Richard Taylor

[MikeyB]

Didn't know much about him, but just finished reading about Red River in Foote. Would he have been a good candidate to replace JEJ instead of JB Hood? Seems to have the aggressiveness but maybe a bit more sensible and responsible? Was this the type of general that was needed?

 

[wtexas]

I am, admitedly, a Richard Taylor fan. He was aggressive, but not overly so. As a district commander, he seemed to grasp the strategic situation in western Louisiana very well. Had he gotten his way, he may have inflicted some severe damage to Banks' Army of the Gulf on its way out of northwestern Louisiana. If you were on Taylor's good side--Tom Green, Alfred Mouton--he would defend you ferociously.

Having said this, he was very focused on his needs, almost to the exclussion of others and argumentative to a fault. He struggled mightily to get along with E.K. Smith, primarily because he had little respect for Smith.

I think Taylor was less rash than Hood and more aggressive than Johnston. But whether he could have had any different results than either of those two, we will never know. I do doubt the results would have been worse.

 

[jackt62]

His lack of a professional military background may have had something to do with not considering him for major army command. Nevertheless, he was still one of the few non-professional soldiers to quickly understand and effectively perform military operations on a large scale. He did a highly competent job in thwarting Banks' and Union attempts to make headway in the Louisiana bayou and Red River regions from 1862 through 1864. He did clash with Kirby Smith, his superior officer in the trans-Mississippi, which was probably another strike against him.

 

[MikeyB]

His lack of a professional military background may have had something to do with not considering him for major army command. Nevertheless, he was still one of the few non-professional soldiers to quickly understand and effectively perform military operations on a large scale. He did a highly competent job in thwarting Banks' and Union attempts to make headway in the Louisiana bayou and Red River regions from 1862 through 1864. He did clash with Kirby Smith, his superior officer in the trans-Mississippi, which was probably another strike against him.

How do historians rate Kirby Smith? He arguably had the toughest job in the Confederacy.

 

[Louisiana Jayhawker]

Richard Taylor is highly overrated and was not capable of commanding a large Army. He was promoted mainly due to his kinship with Jefferson Davis and pure luck at Manifest. He was a trouble maker and highly overrated himself with his fantastic glorifications of his abilities. His writings read more like a novel than historical truths. Several times he bragged he could storm large entrenchments, if he had been given enough resources to do so (examples are as follows: Grand Encore, Louisiana; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Alexandria, Louisiana). Fortunately Kirby Smith saw this as foolish and saved many Southerners from death and physical impairment by not allowing such crazy acts. He had no formal military training, but was a historian with some understanding of military issues. At Manifest, he and Banks stubbled into other accidentally. Taylor was already concentrated, basically, but Banks Army was caught in marching formations. Taylor defeated, the frontal part of the Federal Army, but was checked at dusk. He losses were sharp and he lost General Mouton (reckless behavior). He lost Green at Blair's Landing same time ( again reckless behavior) At Pleasant Hill, he threw his Army at Banks, recklessly got checked and routed from the field. Most claimed it was a draw, but Banks withdrew unmolested, due to low water and Sherman's deadline. At Yellow Bayou, (which all his fans and most others ignore, but it reflects his continuous recklessness and unskilled tactician behavior) his brag, that he could have destroyed Banks, ended in a sorrowful check and another rout from the field. His nice capture of Morgan City was helped greatly by incompetent Federal command, who had a sloppy defense and a refusal to armed hundreds, if not a few thousand, of escape Negro slaves who were begging to be enrolled and armed. With this enlargement, Taylor would have been easily checked. In the later period, he got his political appointment and put on the back shelf to hang out with Bedford Forrest. He may have had a nervous breakdown after Yellow Bayou and his ongoing childish behavior with Kirby Smith in their infamous dispute. As far as the Civil War standards, I would say he was an average commander.

 

[J. Stanley]

My two cents: Richard Taylor was definitely a fairly skilled commander. He did face great difficulty in having to organize the infrastructure and train the troops in his own district and there were times when he was driven back quite a distance as seen in the Bayou Teche Campaign against Banks. He put some hard pressure on the Federal defenses around New Orleans during the Port Hudson Campaign, only for Banks to hold his nerve. He won a good fight at Mansfield, only to lose at Pleasant Hill due to A.J. Smith's smart flank attack on Taylor's flank attack.

