Question about infantry tactics

[Patrick H]

Maybe some of you infantry / historian folks out there can fill me in about this. As I've been reading battle accounts for the last couple of years, I repeated see instances of frontal assaults against well-defended positions. I also see numerous accounts of flanking maneuvers, but it seems they usually take the form of a massed frontal assault from a new position on either side of the enemy's position.

I'm curious about fire and maneuver tactics in a more modern sense. I realize this is technically what we've got any time we have a row of infantry firing while a second row is reloading and then advancing. But I'm not thinking so much about volley fire. Rather, I mean continuous, well-aimed, "keep their heads down" fire from prone or protected positions while a second force maneuvers against the enemy position. This tactic would work best with breech loaders, and would work ideally with repeating rifles. But some units were equipped with those weapons in the Civil War. So, my question is: Was this sort of tactic ever trained to infantry units in the CW and then employed on the field? Perhaps so, but I have not encountered it in my reading. Please fill me in.
Many thanks.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

It definitely happened throughout the war, especially on the skirmish lines; and whenever you hear fighting referred to as "Indian" or "frontier-style," that's pretty much what's happening.

The massed formations we commonly associate with the war were intended for their historical role, to concentrate firepower (in an era of single-shot weapons) and to attempt to overcome the defense through sheer mass and numbers.

Although I'm not an infantry expert, it is my understanding that people like Emory Upton were beginning to evolve a more 'modern' style of infantry tactics toward the end of the war.

 

[John Winn]

Thanks for asking that Patrick. I wonder the same thing.

In my first post I asked a similar question and got some really good answers. I'll be lurking to see what the people who know these things tell us.

 

[John Davison]

I'm just guessing here but I think the "move and shoot" method of attack was probably practiced to some degree but, as Mark says, the single shot weapons were not really capable of sustaining much fire power. During my service in the army that tactic was used with 4 to 5 man teams, an Alpha and a Bravo. Armed with the 8 shot M-1 Rifle and a 20 round magazine in a BAR, a pretty good base of fire could be laid down by the Alpha Team while the Bravo Team "moved out" on voice command toward the objective. Then it would be Bravo's turn to lay down the lead while Alpha moved forward. A zig zag maneuver until the objective was reached. The civil war soldier was limited both by firepower and the inability to communicate the move and shoot commands much beyond a five man team.

 

[NFB22]

Good question, if I'm understanding correctly you're identifying what the modern military calls "bounding" which is one of the most basic infantry tactics taught to soldiers and Marines in the U.S. military today. It's taught to small units such as fire-teams of 4 men and then evolves onto a larger scale as we get larger in size (squads, platoons, companies, etc). On fire-team level 2 men will move forward while the other 2 lay down cover from a good protected position, once the 2 men rushing find a good position they move to the prone or crouched position and lay down cover for the other 2 to advance and unit will repeat the tactic until reaching their objective.

I have not read of a "major" attack like this but you can find evidence of it in urban areas such as when Union troops cleared the town of Fredricksburg on the first day of the battle in December of 62. Union troops would clear an area while more troops advanced to clear the next section of town and then the previous unit would "leapfrog" that unit. I suppose you could say the same thing sort of happened at Gettysburg when the two forces fought in the town itself on July 1.

The tactic is certainly more evident in rearguard actions where the retreating force sort of bounds backwards, each covering the other unit as they would withdraw from the field.

If anyone knows of any pitched battle where a large force uses this kind of movement in the field to attack I would love to hear about it and know how it was employed, love learning about tactics...I suppose that is why I chose to go infantry in the Marines

Good question Patrick H

 

[Patrick H]

Yes, "bounding" is exactly what I'm talking about. I don't know the practical size for two rifle teams using this technique, but alternating teams providing suppressive fire and maneuvering, each team covering the other in turn, that's exactly what I was wondering about.

 

[Pat Answer]

I usually run to two reference works when good questions like this come up: The Bloody Crucible of Courage (Brent Nosworthy, pp. 258-278) and Battle Tactics of the Civil War (Paddy Griffith, pp. 150-158)
The latter has a diagram on p. 156 illustrating an "'Indian Rush' by Alternate Bounds". What appears to be two company-sized units are attacking: the one on the left fires and the one on the right surges forward. Then the one on the left surges forward to the point where the one on the right has stopped to fire. And so on.
Griffith finds little evidence that this method was used as a large-scale attack plan. He does cite the 13th MA clearing Barksdale out of Fredericksburg (Dec 11) [which NFB22 mentions above], noting that the regiment "advanced, drove off the enemy skirmishers by fire and then used all its ammunition against the enemy's main line - but did not assault." (p. 155) He finds many other examples, usually less formal than this one, of skirmish 'fire and advance' but not true modern 'bounding' to suppress and overcome an objective.

