Replenishing ammunition in battle, help needed

[RRKirkland]

Hi,

I'm trying to find some more detail about the chain of command on the Confederate side in regards to ammunition on the battlefield. Since I'm not a reenactor (though hopefully some day), I'm hoping you folks can help me out.

For example, at the stone wall at Fredericksburg, when Cobb's/Kershaw's men were exhausting their rounds against the repeated brave but idiotic charges of Burnside's command, who would be sent to the rear to search for more ammunition? Of course, they would take from their dead and wounded comrades, but I was curious if there was a particular group of soldiers with specific duties that would be sent to find more rounds in the organized chaos of battle.

Any of your expertise would be greatly appreciated!

Have a great weekend, all.

 

[Republican Blues]

Beans and bullets are the responsibility of the Quartermaster, and the Quartermaster Sgt, either battalion or Company and higher. Ammunition would have been carried by the company, regimental, Brigade etc trains, and the ammunition pushed forward as it was needed. This is where the "they carried whatever gun they could find" thing falls apart, as there had to be a standard, or you would have guys armed with .58 rifled muskets getting ammuniton for .69 muskets because they had such when everyone else had the later. It's one of the things that drives me crazy in reenacting. LOL.

There is and was a supply chain, and sometimes it worked, and sometimes it didnt. It's one of those interesting facets of the Cornfed supply system, that while Subsistence items would sit at depots and rot, ammunition seemed to always make it......and the quality of powder turned out by the Confederate powder works at Augusta was really good.

 

[phil1861]

In my reading of OOB reports and other histories the regiment would be pulled from the line to replenish as their trains were further back from the line of battle if the system was working. It wasn't a simple matter of sending a company to the rear to collect the boxes; the ammunition issued to the commands was just for those commands and had to be accounted for. You may think, 'well, they're all on the same side, right? One brigades or divisions trains supplies would be available to any unit wandering the rear in search of supplies'. Not every unit or even regiment would have the same caliber of weapons in use so one could cast about the rear areas all day long and not find a supply of what you needed but if you did it would be more akin to begging from your neighbor to borrow some needed staple item.

This broke down in times of crises such as at Chickamauga where the 21st Ohio was left basically to rot in the confusion of the approaching darkness, trains nowhere to be found, using the effective colt repeating cylinder rifles but having already stripped the dead and wounded and the only regiment on the last defensive line to have the colt. They basically stayed on the line until mostly captured as they had little to fight with in the dark and didn't get the word to pull out.

 

[johan_steele]

The ammo variety in a Brigade could be quite bad and early war even w/in the company various calibers were sometimes prevelant. The example of the 4th MN that I always use isn't unusual. In the late spring of 1862 at least one company had both .58 & .69 present. Though most companies were standard. When they left MN the 4th MN had .54, .58, .69 & .71... a confusing matter for any QM. That wasn't untypical at the time.

By the time of Gettysburg the ANV had largely standardized their arms to .577/.58 but there were still some .69 & .54 in the ranks. But the ANV had done a far better job of standardizing their ammo than either the AoT (CS) or AoP at the time and in a lot of cases were better armed than their US counterparts.

The idea of the CS soldier bringing whatever from home & using it is mostly moonshine. While it happened it wasn't common. As civilian long arms ran the gamut from .31 up to .75 or greater such a practice was not only illogical but unfeasible.

 

[Historyprof]

Even with the most careful planning, there were times in battle when soldiers would run out of ammunition. At time like these, anything that would go down the barrel or into the breach was used. I have a few examples in my bullet collection. A Confederate .69 minnie ball that was apparently fired from a smoothbore, a .69 musketball that shows marks from rifling, and a .58 Williams Type III that was possibly crammed into a Sharps (5 groove rifling and .52 diameter).

 

[Red Harvest]

With regards to variation in the arms, wome of this depends on which theater is being discussed. In the trans-Mississippi, particularly the Missouri State Guard units there was a lot of bringing whatever they had. While the veterans became better armed over time, there was still a serious lack of arms, even in 1864. Sterling Price habitually had several thousand unarmed men in camp or on campaign. Van Dorn didn't help things of course, since he stripped the theater of arms and regiments to take across the Mississippi after a disastrous retreat from Pea Ridge.

Different companies in a regiment frequently had different arms early in the war. It depended alot on how they were formed and where. Some were pre-war militia units. Some had rifles, some smoothbores.

 

[M E Wolf]

O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME X/1 [S# 10]
April 6-7, 1862..--Battle of Pittsburg Landing, or Shiloh, Tenn.
No. 28. -- Report of Maj. Richard Rowett, Seventh Illinois Infantry (of the Third Brigade, Second Division).