He was bold, a capable tactician and he knew when to call it quits. When the Federals threatened to turn him at Mansura, he disengaged. He tried a trap at Yellow Bayou, it failed, and he did not escalate further. In this, I suppose he was more judicious than Hood and more aggressive than Joe Johnston.

However, I must point out that his army only amounted to 10k at most. If he were to take command of the 50k strong Army of Tennessee, that's quite the leap. We don't and will never know if he was up to the task. As Napoleon himself demonstrated, a general as skilled as himself was at his best when he could control his whole army as in the 1814 campaign vs. the campaigns in Russia and Germany in 1812-13, where he had to delegate to his subordinates.

His relationship with E.K. Smith was definitely a negative, but at least in the Army of Tennessee, there would be less jealous competition for resources.

Also, I should note that Davis' concern about bringing Taylor over seems to be more about concerns of perceived nepotism - Taylor was his brother-in-law after all.

 

[Louisiana Jayhawker]

I appreciate your input but there remains objections. In the Bayou Tech campaign, Taylor was fortunate to avoid being stomped by the massive Federal onslaught. Taylor's small Army numbered hardly 3,000. They were almost trapped and captured by Banks. The river region was entirely sacked of Confederate resources. Banks ignored Taylor and moved on to success at Port Hudson. Taylor's attempts to relieve pressure upon Port Hudson and Vicksburg were completely useless as both were captured. You claimed he "knew when to call it quit", you must be kidding. He throw everything against the wall at Manifest without any sign of quitting. Fortunate for him, the Federal decided to fall back to Pleasant Hill and not press him. This allow Taylor again to throw everything against the wall, without any sign of quitting, until Taylor was driving from the field of battle. Again Taylor repeats the same tactic at Yellow Bluff, and again is driven from the field of battle. At Mansura, the same behavior could have been repeated and it did not happen. Taylor was hoping the Federals would foolishly frontal assault Taylor's mass artillery at Mansura but Feds simply refused the bait, and continued they unmolested withdrawn from Taylor for reasons already stated. Taylor does not have to call any "when to call it quits", as he did not launch an attack and the Feds had marched easily away. I will not disrespect Hood or Joe Johnson in claiming Taylor was any where near their level.

 

[wtexas]

Manifest without any sign of quitting. Fortunate for him, the Federal decided to fall back to Pleasant Hill and not press him.

It's Mansfield, not Manifest.

And all I am going to say is "wow" if you think the Federals just decided to fall back on Pleasant Hill. The Confederates, for all intents and purposes, destroyed Landram's division of the XIII Corps at Mansfield and manhandled Cameron's division of the XIII Corps. Yes, Emory and a division of the XIX Corps did stop the Confederates at Pleasant Grove yet, if you look at the casualty reports from those regiments engaged, some took a beating (despite it being dusk and the Confederates were very disorganized) though the Union did hold the position. But here's the problem: If Emory stays at Pleasant Grove, with the rest of the Army of the Gulf strung out, how were the Federals going to advance forward again? There was no place between the Moss Plantation and Pleasant Hill to deploy an army the size of Banks'. No sir, the Federals did not just decide to fall back to Pleasant Hill, they had to fall back to Pleasant Hill.

The Battle of Pleasant Hill was another matter. Yes, many people consider it a tactical draw but some mistakes on the battlefield by the Confederates may have cost them another victory. As it is, Taylor had spent his army in the two days of fighting and, at this point, the Federals had an opportunity to continue advancing. (A.J. Smith even encouraged William Franklin to supercede Banks but Franklin declined to do so.) The Federals continued to withdraw from northwestern Louisiana for any number of reasons--and nearly suffered a disaster at Monett's Ferry (it would have been interesting to see what Green would have done there instead of Bee). Still, in the immediate aftermath of Pleasant Hill, it might have been possible for the Union to continue their advance.

But, in some ways, doesn't this speak to the experience of Taylor? He knew Banks from the Shenendoah Valley, the Bayou Teche, the Lafourche Offensive, and now the Red River Campaign. Perhaps he understood that Banks, once bloodied, would withdraw. He certainly gambled on it and, despite the results of Mansura and Yellow Bayou, Banks never reached Shreveport.

