerky uncoordinated mess that sent Dodge's intel about Vicksburg via the commander in Memphis, adding weeks to the transit time, Grant was at the center of the web pulling all the strings. As a result, from Grant's point of view, Burnside, Thomas, Sherman & Hooker were all fighting the same battle, not isolated uncoordinated actions. For that reason, much of the critique of Grant's Chattanooga decisions does not reflect what he was really dealing with.

Rosecrans, I have a deep appreciation for General Rosecrans & what he achieved. I also have no illusions as to the downside of his personality. Riding around the battlefield issuing nonsense orders in a jackhammer stutter is not a characteristic of a great field commander. Like many entrepreneurs who create great companies from scratch, Rosecrans was not the man to manage it. I have concluded that replacing Rosecrans was the correct decision.

Anyways, my point is that Rosecrans' logistics is a fascinating subject. We have access to sources that did not exist when books written around the turn of the 20th Century were written. Modern historians have access to a broad array of sources that earlier writers did not have. I await your reactions to this very eccentric post. Rhea Cole

​

 

[DanSBHawk]

So much bad information by some on
this site.
Lamers' book came out in 1961 not 1932 as someone wrote.
I invite everyone posting or observing here to join several Facebook pages on Chattanooga and the Western Theater.
On them one may engage in discussion with NPS people and published authors. However one must know their stuff or risk being ignored. (People are never insulted.) Mere opinion impresses no one. There is value of course in learning and not posting.
It is sad that this site is dominated by people who know so little and even sadder have no interest in learning more.

If you feel that these discussions are so bad, you are free to ignore them as well. Why do you come here if you feel the site is so sad?

Being a published author does not necessarily mean that someone is an ultimate authority. Many writers suffer from debilitating bias, and are unable to process any information that does not conform to their bias.

There are many informed discussions here, using primary sources, which show that biased authors can be wrong even if published. And published authors are welcome to join the discussion here as well.

 

[gjpratt]

So much bad information by some on
this site.
Lamers' book came out in 1961 not 1932 as someone wrote.
I invite everyone posting or observing here to join several Facebook pages on Chattanooga and the Western Theater.
On them one may engage in discussion with NPS people and published authors. However one must know their stuff or risk being ignored. (People are never insulted.) Mere opinion impresses no one. There is value of course in learning and not posting.
It is sad that this site is dominated by people who know so little and even sadder have no interest in learning more.

Over the past COVID year when I have had so much time on my hands, I have made a point to expand and deepen my knowledge of the CW and the military actors. That has included filling in gaps -- like the Iuka/Corinth action -- and studying countervailing or competing (or just multiple) books on topics or figures I thought I knew. As a result, I have experienced several sea changes of understanding. David Powell's Failure in the Saddle had probably the most dramatic effect. But I got very curious about Rosecrans after reading Powell's and Eric Wittenberg's tour de force on the Tullahoma Campaign. This was an objective, supported history that was professionally done and it persuasively portrays Rosecrans as a very able commander as well as an innovative and strategic thinker. So I asked myself, what happened? My next book was Lamers' biography. In my opinion, this was one of the soundest biographies of any historical figure I have read. The conclusions were all based on the careful marshalling of the historical record. It had added credibility from its gentle commentary re Grant and other Rosecrans antagonists -- no character bashing at all. I am not a historian, but my line of work requires critical analysis and review and the discernment and refutation of biased writing. I found David Moore's book here on another forum and it is just as careful and well reasoned in its conclusions. My point is this. If a historian is honestly led to conclusions by the evidence and explains the analytical process used in reaching these conclusions, the result will be a point of view. That of itself does not make the author or his work "biased."

And FWIW, even biased works can be helpful to a marginal, and sometimes even a more fulsome, understanding of their subject.

 

[gjpratt]

So much bad information by some on
this site.
Lamers' book came out in 1961 not 1932 as someone wrote.
I invite everyone posting or observing here to join several Facebook pages on Chattanooga and the Western Theater.
On them one may engage in discussion with NPS people and published authors. However one must know their stuff or risk being ignored. (People are never insulted.) Mere opinion impresses no one. There is value of course in learning and not posting.
It is sad that this site is dominated by people who know so little and even sadder have no interest in learning more.

Can you provide links or more specific references to these discussion groups?

Thank you in advance.

 

[RLowe]

Can you provide links or more specific references to these discussion groups?

Thank you in advance.

Here is one, run by historian/author Robert Carter.
https://www.facebook.com/groups/1620249201457778

And the link to my round table site on FB.

https://www.facebook.com/groups/329344228425502

Ed

 

[DanSBHawk]

Over the past COVID year when I have had so much time on my hands, I have made a point to expand and deepen my knowledge of the CW and the military actors. That has included filling in gaps -- like the Iuka/Corinth action -- and studying countervailing or competing (or just multiple) books on topics or figures I thought I knew. As a result, I have experienced several sea changes of understanding. David Powell's Failure in the Saddle had probably the most dramatic effect. But I got very curious about Rosecrans after reading Powell's and Eric Wittenberg's tour de force on the Tullahoma Campaign. This was an objective, supported history that was professionally done and it persuasively portrays Rosecrans as a very able commander as well as an innovative and strategic thinker. So I asked myself, what happened? My next book was Lamers' biography. In my opinion, this was one of the soundest biographies of any historical figure I have read. The conclusions were all based on the careful marshalling of the historical record. It had added credibility from its gentle commentary re Grant and other Rosecrans antagonists -- no character bashing at all. I am not a historian, but my line of work requires critical analysis and review and the discernment and refutation of biased writing. I found David Moore's book here on another forum and it is just as careful and well reasoned in its conclusions. My point is this. If a historian is honestly led to conclusions by the evidence and explains the analytical process used in reaching these conclusions, the result will be a point of view. That of itself does not make the author or his work "biased."

And FWIW, even biased works can be helpful to a marginal, and sometimes even a more fulsome, understanding of their subject.

Powell and Wittenberg are well-regarded authors. No disagreement there.

There are other authors who are fans of Rosecrans and Thomas and the Army of the Cumberland, that are not as objective and their work is more bitter and consumed with attacking Grant. Unfortunately it seems that Army of the Cumberland authors in particular, have a tendency towards this obsessive jealousy of Grant, Sherman, and the Army of the Tennessee. You don't really see the same anti-Grant and anti-Sherman bitterness in Army of the Potomac authors as much.

 

[David Moore]

These are some I like.
I've found I read much more than I comment.
That's another way of saying I learn things.
Everyone is respectful. Opinions are weighed fairly.

The Western Theater in the Civil War

The Battle of Chickamauga Discussion Group

Chickamauga and Chattanooga Civil War Roundtable

Chickamauga: The Campaign and Battle.

Let me also say I think CWT is a great site but
discussions too often fall into personal attacks.

I posted most recently because someone wrote that William Lamers wrote his book in 1932 in an
effort to dismiss its conclusions. The book in fact was published nearly 30 years later.
It is a unique, ground breaking work on which all modern Rosecrans scholarship stands.