HDQRS. SEVENTH REGIMENT ILLINOIS VOLUNTEERS,
Pittsburg, Tenn., April 10, 1862.
COLONEL: Pursuant to paragraph 742 of the Revised Regulations, the subjoined report is most respectfully submitted:
On the morning of Sunday, the 6th instant, together with the rest of your brigade, the Seventh Illinois, under my command, had the honor of being led to the field of battle by you. No sooner had we reached our position in line, as ordered by you, than the enemy in force advanced upon our front. We immediately gave him battle. A sharp engagement ensued, and in half an hour, aided by the forces on our right and left, we succeeded in driving him back.

Our position was now, by your order, changed to the right, and under the same order, co-operating with the Eighth Illinois on our right we exchanged a few shots with the enemy, and driving back the left of the force with which he had engaged us, advancing over and beyond the ground from which we had driven him. Under your personal superintendence a reconnaissance in regimental force was made along the enemy's lines towards his right, and at your suggestion I had sent a detail to our rear to bring up ammunition for the regiment. Again we succeeded by a sharp skirmish in maintaining our ground and advanced clear on the enemy's center, and having thrown forward our skirmishers, ascertained that the enemy on our front was now in very large force, and, with lines extending far beyond our flanks, seemed intent upon our movements. Our detail had reported that no ammunition of our caliber (.69) could be obtained, as it seemed that our ammunition wagon had mistaken our course and been driven back. We were not supported on either flank, and to avoid being outflanked and surrounded it became necessary to retire to the position you had originally assigned us, and we but just gained it in time to turn a deadly fire upon the enemy as he advanced with greatly superior numbers Here was our severest engagement and our heaviest loss, while the enemy's ranks were visibly thinned by the steady and rapid firing which the men with the utmost coolness poured into them. The enemy's firing in front was silenced, but on making an effort to connect with the regiments on our right I found that he had completely succeeded in turning our right flank, and, our ammunition being exhausted, we changed position by passing around the enemy's left, thrown out to cut us off, receiving in our ranks a cannon-shot from the guns which the enemy brought into position on our flank before we had extricated ourselves.

We now obtained a partial supply of ammunition, and came up in time to co-operate with McClernand's command in opposing the enemy's advance and repulsing successfully two of his most brilliant charges. Here our forces at this point,, now so greatly strengthened, were finally compelled to retire before the superior numbers which your command had so long held at bay. We now took our position in support of battery and lay on our arms for the night, contributing largely to picket and guard duty.

On the morning of Monday, the 7th, under the brigade command of Colonel Baldwin, we were on the field, during the greater part of the day under the enemy's guns and in severe engagements, leaving the field only when the last gun was fired, the officers and men of the regiment having signalized themselves particularly by the very honorable part which they bore in the most hotly-contested engagement of the day near the camp ground of Oglesby's brigade.

On Tuesday, the 8th, we were again in the field, and were returned to our quarters after night-fall.
It affords me great pleasure to report that the officers and men of the Seventh Regiment, during the whole time of our two days' engagement, acquitted themselves with great credit and distinction.

I am permitted only to mention the name of Acting Major Monroe, who gallantly sustained his share of the command of the regiment during the whole engagement, and as a tribute to the worthy dead the name of Leo W. Myers, Company H, who fell during the early part of the engagement on Sunday, and of Capt. Samuel G. Ward, Company A, who fell on the same day in the front of his company while most gallantly leading them on, having distinguished himself by almost unparalleled bravery.

In conclusion, allow me to express my sincere regret that by your wounds we were deprived of your inspiring leadership, and of the hope that we may yet again be favored as a humble part of your command.

All of which is respectfully submitted.
R. ROWETT,
Major, Commanding Seventh Regiment.
Colomel SWEENY,
Commanding Third Brigade.

 

[M E Wolf]

O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME X/1 [S# 10]
April 6-7, 1862..--Battle of Pittsburg Landing, or Shiloh, Tenn.
No. 90. -- Report of Brig. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook, U.S. Army, commanding Second Division.