 

[bayouace]

Well, I know Jackson was thankful he had him at Port Republic. To be concise, I feel he did the best he could with inferior numbers and inadequate supplies, as did most commanders in the West. When Banks retreated down the Red River, it certainly did not help when Smith siphoned off a substantial number of troops for Arkansas. Essentially, Taylor was fighting a guerilla warfare, and Banks should have been able to smash Taylor's army. As for Tom Green, whom I respect highly, he put himself in position to be killed. He had likely been drinking, and had no business being where he was in relation to the firepower of Porter's boats. I will judge Taylor by what he did with what he had.

 

[Louisiana Jayhawker]

Well now it might surprise you that much of what you posted has no conflict with my position. But let me object to some of your contradictions. The Feds concentrated at Pleasant Hill was due to their large Army, and it was the nearest location that had the most open space to do so. Taylor had been checked that night, and was in no position to molest this important concentration of Bank's Army. Taylor's Command was very busy gathering his scattered units from the mess it was in after battle. Strange you bring up Bank's Army even had the slightest notion of further advancement at time of Pleasant Grove at night. Only a fool would have advance with Navy stalled by low water and Sherman's direct order to return his troops by his deadline. I had no objections to what happen at Mansfield as set within the truth. The A.J. Smith discussion with Franklin among themselves had no effect on anything. I am strongly opposed to calling the small battle at Monett's Ferry a significant issue. The Confederates were small in number and very easily flanked out to position. It was nothing but a stalling event of the massive Federal movement. Where was the Taylor Army concentration to impose a real battle to make it significant? The Pleasant Hill affair was mishandled by Taylor. His Louisiana troops were placed on the left flank and center, but due to sharp losses and exhaustion, they were ineffective and useless. The newly arrived Confederates were massed on the right flank and throw into a frontal attack, in an area that was not properly known by the Confederates. Taylor believed or guessed wrongly that they would strike the Federal left flank that should be exposed. That's not how it's done professionally. He is suppose to know where the end of the left flank is before launching an attack, without any reserves what so ever. They were routed from the field allowing the Feds to continue their withdrawal. Had the Feds advanced again to Shreveport there was nothing to stop them bu

 

[wtexas]

He had likely been drinking, and had no business being where he was in relation to the firepower of Porter's boats.

I've never been able to find any reliable source regarding his drinking at Blair's Landing. The Federals, who did not land there, state that the Confederates were drunk. But both sides had a propensity to say, "Hey, we were brave and fearless when we charged the enemy's earthworks" while stating of the enemy, "Boy, those fools had to be drunk. No one in their right mind would've made that attack."

I do have a source that talks about Green at lunch before reaching Blair's Landing. He was a bit downcast and felt that West's artillery, which was not rifled, was not the kind he needed. Nevertheless, he was going to attack because that's what Taylor wanted and Green was very loyal to Taylor.

Finally, remember that Green was a legend in Texas and his fame had only grown with his accomplishments during the previous year. Most of the men he led to Blair's Landing had little experience and had not fought with him before. Green believed that leadership meant fearlessness, so he led from the front because that's what he had been taught as an early Texas Ranger and that's what his inexperienced men needed against the Union Navy.

 

[wtexas]

We agree on most of this, though I think we see things through a slightly different lense (I like Taylor, you do not). And that's okay.

The newly arrived Confederates were massed on the right flank and throw into a frontal attack, in an area that was not properly known by the Confederates.

I have a source that indicates the Confederates did not where A.J. Smith's line was. When the Confederate cavalry arrived at Pleasant Hill early on April 9th, they did some extensive scouting. Col. William Hardemann one of Green's ablest commanders, tried to get Moseby (it may have been Tappen) to move 1/4 mile to the east, which would have placed him on A.J. Smith's flank. Instead, Hardemann was told, in essence, this is where General Churchill has posted us and this is where we are staying. I am not 100% certain of the accuracy of this source but it is very plausible.