Which is essentially what Mark Jenkins, John Davison, and NFB22 said...

 

[Patrick H]

Thanks. Yes, that's it exactly. That's what I was asking about. Nice to know it was used, at least a bit. Too bad it wasn't used more often. And I've found lots of references to Indian and Frontier-style fighting (usually with smaller units) and now I know that's more or less what they were talking about, too.

 

[phil1861]

The advent of fire and manouver would not occur until multi-round weapons became more wide spread.

Other than skirmisher activity where a soldier could fire from any position, the purpose of skirmisher activity was to develop/delay the enemy or drive in his skirmishers but not as the main assault. Rear guard actions might take the form of holding with some units while advancing with others, but the formations would be controlled advances of companies or even regiments and vice versa when retreating.

Frontal assaults or finding the flanks and vulnerabilities in the line was the only way to wrest control of a field when we're talking about tens of thousands of double lined formations (with supports in the rear in positions of en echelon by battalions) the process of taking a hill, a road, or a defensive work entailed assault en main until the line broke or you bruised your brigade too poorly to sustain further punishment.

Until the Overland Campaign, the armies had been accostomed to mostly open field fighting or using fence lines or natural barriers for defense; the actions during the last campaigns saw both sides constructing field works and throwing their massed formations against ever more sophisticated constructions for defense.

 

[John Davison]

The advent of fire and manouver would not occur until multi-round weapons became more wide spread.

Other than skirmisher activity where a soldier could fire from any position, the purpose of skirmisher activity was to develop/delay the enemy or drive in his skirmishers but not as the main assault. Rear guard actions might take the form of holding with some units while advancing with others, but the formations would be controlled advances of companies or even regiments and vice versa when retreating.

Frontal assaults or finding the flanks and vulnerabilities in the line was the only way to wrest control of a field when we're talking about tens of thousands of double lined formations (with supports in the rear in positions of en echelon by battalions) the process of taking a hill, a road, or a defensive work entailed assault en main until the line broke or you bruised your brigade too poorly to sustain further punishment.

Until the Overland Campaign, the armies had been accostomed to mostly open field fighting or using fence lines or natural barriers for defense; the actions during the last campaigns saw both sides constructing field works and throwing their massed formations against ever more sophisticated constructions for defense.

And then the trench warfare of WW1 that had the fortifications which they left every now and then to go back to the old "attack in mass" only to be mowed down in droves by a single machine gun that could pour out more firepower than a couple of companies of Johnny Rebs or Billy Yanks.

 

[Albert Sailhorst]

In my Artillery reenacting unit, if we take 2 guns to a battle, we practice firing "in echelon"....Probably not practical for a combat situation with cannons, but it is interesting to hone our battlefield skills with this type of excersize....

 

[NFB22]

In my Artillery reenacting unit, if we take 2 guns to a battle, we practice firing "in echelon"....Probably not practical for a combat situation with cannons, but it is interesting to hone our battlefield skills with this type of excersize....

If you're firing from a flank its very practical. Now if your battery is deployed in the center of the line...

 

[thomas aagaard]

One question is: What do the books say?
2nd.: What did they actually do?

If you read the introduction to Casey it state that the permanently detachment of two companies is removed.
The two flank companies was planed to deployed as skirmishers as a standard. (so 20% should be skirmishers) but this was removed... by this line and marking the specific § with a 0.

You can sometimes read the idea that the civil war was fought with Napoleonic tactics. And that is in my view not correct.
The English or French would use large numbers of skirmishers and/or artillery to weaken and disorder the enemy line, then go true it with a ordered and steady charge.
And with the use of rifled weapons skirmishers only becomes more effective.
The main "work" is done by the skirmishers and artillery.

So the "book" wants 20% skirmishers as a standard.
But when you need to make an army out of nothing with no cadre of trained reserve officers and NCOs you need to cut corners. And learning to fight in two closed ranks is so much simpler than learning to fight as skirmishers.

So In my view infantry tactics degenerated from the level it had before the war to something more similar to 18th century warfare, where two lines just pound each other with limited use of combined arms. (the battlefields also help make it harder, compared to how western Europe is)
So the basic tactics in the early war was to march into range, then start a firefight and hope for the best.

