Regimental casualty stats from Gettysburg

[Bruce Vail]

I'm wondering whether there is a central depository of reliable regimental casualty data for the battle?

I'm interested in particular in the 3rd North Carolina State Troops (CSA), which was engaged at Culp's Hill July 2-3. . My 1901 regimental history says the casualty rate was about 75 percent while the current NPS site says 40 percent. I am trying to reconcile.

 

[rpkennedy]

I'm wondering whether there is a central depository of reliable regimental casualty data for the battle?

I'm interested in particular in the 3rd North Carolina State Troops (CSA), which was engaged at Culp's Hill July 2-3. . My 1901 regimental history says the casualty rate was about 75 percent while the current NPS site says 40 percent. I am trying to reconcile.

Confederate records in regards to casualties are spotty at best but I believe the 40% is probably closer to the truth than the 75% stat. I can look up the Busey and Martin numbers when I get home (unless someone has J.D. Petruzzi's book handy).

R

 

[Bruce Vail]

Confederate records in regards to casualties are spotty at best but I believe the 40% is probably closer to the truth than the 75% states. I can look up the Busey and Martin numbers when I get home (unless someone has J.D. Petruzzi's book handy).

R

Busey and Martin numbers?

 

[rpkennedy]

Busey and Martin numbers?

John Busey and David Martin's Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg. There have been a number of editions, the most recent being 2005, IIRC.

They put the numbers at 548 battle strength with 218 casualties (48 killed, 140 wounded, 30 missing/captured) for 39.8% losses.

R

 

[Jackson Hornets]

I'm wondering whether there is a central depository of reliable regimental casualty data for the battle?

I'm interested in particular in the 3rd North Carolina State Troops (CSA), which was engaged at Culp's Hill July 2-3. . My 1901 regimental history says the casualty rate was about 75 percent while the current NPS site says 40 percent. I am trying to reconcile.

I don't have a regimental casualty statistics but the entire brigade took a huge beating at Culp's Hill.
Here's a bit of Louis Leon's journal. He was there.

 

[Bruce Vail]

Thank you, Capt. Kennedy!

Well, the discrepancy is easily explained in that the authors of the regimental history state that they went into battle July 2 with "three hundred guns" and reported about the same number of casualties, while the NPS web site info is taken from Busey & Martin, which uses a higher estimate of 548 for the total size of the regiment at the onset of the fighting.

 

[Delhi Rangers]

I'm wondering whether there is a central depository of reliable regimental casualty data for the battle?

I'm interested in particular in the 3rd North Carolina State Troops (CSA), which was engaged at Culp's Hill July 2-3. . My 1901 regimental history says the casualty rate was about 75 percent while the current NPS site says 40 percent. I am trying to reconcile.

Here is a link to a great site that includes ANV-NC Casualties at Gettysburg.

http://www.26nc.org/History/NC-ANV-Study/FortheGoodoftheOldNorthState.pdf

 

[Rank and File]

Brigades of Gettysburg by Bradley Gottfried lists losses by Steuart's Brigade at 769 (149-385-235) - 36%.
Strength for the brigade was 2121

 

[rpkennedy]

Brigades of Gettysburg by Bradley Gottfried lists losses by Steuart's Brigade at 769 (149-385-235) - 36%.
Strength for the brigade was 2121

Those are the same numbers that Busey and Martin give.

R

 

[Tom Elmore]

I estimate the regiment took about 29 officers and 300 enlisted men into the battle. The regiment mustered only 77 muskets after the battle, and their officer losses were likely proportional. That works out to a loss of about 75 percent, which seems about right to me. The 1st Maryland Battalion, which fought right next to them, lost 47 percent, but they were nearly completely protected by breastworks for most of the nine hours of heavy fighting on July 2 and 3, while the 3rd North Carolina had no such cover.

If the 3rd North Carolina began the fight with over 500 "muskets" as indicated in Busey and Martin, their percentage loss would have been staggering, and in my opinion, rather unbelievable.

As a general rule of thumb, 10-15 percent of the enlisted men were detailed to duties that kept them off the firing line. That works out to roughly 40 men for the 3rd, meaning the regiment came to Gettysburg with about 29 officers and 340 enlisted men.

Captain Edward Hall Armstrong of Company G, 3rd North Carolina said the regiment went into action with 290 and lost 207 (71 percent). He says his company carried in 33 and lost 4 killed and 19 wounded (70 percent). Captain Armstrong's numbers are probably as close to the truth as one can get.

 

[novushomus]

Thank you, Capt. Kennedy!

Well, the discrepancy is easily explained in that the authors of the regimental history state that they went into battle July 2 with "three hundred guns" and reported about the same number of casualties, while the NPS web site info is taken from Busey & Martin, which uses a higher estimate of 548 for the total size of the regiment at the onset of the fighting.

I think that's the difference between "effective strength" (which Confederate officers often termed as "musket strength" or "bayonet strength"), versus present for duty strength (which is what Busey and Martin use). Essentially, Confederates used effective strength as a very raw number of just armed, equipped, enlisted men who shot a musket on the firing line (or worked a cannon) and removed from them officers, musicians, stretcher bearers, file closers, unarmed men, pickets, detached units and basically anyone who was not a trigger puller on the line of battle.

Present for duty includes of all the above, except usually making a distinct numeration of officers, and only excludes sick men, men under arrest, stragglers who failed to make the morning report, and deserters.

So it is entirely possible that the 3rd NCST went into battle with 548 present for duty, but only 300 "effectives" ("muskets"). And since bullets don't discriminate between an "effective" and a present, I find it is better to take casualty percentages out of known present for duty strengths when possible.