Could Taylor have gone to the right to post Churchill himself? He admits this. Was the attack even wise? Depends. Some sources agree that Taylor was not aware of Smith's presence in Pleasant Hill so it would have been a shattered XIII Corps, a fairly fresh XIX Corps, and a disorganized Cavalry Division he was facing. Somehow, though, I believe that Taylor had to be aware that Smith was either there, or close by. Still, the wisdom of the attack is open to debate, for sure.

 

[Louisiana Jayhawker]

I like your posting, but I need to point out several issues. General Green was fully aware of the damage Navy vessels could do to his troops. He was taught this at the Battle of Fort Butler earlier (check out that battle). In that battle, Green was not at the forefront of the assault showing leadership. At Blair's Landing, Green's troops were driven away and the Federals could easily observe the battlefield. They reported large numbers of dead left abandoned on the shoreline. The Confederate losses are not known and were not officially reported by Confederates with any accuracy. The Federals did land field batteries from their vessels to the opposite side of the river unreachable by the Confederates. I believe I have read that after the battle some Feds looked over the dead and smelled alcohol on some, but I may not be correct on that. The part about inexperience Confederate troops is important, as they were unsure of the effectiveness of the Navy ability to fight back is highly likely. Were they told that there was little to fear by a drunken commander? I do not disagree that Green was a valued asset for the Confederacy and his historical record is impressive. Did Federal alcohol looted from the captured Federal supply wagons at Mansfield find it's way to the alcoholic Green and some of his troops? It would explain the crazy reckless behavior rushing unprotected in the Federal firestorm of naval and field batteries firing at them pointblank.

 

[Stryker65]

Richard Taylor is highly overrated and was not capable of commanding a large Army. He was promoted mainly due to his kinship with Jefferson Davis and pure luck at Manifest. He was a trouble maker and highly overrated himself with his fantastic glorifications of his abilities. His writings read more like a novel than historical truths. Several times he bragged he could storm large entrenchments, if he had been given enough resources to do so (examples are as follows: Grand Encore, Louisiana; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Alexandria, Louisiana). Fortunately Kirby Smith saw this as foolish and saved many Southerners from death and physical impairment by not allowing such crazy acts. He had no formal military training, but was a historian with some understanding of military issues. At Manifest, he and Banks stubbled into other accidentally. Taylor was already concentrated, basically, but Banks Army was caught in marching formations. Taylor defeated, the frontal part of the Federal Army, but was checked at dusk. He losses were sharp and he lost General Mouton (reckless behavior). He lost Green at Blair's Landing same time ( again reckless behavior) At Pleasant Hill, he threw his Army at Banks, recklessly got checked and routed from the field. Most claimed it was a draw, but Banks withdrew unmolested, due to low water and Sherman's deadline. At Yellow Bayou, (which all his fans and most others ignore, but it reflects his continuous recklessness and unskilled tactician behavior) his brag, that he could have destroyed Banks, ended in a sorrowful check and another rout from the field. His nice capture of Morgan City was helped greatly by incompetent Federal command, who had a sloppy defense and a refusal to armed hundreds, if not a few thousand, of escape Negro slaves who were begging to be enrolled and armed. With this enlargement, Taylor would have been easily checked. In the later period, he got his political appointment and put on the back shelf to hang out with Bedford Forrest. He may have had a nervous breakdown after Yellow Bayou and his ongoing childish behavior with Kirby Smith in their infamous dispute. As far as the Civil War standards, I would say he was an average commander.

I disagree with almost everything you've said, but we've had this discussion before in other threads and I don't think we need to go through it all again.

But in a nutshell, I don't think Kirby Smith was that good of a commander either, I do think taking away all of his infantry prevented further success at New Orleans and Yellow Bayou, I also think you're minimizing Mansfield and Brashear City, Blair's Landing was clearly Green's fault, and Taylor was not routed at Pleasant Hill.

 

[Louisiana Jayhawker]

wtexas

Again another good post. If the Confederate calvary did fail to find A.J. Smith's troops it was due to slopy work on their part. I will say that Smith's troops were a double line behind the front line somewhat with some overlap. Were they hidden in the woods from view of the Confederate scouts? If the scouts found Smith's troops and asked Tappen or whoever to move over 1/4 mile to the east that would be very important, but no grounds to claim it would make a difference. The Confederates came out of the thickets in disorder and confusion of just where they were. That's not good for them. The line extension likely was presented to Taylor also, so why did he not intervene? Was it not to chance upsetting his new arrived commanders after their refusal to move at request of a scout leader. That's not very professional of Taylor not to enter the dispute and set it right. The Confederates were exhausted having forced back the first Federal line but now faced a rested and highly skilled Sherman troops in a second line attacking. Taylor had no reserves. They were routed from the field.