HDQRS, SECOND DIVISION, ARMY OF THE OHIO,
Field of Shiloh, April 9, 1862.
SIR: I have the honor herewith to report that on the morning of the 6th instant, while on the march, at a point 12 miles from the town of Savannah, Tenn., I received an order to hasten forward with my division, with three days rations in haversacks and all my supply of ammunition. On account of the condition of the roads and baggage trains it was impossible for me to get more than two days' rations and the 40 rounds of cartridges in the cartridge boxes of the men. I hastened forward, arriving at Savannah at 7 p.m. on the 6th instant, with my entire division, except the Second Regiment of Kentucky Cavalry, which was left to guard the baggage. After resting my men two hours I marched to the river with General Rousseau's brigade, ordering the other brigades and the artillery to follow immediately. Arriving at the steamboat landing, I found no preparation made whatever to convey my division to this battle-field. I ordered my staff aboard boats at the Landing, compelling the captains to get out of their beds and prepare their boats for my use. I succeeded in embarking General Rousseau's brigade. As boats arrived I pressed them into service, and embarked the Thirty-fourth Regiment of Illinois Volunteers, belonging to Colonel Kirk's brigade, and left with it for the field, leaving instructions at Savannah for the other potion of my division to follow as rapidly as means of transportation was afforded.

[excerpt]
At this juncture Colonel Buckley's Fifth Regiment Kentucky Volunteers charged and captured the two guns in position, with four more of the same battery, partially disabled, which the enemy could not carry off. Here General Rousseau had the pleasure of retaking General McClernand's headquarters, and at this time it is supposed General A. S. Johnston fell, as his body was found on the outer edge of this encampment. The enemy fell back over an open field, and reformed in the skirt of the woods beyond. General Rousseau's brigade then advanced into the open field to engage him. The advance of my division had created a space between it and General Crittenden's, and the enemy began massing troops to take advantage of this gap in our line, made unavoidable by the attempt of the enemy to turn my right flank and his subsequent retreat. I immediately ordered Colonel to advance to the support of General Rousseau's left and to give the enemy the bayonet as soon as possible. His regiment filed through the lines of Colonel Kirk's brigade, which had been withdrawn from the right when the danger menacing that flank had passed, and advanced into a most withering fire of shell, canister, and musketry, which for a moment staggered it; but it was soon rallied, and for an account of the numerous conflicts and desperate charges this regiment made I refer you to Colonel Willich's report, transmitted herewith.

Being now satisfied that the enemy had changed his point of attack from the right to my extreme left, I ordered Colonel Stumbaugh's Seventy-seventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers to take up a position on my extreme left and repel the assault there being made. He immediately engaged them, and at this moment the contest along the whole line became terrible. Colonel Kirk's brigade was now ordered to engage, and he arrived precisely at the right moment, as the cartridges of General Rousseau's brigade were all expended. General Rousseau's brigade fell back through openings made in Colonel Kirk's ranks, and retired to the woods in the rear to be supplied with ammunition.

Three hours before, being convinced from the stubbornness with which the enemy was contending and the rapid discharges of my regiments that their 40 rounds of cartridges would soon be exhausted, I dispatched Lieutenant Campbell, my ordnance officer, for teams to bring up ammunition. He arrived at the opportune moment with three wagon loads. While General Rousseau's brigade was being supplied with ammunition, I ordered Colonel Gibson's brigade to engage on the left of Colonel Kirk's, where the enemy was still endeavoring to force his way. At this moment every available man was under fire, and the enemy seemed to increase in the vigor and the rapidity of his attack. Now the contest for a few moments became terrific. The enemy, to retake the ground and battery lost, advanced with a force of at least 10,000 men against my two brigades, and when he deployed in line of battle the fires from the contending ranks were two continuous sheets of flame. Here Major Levanway, commanding the Thirty-fourth Regiment of Illinois Volunteers, was killed by a shell, and the regiment wavered for a moment, when Colonel Kirk, colonel of the regiment, but commanding the Fifth Brigade, seized a flag, rushed forward, and steadied the line again. While doing this he was severely wounded in the shoulder.

The enemy now began to turn the left of Colonel Gibson's brigade, when the Forty-ninth Ohio, by this disposition of the enemy, was compelled to change its front twice, which was done under a heavy fire. I am proud to say that this hazardous maneuver was performed with apparently as much steadiness as on parade.

As soon as General Rousseau's brigade received its ammunition it was again ordered into line, and I directed into action two regiments belonging to General Hurlbut's division, which had been lying in reserve on my left since morning. When these dispositions were made I ordered an advance of my whole command, which was made in gallant style. The enemy did not withstand the charge, but fled, leaving all of their wounded, and were pursued by my division beyond General Sherman's headquarters of the day before, where the pursuit was taken up by the cavalry and artillery. During the action I momentarily expected the arrival of Captain Terrill and his battery. I sent an aide-de-camp to conduct him to me, so that I could put him in position. The aide-de-camp, through mistake, took the road which led to General Nelson's right. Captain Terrill was there ordered by General Buell into position. This officer did not fight under my immediate supervision, but from his report, herewith appended, and the verbal acknowledgment to me of General Nelson, he fought his battery gallantly and judiciously, and I commend him and his officers to my superiors. Captain Terrill, on account of his strict attention to duty in the past and conspicuous gallantry in this terrible conflict, is worthy of any promotion that can be bestowed upon him. My other two batteries, Captains Stone's and Goodspeed's, did not arrive in time to participate in the conflict.