Then during the civil war some officers started to try out different solutions to open the formations up and make them less vulnerable, like basically fighting with a heavy skirmish line and just using the rest of the regiment as a reserve.


Another point is how the regiment was the basic tactical block. Where at the same time some European armies used the company. (we are here talking 4 companies to a battalion, so 200-250 men companies... still smaller than the typical cw regiment)

Makes the use of cover much easier and exploiting flanking options or openings in the enemy line.

Suggest you read this:
http://johnsmilitaryhistory.com/cwarmy.html

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

I think the 'Napoleonic tactics' item partly results from confusion as to what is 'tactics,' what is 'strategy,' and what is now called 'operational art.' The military theory and strategy of the day was unquestionably derived from writers using the Napoleonic wars as a major model (principally Jomini), and what we'd call 'operational art,' Jomini called 'grand tactics.' (in English translation, anyway)

Again, not an expert in the infantry tactics field, but I would expect to see significant differences between Hardee's tactical manual and what was used in the French army in 1805-1815.

 

[NFB22]

If you're interested in the Napoleonic war-style tactics in order to compare them to ACW tactics I would recommend David Chandler's Waterloo: The Hundred Days. Chandler is a leading expert in the field and does a great job describing the tactics in his book and how they played a role during the Battle of Waterloo in 1815

 

[phil1861]

In my Artillery reenacting unit, if we take 2 guns to a battle, we practice firing "in echelon"....Probably not practical for a combat situation with cannons, but it is interesting to hone our battlefield skills with this type of excersize....

Cool; in my recent research into Stone's River I ran across a nice report from a battery supporting Wood's Brigade in their retreat and movement by prolong. It was interesting to read the commander's account of the action and the necessity of the maneuver.

 

[phil1861]

ACW use of skirmishers was two fold: operational security (pickets) when halted and to develop the enemy when moving.

Skirmishers had a limited role, force the enemy to deploy if defending and feel out the enemy when advancing. The flanking companies of a regiment would be deployed when in regimental front (when falling back on the main body they would easily fall into their places on the flanks) but would always fall back on the main body before engaging an opposing line.

If you look at battlefield movements in the early years, instead of one solid mass of brigades moving forward in tandem you had divisions deployed and brigades used at times piecemeal or in echelon as a flank is being sought after; hold with your main body and seek the flank with a second. Unless it was a meeting engagement where each side was constantly seeking an open flank the opposing commanders were constantly deploying their brigades in an attempt to hold and seek an opening or cause an opening.

 

[Pat Answer]

If you're interested in the Napoleonic war-style tactics in order to compare them to ACW tactics I would recommend David Chandler's Waterloo: The Hundred Days. Chandler is a leading expert in the field and does a great job describing the tactics in his book and how they played a role during the Battle of Waterloo in 1815

This reference has also aged well:
Firepower: Weapons Effectiveness on the Battlefield, 1630-1850 Maj-Gen Basil P Hughes, 1975

Again, not an expert in the infantry tactics field, but I would expect to see significant differences between Hardee's tactical manual and what was used in the French army in 1805-1815.

Considering that Hardee's manual was based on the French update of their 1791 edition, I'd say you were right!
The main thing of course being the attempt to deal with the increased range of the rifled musket by accelerating the pace of the attack (the famous "double-quick" among other expedients).

Suggest you read this:
http://johnsmilitaryhistory.com/cwarmy.html

Good article. Dang, it's hard to remember and acknowledge that, as tough as they quickly became, ACW armies weren't exactly at the tactical cutting edge of the 1860s...

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

Good article. Dang, it's hard to remember and acknowledge that, as tough as they quickly became, ACW armies weren't exactly at the tactical cutting edge of the 1860s...

No real reason they should've been, IMHO. Soldiers weren't traversing the battlefield any quicker than they did in Roman times; it's just that the "reach" of the weapons was longer and artillery was a significant factor. The updates in the CW era were more in the strategic and operational areas (railways, telegraph, steamships)... increased battlefield mobility wouldn't come till motorization.

 

[Albert Sailhorst]

Cool; in my recent research into Stone's River I ran across a nice report from a battery supporting Wood's Brigade in their retreat and movement by prolong. It was interesting to read the commander's account of the action and the necessity of the maneuver.

Which Battery was that??.....We portray Scott's Battery.....they were at Stone's River, though I am not sure where....