 

[Louisiana Jayhawker]

Stryker65

Taylor best and only victories were at Mansfield and Brashear City, and I explained the truth about them. At Pleasant Hill, after Smith's attack, there was nothing of the Confederates left on the battlefield, but Taylor riding around with his escort looking over the carnage. Banks called Smith's troops back as they could not catch the fleeing Confederates. They ran for eight miles, with no one chasing them, which sounds to me like rout to me.

 

[sunday silence]

Well, I know Jackson was thankful he had him at Port Republic. To be concise, I feel he did the best he could with inferior numbers and inadequate supplies, as did most commanders in the West. When Banks retreated down the Red River, it certainly did not help when Smith siphoned off a substantial number of troops for Arkansas. Essentially, Taylor was fighting a guerilla warfare, and Banks should have been able to smash Taylor's army. As for Tom Green, whom I respect highly, he put himself in position to be killed. He had likely been drinking, and had no business being where he was in relation to the firepower of Porter's boats. I will judge Taylor by what he did with what he had.

Why is Jackson's opinion on his officers to be trusted? He promoted guys like John R Jones, Elisha Paxton and Raleigh Colston probably more on the basis of him liking them than military merit. All of them were lacking. How do we know Jackson just liked Taylor for whatever reason?

 

[Louisiana Jayhawker]

sunday silence

I have always been suspecting of Jackson's evaluations of his officers. In case of Richard Taylor especially, with the Jeff Davis connection and Jackson's reported strong religious status. Taylor did ruthlessly follow Jackson's instructions on field which surely pleased Jackson. Taylor was behaving like a good student in a learning process. Surely, he dreamed of become a Jackson like figure which may explain his reckless behavior and lofty beliefs of what his Army could/should be allowed to do which conflicted with Kirby Smith.

 

[SWS]

Taylor and Hood (both young men in their 30s) are among the only generals who demonstrated sufficient enterprise and ability in the Western campaigns of 1864, coming within "an ace" of immense strategic results during their efforts to destroy the skedaddling armies of Banks and Schofield, although the objectives of recapturing New Orleans and Nashville were probably unrealistic, although worth consideration. Unlike Kirby-Smith and Johnston, who seem at times more concerned with their own reputation and prestige rather than the general good of their country, they were truly calculating for victory. They were made discontent over the retreats made in the direction of Shreveport and Atlanta and burned for an opportunity to check the enemy. After all, both men gained their education in the "hard school" of large-scale combat and operations as hard-hitting brigadiers in Virginia in 1862, under the tutelage of Lee and Jackson, an experience that must have left a strong impression, considering just how decisively the tide turned in the Old Dominion between April and September 1862, even when the odds seemed impossible to overcome. Both men, in spite of their relative youth and vigor in command, can also be regarded as technical cripples. In any event, to paraphrase Edward Gibbon's comments on the Emperor Majorian, "Dick" Taylor and "Sam" Hood (as well as "Jube" Early out East) present the welcome discovery of great and heroic characters, such as sometimes arise, in the very closing months of the Civil War no less, when historians in their inestimable powers of hindsight and minute analysis have already condemned the South to ruinous defeat, to vindicate the skill, valor, determination, hope, etc., of the Confederate army in its bid for a national destiny.

 

[Louisiana Jayhawker]

Taylor came nowhere near "immense strategic results" fighting against Banks Army as best as the historical record is observed truthfully. Please explain how you see Taylor came "within an ace" of doing so. Please without wild speculations but using historical facts. It was a nice affair for him a Mansfield, but only in a partial way. The Bailey Dam was about Mother Nature. Recapturing New Orleans is fictional. Kirby Smith ordered movement to Shreveport was not a retreat, but a practical professional military movement made under what information was available about the Federal force in Arkansas moving toward Shreveport.