To make it even more complex, returns also include aggregate present, which is basically everyone who is drawing a ration (sick, detached, arrested) and aggregate present and absent include deserters.

 

[Bruce Vail]

I think that's the difference between "effective strength" (which Confederate officers often termed as "musket strength" or "bayonet strength"), versus present for duty strength (which is what Busey and Martin use). Essentially, Confederates used effective strength as a very raw number of just armed, equipped, enlisted men who shot a musket on the firing line (or worked a cannon) and removed from them officers, musicians, stretcher bearers, file closers, unarmed men, pickets, detached units and basically anyone who was not a trigger puller on the line of battle.

Present for duty includes of all the above, except usually making a distinct numeration of officers, and only excludes sick men, men under arrest, stragglers who failed to make the morning report, and deserters.

So it is entirely possible that the 3rd NCST went into battle with 548 present for duty, but only 300 "effectives" ("muskets"). And since bullets don't discriminate between an "effective" and a present, I find it is better to take casualty percentages out of known present for duty strengths when possible.

To make it even more complex, returns also include aggregate present, which is basically everyone who is drawing a ration (sick, detached, arrested) and aggregate present and absent include deserters.

This is getting pretty confusing....

 

[rpkennedy]

I think that's the difference between "effective strength" (which Confederate officers often termed as "musket strength" or "bayonet strength"), versus present for duty strength (which is what Busey and Martin use). Essentially, Confederates used effective strength as a very raw number of just armed, equipped, enlisted men who shot a musket on the firing line (or worked a cannon) and removed from them officers, musicians, stretcher bearers, file closers, unarmed men, pickets, detached units and basically anyone who was not a trigger puller on the line of battle.

Present for duty includes of all the above, except usually making a distinct numeration of officers, and only excludes sick men, men under arrest, stragglers who failed to make the morning report, and deserters.

So it is entirely possible that the 3rd NCST went into battle with 548 present for duty, but only 300 "effectives" ("muskets"). And since bullets don't discriminate between an "effective" and a present, I find it is better to take casualty percentages out of known present for duty strengths when possible.

To make it even more complex, returns also include aggregate present, which is basically everyone who is drawing a ration (sick, detached, arrested) and aggregate present and absent include deserters.

To be fair, when I looked at B & M's numbers, the larger number is an extrapolation since there are no records of how many were at Gettysburg. They took the August numbers, for which they had reports, and added back the casualties during the campaign. It's entirely possible that the 3rd only had some 300 men at Gettysburg, particularly if the extrapolation is flawed somehow.

And this is why trying to nail down numbers for the Confederate armies is frustrating.

R

 

[Tom Elmore]

The only point I would take issue with is the supposed present for duty (548 suggested) versus effectives (300) numbers. That would mean 248 non-combatants out of 548, or 45 percent. That percentage is just not credible. I have reliable data in eight instances, and the range varies from 8-16 percent, with the average being 12.5 percent. Using the latter percentage as a guide with 300 effectives yields 43 men as non-combatants (43 out of 343). Using Captain Armstrong's figure of 290 effectives would mean 41 non-combatants (41/331).

Even adding in the numbers of sick and those under arrest would contribute perhaps no more than 20 men to the total. Incidentally, that might explain Capt. Armstrong's count of 290, with 10 or so soldiers being left behind (mostly sick in the field hospital).

 

[rpkennedy]

The only point I would take issue with is the supposed present for duty (548 suggested) versus effectives (300) numbers. That would mean 248 non-combatants out of 548, or 45 percent. That percentage is just not credible. I have reliable data in eight instances, and the range varies from 8-16 percent, with the average being 12.5 percent. Using the latter percentage as a guide with 300 effectives yields 43 men as non-combatants (43 out of 343). Using Captain Armstrong's figure of 290 effectives would mean 41 non-combatants (41/331).

Even adding in the numbers of sick and those under arrest would contribute perhaps no more than 20 men to the total. Incidentally, that might explain Capt. Armstrong's count of 290, with 10 or so soldiers being left behind (mostly sick in the field hospital).

Another variable with the extrapolation when using the August reports is that guys who were injured or sick during the campaign may have returned after the battle, some reinforcements may have arrived, etc. Adding the casualties to their August strength may be counting a bunch of men who weren't at Gettysburg. It's certainly not an exact science, particularly since B & M had no reports for June to start with as a base number.

R

 

[novushomus]

To be fair, when I looked at B & M's numbers, the larger number is an extrapolation since there are no records of how many were at Gettysburg. They took the August numbers, for which they had reports, and added back the casualties during the campaign. It's entirely possible that the 3rd only had some 300 men at Gettysburg, particularly if the extrapolation is flawed somehow.

And this is why trying to nail down numbers for the Confederate armies is frustrating.

R

'
This seconded. I'm researching Confederate troop strengths of the District of Arkansas for the Battle of Helena and the Little Rock Campaign - and there are cases when reports seemingly contradict one another.

For example, in Price's report of the Battle of Helena he reports the strength of the two brigades under his command, present for duty. McRae's brigade he gives as 1,227 men present for duty, and Parsons's brigade is given as 1,868 present for duty for a total of 3,095 present for duty.

Parsons's brigade reported two days after the battle an effective present of 1,359 and an aggregate present of 1,576. Yet Parsons's brigade at Helena suffered was initially thought to be 764 casualties (but later revised down to 731 losses). So, if Parsons's brigade lost 735 out of 1,868 present for duty, there should only be around 1,133 present for duty. Yet the "effective" number is higher than the present for duty number should be. The only rational explanation in my mind is that some of the lightly wounded or sick men were returning to ''effective" status.