[extensive excerpt]
My casualties during the conflict were 93 killed, 803 wounded, and 9 missing. The small number of the latter indicates the manner in which the division was held in hand. I herewith inclose a tabular statement of the killed and wounded and missing in each brigade.(*)
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. McD. McCOOK,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Second Division.
Capt. J. B. FRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.

 

[M E Wolf]

O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXVI/2 [S# 68]
UNION CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEASTERN VIRGINIA AND NORTH CAROLINA, FROM MAY 1, 1864, TO MAY 19, 1864.(*)--#12
MAY 10, 1864.
Colonel JACKSON:
I shall want some infantry ammunition to-day. How many wagons can you let me have?
Respectfully,
JNO. W. TURNER,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Second Division.
[Indorsement.]
Your own division supply train is expected to bring up ammunition and rations; there is no corps train. We can't find an ordnance officer, but the general has written to Colonel Shaffer. I think you ought to send your wagons back for ammunition.
Respectfully,
R. H. JACKSON,
Assistant Inspector-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS TENTH ARMY CORPS,
May 10, 1864--8 a.m.
Brigadier-General TURNER:
Mordecai has ammunition here. If you have rations for to-day and to-morrow it will probably be enough; if not, send back for more.
By command of Maj. Gen. Q. A. Gillmore:
ED. W. SMITH,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
-------------------------------------------
O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME XXXIX/2 [S# 79]
UNION CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN KENTUCKY, SOUTHWEST VIRGINIA, TENNESSEE, MISSISSIPPI, ALABAMA, AND NORTH GEORGIA (THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN EXCEPTED), FROM OCTOBER 1, 1864, TO NOVEMBER 13, 1864.(*)--#10
HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field, Rome, Ga., October 13, 1864.
General McCOOK,
Resaca:
There is no necessity for trains going from Resaca to Cartersville for ammunition. There are trains at Cartersville which can bring up the ammunition. Give orders for the ammunition and Hughes will have the trains dispatched. I had ordered General Ransom's division to march for Adairsville, then to take cars, and we must avoid collision. Let Hughes move the train. Tell him what you want and he will have it done.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-general.
Send this to Hughes and he can report it to General McCook. Road safe at Adairsville now.
-----------------------------------
O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME XLV/1 [S# 93]
DECEMBER 10-29, 1864.--Expedition from East Tennessee into Southwestern Virginia.
No. 7.--Reports of Capt. Henry T. Stanton, Assistant Adjutant-General, C. S. Army.
WYTHEVILLE, December 19, 1864--2 p.m.
MAJOR: We have been worrying for several hours with telegraph and cannot get a message through. Walked from Max Meadows this morning. A courier is just in from General Breckinridge, and reports that he met the enemy two miles this side of Marion yesterday; fought and drove them twice. A column was on each of his flanks, and he was almost out of ammunition. He sent no written dispatch, but I know the courier well (Hiram Rogers). The general told him to state that he was nearly out of ammunition, and that he would like to have it as soon as possible. He will be near Mount Airy to-night. About 500 men were left at Saltville. General Echols is with General Breckin-ridge all right; Witcher, Duke, Giltner, and Cosby are all with him. Enemy had four pieces of artillery. They did not carry off any of the artillery captured from Vaughn and Gillespie, but spiked all the pieces and left them. You will see the necessity of at once sending troops forward. Saltville may be besieged at any hour, and troops must go to its relief. Ammunition should be sent up at once. Trains can come three miles this side of Max Meadows. For God's sake get this line to working if the fault is at your end.

We will do all we can to accomplish it here. Rogers says the loss on our side at Marion was slight. Stoneman is in command; Burbridge and Gillem with him. No correct estimate yet of the number, but evidently large force. Railroad can be repaired between here and Wytheville in one day with fifteen bridge hands. Urge Goodwin to have it done at once. If Langhorne persists in refusing to let the Lynchburg troops come, I would telegraph to Colton, and if he refuses, to General Lee. Troops must come, and come speedily. Vaughn is at Hillsville with 500 men. Colonel Bradford, of his brigade, left here with 100 men this morning for some point on road between this and Hillsville. The predominant idea with Vaughn's men seems to be to get out of reach. We will use every exertion to have wagons at Max Meadows to bring up ammunition. Send the ammunition without fail. When line is working, come in the office.
Respectfully,
H. T. STANTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Maj. J. STODDARD JOHNSTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.